

MESSAGE FORM  
OUTGOING

FILE REF.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: .....

Message To Be Sent	No. ....	Date	For Communications Office Use Only
EN CLAIR CODE CYPHER			
Degree of Priority			
ORIGINATOR			
Sig. ....			
Typed: .....			
Div. ....			
Local Tel. ....			
APPROVED BY			
Sig. ....			
Typed: .....			
Is This Message Likely To Be Published			
Yes ( ) No ( )			
Internal Distribution:			
Done .....			
Date .....			
Copies Referred To:			
Done .....			
Date .....			

- 3 -

United Nations may be assuming a moral obligation to prevent either side from seeking a solution by force before then.

(b) The solution sets the Formosan problem against background of "the maintenance of international peace and order in the area". This goes beyond "neutralization" undertaken by President Truman and might open way for proposal that Formosa should be detached from China or permanently neutralized. It is by no means clear that political and military commitments which would arise would be offset by corresponding strategic compensations.

Summary ends.

The text of the memorandum is being sent you by bag. A later draft ~~copy~~ of the United Kingdom resolution which is substantially the same as that which you have should reach you early next week under our <sup>form</sup> despatch Y.727 of November 6. It contains the words quoted in paragraph 4 (b) of the summary.

1020 NOV 12 1950

**SECRET**

OK  
JDM

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OTTAWA

November 15 1950

No. Y-3416

50056-A-40  
27 | 18

Sir,

I enclose the document (2) listed below.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

**The High Commissioner  
for Canada,  
LONDON,  
England.**

**A.D.P. HEENEY**

**for** Secretary of State for External Affairs.

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT	SUBJECT
<p>Teletype No. 380, dated November 13, 1950, from the Chairman, Canadian Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly.</p>	<p>Formosa.</p>

File copy

Am.&F.E./E. Wilgress/MCC

Ext. 140

*W. J. M.*  
**SECRET**

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OTTAWA

.....November 15..... 19 50.....

No. *y-1010*

50056-A-90  
27 | 18

Sir,

I enclose the document (x) listed below.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

The Head of the  
Canadian Liaison Mission,  
TOKYO,  
Japan.

A.D.P. HEENEY

for Secretary of State for External Affairs.

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT	SUBJECT
Teletype No. 380, dated November 13, 1950, from the Chairman, Canadian Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly.	Formosa.

File copy

Am.&F.E./J.J.McCardle/MCC

Ext. 140

OK  
SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OTTAWA

No. Y-488

November 15 19 50

50056-A-40
27   18

Sir,

I enclose the document (s) listed below.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

A.D.P. HEENEY

The High Commissioner  
for Canada,  
CANBERRA,  
Australia.

for Secretary of State for External Affairs.

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT	SUBJECT
Teletypes Nos. 379 and 380, dated November 13, 1950, from the Chairman, Canadian Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly.	Formosa.

File copy

Am.&F.E./J.J.McCardle/MCC

Ext. 140

*Handwritten initials*

**SECRET**

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OTTAWA

..... November 15 ..... 19. 50

No. Y-136.....

50056-A-40  
27 | 27

Sir,

I enclose the document (s) listed below.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

**The Chairman, Canadian Delegation  
to United Nations General Assembly,**

**NEW YORK.**

A.D.P. HEENEY

**for the**

*Secretary of State for External Affairs.*

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT	SUBJECT
<p>Telegram No. <u>150</u> of November 15, 1950 to the High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi, India.</p>	<p>Formosa.</p>

- AAA 1 -

C H I N A

Nov. 15, 1950

*See file*

50056-A. 10
32   33

CHOU CABLE TO U.N. INDORSED BY PRESS

Peking, NCNA, in English Morse to North America, Nov. 14, 1950, 1736  
GMT--R

(Text)

"Shanghai, Nov. 14--Shanghai papers fully support Foreign Minister Chou En-lai's Nov. 11 telegram to Trygve Lie, which says that the Security Council must discuss the American aggression on Taiwan and American armed intervention in Korea at the same time.

"In a commentary the SIN WEN JIH PAO says that MacArthur and Warren Austin are blaming others for their own crimes by slandering against the just action of Chinese volunteers in Korea. It states: 'The ultimatum of our voluntary action in assisting Korea is the peaceful settlement of the Korean question and the safeguarding of the integrity and security of our country.'

"The TA KUNG PAO says that the resolution of the United Nations on Korea of June 26 is illegal because it was adopted without the participation of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. 'Austin is now employing the same trick to make the Security Council dubb the words "intervention" and "aggression" on China.'

"When this is done, states the TA KUNG PAO, the United States will have a pretext to extend the war to China in the name of the United Nations, just as she had done in invading Korea.

"The WEN WEI PAO stresses that American aggression on Taiwan and intervention in Korea must be discussed together. 'If the United States acts arbitrarily, she must be answerable for all unfortunate consequences,' it says."

Northeast, Inner Mongolia

Peking, NCNA, in English Morse to North America, Nov. 14, 1950, 1400  
GMT--R

(Text)

"Peking, Nov. 14--Northeast China, bordering on Korea, is solidly in support of Foreign Minister Chou En-lai's Nov. 11 cable to Trygve Lie and the statement of the Foreign Office spokesman of the same day.

Nov. 15, 1950

"People's organizations of Liaotung Province, which has been raided time and again by U.S. planes, published a joint declaration stating: 'We, people of Liaotung Province, have ourselves seen enough to make us realize clearly what lies behind U.S. aggression in Korea. The aim is not only to swallow up Korea, but to extend aggressive war to China.'

"In Heilungkiang Province, the Trade Union Council, New Democratic Youth League, Democratic Women's Federation, Students Union, and other popular organizations in a joint statement said that they could not sit by idly while their close neighbors were being slaughtered by American butchers. 'We will never tolerate the intrusion of American imperialists into our territory, our air and sea, killing of our people, and destruction of our property,' the statement continued. 'The action of infuriated Chinese people in volunteering to help the Koreans in throwing out the American aggressors and defending their homes is completely just and praiseworthy and is a defense against aggression in China.'

"People's organizations in Shansi Province, too, warned the imperialists that they cannot cow the Chinese people. They pledged themselves to defend China by helping the Korean people.

"The Inner Mongolian people, too, living in the area next to Northeast China, are similarly expressing their enthusiastic support for the historic statements issued on Nov. 11. A big representative gathering of delegates from various Inner Mongolian people's organizations unanimously endorsed the statements at a conference on Nov. 13.

"Passionate speeches were made denouncing American imperialists' atrocities in Korea and their attacks on Northeast China, and the conference solemnly pledged that Inner Mongolia would play a full part in resisting the U.S. aggressors, helping the Koreans and safeguarding their Motherland."

#### UNION SUPPORTS U.S. TELEPHONE STRIKE

Peking, NCNA, in English Morse to North America, Nov. 14, 1950, 1543  
GMT--R

(Text)

"Peking, Nov. 14--The following message has been sent to the American telecommunication workers by workers in the same field in China:

"On behalf of all Chinese postal and telecommunication workers, the National Committee of the Chinese Union of Postal and Telegraph Workers wishes to express its sympathy toward the American telecommunication workers who are engaged in a resolute nation-wide strike for the betterment of their living conditions, in spite of the obstruction put up by the head of the union who betrays the workers' interests.

FROM: THE CHAIRMAN, CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NEW YORK  
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

IMPORTANT

CYPHER - AUTO

NO. 394

SECRET

NEW YORK, November 14, 1950.

To be  
Karl...  
for the...  
7/11/50  
WDS  
PH

Refer: USSEA  
In Recd  
Ref: Mission  
HN Div.  
Secy to Cabinet  
Secy C.O.S.  
D.S.  
London  
New Delhi  
Tokyo  
Copenhagen  
Kuala Lumpur  
Wellington  
Manila

50056-A-40  
27 27

J.J. McCARDLE

Secret. Addressed External No. 394, repeated Beaver

No. 51. Following from Riddell, Begins:

Formosa.

Revised memorandum on Formosa has now been shown to United Kingdom, Australian, New Zealand and Indian delegations. As you suggested, I informed Indian delegation that copy of memorandum was being given to their Department of External Affairs by our Embassy. Indians inform me that, although they had originally been favourably impressed with the draft resolution, they did not now think they would be able to support it. Berendson, after brief examination of the memorandum, said that he did not see what else we could do except support proposals for a Commission on Formosa and that he would like to know what conclusions we drew as a result of expression of misgivings contained in our memorandum. United Kingdom delegation asked whether we had given a copy of our memorandum to Americans, and said they considered it was our responsibility to express these misgivings to the United States delegation. I said that we had not given United States delegation a copy of the memorandum nor were we at present discussing the question with them. I said, however, that the Minister had given Mr. Acheson personally some idea of our misgivings when he visited Washington recently.

2. United Kingdom delegation has not yet received firm instructions either to sponsor the draft resolution or to support it. They are not therefore certain whether they will be in a position to put it in when the debate on Formosa opens and neither are they certain whether draft resolution has been finally approved by United States Government, although they are inclined to think

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	

NOV 15 1950



that United States Government approves the resolution in its present form. United States delegation here, at the official level, is considering for membership on the Formosan Commission the following States: United Kingdom, United States, India or Burma, Thailand, Philippines and Australia. In the light of comment made today by Indian delegation, I would not, however, expect India to accept the nomination. Ends.

CHAIRMAN

CLEARED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1957 NOV 15 AM 10:47

SECRET *DM*

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OTTAWA

..... November 14 ..... 19..... 50

No. *Y-3562*

*50056-A-40*  
*27 | 27*

Sir,

I enclose the document (s) listed below.

The Canadian Ambassador,  
Washington,  
D.C.

*✓ 3562*  
*also on*  
*Korea file*

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

A.D.P. HEENEY

for the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT	SUBJECT
<p>Copy of telegram No. 273 to The Chairman, Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, New York, dated November 13.</p> <p>Copy of telegram No. 274 to The Chairman, Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, New York, dated November 13.</p>	<p>Formosa.</p> <p>Korea.</p>

Ext. 176

CANADIAN EMBASSY

Washington, D.C.

November 14, 1950.

No. 2911

To the Secretary of State for External Affairs,  
Ottawa.

50056-A - 40	
27	27

I transmit herewith 5 copies of the document(s) listed below.

Refer to: Mr. Reid Done-mce  
 (Copies of enclosure) U.N. Div. Nov. 22/50  
 Dep. Liaison Div. G. H. W.  
 R.R. G. H. W.

*[Signature]*  
 (For the Ambassador)

DOCUMENTS AND DATE	SUBJECT											
<p>Department of State Press Release            No. 1140, November 9, 1950.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Encs 5c      Y</p>	<p>Chinese Communist Delegation to            Security Council</p> <div style="text-align: center;"> <table border="1"> <tr><td>Y</td></tr> <tr><td>1</td></tr> <tr><td>2 REC</td></tr> <tr><td>3</td></tr> <tr><td>4</td></tr> <tr><td>5</td></tr> <tr><td>6</td></tr> <tr><td>7</td></tr> <tr><td>8</td></tr> <tr><td>9</td></tr> <tr><td>10</td></tr> </table> <p>NOV 18 1950</p> </div>	Y	1	2 REC	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Y												
1												
2 REC												
3												
4												
5												
6												
7												
8												
9												
10												

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

NOVEMBER 9, 1950  
No. 1140

On September 29, 1950 the Security Council of the United Nations passed a resolution inviting the Chinese Communist regime to be represented during the discussion by the Security Council of that Government's declaration regarding an armed invasion of the Island of Taiwan (Formosa). When the Secretary General of the United Nations was notified by the Communist regime of the appointment of its representative and eight member staff, he requested the Government of the United States to make the necessary arrangements for the entry of these persons to the Headquarters District.

Although the United States does not recognize the Chinese Communist regime and while it voted against the Security Council resolution inviting the Chinese Communists to the Headquarters of the United Nations, it is incumbent on this Government to make it possible for the resolution to take effect. These persons are invitees of the United Nations. The Headquarters Agreement, entered into between this Government and the United Nations when that Organization agreed to locate its headquarters here, specifically provides, in part, that, "The federal, state, or local authorities of the United States shall not impose any impediments to transit to or from the headquarters district of ... persons invited to the headquarters district by the United Nations ..."

Since these persons would otherwise be inadmissible under our immigration laws, they are being granted transit to the Headquarters District under the discretionary authority of the Attorney General of the United States contained in the ninth proviso to Section 3 of the Immigration Act of February 15, 1917, as amended. The Department of State has advised the American Embassy in Prague, Czechoslovakia, to issue appropriate visas upon application by the Chinese Communist representative and his staff.

The names of the Chinese Communists who are coming to Lake Success for discussion of the Formosa question at the invitation of the Security Council, according to information received from the Secretary General, follow below. The American Embassy in Prague has been advised to issue the appropriate visas for their transit to the United Nations for this purpose.

Representative

Wu Hsiu-chuan

Adviser

Chiao Kuan-Jua

Staff Members

Kung Poo-sung  
An Tung  
Chen Chiao  
Pu Shan  
Chou Yen  
Sun Piap  
Wang Nai-ching

\* \* \*

50054-A-40  
27 27  
file [signature]

U.S. DRAFT FOR RESOLUTION ON THE PROBLEM OF FORMOSA

Noting that the signatories to the Cairo Declaration declared it to be one of their purposes that certain of the territories formerly held by Japan, including Formosa and the Pescadores, should be restored to the Republic of China, and that no formal act restoring sovereignty to China has yet occurred;

Recognizing that two parties at present claim the right to administer Formosa, that there have been threats of an armed attack on Formosa from the Chinese mainland and that Formosa has been used as a base for attacks on the Chinese mainland, that attempts to settle the dispute by force would heighten international tension and be prejudicial to the maintenance of international peace and order in the area as well as prejudicial to the interests of the people of Formosa; and further

Recognizing that the foregoing considerations raise questions as to the obligations and responsibilities of Members under the Charter;

Decides to establish a commission composed of the representatives of the following states (5-7) which, bearing in mind the considerations set forth in the preceding paragraphs should study the problem and submit a report to the General Assembly containing recommendations for the future of Formosa and the Pescadores. The commission should consult all governments, authorities and parties concerned;

Recommends that, pending the study by the commission and adoption by the General Assembly of recommendations concerning this problem there be no attempt to change the status of Formosa by force and that there be neither (a) armed attack on Formosa from the Chinese mainland, or (b) attack on the Chinese mainland from Formosa;

Requests all governments and authorities concerned to act in conformity with the recommendation in the preceding paragraph and render every possible assistance to the commission in the performance of its tasks.

FROM: THE CHAIRMAN, CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NEW YORK

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER - AUTO

NO. 380

SECRET

NEW YORK, November 13, 1950.

50056-A-140  
27 | 27

*ASSEA*  
*Marked*  
*Very Cabinet*  
*Tokyo ✓*  
*London ✓*  
*Caracas ✓*  
*Done*  
*Nov 13*  
*BHN*  
*7/13/50*  
*✓ SIS*  
*✓ NHQ*  
*✓ Dept. of State*  
*✓ Reg. Div.*  
*✓*

*To see*  
*Mr. Coakley*  
*Mr. Williams*  
*Mr. [unclear]*

Secret. Addressed External No. 380, repeated Beaver No. 49. My teletype No. 379. Formosa.

Following is text of memorandum concerning proposed draft resolution on Formosa:

Secret

Observations concerning proposed draft resolution on Formosa

Both Chinese factions are firmly opposed to any proposal that will question their unshakable conviction that Formosa is and shall remain a part of the Chinese State. Some Asian opinion, which reacted strongly to President Truman's statement of June 27th "neutralizing" Formosa, may equally be suspicious of any proposal that might appear to them to give United Nations approval for maintaining Formosa as a part of the United States military defence arc in the Western Pacific. It might also be considered by people in Asia that any proposal that the United Nations should assume jurisdiction concerning the future disposition of Formosa as an undesirable interference in the internal affairs of China. Some powers may well be doubtful of the wisdom of the United Nations assuming any responsibility for Formosa extending beyond the duration of President Truman's "neutralization", which he said in a conference on August 31st would be terminated at the end of the Korean campaign. Some might also question what they would consider a repudiation of the Cairo declaration. Any solution which appeared to ignore China's title to Formosa would never be acceptable to the Chinese people and Formosa would remain the object of irredentist ambitions and be a constant source of friction between China and the West. Formosa could only be withheld

Y	
1	
2	<i>gm.</i>
3	
4	
5	<i>offile</i>
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	

NOV 14 1950

from Chinese Communist control so long as substantial forces were available for its defence. This would mean a heavy military commitment of indefinite duration, the strategic desirability of which has not been clearly demonstrated. An impartial plebiscite in Formosa would be extremely difficult to arrange as long as Chiang Kai-Shek and his forces remain in control there, and it is doubtful if any but the Chinese Communists wish to assume responsibility for removing them or restraining their control in Formosa. If the proposed United Nations Commission recommends that Formosa should be united with the Chinese mainland, even if the transfer is deferred for a period, the problem of disposing of Chiang Kai-Shek and his army would become acute.

2. The revised United Kingdom draft resolution does not indicate when the Commission is to report to the General Assembly. It could hardly report to this session. If the Commission's report is not made until the next session, the United Nations may be assuming a moral obligation to prevent either side from seeking a solution by force before then. This is an obligation that would extend beyond that undertaken by President Truman in June when, according to the report of his press conference on August 31st, he said; "Of course, it will not be necessary to keep the seventh fleet in the Formosa Straits if the Korean thing is settled. That is a flank protection on our part for the United Nations forces."

3. The revised United Kingdom resolution sets the Formosan problem against the background of "the maintenance of international peace and order in the area", going beyond the implication of President Truman's statements of June 27th and July 19th that the "neutralizing" of Formosa was related to the Korean operations. This leaves the way open for proposals that Formosa should be detached from China or permanently neutralized, and the attitude adopted by some delegations, particularly Latin American delegations during the discussions on China in 1949, suggest that some such radical proposal might well be put forward.



It is by no means clear that the political complications and the heavy military commitment that would arise immediately an effort were made to restrict Chinese control over Formosa ✓ or remove the Island from effective Chinese authority would be offset by corresponding strategic compensations.

CHAIRMAN

Original and File Copy.

FROM: THE CHAIRMAN, CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NEW YORK

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER - AUTO

NO. 379

SECRET

NEW YORK, November 13, 1950.

50056-A-10

27 | 27

Refer:  
USSEA  
Am Recd.  
Secy to Cabinet  
WIS  
✓ 10/24/50  
LW 11/10/50  
Kambama Nov 15/50  
MDS  
J. W. McCAFFREY

To be Am Recd.  
Am Recd.  
MDS  
✓ 10/24/50

Secret. Addressed External No. 379, repeated Beaver

No. 48. Following from Riddell, Begins:

Formosa.

On Saturday I mentioned our tentative views on Formosa to Coulson of United Kingdom delegation and Shann of Australian delegation. I did not, however, give them proposed memorandum which was then being revised. I have since completed revision of memorandum, text of which as revised is given in my immediately following teletype, and have handed copies to Shann and Coulson. I also spoke to Lacoste of the French delegation but since I am not sure that United Kingdom have shown their draft resolution to the French, I have not given Lacoste a copy of the memorandum.

2. Australians telegraphed their Government on Saturday reporting our views and they have this morning received instructions suspending their previous instructions on Formosa pending a review of the circumstances by the Prime Minister. Ends.

CHAIRMAN

Y
1
2
3
4
5
6

NOV 14 1950

ORIGINAL AND FILE COPY

FROM: THE CHAIRMAN, CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NEW YORK  
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

IMPORTANT

SECRET

CYPHER - AUTO

NO. 374

NEW YORK, November 13, 1950.

*McCollum  
file*

50056-A	40
27	27

Secret. Addressed External Ottawa No. 374, repeated Beaver Washington No. 46.

Formosa

The United Kingdom delegation have informed us that the draft resolution as contained in our telegram No. 300 of November 3rd has now been approved on next to the very highest level in Washington with the following minor changes:

Y
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

NOV 13 1950

Paragraph 1: "should be restored to the Republic of China"  
now reads: "should be restored to Chinese sovereignty over that territory".

Paragraph 2: "peace and order" now reads "peace and security".

Paragraph 5(b): "attack" now reads "armed attack"

This information was given to us in enigmatic terms over the telephone without the text at hand. There may be some errors in our interpretation of the revised version of paragraph one, which looks most peculiar.

CHAIRMAN

For P.M.'s use London-1950

SECRET

52056A-10	
33	33

November 13, 1950.

MEMORANDUM

Canadian Observations Concerning Proposed Draft Resolution  
On Formosa

Both Chinese factions are firmly opposed to any proposal that will question their unshakable conviction that Formosa is and shall remain a part of the Chinese State. Some Asian opinion, which reacted strongly to President Truman's statement of June 27th "neutralizing" Formosa, may equally be suspicious of any proposal that might appear to them to give United Nations approval for maintaining Formosa as a part of the United States military defence area in the Western Pacific. It might also be considered by people in Asia that any proposal that the United Nations should assume jurisdiction concerning the future disposition of Formosa as an undesirable interference in the internal affairs of China. Some powers may well be doubtful of the wisdom of the United Nations assuming any responsibility for Formosa extending beyond the duration of President Truman's "neutralization", which he said in a conference on August 31st would be terminated at the end of the Korean campaign. Some might also question what they would consider a repudiation of the Cairo declaration. Any solution which appeared to ignore China's title to Formosa would never be acceptable to the Chinese people and Formosa would remain the object of irredentist ambitions and be a constant source of friction between China and the West. Formosa could only be withheld from Chinese Communist control so long as substantial forces were available for its defence. This would mean a heavy military commitment of indefinite duration, the strategic desirability of which has not been clearly demonstrated. An impartial plebiscite in Formosa would be extremely

difficult to arrange as long as Chiang Kai-Shek and his forces remain in control there, and it is doubtful if any but the Chinese Communists wish to assume responsibility for removing them or restraining their control in Formosa. If the proposed United Nations Commission recommends that Formosa should be united with the Chinese mainland, even if the transfer is deferred for a period, the problem of disposing of Chiang Kai-Shek and his army would become acute.

2. The revised United Kingdom draft resolution does not indicate when the Commission is to report to the General Assembly. It could hardly report to this session. If the Commission's report is not made until the next session, the United Nations may be assuming a moral obligation to prevent either side from seeking a solution by force before then. This is an obligation that would extend beyond that undertaken by President Truman in June when, according to the report of his press conference on August 31st, he said; "Of course, it will not be necessary to keep the seventh fleet in the Formosa Straits if the Korean thing is settled. That is a flank protection on our part for the United Nations forces."

3. The revised United Kingdom resolution sets the Formosan problem against the background of "the maintenance of international peace and order in the area", going beyond the implication of President Truman's statements of June 27th and July 19th that the "neutralizing" of Formosa was related to the Korean operations. This leaves the way open for proposals that Formosa should be detached from China or permanently neutralized, and the attitude adopted by some delegations, particularly Latin American delegations during the discussions on China in 1949, suggest that some such radical proposal might well be put forward. It is by no means clear that the political complications and the heavy

military commitment that would arise immediately an effort were made to restrict Chinese control over Formosa or remove the Island from effective Chinese authority would be offset by corresponding strategic compensations.

CHAIRMAN

Note: This memorandum was shown to United Kingdom, Australian, New Zealand, and Indian Delegations in New York, and to State Department in Washington (November 13, 14, 1950).

ORIGINAL AND FILE COPY

FROM: THE CHAIRMAN, CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NEW YORK  
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

50056-A-10
SECRET

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER - AUTO

NO. 361

NEW YORK, November 10, 1950.

*Refer to U.S. I.E.A. Don AMCC  
Nov 10/50  
D.C. Collins*

Secret. Addressed External Ottawa No. 361, repeated Beaver Washington No. 45. Following for Reid from Holmes, Begins:

Your teletype No. 251 of November 9th, Formosa. Following is the text of my memorandum requested in paragraph 4 of your telegram. I am sending this text to Washington and I presume that you will repeat to them your telegram No. 251 and convey the necessary instructions, text begins:

Observations concerning proposed draft resolution on Formosa

Both Chinese factions are dead set against any proposal that will question their unshakable determination that Formosa is and shall remain a part of the Chinese State. Asian opinion which reacted strongly to President Truman's statement of June 27th "neutralizing" Formosa will be suspicious of any proposal that would appear to give United Nations approval for maintaining Formosa as a part of the United States military defence arc in the Western Pacific. It would also consider any proposal that the United Nations should assume jurisdiction concerning the future disposition of Formosa as an undesirable interference in the internal affairs of China. Other Powers will be doubtful of the wisdom of the United Nations assuming any responsibility regarding Formosa extending beyond the duration of President Truman's "neutralization" which he said in a conference on August 31st would be terminated at the end of the Korean campaign. Many would question the principle of repudiating the Cairo declaration. Any solution which appeared to ignore China's title to Formosa would never be acceptable to the Chinese people and Formosa would remain the object of

irredentist ambitions and be a constant source of friction between China and the West. Formosa could only be withheld from Chinese Communist control so long as substantial forces were available for its defence. This would mean a heavy commitment of indefinite duration and of questionable strategic desirability. An impartial plebiscite in Formosa would be impossible as long as Chiang Kai-Shek and his forces remain in control there, and it is doubtful if any but the Chinese Communists wish to assume responsibility for removing them from control in Formosa. If the United Nations should decide to award Formosa to the Chinese Communists but defer the hand-over for a period, they would again be faced with the problem of taking care of Chiang Kai-Shek and his army.

2. The revised United Kingdom draft resolution does not say how soon the Commission is to report to the General Assembly. It could hardly report to this session. If the Commission's report is not made until the next session, the United Nations may be assuming a moral obligation to prevent either side from seeking a solution by force before then. This is an obligation that would extend beyond that which President Truman took on unilaterally in June as he is quoted in his press conference on August 31st as saying: "of course, it will not be necessary to keep the Seventh Fleet in the Formosa straits if the Korean thing is settled. That is a flank protection on our part for the United Nations forces."

3. The United Kingdom draft resolution does not indicate what the Assembly will do to implement the recommendation of the Commission. If it tries to enforce a solution unwanted by the Nationalists or the Communists it may be assuming a very onerous task.

4. The revised United Kingdom resolution sets the Formosan problem against a broader new backdrop of "the maintenance of international peace and order in the area" going beyond the implication of President Truman's statements of June 27th and



July 19th that the "neutralizing" of Formosa was related to the Korean operations. This leaves the way open to the permanent neutralization of Formosa which is probably desired by the United States military strategists and would add to our general security in the Western Pacific but which would definitely not seem to us to be worth the political complications and military underwriting implied. Text ends.  
Ends.

CHAIRMAN

MESSAGE FORM  
OUTGOING

50056A-40  
27 | 27

FILE REF.	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
SECRET	

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CHAIRMAN, CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NEW YORK 216 ✓

SENT -- NOV 10 1950

Repeat to Wash. EX 2286

Message To Be Sent EN CLAIR CODE CYPHER <i>Auto</i> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	No.	Date November 10, 1950	For Communications Office Use Only SENT -- NOV 10 1950
Degree of Priority <b>IMPORTANT</b> <i>RP</i>	Following from Reid, Begins:- Your teletype No. 361, Repeated to Washington No. 45. Formosa. If the memorandum is to be presented to other Delegations in New York, it should be considerably toned down. The following suggestions have occurred to me and no doubt other suggestions <del>will</del> <sup>will</sup> occur to you. Para. 1, Second Sentence. - Change the words after "suspicious of any proposal" <sup>to</sup> <del>(2)</del> "that might appear to them to give". Para. 2, Fourth Sentence - Change the words after "extend beyond" <sup>to</sup> <del>(2)</del> "that undertaken by President Truman in June". Para. 4, Second Sentence - Change the words after "permanent neutralization of Formosa" <sup>to</sup> <del>(2)</del> "which might have military value but which would definitely not seem to us".		
ORIGINATOR Sig. Typed: /MG. Div. U.S.S.E.A. Local Tel.			
APPROVED BY Sig. <i>RP</i> Typed:			
Is This Message Likely To Be Published Yes ( ) No ( )			
Internal Distribution:			
Done Date			
Copies Referred To:			
Done Date			

1820 MON 19 50 e:57  
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

RECEIVED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
UNIT

File copy

Am.&F.E./A.R.Menzies/MCC

Ext. 140

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OTTAWA

November 10, 1950

No. Y.977 ✓

50056-A 40	
33	18

Sir,

I enclose the document (s) listed below.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

The Acting Head of Canadian  
Liaison Mission,

Tokyo, Japan. ✓

*OK  
AM.*

A.D.P. HEENEY

for the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

SUBJECT

Telegram No. 344 of November 8, 1950  
from the Chairman, Canadian Delegation  
to U.N. General Assembly, New York.

Formosa

SIMILAR TO:

London No. Y3333 ✓

Washington No. Y3505 ✓

New Delhi No. Y263 ✓

Canberra No. Y427 ✓

# MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

FILE REF.	

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: CHAIRMAN, CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NEW YORK

50056-A-40
27   27

*file*

Message To Be Sent	No. <u>251</u>	Date	November 9, 1950	For Communications Office Use Only
EN CLAIR				SENT -- NOV -- 9 1950
CODE				
CYPHER				

Degree of Priority  
**IMMEDIATE**

ORIGINATOR  
Sig. \_\_\_\_\_  
Typed: E.Reid/jh  
Div. USSEA  
Local Tel. 4803

APPROVED BY  
Sig. [Signature]  
Typed: \_\_\_\_\_  
Is This Message Likely To Be Published  
Yes ( ) No ( )

Internal Distribution:  
American Division ✓  
U.N. Division ✓  
Mr Heany

Done [Signature]  
Date **NOV 9 1950**

Copies Referred To: \_\_\_\_\_  
Done \_\_\_\_\_  
Date \_\_\_\_\_

Following from Riddell from Reid; Begins  
Your teleye No. 344 of November 8, Formosa.

- I discussed with the Minister late yesterday afternoon the question whether you should show our alternative draft resolution to the United States, the United Kingdom and the Indian delegations. The Minister's decision is that you should show these delegations the memorandum which you have prepared but that you should not, for the present at least, show them the draft resolution.
- One of the reasons for his decision is that if we were to show our draft resolution now we would immediately be subjected to pressure from the United States and the United Kingdom to amend it. <sup>He</sup> ~~is~~, therefore, think<sup>s</sup> that the resolution should be kept in reserve for possible introduction in the Committee after the debate has started.
- So far as the United Kingdom-United States draft resolution is concerned, the Minister says that we certainly cannot sponsor it and that we might have to vote against it in Committee.

... 2

9.11.7(05)

# MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

FILE REF.		

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: .....

Message To Be Sent EN CLAIR CODE CYPHER	No. ....	Date	For Communications Office Use Only <b>SENT -- NOV - 9 1950</b>
--	----------	------	---

Degree of Priority

- 2 -

### ORIGINATOR

Sig. ....

Typed: .....

Div. ....

Local Tel. ....

4. I think it would be useful if you were to send to Washington and to us the text of your memorandum and if Washington were to take it up on a pretty high level in the State Department. We will consider here whether we should send it to London so that Canada House can discuss it with the Foreign Office.

### APPROVED BY

Sig. ....

Typed: .....

Is This Message  
Likely To Be Published

Yes ( )      No ( )

### Internal Distribution:

Done .....

Date .....

### Copies Referred To:

Done .....

Date .....

SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

NOV 10 10:51

EX-100  
COMMUNICATIONS  
SECRETARIAT

File copy

Am.&F.E./A.R.Menzies/MCC

Ext. 140

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OTTAWA

..... November 9, ..... 1950

No. *X-3330*

50056-A-79
331/8

Sir,

I enclose the document (s) listed below.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

The High Commissioner for  
Canada,

London, England.

*OK/AM*

A.D.P. HEENEY

for the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT	SUBJECT
<p>Telegram No. 205 of October 20, 1950 from the Chairman, Canadian Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly, New York.</p> <p>SIMILAR TO:</p> <p>Tokyo No. <i>Y 974</i> ✓</p> <p>New Delhi No. <i>Y-762</i> ✓</p>	<p>Formosa.</p>

FROM: THE CHAIRMAN, CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NEW YORK  
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

*seen by Minister*

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

CYFFER - AUTO

NO. 344

NEW YORK, November 8, 1950.

*Refer to*  
*✓ USSEA*  
*✓ UN Div*  
*✓ Sec to Cabinet*  
*✓ J. J. S.*  
*✓ Nat. defence*  
*✓ Defence Affairs Div Done-mcc*  
*✓ Legal Div*  
*✓ Tokyo*  
*✓ London*  
*✓ Wash, ton*  
*✓ N. Riddell*  
*✓ Canberra*  
*File*

50056-A-40  
27 | 27  
Nov 10/50

Secret. Following for Reid from Riddell, Begins:

Your teletypes No. 229 of November 6th and No. 230 of November 7th -- Formosa.

1. Text of alternative draft resolution contained in your teletype No. 230 of November 7th did not reach this office in time for the Minister to examine it before he left for Ottawa. It seems to me that your alternative draft resolution, by limiting Assembly's recommendation to duration of Korean war and doing no more in regard to long term problem than enjoining peaceful procedures upon Chinese Communists and Nationalists, is an ingenious way of reducing to a minimum the United Nations commitment on Formosa. It seems to me, however, that object of United States policy is to commit United Nations as fully as possible to defence of Formosa, and they would dislike intensely the alternative resolution you have proposed. If, therefore, we canvass other delegations on the possibility of putting in a resolution along the lines suggested, we shall immediately encounter the hostility of both United States and United Kingdom delegations. I think for this reason that before we consider further the possibility of alternative draft resolution along the lines suggested in your teletype No. 230 of November 7th, we should have a clear instruction in this regard.

2. The Minister did, however, see your telegram No. 229 of November 6th, and he agreed that I should prepare a memorandum on the basis of this telegram and show it to the United Kingdom

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	

NOV 8 1950

delegation, and possibly to the United States delegation, as an indication of our misgivings. This memorandum is now in the course of preparation. I shall not, however, show draft resolution in your teletype No. 230 of November 7th to other delegations pending further instructions from you.

3. I have repeated your two teletypes under reference to Mr. Wrong in Washington. Ends.

CHAIRMAN



MESSAGE FORM  
OUTGOING

FILE REF.

*Handwritten notes:*  
100 Cont.  
see teletype No 9/50  
G.R.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY,  
NEW YORK.

*Handwritten:* 50056A-40

Message To Be Sent	No. ....	Date November 8, 1950	For Communications Office Use Only
EN CLAIR			
CODE			
CYPHER			

CYPHER

Degree of Priority

ORIGINATOR

Sig. ....

Typed: A.R. Menzies/  
MCC

Div. Am. & F. E.

Local Tel. 2991

APPROVED BY

Sig. ....

Typed: .....

Is This Message Likely To Be Published  
Yes ( ) No ( )

Internal Distribution:

Done .....

Date .....

Copies Referred To:

Done .....

Date .....

Following for RIDDELL from PEARSON, Begins:

Your telegram No. 344 of November 8. Formosa.

I think it desirable that we should make another attempt to oppose assumption by the United Nations of this more extensive responsibility for the neutralization of Formosa for another year and the implementation of any future General Assembly decision concerning the disposition of Formosa. I should be grateful, therefore, if you would be good enough to give the United States, the United Kingdom and Indian Delegations confidentially copies of the memorandum which I understand you have prepared on the basis of the Department's teletype No. 229 of November 6 and the draft resolution on Formosa contained in the Department's teletype No. 230 of November 7. Ends.

*file*  
*Appuy*

SECRET

November 8, 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

50056-A-40  
27 27

FORMOSA

Attached is a copy of telegram No. 344 of November 8 from Riddell requesting authority to show our alternative draft resolution on Formosa confidentially to other delegations.

I am attaching for reference purposes a 2 copy of our telegrams Nos. 229 and 230 of November 7 to New York. The latter contains the text of our alternative draft resolution on Formosa.

I think it important that we should make a further effort to oppose assumption by the United Nations of responsibility going beyond the end of the Korean campaign for the neutralization of Formosa and the implementation of any decision that the General Assembly might reach as a result of the recommendation submitted by the Commission that is proposed in the United Kingdom resolution. The attached teletype submitted for your approval authorizes Riddell to circulate our alternative draft resolution on Formosa with the explanatory memorandum he has prepared to the United States, the United Kingdom and Indian Delegations.

*Handwritten notes on the left margin:*  
- This is a copy of the original  
- Keep a copy in the file  
- The teletype submitted for your approval authorizes Riddell to circulate our alternative draft resolution on Formosa with the explanatory memorandum he has prepared to the United States, the United Kingdom and Indian Delegations.  
- The attached teletype submitted for your approval authorizes Riddell to circulate our alternative draft resolution on Formosa with the explanatory memorandum he has prepared to the United States, the United Kingdom and Indian Delegations.  
- The attached teletype submitted for your approval authorizes Riddell to circulate our alternative draft resolution on Formosa with the explanatory memorandum he has prepared to the United States, the United Kingdom and Indian Delegations.

*Signature*  
A.D.P.H.

*Mr. Riddell said over the telephone that he thoroughly agreed with our alternative draft resolution.*

MESSAGE FORM  
OUTGOING

FILE REF.		

50056-A | 40  
27 | 27

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: The Chairman, Canadian Delegation to the United Nations  
Assembly,  
NEW YORK.

Message To Be Sent	No. 230	Date November 6, 1950	For Communications Office Use Only SENT -- NOV - 7 1950
EN CLAIR			
CODE			
CYPHER AUTO	X		

Degree of Priority

ORIGINATOR

Sig. ....

Typed: A.R. Menzies /  
MCC  
Div. Am. & F. E.

Local Tel. 2991

APPROVED BY

Sig. ....

Typed: .....

Is This Message  
Likely To Be Published  
Yes ( ) No ( )

Internal Distribution:

Done .....

Date .....

Copies Referred To:

Done .....

Date .....

Formosa.

Following is the text of a possible limited resolution on Formosa, Begins:  
The General Assembly of the United Nations.  
HAVING in mind that United Nations armed forces are at present operating in Korea in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council of 27 June, 1950, subsequent to its resolution of 25 June, 1950, that members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area;

RECALLING its resolution of 7 October 1950 establishing a United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to represent the United Nations in bringing about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government of all Korea;

NOTING that there have been threats of an armed attack on Formosa from the Chinese mainland and that Formosa has been used as a base for attacks on the Chinese mainland;

CONSIDERING that an armed attack on Formosa from the Chinese mainland or an armed attack on the Chinese

# MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

FILE REF.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: .....

Message To Be Sent	No. ....	Date	For Communications Office Use Only
EN CLAIR CODE CYPHER			
Degree of Priority			
<b>ORIGINATOR</b> Sig. .... Typed: ..... Div. .... Local Tel. ....	<p style="text-align: center;">- 2 -</p> <p>mainland from Formosa might directly or indirectly interfere with the efforts of the United Nations armed forces to restore international peace and security in the Korea area;</p> <p style="text-align: center;">the</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>CALLS UPON</u> the parties to/dispute over Formosa to refrain from taking hostile action against each other while the United Nations armed forces are engaged in restoring international peace and security in the Korea area;</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>URGES</u> the parties to endeavour to settle their differences by peaceful means and to this end offers its good offices to the parties;</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>REQUESTS</u> the Secretary General to consult the parties with a view to establishing a mutually agreeable procedure for the appointment of a mediator who, on behalf of the United Nations would endeavour to assist the parties to settle their differences by peaceful means. Ends.</p>		
<b>APPROVED BY</b> Sig. .... Typed: .....			
Is This Message Likely To Be Published Yes ( ) No ( )			
Internal Distribution:			
Done .....			
Date .....			
Copies Referred To:	<p style="text-align: center;">D. P. M. E. M. I.</p>		
Done .....			
Date .....			
49-P-274-100M			

MESSAGE FORM  
OUTGOING

FILE REF.	

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: The Chairman, Canadian Delegation to the United Nations  
NEW YORK.

50056-A-40 Assembly,  
27 | 27

Message To Be Sent	No. 229	Date NOV 26, 1950	For Communications Office Use Only
EN CLAIR			SENT -- NOV - 6 1950
CODE			
CYPHER AUTO X			

Degree of Priority  
**Important**

ORIGINATOR

Sig. ....

Typed: A.R. Menzies / MCC

Div. Am. & F.E. ....

Local Tel. 2991

APPROVED BY

Sig. *[Signature]*

Typed: *[Signature]*

Is This Message Likely To Be Published

Yes ( ) No ( )

Internal Distribution:

Sec'y to Cabinet

J.I.S.

Def. Liaison Div.

Legal Div.

U.N. Div.

Done R. Dwyer

Date Nov. 17/50

Copies Referred To:

*[Signature]*

Nat'l Defence

Tokyo

London

New Delhi

Washington

Canberra

Done R. Dwyer

Date Nov. 17/50

*Following from Radio.*

Your telegram No. 330 of November 3. Formosa.

1. Debate on the Formosan question could develop into one of the most explosive and divisive disputes of this session of the General Assembly. This item bristles with difficulties. Both Chinese factions are dead set against any proposal that will question their unshakable determination that Formosa is and shall remain a part of the Chinese state. Asian opinion which reacted strongly to President Truman's statement of June 27 "neutralizing" Formosa, will be suspicious of any proposal that would appear to give United Nations approval for maintaining Formosa as a part of the United States military defence arc in the Western Pacific. It would also consider any proposal that the United Nations should assume jurisdiction concerning the future disposition of Formosa as an undesirable interference in the internal affairs of China. Other powers will be doubtful of the wisdom of the United Nations assuming any responsibility regarding Formosa extending beyond the duration of President Truman's "neutralization" which he ~~said~~ <sup>in a conference on August 31</sup> would be terminated at the end of the Korean campaign. Many would question the principle of repudiating the Cairo Declaration. Any solution which appeared to ignore China's title to



# MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

FILE REF.	

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: .....

Message To Be Sent	No. ....	Date	For Communications Office Use Only
--------------------	----------	------	------------------------------------

EN CLAIR  
CODE  
CYPHER

- 3 -

Degree of Priority

ORIGINATOR

Sig. ....

Typed: .....

Div. ....

Local Tel. ....

APPROVED BY

Sig. ....

Typed: .....

Is This Message  
Likely To Be Published

Yes ( )    No ( )

Internal Distribution:

Done .....

Date .....

Copies Referred To: 3

Done .....

Date .....

think that any draft resolution should be examined carefully to see the extent of responsibility which the United Nations might be expected to assume.

3. The revised United Kingdom draft resolution contained in your telegram No. 300 of November 3 does not say how soon the Commission is to report to the General Assembly. It could hardly report to this session. If the Commission's report is not made until the next session, the United Nations may be assuming a moral obligation to prevent either side from seeking a solution by force before then. This is an obligation that would extend beyond that which President Truman took on unilaterally in June as he is quoted in his press conference on August 31 as saying: "Of course, it will not be necessary to keep the Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Straits if the Korean thing is settled. That is a flank protection on your part for the United Nations forces".

4. The United Kingdom draft resolution does not indicate what the Assembly will do to implement the recommendation of the Commission. If it tries to enforce a solution unwanted by the Nationalists or the Communists it may be assuming a very onerous task.

MESSAGE FORM  
OUTGOING

FILE REF.	

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: .....

Message To Be Sent	No. ....	Date	For Communications Office Use Only
EN CLAIR CODE CYPHER			
Degree of Priority	- 4 -		
ORIGINATOR	5. The revised United Kingdom resolution sets the Formosan problem against a broader new backdrop of "the maintenance of international peace and order in the area" going beyond the implication of President Truman's statements of June 27 and July 19 that the "neutralizing" of Formosa was related to the Korean operations. This leaves the way open to the permanent neutralization of Formosa which is probably desired by United States military strategists and would add to our general security in the Western Pacific but <del>may not</del> <sup>which would definitely not</sup> be worth the political complications and military underwriting implied. <i>Seem to go to</i>		
Sig. ....	6. It seems to us that some effort should be made at this stage to get a number of the more important delegations to understand where each thinks they are going in supporting the current United Kingdom resolution. The United States apparently wants the United Nations to assume responsibility for Formosa as it did for Korea and it undoubtedly hopes for the permanent neutralization of Formosa. The Indians, according to your telegram No. 205 of October 20 seem to think that the United Kingdom draft resolutions are nothing but a convenient way of joining Formosa to the mainland without fighting. How Chiang Kai-shek and his <del>army</del> are to be ousted is left		
Typed: .....			
Div. ....			
Local Tel. ....			
APPROVED BY			
Sig. ....			
Typed: .....			
Is This Message Likely To Be Published			
Yes ( ) No ( )			
Internal Distribution:			
Done .....			
Date .....			
Copies Referred To:			
Done .....			
Date .....			



# MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

FILE REF.		

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: .....

.....

Message To Be Sent	No. ....	Date	For Communications Office Use Only
EN CLAIR CODE CYPHER			- 5 -
Degree of Priority			<p>unanswered. The United Kingdom seems to be trying to find middle ground, but <del>is going very far</del> <sup>appears to us to be going too</sup> far to meet the United States position.</p> <p>7. If it is desired to have a milder resolution which would not saddle the United Nations with responsibilities it might find difficult or inadvisable to carry out, my immediately following telegram contains a draft which might be used for discussion with other delegations.</p>
ORIGINATOR			
Sig. ....			
Typed: .....			
Div. ....			
Local Tel. ....			
APPROVED BY			
Sig. ....			
Typed: .....			
Is This Message Likely To Be Published Yes ( )      No ( )			
Internal Distribution:			
Done .....			
Date .....			
Copies Referred To:			
Done .....			
Date .....			

RECEIVED

File copy

Am.&F.E./R.E.Collins/MCC

Ext. 140

*R.E. Collins*

**SECRET**

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OTTAWA

..... November 6, 1950 ..... 19.....

No. *y-946*

Sir,

I enclose the document (s) listed below.

50056A/40  
27 | 27

I have the honour to be,

The Acting Head of the Canadian  
Liaison Mission,  
Tokyo, Japan.

Sir,  
Your obedient servant,

A.D.P. HEENEY  
for the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT	SUBJECT
<p>Telegram No. 300 of November 3, 1950 from the Chairman, Canadian Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly, New York.</p> <p>SIMILAR TO:</p> <p>London No. <i>y 3237</i> ✓</p> <p>New Delhi No. <i>y 727</i> ✓</p> <p>Canberra No. <i>y 464</i> ✓</p>	<p>Formosa</p>

FROM: THE CHAIRMAN, CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NEW YORK

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

*Tosca*  
*Mr. Meagan*  
*Mr. Wilgus*

IMPORTANT

SECRET

CYPHER - AUTO

NEW YORK, November 3, 1950.

NO. 300

50056A/40  
27 | 27

*Refer*  
*USSEA*  
*Mr. Reid*  
*Mr. Duffman*  
*Don Mee*  
*Nov 6/50*  
*Mr. Tolson*  
*Mr. Boardman*  
*Mr. Nichols*  
*Mr. Belmont*  
*Mr. Ladd*  
*Mr. Clegg*  
*Mr. Glavin*  
*Mr. Harbo*  
*Mr. Rosen*  
*Mr. Tracy*  
*Mr. Egan*  
*Mr. Gurnea*  
*Mr. Hendon*  
*Mr. Pennington*  
*Mr. Quinn*  
*Mr. Nease*  
*Mr. Gandy*

Secret. Addressed External Ottawa No. 300, repeated Beaver Washington No. 31.

At Commonwealth meeting yesterday morning the three following topics were discussed which are covered in my three immediately following teletypes.

Formosa

The United Kingdom representative (Younger) referred to previous United States redraft of United Kingdom draft resolution on Formosa (which was sent to you under cover of my despatch No. 79 of October 20th) which contained a number of points which the United Kingdom Government had not approved. As a result of further conversations with United States officials, State Department had produced a further redraft but this had not yet been finally approved by the United States Government.

Following is text of this latest United States redraft of United Kingdom resolution, Begins:

"Noting that the signatories to the Cairo Declaration declared it to be one of their purposes that certain of the territories formerly held by Japan, including Formosa and the Pescadores, should be restored to the Republic of China, and that no formal act restoring sovereignty to China has yet occurred;

Recognizing that two parties at present claim the right to administer Formosa, that there have been threats of an armed attack on Formosa from the Chinese Mainland and that

Y
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

NOV 4 1950

Formosa has been used as a base for attacks on the Chinese Mainland, that attempts to settle the dispute by force would heighten international tension and be prejudicial to the maintenance of international peace and order in the area as well as prejudicial to the interests of the people of Formosa; and further

Recognizing that the foregoing considerations raise questions as to the obligations and responsibilities of members under the Charter;

Decides to establish a Commission composed of the representatives of the following States (5-7) which, bearing in mind the considerations set forth in the preceding paragraphs should study the problem and submit a report to the General Assembly containing recommendations for the future of Formosa and the Pescadores. The Commission should consult all Governments, authorities and parties concerned;

Recommends that, pending the study by the Commission and adoption by the General Assembly of recommendations concerning this problem there be no attempt to change the status of Formosa by force and that there be neither (a) armed attack on Formosa from the Chinese Mainland, or (b) attack on the Chinese Mainland from Formosa;

Requests all Governments and authorities concerned to act in conformity with the recommendation in the preceding paragraph and render every possible assistance to the Commission in the performance of its tasks." Ends.

2. It was generally felt by the meeting that this would be a great improvement over the earlier United States redraft. As you will notice, it omits reference to "taking into account the interests of the people of Formosa and giving consideration to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific" as also to the provision that the Commission should consult all "Government authorities and parties concerned including both Chinese claimants" which

appeared in the earlier United States draft. The United Kingdom delegation expressed the view that as it had been decided to include Formosa on the agenda of the Assembly, they thought that the approach outlined in this draft was about the best that could be hoped for. They had not yet referred it to the United Kingdom Government, but it was apparent that they would probably be able to sponsor it. The Australians also stated that they would be willing to sponsor such a resolution. Younger explained that the United States were anxious to get a large number of sponsors for the resolution. He added that sponsorship would not imply an obligation to service on the Commission of 5-7 members referred to in the body of the resolution. I said that our general position was that we did not wish to see the United Nations given the same sort of responsibility for Formosa that they had for Korea. We should have preferred not to have Formosa on the agenda of the General Assembly at all - as it had been included - we now favoured an approach which should saddle the General Assembly with the minimum responsibilities for the future of Formosa. In this connection I pointed out that the present wording of paragraph 3 of the resolution - "recognizing that the foregoing considerations raise questions as to the obligations and responsibilities of members under the Charter" - might cause complications. For example, I pointed out that one of the "foregoing considerations" was the fact that Formosa had been used as a base for attacks on the Chinese Mainland. Was it therefore suggested that members of the United Nations had obligations and responsibilities in connection with such an attack?

3. Other delegations, including the South Africans and Indians, agree that the wording of this paragraph was too wide, and in general showed a reserve similar to our own about the United Nations' assumption of responsibility for Formosa. In conclusion I indicated that it was unlikely that Canada would sponsor the resolution on Formosa. There was little general

discussion at the meeting. The United Kingdom delegation said that they saw little prospect of getting the Americans to modify the draft further. Personally I am inclined to think that we shall be lucky if the United States' Government approve the draft put forward by the State Department officials, which seems to be about the best we can hope for in the circumstances.

CHAIRMAN

24: 6 WA 3: 42

EXLEBMT VEEVIBS  
COMMON OYALIONS  
CFEVVED

TELETYPE

From THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

To THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

CYPHER - AUTO

WA-2673

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1950.

*New Delhi  
Karachi  
Canton  
Wellington  
Manila  
Tokyo*

*Refer to  
A/SEA  
USSEA  
National Defence  
J.I.S.  
Defence Liaison Div  
US Div  
London*

*26/10/50*  
50056-A-40  
27 | 27

Secret. Addressed External WA-2673, repeated Permdel, New York, No. 291, from Beaver.

Part I. Formosa.

1. Collins and Campbell called upon officers of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department on October 23rd. Conversation with O.E. Clubb, Director of the China Affairs Office, was concerned mainly with Formosa. Questioned about the possibility of withdrawal of seventh fleet from protective disposition about the island, Clubb thought that this could be done when the Korea emergency was over, in accordance with President Truman's statement of August 31st. He went on to say it would still be necessary for some time to come to take precautions against possible attempts to solve the Formosa problem by force and he thought this would have to be done in some way by the United Nations (e.g. by the United Kingdom draft resolution on Formosa as amended by the United States).

2. Clubb perfunctorily agreed that saddling the General Assembly with the responsibility for Formosa might cause an undesirable division amongst the democratic Powers and, even if pushed through, might embarrass the United Nations, since it is not a matter upon which the issues are clear cut and unquestionable. Nevertheless, it was apparent that he thought other members of the United Nations should take over from the United States responsibility for keeping Formosa.

Y	
1	AM
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	

OCT 26 1950

*File AM*

## TELETYPE

*From* THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

*To* THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

- 2 -

WASHINGTON.

neutralized for the time being and should be prepared, if necessary, to take action to enforce the neutralization.

3. On the question of the ultimate disposition of Formosa, Collins and Campbell observed that the crux of the situation seemed to be whether Formosa was to be regarded basically as part of China or not, i.e. whether in reality it was to be disposed of. Clubb admitted the difficulties in the way of considering the island anything but Chinese. He dwelt at some length however, upon the possibility of Formosa eventually acquiring an autonomous status under nominal Chinese suzerainty somewhat after the fashion of Tibet. He thought it possible that Peking might be willing to accept such an arrangement in order to gain other ends, such as entry into the United Nations, while not losing face altogether over Formosa.

4. Since Clubb had a good deal to say about the practicality of United States policy in the East as compared with Indian "theorizing", Collins and Campbell did not go so far, in commenting on the autonomy idea, as to mention that Peking was apparently objecting to this type of relationship even for Tibet, where it at least had the sanction of time. They did, however, express doubts that the idea would be acceptable to the Chinese Communists and they wondered what would become of Chiang Kai-Shek and his forces, even if it were acceptable to Peking. Clubb observed that it would be very difficult for Chiang to maintain himself in Formosa for long without support.

EX-111  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION  
CANADIAN AMBASSADOR





*file  
A.R. Menzies*

PERSONAL

WASHINGTON, D.C.,  
October 25, 1950.

50056-A	40
27	27

Dear Arthur,

The enclosed clipping from the Washington Post will show that Harry Hussey was wrong either about Drew Pearson or about Truman's views on China. If Pearson has the inside knowledge attributed to him by Hussey then the writer's description of Truman's attitude towards China is much more encouraging than that given by Hussey.

I was sorry to have missed you both times when I came to say good-by to you in Ottawa but on each occasion you were apparently closeted in a heavy and important conference. However, I want to wish you the best of luck in your new, and what should be intriguing adventure.

*you. [signature]*

*Hussey tried to tell us that Truman felt even more strongly about holdg Formosa than did Mac Arthur.*

A.R. Menzies, Esq.,  
Department of External Affairs,  
American and Far Eastern Division,  
OTTAWA, Canada.

# CANADIAN EMBASSY WASHINGTON

Subject MEETING OF TRUMAN AND MACARTHUR

Date October 23/50 Publication The Washington Post

## Wake Meeting Was Harmonious

By Drew Pearson

SAN FRANCISCO.—It's now possible to piece together a fairly accurate picture of what went on at the mysterious Wake Island conference — except for one part. I have not been able to ascertain what took place during the solid hour when President Truman and General MacArthur were alone together.



**Gen. MacArthur** Another part of the picture puzzle is also missing—namely, why did MacArthur decline President Truman's invitation to lunch and rush off to Tokyo without breaking bread with his Commander in Chief? It was because MacArthur requested that he be excused from lunching that the visit broke up earlier than expected.

Aside from these missing points, however, here is pretty much the story of what happened:

The President and his party had expected a tough argument with MacArthur over Formosa and the general policy agreed upon by both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department—that we cannot afford to risk war with China over Formosa. Expectation of such a blow-up may have been the reason for the President's solemn silence while en route to Wake. He had indicated to his staff that he was prepared to stay all night and longer on Wake, if necessary, in order to bring MacArthur around to his point of view.

First signs were slightly ominous. MacArthur did not go down to meet Gen. Omar Bradley when he arrived half an hour ahead of the Independence, though Bradley, as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is MacArthur's superior.

### Kept Truman Waiting

When the President arrived in the Independence, MacArthur rode down the air strip in a jeep, and, walking to the plane with Averell Harriman, stopped on the way to pose for the photographers with the result that the President had to stand for a few minutes inside the plane, by the door, waiting for MacArthur to greet him.

The two were guardedly cordial. In contrast, MacArthur remarked to United States Ambassador to

Arthur is not known. What is known is that the President felt strongly that the United States could not afford to risk thousands of expensively trained American soldiers in a war with millions of orientals over Formosa; also, that we must avoid border incidents along the Manchurian and Siberian frontiers at any cost; and finally, that our main hope in China was to make a Tito out of Mao Tse-Tung.

At times the President has been known to get so wound up and engrossed in his subject that he doesn't let the other person put in a word edgewise. He has also been known to get so steamed up that what he says amounts to a bawling-out. Whatever tactics he used with MacArthur, however, the general later gave every appearance of agreement. And afterward the President personally appeared highly pleased.

### Talks on Staff Level

After the hour's personal talk, staff discussions followed—in two groups: one the military, the other diplomatic. Ambassador Muccio conferred with the State Department officials who accompanied Truman, while Bradley conferred with MacArthur.

The President at this point indicated that he would let the staffs work out further details and went for a trip around the island.

During the staff talk, MacArthur reported that he expected to clean up the bulk of the Korean fighting by around November 1. He said that he had quit worrying about the Chinese and Russians intervening in Korea, and he was convinced now that they realized it would be foolish to do so.

MacArthur also agreed to the idea of pulling American troops out of Korea as soon as possible, probably after elections in North Korea. He paid tribute to the South Korean army, said they were now rehabilitated, reequipped and competent to defend South Korea.

It was also decided that MacArthur would make an economic survey of Korea, using Army and ECA personnel, in order to report on rebuilding Korea. The report is to be turned in within 30 days and will be sent to the United

French, not any new commitments.

At one point, when President Truman had returned to the staff conference, an important difference of opinion arose regarding Korean President Syngman Rhee. Truman had some rather harsh things to say about Rhee, felt he

the President wanted to hold elections in both North and South Korea as suggested by the United Nations, MacArthur held out for holding elections only in North Korea. Thus Syngman Rhee would remain in power in South Korea until 1952.

It was finally decided that the United States would maintain this

**DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS** File copy  
**OTTAWA**

~~SECRET~~  
October 26, 1950.

No. ....

Sir,

I enclose the document (s) listed below.

50056-A-40  
27 | 27

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

A.D.P. HEENEY

For the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT	SUBJECT
<b>Cypher 11-2073 Secret Teletype of October 26, 1950, from Washington.</b>	<b>China Affairs - Formosa.</b>
LONDON NO. Y-3096 ✓ NEW DELHI NO. Y-689 ✓ KARACHI NO. Y-472 ✓ CANBERRA NO. Y-444 ✓ WELLINGTON NO. Y-369 ✓ MANILA NO. Y-158 ✓ TOKYO NO. Y-896 ✓	

FROM: THE OFFICER IN CHARGE, CANADIAN EMBASSY, NANKING, CHINA  
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

S E C R E T

CYPHER - O.T.P.

No. 74

NANKING, October 24, 1950.  
(Rec'd: October 26, 1950)

*Original on  
50067A-40*

50056-A-40	
27	27

Secret. As military action in Korea draws to close, opinion in circles of Chinese local officials here is that possibility of China becoming involved has not, repeat not, passed. They point out that:

(a) Great numbers of troops are concentrated in Manchuria within striking distance of Korean border, and

(b) Foreign Minister has said China will not, repeat not, "tolerate seeing its neighbour being invaded by imperialists".

2. There is no doubt but that China has genuine fear of United States due to,

(a) Support of Nationalists in civil war,

(b) Talk of encouraging third group to overthrow present regime, and

(c) Direct interference in Formosa with McArthur - Chiang plans for restoration of Nationalists.

3. There is a growing sense of frustration due to,

(a) Loss of face in being forced to give up plans to "liberate" Formosa this year, and

(b) Refusal by UNO under American leadership to admit People's Government. Coupled with inferiority complex developed in century of relations under (group corrupt) with foreign powers, this frustration could give rise to precipitate and unwise action.

4. While a sour grapes attitude is developing with respect to failure to be admitted to UNO, the one action which could be taken now that would be more effective than any other in preventing an eleventh hour spread of Korean conflict would be immediate

promise of admission of People's Government to UNO and paving way for diplomatic relations with Western powers.

Unclassified Bags 47 and 48 received.

OFFICER IN CHARGE

FROM: THE CHAIRMAN, CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NEW YORK  
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

IMPORTANT

CYPHER - AUTO

NO. 205

SECRET

NEW YORK, October 20, 1950.

*Refer to  
London  
Tokyo  
New Delhi  
Done-mee  
Nov. 9/50  
file  
Admiral*

*Copy on 5475-EJ-40*

50056-A-40
27   27

Secret. Addressed External Ottawa No. 205, repeated Beaver  
Washington No. 24.

Y
① ARM
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Riddell and Collins had lunch today with Menon of the Indian delegation to discuss the proposed United Kingdom resolution on Formosa. As you will recall, we reported in our teletype No. 17 of September 22nd that Dening had sounded out the Indians on the original United Kingdom draft, and said that they were not opposed. The situation does not appear to have changed, and Menon indicated that New Delhi is prepared to support the present draft. He had no suggestions to make regarding possible improvements, but mentioned the fact that they had not wanted too much emphasis placed on consultation with the Formosans. (A reference of this sort in the original United Kingdom draft was deleted at Rau's request.)

**OCT 21 1950**

2. The Indian position is evidently based on the following assumptions regarding the probable sequence of events:

(a) A Commission will be appointed which will report to the next Assembly in about a year's time;

(b) The question of Chinese representation will be settled during the interval in favour of the Peiping regime; and

(c) The Commission's report will recommend the turning over of Formosa to China. Meanwhile, the Chinese Communists will withhold their fire, in anticipation of a favourable result.

3. Menon said they had hoped that action could be taken on the resolution and a report made in time to achieve results during the present session, but that this was now out of the question, and they

were reconciled to the necessary delay. It was clear from what he said that he had not thought of the draft resolution as involving anything more than a convenient means of joining Formosa eventually with the mainland, and had not considered what the responsibility of the Assembly might be if the timing did not work out as anticipated, or a different kind of report were submitted by the Commission. When these possibilities were mentioned, Menon simply said that if the issue of Chinese representation were not settled in the relatively near future the whole situation in the United Nations would be impossible anyway. It may be, of course, that the Indians are perfectly well aware of the dangers inherent in any such resolution, but consider that they could avoid involvement and responsibility for maintaining the status quo in Formosa in case anything should go wrong.

4. Incidentally, Menon said that they, like ourselves, have endorsed the Cairo decisions and are strongly in favour of a reference to them in the resolution. This is the one point on which we know of any definite divergence of opinion so far, since the Australians have said privately at least that they do not consider themselves bound by Cairo and would like to have this reference deleted.

5. We have received a copy of a tentative United States re-draft of the United Kingdom proposal, copies of which together with a covering memorandum are going forward by bag under form despatch No. 79.

CHAIRMAN

REC'D DOI 17 10: 53

EXTRINSIC RELATIONS  
COMMUNICATIONS  
OFFICE

*file  
Adm. 115*

EXT. 140

CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE FIFTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

NEW YORK

50056-A-140  
27 | 27

October 20, 1950.

No. 79

I enclose the document(s) listed below.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

The Acting Secretary of State  
for External Affairs,  
Department of External Affairs,  
O t t a w a, Ontario.

*J. B. Pollack*  
*per L.F.*

for Chairman, Canadian Delegation

Description of Document

Subject

2 copies of a memorandum for Mr. Pearson.  
2 copies of a modified text of British draft with U.S. additions and changes

Formosa

de.

Y
① ARM
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

OCT 23 1950

*Encs 2c*

*y*



EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
RECEIVED-CLEARED

1950 OCT 23 AM 10:32

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI  
FROM: SAC, [illegible]

[illegible]

RE: [illegible]

10/23/50

[illegible]

R. Collins/HMcC

October 19, 1950.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PEARSON

FORMOSA

Attached is a copy of a "modified text" of the United Kingdom draft resolution on Formosa, with changes and additions suggested by the United States. This was given to me informally this afternoon by Allison, who had not yet had an opportunity to give it to the British - and who asked me to keep it for a day or so before sending it on to Ottawa. As a compromise I sent a copy to Menzies, by bag, under a personal note, explaining the circumstances.

2. The additions to the original text in paragraphs 1 and 4 have been underlined. Paragraph 7, referring to the Security Council, is entirely new. Paragraph 5 (first recommendation) has been reworded to make it clear that its restrictive force bears equally on the Chinese Communists and Nationalists, and to tighten the original by referring to the "adoption by the Assembly of recommendations concerning the problem." For comparison, following is the United Kingdom text:

RECOMMENDS (a) that, pending consideration of the Commission's report by the General Assembly, there should be no attempt to seek a solution of the issue by force,

(b) that Formosa should not be used as a base for attacks on the Chinese mainland.

3. The purpose behind the changes is explained by the United States at the end of the attached text. As Allison pointed out, the United States do not assume that Formosa must inevitably go to the Chinese Communists (at

...2

least for some time) and wish to stress two considerations in addition to the conflicting Chinese claims: the interests of the Formosans and the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. The implication is that it might be contrary to both considerations to hand Formosa to the Communists in the near future. In support of this Allison maintained that it is by no means clear that the Communists are going to be able to maintain complete control of the mainland; that China may be in for a continuation of the internal disturbances and divisions which have been characteristic of her modern history; and that, in the circumstances, it would not necessarily be wise to transfer Formosa from a moribund claimant to one whose authority is still dubious. (If this represents more than pre-election rationalizing, it makes the solution of both the Formosa problem and of Chinese representation on the United Nations more difficult than ever).

4. The United Kingdom draft had been intended to provide a means of putting the question on ice for the time being, with as limited a commitment as possible on the part of the General Assembly and with the implication that the task in hand is to find a suitable formula which would permit the Chinese Communists to gain control without resort to force. (The United Kingdom officials concerned say privately that force is the only eventual solution and a resolution can only hope to delay this). The United States have now carried the United Kingdom draft to its logical conclusion and amended it to make it quite clear that responsibility for Formosa should be vested in the United Nations. If the Communists do not wait for an Assembly recommendation, the issue would immediately be referred to the Security Council, presumably as a breach of the peace, and then to the Assembly again under the "United Action" resolution. If the United States draft were adopted, it would be difficult for the other members of the United Nations to refuse to accept the responsibility for neutralizing Formosa that is now held by the United States through the Seventh Fleet.

5. As an indication of United States thinking, Allison said that this resolution would not put the General Assembly in the impossible position of trying to handle something beyond its powers. It would be a genuine deterrent, since Peking would hesitate to take action, as in Korea, unless the Chinese Communists and the Russians are ready to start the major war. In other words, the United States would like to equate Formosa with South Korea.

R. Collins

Following is modified text of British draft with our additions and changes:

"Noting (A) that the signatories to the Cairo declaration declared it to be one of their purposes that all the territories that Japan had stolen from the Chinese, including Formosa and the Pescadores should be restored to the Republic of China;

"(B) that no formal act restoring sovereignty to China has yet occurred, although at the end of hostilities with Japan the Chinese Nationalist Government was permitted to assume the administration of the island;

"Recognizing that two parties, both Chinese, at present claim the right to administer Formosa, that there have been threats of an armed attack on Formosa from the Chinese mainland and that Formosa has been used as a base for attacks on the Chinese mainland, and that an attempt to settle the dispute by force or the continuance of attacks on the Chinese mainland from Formosa would heighten international tension at a time when the situation in the Pacific area is already tense as a result of events in Korea, and would be prejudicial to the interests of the people of Formosa;

"Decides to establish a Commission composed of the representatives of (specified states) which, bearing in mind China's claims, taking into account the interests of the people of Formosa, and giving consideration to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, should study the problem and submit a report to the GA containing recommendations for the future of Formosa and the Pescadores. The Commission should consult all government authorities and parties concerned, including both Chinese claimants;

"Recommends that, pending the study by the Commission and adoption by the GA of recommendations concerning this problem (A) there be no attempt to seek a solution of the status of Formosa by force, (B) Formosa not to be used as a base for attacks on the Chinese mainland;

"Requests both Chinese parties to act in conformity with the recommendations in the preceding para;

"Recommends to the SC that it consider immediately any action in contravention of (A) or (B) of above recommendation with a view to adopting appropriate measures for the maintenance of international peace and security;

"Requests all parties to render every possible assistance to the Commission in the performance of its tasks."

In the first operative paragraph beginning with "decides" insertion

of phrase "taking into account the interests of the people of Formosa" is predicated upon our belief that interests of Formosan people should be mentioned on equal level with China's claim. In addition to China's claim and wishes of Formosans' broad interests of UN in peace of Pacific area also a factor to be taken into account.

Rephrasing of first recommendation is drafting change designed primarily to define more clearly the period during which that recommendation applies.

Department believes desirable that first recommendation of British draft be further strengthened. With this in mind Department has added recommendation referring to SC action as warning to those who might violate recommendation to refrain from use of force.

R. Collins/HMcC

October 19, 1950.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PEARSON

FORMOSA

Attached is a copy of a "modified text" of the United Kingdom draft resolution on Formosa, with changes and additions suggested by the United States. This was given to me informally this afternoon by Allison, who had not yet had an opportunity to give it to the British - and who asked me to keep it for a day or so before sending it on to Ottawa. As a compromise I sent a copy to Menzies, by bag, under a personal note, explaining the circumstances.

2. The additions to the original text in paragraphs 1 and 4 have been underlined. Paragraph 7, referring to the Security Council, is entirely new. Paragraph 5 (first recommendation) has been reworded to make it clear that its restrictive force bears equally on the Chinese Communists and Nationalists, and to tighten the original by referring to the "adoption by the Assembly of recommendations concerning the problem." For comparison, following is the United Kingdom text:

RECOMMENDS (a) that, pending consideration of the Commission's report by the General Assembly, there should be no attempt to seek a solution of the issue by force,

(b) that Formosa should not be used as a base for attacks on the Chinese mainland.

3. The purpose behind the changes is explained by the United States at the end of the attached text. As Allison pointed out, the United States do not assume that Formosa must inevitably go to the Chinese Communists (at

...2

least for some time) and wish to stress two considerations in addition to the conflicting Chinese claims: the interests of the Formosans and the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. The implication is that it might be contrary to both considerations to hand Formosa to the Communists in the near future. In support of this Allison maintained that it is by no means clear that the Communists are going to be able to maintain complete control of the mainland; that China may be in for a continuation of the internal disturbances and divisions which have been characteristic of her modern history; and that, in the circumstances, it would not necessarily be wise to transfer Formosa from a moribund claimant to one whose authority is still dubious. (If this represents more than pre-election rationalizing, it makes the solution of both the Formosa problem and of Chinese representation on the United Nations more difficult than ever).

4. The United Kingdom draft had been intended to provide a means of putting the question on ice for the time being, with as limited a commitment as possible on the part of the General Assembly and with the implication that the task in hand is to find a suitable formula which would permit the Chinese Communists to gain control without resort to force. (The United Kingdom officials concerned say privately that force is the only eventual solution and a resolution can only hope to delay this). The United States have now carried the United Kingdom draft to its logical conclusion and amended it to make it quite clear that responsibility for Formosa should be vested in the United Nations. If the Communists do not wait for an Assembly recommendation, the issue would immediately be referred to the Security Council, presumably as a breach of the peace, and then to the Assembly again under the "United Action" resolution. If the United States draft were adopted, it would be difficult for the other members of the United Nations to refuse to accept the responsibility for neutralizing Formosa that is now held by the United States through the Seventh Fleet.



5. As an indication of United States thinking, Allison said that this resolution would not put the General Assembly in the impossible position of trying to handle something beyond its powers. It would be a genuine deterrent, since Peking would hesitate to take action, ~~as~~ in Korea, unless the Chinese Communists and the Russians are ready to start the major war. In other words, the United States would like to equate Formosa with South Korea.

E. Collins

Following is modified text of British draft with our additions and changes:

"Noting (A) that the signatories to the Cairo declaration declared it to be one of their purposes that all the territories that Japan had stolen from the Chinese, including Formosa and the Pescadores should be restored to the Republic of China;

"(B) that no formal act restoring sovereignty to China has yet occurred, although at the end of hostilities with Japan the Chinese Nationalist Government was permitted to assume the administration of the island;

"Recognizing that two parties, both Chinese, at present claim the right to administer Formosa, that there have been threats of an armed attack on Formosa from the Chinese mainland and that Formosa has been used as a base for attacks on the Chinese mainland, and that an attempt to settle the dispute by force or the continuance of attacks on the Chinese mainland from Formosa would heighten international tension at a time when the situation in the Pacific area is already tense as a result of events in Korea, and would be prejudicial to the interests of the people of Formosa;

"Decides to establish a Commission composed of the representatives of (specified states) which, bearing in mind China's claims, taking into account the interests of the people of Formosa, and giving consideration to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, should study the problem and submit a report to the GA containing recommendations for the future of Formosa and the Pescadores. The Commission should consult all government authorities and parties concerned, including both Chinese claimants;

"Recommends that, pending the study by the Commission and adoption by the GA of recommendations concerning this problem (A) there be no attempt to seek a solution of the status of Formosa by force, (B) Formosa not to be used as a base for attacks on the Chinese mainland;

"Requests both Chinese parties to act in conformity with the recommendations in the preceding para;

"Recommends to the SC that it consider immediately any action in contravention of (A) or (B) of above recommendation with a view to adopting appropriate measures for the maintenance of international peace and security;

"Requests all parties to render every possible assistance to the Commission in the performance of its tasks."

In the first operative paragraph beginning with "decides" insertion

of phrase "taking into account the interests of the people of Formosa" is predicated upon our belief that interests of Formosan people should be mentioned on equal level with China's claim. In addition to China's claim and wishes of Formosans' broad interests of UN in peace of Pacific area also a factor to be taken into account. //

Rephrasing of first recommendation is drafting change designed primarily to define more clearly the period during which that recommendation applies.

Department believes desirable that first recommendation of British draft be further strengthened. With this in mind Department has added recommendation referring to SC action as warning to those who might violate recommendation to refrain from use of force.

CANADIAN DELEGATION



file  
Appreciated Important  
DELEGATION DU CANADA

SECRET

Thursday, Oct 19, '50

50056 A 40

33 | 27

Dear Arthur,

This is slightly unusual, but I am enclosing a copy of the U.S. redraft of the U.K. resolution (draft) on Formosa for the General Assembly. The U.K. delegation haven't seen it yet, and I don't want to put it on the teletype officially since Allison asked me to hold it for a day or so until he had an opportunity of giving it to them. I'll send it under a despatch tomorrow.

Also - The bag is closing and I haven't enough stenographic assistance to do more than copy the redraft x (sorry - only the altered or new paragraphs)

The main change is in the reference to the Security Council (new paragraph), and the provision for no action until the Commission's report had been considered "and adopted" by the G.A. You can see the drift of the amendments by comparing the texts.

Must close to make the bag,  
Yours sincerely,  
Ralph

SECRET

Following is modified text of British draft with our additions and changes:

"Noting (A) that the signatories to the Cairo declaration declared it to be one of their purposes that all the territories that Japan had stolen from the Chinese, including Formosa and the Pescadores should be restored to the Republic of China:

.....

"Decides to establish a Commission composed of the representatives of (specified states) which, bearing in mind China's claims, taking into account the interests of the people of Formosa, and giving consideration to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, should study the problem and submit a report to the GA containing recommendations for the future of Formosa and the Pescadores. The Commission should consult all government authorities and parties concerned, including both Chinese claimants;

"Recommends that, pending the study by the Commission and adoption by the GA of recommendations concerning this problem (A) there be no attempt to seek a solution of the status of Formosa by force, (B) Formosa not be used as a base for attacks on the Chinese mainland;

"Requests both Chinese parties to act in conformity with the recommendations in the preceding para;

(new) "Recommends to the SC that it consider immediately any action in contravention of (A) or (B) of above recommendation with a view to adopting appropriate measures for the maintenance of international peace and security;

....."

410

FROM: THE CHAIRMAN, CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NEW YORK  
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

CYPHER - AUTO  
NO. 126

SECRET

NEW YORK, October 12, 1950.

*Mr. Murphy Done Oct. 12/50  
Mr. [unclear]  
Mr. [unclear]  
NA [unclear]  
Sec. Chief [unclear]  
S.S.  
Leg. [unclear]  
T. [unclear]  
London  
New Delhi  
Cairo*

*To see: [unclear]  
McLain  
W. [unclear]  
file  
[unclear]*

50056-A/40  
27 | 27

Secret. Addressed External Ottawa No. 126, repeated Beaver Washington No. 16, from Candel.

My telegram No. 17 of September 22nd, Formosa.

1. Following is text of the latest draft of the proposed United Kingdom resolution, Begins:

1	
2	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	

NOTING (a) that the signatories to the Cairo Declaration declared it to be one of their purposes that all the territories that Japan had stolen from the Chinese, including Formosa, should be restored to the Republic of China;

(b) that no legal change in the status of Formosa as Japanese territory has yet been effected, although at the end of hostilities with Japan China was permitted to assume the administration of the island,

RECOGNIZING that two parties, both Chinese, at present claim the right to administer Formosa, that there have been threats of an armed attack on Formosa from the Chinese mainland and that Formosa has been used as a base for attacks on the Chinese mainland, and that an attempt to settle the dispute by force or the continuance of attacks on the Chinese mainland from Formosa would heighten international tension at a time when the situation in the Pacific area is already tense as a result of events in Korea, and would be prejudicial to the interests of the people of Formosa,

DECIDES to establish a commission which, bearing in mind China's claims, should study the problem and submit a report to the General Assembly containing recommendations for the

OCT 12 1950

|||

future of Formosa. The Commission should consult with all Governments, authorities and parties concerned,

RECOMMENDS (a) that, pending consideration of the Commission's report by the General Assembly, there should be no attempt to seek a solution of the issue by force,

(b) that Formosa should not be used as a base for attacks on the Chinese mainland;

REQUESTS all parties (a) to act in conformity with (a) and (b) above;

(b) to render every possible assistance to the Commission in the performance of its task.

Text of resolution ends.

2. You will note that the part (a) of the first paragraph of the former resolution, referring to the historical connection between Formosa and China, has been dropped, and that a new part has been added referring to the present legal status of the island. The final request to all parties has also been expanded slightly, asking them to act in conformity with the recommendations. ) bD

3. We have noted the doubts which you raised in your telegram No. 544 of September 27th regarding the wisdom of saddling the General Assembly with the task of dealing with the disposition of territories such as Formosa, in which a powerful state has a direct interest, and would appreciate your comments and suggestions on the United Kingdom proposal.

CHAIRMAN

NOV 23 1948

EX-100 11 21 48  
COMM. FILED  
CREVED

FILE

7620

P.G.R. CAMPBELL/RD  
Am. & F.E. Div.

SECRET

Ext. 140

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OTTAWA

October 12 19 50

No. Y-829

Sir,

I enclose the document (s) listed below.

50056-A-40	
27	27

The Head of Mission,  
Canadian Liaison Mission,  
Tokyo, Japan. ✓

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

A.D.P. HEENEY

for the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

SUBJECT

Telegram No. 126 of October  
12 from New York.

~~Fuzhosa.~~

SIMILAR TO:

London No. Y-2940 ✓

New Delhi No. Y-654 ✓

Canberra No. Y-423 ✓



FILE

P.G.R. CAMPBELL/RD  
Am. & F.E. Div.

Ext. 140

*760*

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OTTAWA

October 10 19 50

No. Y-46

SECRET

Sir,

I enclose the document (s) listed below.

50056-A-40	
27	27

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

The Chairman,  
The Permanent Delegation of  
Canada to the United Nations,  
New York, N.Y.

Your obedient servant,

*General Assembly*  
A.D.P. HEENEY

for the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT	SUBJECT
Copy of telegram No. 1927 from London, England, dated October 9, 1950.  P.G.R. Campbell/RD Am. & F.E. Div.  SIMILAR TO Canadian Permanent Delegate to the U.N. No. <u>Y-1322</u> ✓ Canadian Ambassador, Washington No. <u>Y-3041</u> ✓	Formosa.

Extract from THE NEW YORK TIMES,  
Thursday, October 5, 1950.

*file*  
50056-A-40  
27-27

ACHESON DISCUSSES U.N. FORMOSA VISIT

Says a Commission to Study Problem Should Be  
Able to Consult Peiping

By Walter Sullivan

LAKE SUCCESS, Oct. 4. - Secretary of State Dean Acheson today proposed that a United Nations commission be established to study the Formosan problem and that it be empowered to visit both that Island and Peiping and consult with whom-ever it deems necessary to arrive at its decision.

The commission should not be a static group in a chamber at Lake Success, listening to witnesses, Mr. Acheson said. It should be able, if it wishes, to consult both Nationalist and Communist leaders, if it so desires, as well as the native Formosans, he declared.

Such a study would require time, he added, and it probably would not be possible for the proposed commission to report its findings until next year's session of the General Assembly.

The Secretary of State spoke briefly on the Formosan problem at a press conference for correspondents covering the General Assembly here. Afterward he elaborated somewhat on his remarks.

The proposal that a United Nations commission be established to study the Formosan problem has not yet been placed before the General Assembly. However, the United States has proposed that the question of the future of Formosa be put on the Assembly agenda.

The Assembly's General Committee is due to meet tomorrow with this United States proposal as its chief order of business.

Mr. Acheson told the press hopefully that there was reason to believe Communist China would not send troops into North Korea. He declined to make a flat prediction, but said that any country seeking acceptance among the nations of the world would not attack United Nations forces.

Comments on U.S. Formosa Step

Mr. Acheson was asked if the U.S. commitment to prevent an invasion of Formosa would end when fighting stopped in Korea. He replied that the original decision to enter the Formosan scene had been out of military necessity and had nothing to do with the future status of that territory.

FILE COPY

A.&F

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OTTAWA

October 4 19 50

No. Y-2940

Sir,

I enclose the document (s) listed below.

50056-A-40  
27 | 27

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

The Canadian Ambassador,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

A.D.P. HEENEY

for the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT	SUBJECT
Despatch No.298 of September 7, 1950 from Karachi.	Formosa.

FILE COPY

A.&F.E./P.G.R.Campbell/el

1510

SECRET

Ext. 140

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OTTAWA

October 4 19 50.

No. Y-2917

Sir,

I enclose the document (s) listed below.

50056-A-40  
27/27

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

The Canadian Ambassador,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

A.D.P. HEENEY,

for the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT	SUBJECT
Telegram No.1884 of October 2, 1950 from London.	Formosa.

*File* EXT. 97.

# MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

FILE REF.	

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA,  
NEW DELHI, INDIA.

50056-A-40
27   27

Message To Be Sent EN CLAIR <input type="checkbox"/> CODE <input type="checkbox"/> CYPHER <i>OTL</i> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	No. <i>134</i>	Date October 3, 1950	For Communications Office Use Only SENT -- OCT 03 1950
	Degree of Priority		
ORIGINATOR Sig. _____ Typed: A.R. Menzies / MCC Div. Am. & F. E. Local Tel. 2991			
APPROVED BY Sig. <i>A.R. Menzies</i> Typed: _____			
Is This Message Likely To Be Published Yes ( ) No ( )			
Internal Distribution:			
Done _____ Date _____			
Copies Referred To:			
Done _____ Date _____			

Formosa.

Your telegram No. 211 of September 25.

The Minister would have no objection to your showing Bajpai and Nehru a copy of his letter to Acheson. You should point out, however, that this is a personal letter and the Minister would not like it to find its way into the files of the government of India.

OCT 3 11:01

RECEIVED  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FILE COPY

56056-A 40 |  
33 | 27

OTTAWA FILE
No.....
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

Letter N~~X~~ 614.....  
Date.... October 3, 1950.....

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA  
TO: The Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, NEW DELHI.  
Reference: Your despatch No. 394 of September 13, 1950.....  
Subject: Sir Girja Bajpai's Views on United States-Chinese Relations..

I have had a copy of your despatch No. 394 of September 13 sent down to the Minister, who is now in New York as Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations. Mr. Pearson's attention has been drawn to the fact that Sir Girja Bajpai particularly asked you to report his views to the Minister.

I am sure that Mr. Pearson will be interested to read your despatch because, as you know, he is most anxious that everything be done to prevent deep differences from arising with Asian countries over the China question.

A. R. MENZIES

*for the* Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs.

Copies Referred To.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
No. of Enclosures
.....
Post File
No.....

FILE COPY

Am.&F.E.Div./A.R.Menzies/MCC

October 3, 1950

NOTE FOR HEADS OF DIVISIONS MEETING

50056-A-40
27   27

Formosa

Mr. Menzies said that the United Kingdom Delegation to the General Assembly had circulated a draft resolution on Formosa which, after reciting the assignment of Formosa to China in the Cairo Declaration, proposed the establishment of a Commission to study the problem of Formosa and submit a report to the Assembly containing recommendations for the future. In the meantime, all parties were requested to refrain from seeking a solution of the issue by force. (SECRET)

A.R.Menzies

C O P Y

50056A-40  
27 | 27  
EXTRACT FROM PRESS RELEASE GA/668

FIFTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY - GENERAL COMMITTEE - SECOND MEETING  
GENERAL COMMITTEE VOTES TO RECOMMEND INCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL  
USSR ITEM ON "AGGRESSION AGAINST CHINA" IN ASSEMBLY AGENDA -  
APPROVES SETTING UP AD HOC POLITICAL COMMITTEE AND ALLOCATES  
AGENDA ITEMS

AT ITS SECOND MEETING, THE GENERAL COMMITTEE THIS MORNING  
TOOK THE FOLLOWING DECISIONS:

(1) TO POSTPONE A DECISION ON THE INCLUSION OF THE  
ADDITIONAL ITEM PROPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES -- "THE QUESTION  
OF FORMOSA" FOR TWO TO THREE DAYS.

THE POSTPONEMENT WAS REQUESTED BY DR. T.F. TSIANG OF CHINA,  
WHO HAD ALSO YESTERDAY MADE THE SAME REQUEST. DR. TSIANG SAID  
THAT HE HAD NOT AS YET RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS GOVERNMENT.  
HE DID NOT THINK THAT AN IMMEDIATE DECISION ON THE INCLUSION  
OF THIS ITEM WAS OF ANY SIGNIFICANCE OR THAT A DELAY OF TWO  
TO THREE DAYS WOULD HAMPER THE WORK OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

THE VOTE ON THE MOTION FOR POSTPONEMENT WAS FIVE IN FAVOR  
(CHINA, COLOMBIA, INDIA, THE NETHERLANDS, THAILAND), ONE AGAINST  
(AUSTRALIA), AND EIGHT ABSTENTIONS.

(2) TO RECOMMEND THE INCLUSION ON THE ASSEMBLY AGENDA OF  
THE ADDITIONAL ITEM PROPOSED BY THE USSR -- "COMPLAINT BY USSR  
OF AMERICAN AGGRESSION AGAINST CHINA."

WARREN R. AUSTIN OF THE UNITED STATES SAID THAT IN  
ACCORDANCE WITH ITS CUSTOMARY ATTITUDE THE UNITED STATES  
DELEGATION WOULD VOTE FOR THE INCLUSION OF THIS ITEM. THE  
UNITED STATES, MR. AUSTIN OBSERVED, BELIEVED THAT "IN FAIRNESS,"  
EVERY COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE ITS HEARING.

DR. TSIANG OPPOSED THE INCLUSION, AND DECLARED THAT THERE  
WAS "NOT EVEN THE FLIMSIEST PRIMA FACIE CASE" FOR THIS ITEM.

THE VOTE WAS 11 IN FAVOR OF INCLUSION, ONE AGAINST (CHINA),  
AND TWO ABSTENTIONS (NETHERLANDS, THAILAND).



C O P Y

EXTRACT FROM PRESS RELEASE GA/665 *m* *File*  
*Formosa* *JBRP*

FIFTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY - GENERAL COMMITTEE - FIRST MEETING  
GENERAL COMMITTEE DECIDES TO RECOMMEND INCLUSION OF 69 ITEMS  
IN ASSEMBLY AGENDA -- DEFERS ACTION ON TWO OTHERS

(5) TO POSTPONE A DECISION ON THE INCLUSION OF THE SECOND ADDITIONAL ITEM PROPOSED BY THE US -- "THE QUESTION OF FORMOSA" UNTIL AN EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE US DELEGATION. THIS WAS REQUESTED BY DR. T.F. TSIANG OF CHINA, AND WARREN R. AUSTIN OF THE UNITED STATES AGREED TO THIS PROCEDURE. IN THE DISCUSSION, YAKOV A. MALIK OF THE USSR ASKED MR. AUSTIN TO EXPLAIN WHAT WAS MEANT BY THIS ITEM. IF THE UNITED STATES INTENDED TO ASK THE ASSEMBLY TO DISCUSS THE STATUS OF FORMOSA, THEN, SAID MR. MALIK, THIS ITEM WAS "NOT RECEIVABLE", AND BESIDES, ITS INCLUSION WOULD BE CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 107 OF THE CHARTER. MR. AUSTIN REPLIED BY QUOTING SECRETARY ACHESONS STATEMENT IN THE ASSEMBLY YESTERDAY THAT THE US BELIEVED THAT THE QUESTION OF FORMOSA SHOULD NOT BE SETTLED BY FORCE OR UNILATERAL ACTION, BUT BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AND AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION BY ALL INTERESTED PARTIES.

MR. AUSTIN ADDED THAT HE WOULD ASK FOR A REFERRAL OF THIS ITEM TO THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY COMMITTEE;

(6) TO POSTPONE DECISION ON THE SECOND ADDITIONAL ITEM PROPOSED BY THE USSR -- "COMPLAINT BY USSR OF AMERICAN AGGRESSION AGAINST CHINA" (DOC. A/1375), UNTIL AN EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE SOVIET DELEGATION. THE POSTPONEMENT, MOVED BY SIR GLADWYN JEBB OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, WAS VOTED BY 11 IN FAVOR, 2 AGAINST (CZECHOSLOVAKIA, USSR); AND ONE ABSTENTION (IRAN). THE NEW WORDING OF THE ITEM WAS PROPOSED BY THE JAM SAHEB OF NAWANAGAR (INDIA), AND AGREED TO BY MR. MALIK:

50056-A	80
27	27

美 國 紐 約 中 華 公 府

CHINESE CONSOLIDATED BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION

16 MOTT STREET NEW YORK 13, N. Y.

TELEPHONES: WORTH 2-6683-6984

WOODROW CHAN  
PRESIDENT

EDWARD Y. T. LIN  
EXEC. SECRETARY

lee  
Kyu

October 2, 1950

50056-A-1  
27 27

Mr. Trygve Lie  
Secretary General, United Nations  
Lake Success, New York

In re: The future status of Formosa.

Sir:

In behalf of the Chinese-American people in the Eastern United States, we, the undersigned, as leading officers of the several civic and community organizations with headquarters in New York City, wish to take this opportunity to voice our sincere opinions on the issue of Formosa now pending before the United Nations.

We wish to state also that the views and popular sentiments which we present herewith were incorporated in resolutions unanimously adopted at a mass meeting held here in Chinatown, New York City, on August 20, 1950.

With full respect for the moral spirit and guiding principles of the United Nations Charter, we beg to call your fair-minded attention to the following:

We maintain that Formosa should be considered as an integral part of Chinese Territory. Our purpose is to substantiate this most clearly by setting forth the factual and historical evidence (in points 1-2-3) as well as to outline our arguments in terms of recent international agreements and world public opinion.

1. Historically, the island of Formosa was settled by Chinese emigrants from the provinces of Fukien and Kwantung beginning in the year 607 A.D., when the legend has it that Fukien fishermen, who wandered far offshore, discovered mountain ranges towering above the clouds on the Eastern Sea. Since the early part of the 15th century or the early Ming Dynasty, Chinese historical records invariably reported the island of Taiwan (as the Chinese call it) as a Chinese possession or territory, with the exception of the years 1895-1945, when it was wrested from China by Japanese aggressors. This was the reason why the arbitrary annexation of Formosa by Japan in 1895 was hated and challenged relentlessly by the Chinese people until its liberation and return in 1945.

1-12-32(85)

2. It is a well known fact that ethnologically speaking, well over 95% of the population in Formosa are people of Chinese descent who have emigrated to the island since the beginning of the 7th century, or the Sui dynasty in Chinese history. Their language, culture, and customs have always been inseparable from those of their kinsmen on the mainland. The incessant efforts of Japan to colonize and assimilate the Formosan people failed to bring about any appreciable changes in their thoughts and traditions; but on the contrary, these have remained essentially Chinese through the fifty year period of attempted subjugation by the Japanese imperialists.

3. Since the early 15th century Taiwan (meaning "the fort on the sea curve"), i.e. Formosa, and the Pascadores have been recorded steadily as Chinese possessions or tributary countries. The geographical proximity, coupled with their racial and cultural ties with the Chinese mainland, placed these islands in a mutually interdependent position with respect to China. Thus, in practically every Chinese geography book published during the past five centuries, Formosa was treated invariably as a Chinese dependency or territory. In 1782 the Emperor Chien Lung formally incorporated the island into the province of Fukien on the mainland to be administered by a district governor, or a tao-tai.

Now, the restoration of Formosa to China not only has been the object of undivided demand by the Chinese people, but also has been favored by public opinion in all the civilized world. The now famous Cairo declaration in December 1943, later reaffirmed by the Potsdam Conference, that "Manchuria, Formosa and the Pascadores shall be restored to the Republic of China", has been universally approved by both Chinese and world opinion.

In truth, ever since the Sino-Japanese conflict of 1895, the loss of Formosa to Japan has been the foremost object of popular indignation in the minds of the Chinese people. Up till the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and Shanghai in 1931, Chinese patriots all over the world regarded the restoration of Formosa as the key issue in China's troubled relations with her aggressive neighbor. To rob China of her chief prize of victory or revenge over Japan, after she has fought so valiantly and determinedly for a period of fifteen years (1931-1945) and at enormous costs in lives and property destroyed by the Japanese invaders, is surely to sow the seeds of international dissension and animosity that might erupt into another world conflict.

Furthermore, the general feeling among the Chinese people is that the current suggestion that the future status of Formosa be made a subject for investigation and consideration by the United Nations is both legally untenable and practically unsound. For if that were to be the case with Formosa, why not also bring up to question the future status of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriel Islands, which were occupied by Russia, and the numerous Pacific Islands such as Saipan, Marshall and Caroline groups, which were occupied by the U.S., after the surrender of Japan?

Mr. Trygve Lie

-3-

In conclusion, on the basis of the foregoing statement of facts and reasonings, we feel conscience-bound to submit our honest belief and true feeling on the status of Formosa, i.e. Historically and juridically the island should be considered as an integral part of China, and that any proposal to separate or detach it from the Chinese nation under any form or pretext, is bound to be regarded by the Chinese people as an unjust act, in violation of their nation's vital rights and interests. We, therefore, wish to state for your kind attention and consideration that each one of the suggested plans, such as, to place Formosa under a United Nations Mandate or trusteeship, to set it free and independent, or to give it back to Japan, should be dismissed as basically misguided and unwarranted plots that are fraught with dangers of future troubles and destined to be refuted by world-wide public opinion.

Respectfully yours,

THE CHINESE CONSOLIDATED BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC.

By W. H. H. Lee 李中河  
President

The Chinese Chamber of Commerce  
154 Canal St., NYC By Young Nai Lee  
President

The Lin Sing Association Inc.  
47 Mott St., N.Y.C. By Paul D. Lim 練天然  
Chairman

The Ming Yong Association Inc.  
9 East Broadway NYC By K. G. Lee  
Chairman

The On Leong Merchants Association  
41 Mott St., NYC By Chan Jork  
Chairman

The Hip Sing Association Inc.  
16 Pell St., NYC By Dick Wong  
Chairman

The Kuo Ming Tang  
167 Canal St., NYC By Y. S. Wong  
Chairman

Ming Chi Tang  
22 Mott St., NYC By Y. K. Moy  
Chairman

CHINESE SEAMEN'S UNION  
#2 Soberys Street, NYC

By Henry T. Chan

CHINESE COMMUNITY CLUB

By Arthur Lee, MD

TSUNG TSIN ASSOCIATION  
20 E. B'way, NYC

BY Chun Saon Yin

TAI FUN BENEVOLENT ASS'N  
47 Bayard St., NYC

BY Woodward Lee

KANG JAI ASSOCIATION  
86 Schermerhorn St.  
Brooklyn, N.Y.

BY Chan A. Kim

AMERICAN LEGION, Kim Lau Post  
196 Canal St., NYC

BY Mon Jank Lee

CHINESE AMERICAN RESTAURANTS ASS'N  
173 Canal St., NYC

BY Chung Sa Ping

CHINESE WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION  
64 Mott St., NYC

BY Mrs. S. F. Lee - S. Y. Yeung  
李揚素影

FUKIEN BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION  
175 Canal Street, NYC

BY Chao-Ming Chen Pres.  
Lois Y. T. Lin Exec. Vice-Pres

HOP SAM ASSOCIATION  
42 Mott Street, NYC

BY Samuel Chay

SAM KIANG ASSOCIATION  
22 E. Broadway, NYC

BY Peter Shen

CHINESE HAND LAUNDRY ASS'N  
196 Canal St. NYC

BY G. Ping He

CHINESE FIRST PRESBYT. CHURCH  
225 E. 31st St., NYC

BY K. C. Yung (Rev.) 楊國榮

TUNG ON SOCIAL CLUB  
1) 10 Chatham Sq. NYC

BY Mon Shew Shee

CHINESE MUSICAL & THEATRICAL  
ASSOCIATION  
173 Canal St., NYC

BY Moy Chong

LUN YEE ASSOCIATION  
173 Canal St. NYC

BY Chan 'OK

WAH PEI ASSOCIATION, INC.  
229 Park Row

BY Harish Gindge

CHUNG SHAN ASS'N  
12 Bowery

BY Edward Chin

SUN WEI ASSOCIATION  
15 Bowery, NYC

BY Kuan Dick Eng

FAY CHOW MERCHANTS ASS'N  
( 89 E. B'way, NYC

BY George Wang

YEE SHAN CLUB  
182 Park Row, NYC

BY Yeung Fook Yip

KING LUN ASSOCIATION  
~~15 Bowery, NYC~~  
12 Mott St

BY Edward Chin

NUM SHUN ASSOCIATION  
100 Bowery, NYC

BY W. W. Chee

HOY YIN ASS'N  
195 Canal St., NYC

BY Chan Jock

CHOW LUN LIN YEE ASS'N  
173 CANAL St.

Lee Chin

YAN PING GUNG ~~Ass'n~~  
87 Broadway, N.Y.C.

BY Eng Chin

TAI LOOK MERCHANTS ASS'N  
74 Hicks St.  
Brooklyn, NY

BY Lum Kay Fung

ENG SUEY SUN ASS'N  
% 5 Mott St., NYC

BY John A. Eng

GEE TUCK SAM TUCK ASS'N  
173 Canal St.

BY Harry H. Coy

SAM YICK ASS'N

BY Yung Chong Fung

LUN KUNG ASS'N 龍園  
& 7 e. B'way.

L. Ho Long

LEE'S FAMILY ASS'N  
L 18 Mott St., NYC

BY William Lee

SOO YUEN TONG  
68 Mott St.

BY Fong Wick

GEE HOW OAK TIN ASS'N  
62 Bayard St.

Chai Sney King

Mr. Trygve Lie-United Nations

P. 6

CHOW LUN LIN YEE ASS'N  
173 Canal St., NYC

BY Wai Tai Lam

Chinese Dramatic & Benevolent Association  
169 Canal Street, City

BY Frank H. G. Joy

TOM'S FAMILY ASSOCIATION

BY J. G. Horn

Seeto Family Association

BY Sing Yee Seto

譚錫金

MOY'S FAMILY ASS'N  
68 Bayard St.

BY Song Kuo Moy

YEE FONG TOY ASS'N  
175 Canal Street, NYC

BY Yee Kai Wah

LUNG KUNG ASS'N  
7 E. Broadway

BY L. K. Ling

Leong's Family Ass'n

BY S. T. Liang

Wong Kung Ha ASS'n

BY Wong Kung Ha

LUM'S Family ASS'N

BY Lin Yee Fook 林毓德

ACCESS REVIEWED:

RECORD GROUP 25

ACC. 90-91/208

VOL/BOX 173 4724

FILE 50056-A-40 pt 4

Open PD  Closed

Date 10/6/90



PROS

HONORARY CO-CHAIRMEN  
HON. WARREN R. AUSTIN • HON. JOSEPH C. GREW  
STEERING COMMITTEE

SEN. PAUL I. DOUGLAS, HON. CHARLES EDISON, REP. WALTER H. JUDD, SEN. KENNETH B. KEATING, HON. H. ALEXANDER SMITH, REP. FRANCIS E. WALTER  
TREASURER DR. B. A. GARSIDE • SECRETARY MR. MARVIN LIEBMAN

**THE COMMITTEE OF ONE MILLION**  
*Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations*

SUITE 909 • 79 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK 16, NEW YORK • MURRAY HILL 5-0190

NON-CONGRESSIONAL  
MEMBERS

(Partial List)

Mr. Robert S. Allen  
Rev. Theo. W. Anderson  
Mr. Murray Baron  
Hon. Alvin M. Bentley  
Mr. James G. Blaine  
Mr. L. Brent Bozell  
Gen. Lewis H. Brereton  
Mr. George Bucher  
Mr. Wm. F. Buckley, Jr.  
Col. Laurence E. Bunker  
Mr. James Burnham  
Mr. Noel F. Busch  
Miss Taylor Caldwell  
Mr. John Chamberlain  
Mr. W. H. Chamberlain  
Gen. Lucius D. Clay  
Prof. Kenneth Colegrove  
Mr. Seaborn P. Collins  
Fr. Dennis J. Comey, S.J.  
Adm. Charles M. Cooke  
Bishop Fred P. Corson  
Hon. Thomas J. Cuite  
Mr. C. Suydam Cutting  
Mr. Moishes Decter  
Mr. Cleveland E. Dodge  
Mr. John Dos Passos  
Dr. Paul F. Douglass  
Mr. Max Eastman  
Mr. Christopher Emmet  
Mr. James T. Farrell  
Mr. Bob Feller  
Mrs. Geraldine Fitch  
Hon. Ralph E. Flanders  
Mr. Clifford Forster  
Mr. Hollis P. Gale  
Mr. Arthur J. Goldsmith  
Mr. J. Peter Grace, Jr.  
Mr. Albert M. Greenfield  
Dr. Magnus I. Gregersen  
Adm. J. L. Hall, Jr.  
Gen. E. N. Harmon  
Rev. Frederick Brown Harris  
Adm. Thomas C. Hart  
Gen. John R. Hodge  
Mr. Sal B. Hoffmann  
Prof. Sidney Hook  
Hon. Stanley K. Hornbeck  
Hon. Donald L. Jackson  
Gen. Robert W. Johnson  
Prof. Horace M. Kallen  
Mr. H. V. Kaltenborn  
Mr. Ben Kaufman  
Gen. George C. Kenney  
Mr. Walter Kirschenbaum  
Mr. Frank L. Kluckhohn  
Hon. Wm. F. Knowland  
Mrs. Alfred Kohiberg  
Mr. Victor Lasky  
Dr. Emil Lengyel  
Mr. Marx Lewis  
Mr. Eli Lilly  
Mr. William Loeb  
Adm. Leland P. Lovette  
Gen. Frank E. Lowe  
Mr. Henry R. Luce  
Mr. Eugene Lyons  
Mr. Arthur G. McDowell  
Fr. F. A. McGuire, C.M.  
Bishop Leslie R. Marston  
Hon. Edward Martin  
Dr. Frank L. Meloney  
Mr. Adolph Menjou  
Mr. Frank S. Meyer  
Miss Emma De Long Mills  
Hon. Robert Morris  
Mr. Norbert Muhlen  
Mrs. Robert B. Patterson  
Rev. Norman Vincent Peale  
Col. Bruce Pirnie  
Rev. Daniel A. Poling  
Miss Katherine Anne Porter  
Adm. Arthur W. Radford  
Mr. Serafino Romualdi  
Prof. O. Glenn Saxon  
Mr. George S. Schuyler  
Dr. Aura E. Severinghaus  
Mr. Leslie R. Severinghaus  
Bishop Bernard J. Sheil  
Mr. Boris Shub  
Mr. Igor I. Sikorsky  
Bishop John M. Springer  
Dr. Robert G. Sproul  
Adm. William H. Standley  
Adm. Emory D. Stanley  
Dr. Wendell M. Stanley  
Hon. J. Leighton Stuart  
Prof. George E. Taylor  
Archbishop Theodotus  
Mr. Ralph de Toledano  
Gen. James A. Van Fleet  
Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer  
Bishop Herbert Welch  
Mr. William L. White  
Dr. Maurice William  
Dr. W. Carlos Williams  
Dr. Karl A. Wittfogel  
Dr. Max Yergan

*For Eastern  
for info.*

*JL 50056-A-40*

May 11, 1962

Dear Friend:

This letter is to ask you to join in lending your financial support to the work of our Committee Of One Million. The coming months will be crucial to our efforts to maintain continued American opposition to the admission of Communist China to the U.N. or any other steps which might build the power and prestige of the Peiping regime.

We earnestly believe that our Committee's work during the past years has played a large part in mobilizing and maintaining the American people's steadfast resolve to protect and strengthen a critical area of our national security which is threatened by the aggressive rulers of Communist China. We enclose a brief report of our work last year. Of particular interest was the successful national circulation of a Petition which was signed by more than 1,250,000 Americans and was endorsed by 351 Members of Congress; 55 Senators and 296 Representatives; 171 Democrats and 180 Republicans.

Since the beginning of this year, our Committee has published and reprinted pertinent material which is being widely distributed throughout the country. This distribution helps to keep the American people informed on the great issue at stake. It serves to arm citizens with the facts to counter the continuing campaign of a small group of American individuals, organizations and publications which would have the United States offer substantial concessions to Communist China in terms of admission to the U.N., diplomatic recognition, trade or other relations. Thanks to the generosity of our friends throughout the country, we have lowered our financial deficit substantially and are now prepared to go ahead with a vigorous national program.

This year is a national election year. The fifty states will elect Representatives and Senators. Those who are elected will be entrusted with maintaining our present policy toward Communist China which, we believe, reflects the sentiments of the overwhelming majority of the American people. In order to keep the electorate informed, we wish to give each individual running for federal office the opportunity to declare publicly his views on Communist China. We plan to do this by circulating a statement (which served as the text of our Petition, and is printed on the reverse side of our letterhead) to all candidates for federal office with a request that they join in giving it their endorsement. This will be one phase of our work during the coming months.

Our Committee must depend on the financial support of public-spirited Americans such as yourself to carry on our work. We can hold the line if funds are available. If not, then our work must be seriously curtailed or even discontinued. We hope that you will take this opportunity to send us your contribution

Sincerely yours,

*Warren R. Austin*

Warren R. Austin

*Charles Edison*

Charles Edison

*Joseph C. Grew*

Joseph C. Grew

*H. Alexander Smith*


H. Alexander Smith

*Statement submitted by the Committee Of One Million to the Congress of the United States  
and signed by 1,250,000 Americans.*

We continue to oppose the seating of Communist China in the United Nations, thus upholding international morality and keeping faith with the thousands of American youths who gave their lives fighting Communist aggression in Korea. To seat a Communist China which defies, by word and deed, the principles of the U.N. Charter would be to betray the letter, violate the spirit and subvert the purposes of that Charter. We further continue to oppose United States diplomatic recognition or any other steps which would build the power and prestige of the Chinese Communist regime to the detriment of our friends and allies in Asia and of our national security. Any such action would break faith with our dead and the unfortunate Americans still wrongfully imprisoned by Communist China and would dishearten our friends and allies in Asia whose continued will to resist Communist China's pressures and blandishments is so vital to our own security interests in that part of the world.

## CONGRESSIONAL ENDORSERS

Rep. Watkins M. Abbott	Rep. Robert B. Chipfield	Rep. William J. Green, Jr.	Rep. Torbert H. MacDonald	Rep. John J. Rooney
Rep. Thomas G. Abernethy,	Rep. Marguerite Stitt Church	Rep. Robert P. Griffin	Rep. Clark MacGregor	Rep. Daniel Rostenkowski
Rep. E. Ross Adair	Rep. Donald D. Clancy	Rep. Martha W. Griffiths	Rep. Peter F. Mack, Jr.	Rep. Richard L. Roudebush
Rep. Joseph P. Addabbo	Rep. Frank M. Clark	Rep. H. Gross	Rep. Ray J. Madden	Rep. John H. Roussetot
Rep. Hugh J. Addonizio	Rep. Merwin Coad	Rep. Charles S. Gubser	Rep. George H. Mahon	Rep. Katharine St. George
Rep. Carl Albert	Rep. Harold R. Collier	Rep. Harlan Hagen	Rep. William S. Mailliard	Rep. Fernand J. St. Germain
Rep. Hugh Q. Alexander	Rep. William M. Colmer	Rep. James A. Haley	Sen. Mike Mansfield	Sen. Leverett Saltonstall
Rep. Dale Alford	Rep. Silvio O. Conte	Rep. Durward G. Hall	Rep. Fred Marshall	Rep. John P. Saylor
Rep. Bruce Alger	Rep. Harold D. Cooley	Rep. Seymour Halpern	Rep. Dave Martin	Rep. Henry C. Schadeberg
Sen. Gordon Allott	Rep. Robert J. Corbett	Rep. Ralph R. Harding	Rep. Joseph W. Martin, Jr.	Rep. Paul F. Schenck
Rep. H. Carl Andersen	Sen. Norris Cotton	Rep. Porter Hardy, Jr.	Rep. Noah M. Mason	Rep. Gordon H. Scherer
Sen. Clinton P. Anderson	Rep. William C. Cramer	Rep. Oren Harris	Rep. D. R. Matthews	Rep. Herman T. Schneebeli
Rep. John B. Anderson	Rep. Glenn Cunningham	Rep. Burr P. Harrison	Rep. Catherine May	Sen. Andrew F. Schoepel
Rep. Victor L. Anfuso	Rep. Willard S. Curtin	Rep. William Henry Harrison	Rep. Chester E. Mellow	Rep. Richard S. Schweiker
Rep. Leslie C. Arends	Sen. Carl T. Curtis	Rep. William H. Harsha, Jr.	Rep. Robert H. Michel	Sen. Hugh Scott
Rep. John M. Ashbrook	Rep. Thomas B. Curtis	Rep. James Harvey	Rep. George P. Miller	Rep. Ralph J. Scott
Rep. Robert T. Ashmore	Rep. Paul B. Dague	Rep. Ralph Harvey	Sen. Jack Miller	Rep. William W. Scranton
Rep. James C. Auchincloss	Rep. Dominick V. Daniels	Rep. Wayne L. Hays	Rep. William E. Miller	Rep. Horace Seely-Brown, Jr.
Rep. William H. Avery	Rep. Clifford Davis	Rep. James C. Healey	Rep. William H. Milliken, Jr.	Rep. John F. Shelley
Rep. Cleveland M. Bailey	Rep. James J. Delaney	Rep. F. Edward Hebert	Rep. Walter H. Moeller	Rep. George E. Shipley
Rep. Howard H. Baker	Rep. John H. Dent	Rep. Ken Hechler	Rep. John S. Monagan	Rep. Don Short
Rep. John F. Baldwin	Rep. Steven B. Derounian	Rep. A. Sydney Herlong, Jr.	Sen. A. S. Mike Monroney	Rep. Abner W. Sibal
Rep. Walter S. Baring	Rep. Edward J. Derwinski	Sen. Bourke B. Hickenlooper	Rep. Joseph M. Montoya	Rep. Robert L. F. Sikes
Rep. William A. Barrett	Rep. Samuel L. Devine	Rep. Edgar W. Hiestand	Rep. Arch A. Moore, Jr.	Sen. George A. Smathers
Rep. Robert R. Barry	Rep. Charles C. Diggs, Jr.	Rep. Charles B. Hoesven	Rep. James H. Morrison	Sen. Benjamin A. Smith, II
Rep. William H. Bates	Sen. Everett McKinley Dirksen	Rep. Elmer J. Hoffman	Sen. Thruston B. Morton	Rep. H. Allen Smith
Rep. James F. Battin	Sen. Thomas J. Dodd	Rep. Elmer J. Holland	Rep. Morgan M. Moulder	Rep. Frank E. Smith
Sen. J. Glenn Beall	Rep. Robert Dole	Sen. Spessard L. Holland	Rep. Abraham J. Multer	Rep. Howard W. Smith
Rep. Frank J. Becker	Rep. Peter H. Dominick	Rep. Walt Horan	Rep. Walter M. Mumma	Sen. Margaret Chase Smith
Rep. Ralph F. Beermann	Rep. Harold D. Donohue	Rep. Craig Hosmer	Sen. Karl E. Mundt	Rep. William L. Springer
Rep. Page Belcher	Rep. Edwin B. Dooley	Sen. Roman L. Hruska	Rep. William T. Murphy	Rep. Robert T. Stafford
Rep. Alphonzo E. Bell, Jr.	Rep. W. J. Bryan Dorn	Rep. George Huddleston, Jr.	Rep. Tom Murray	Rep. Samuel S. Stratton
Rep. Charles E. Bennett	Sen. Paul H. Douglas	Rep. W. R. Hull, Jr.	Rep. Ancher Nelsen	Sen. Stuart Symington
Sen. Wallace F. Bennett	Rep. John Dowdy	Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey	Rep. Robert N. C. Nix	Rep. John Taber
Rep. E. Y. Berry	Rep. Thomas N. Downing	Rep. John Jarman	Rep. Walter Norblad	Rep. Roy A. Taylor
Rep. Jackson E. Betts	Rep. Clyde Doyle	Rep. W. Pat Jennings	Rep. W. F. Norrell	Rep. Charles M. Teague
Sen. Alan Bible	Rep. Edwin R. Durno	Rep. Ben F. Jensen	Rep. Hjalmar C. Nygaard	Rep. Vernon W. Thomson
Rep. Iris F. Blich	Rep. Florence P. Dwyer	Rep. August E. Johansen	Rep. Leo W. O'Brien	Rep. Homer Thornberry
Sen. J. Caleb Boggs	Sen. James O. Eastland	Rep. Lester R. Johnson	Rep. Thomas J. O'Brien	Sen. Strom Thurmond
Rep. Hale Boggs	Sen. Allen J. Ellender	Rep. Charles Raper Jonas	Rep. Alvin E. O'Konski	Rep. Herman Toll
Rep. Frances P. Bolton	Rep. Carl Elliott	Rep. Paul C. Jones	Rep. Arnold Olsen	Rep. Thor C. Tollefson
Rep. Frank T. Bow	Sen. Sam J. Ervin, Jr.	Rep. Walter H. Judd	Rep. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.	Sen. John G. Tower
Rep. Frank W. Boykin	Rep. Robert A. Everett	Rep. Carroll D. Kearns	Rep. Frank C. Osmer, Jr.	Rep. James W. Trimble
Rep. William G. Bray	Rep. Joe L. Evins	Sen. Kenneth B. Keating	Rep. Harold C. Ostertag	Rep. William M. Tuck
Rep. J. Floyd Breeding	Rep. Dante B. Fascell	Rep. Hastings Keith	Sen. John O. Pastore	Rep. James B. Utt
Sen. Styles Bridges	Rep. Michael A. Feighan	Rep. Edna F. Kelly	Rep. Thomas M. Pelly	Rep. William K. Van Pelt
Rep. James E. Bromwell	Rep. Ivor D. Fenton	Rep. Eugene J. Keogh	Rep. M. Blaine Peterson	Rep. George M. Wallhauser
Rep. Overton Brooks	Rep. Paul Findley	Rep. Clarence E. Kilburn	Rep. Gracie Pfof	Rep. Francis E. Walter
Rep. William S. Broomfield	Rep. Paul A. Fino	Rep. Carleton J. King	Rep. Philip J. Philbin	Rep. Phil Weaver
Rep. Joel T. Broyhill	Rep. O. Clark Fisher	Rep. David S. King	Rep. Alexander Pirnie	Rep. Jessica McC. Weis
Rep. Donald C. Bruce	Rep. Daniel J. Flood	Rep. A. Paul Kitchin	Rep. William R. Poage	Rep. Jack Westland
Rep. Charles A. Buckley	Rep. John E. Fogarty	Rep. Horace R. Kornegay	Rep. Richard H. Poff	Rep. J. Irving Whalley
Rep. James A. Burke	Sen. Hiram L. Fong	Sen. Thomas H. Kuchel	Rep. Melvin Price	Rep. J. Ernest Wharton
Sen. Prescott Bush	Rep. Gerald R. Ford, Jr.	Rep. Melvin R. Laird	Sen. Winston L. Prouty	Rep. Basil L. Whitener
Sen. John Marshall Butler	Rep. E. L. Forrester	Rep. Phil Landrum	Sen. William Proxmire	Rep. Jamie L. Whitten
Sen. Robert C. Byrd	Rep. L. H. Fountain	Rep. Thomas J. Lane	Rep. Roman C. Pucinski	Rep. Victor Wickersham
Rep. James A. Byrne	Rep. James B. Frazier, Jr.	Rep. Odin Langen	Rep. Albert H. Quie	Rep. William B. Widnall
Rep. William T. Cahill	Rep. Peter Frelinghuysen, Jr.	Rep. Delbert L. Latta	Rep. Louis C. Rabaut	Sen. Alexander Wiley
Sen. Homer E. Capehart	Rep. Samuel N. Friedel	Sen. Frank J. Lausche	Sen. Jennings Randolph	Rep. John Bell Williams
Rep. Hugh L. Carey	Rep. James G. Fulton	Rep. Alton Lennon	Rep. John H. Ray	Rep. Edwin E. Willis
Sen. Frank Carlson	Rep. Peter A. Garland	Rep. John Lesinski	Rep. Ben Reifel	Rep. Bob Wilson
Sen. John A. Carroll	Rep. J. Vaughan Gary	Rep. J. Carlton Loser	Rep. John J. Rhodes	Rep. Earl Wilson
Sen. Clifford P. Case	Rep. E. C. Gathings	Sen. John L. McClellan	Rep. R. Walter Riehlman	Rep. Arthur Winstead
Sen. Francis Case	Rep. Leon H. Gavin	Rep. William M. McCulloch	Rep. John J. Riley	Rep. James C. Wright
Rep. Robert R. Casey	Rep. Milton W. Glenn	Rep. Gordon L. McDonough	Rep. L. Mendel Rivers	Sen. Ralph W. Yarborough
Rep. Elford A. Cederberg	Sen. Barry Goldwater	Rep. Harris B. McDowell, Jr.	Sen. A. Willis Robertson	Sen. Milton R. Young
Rep. Charles E. Chamberlain	Rep. Charles E. Goodell	Rep. Clifford G. McIntire	Rep. Howard W. Robison	Rep. J. Arthur Younger
Rep. George O. Chambers	Rep. George A. Goodling	Rep. John L. McMillan	Rep. Peter W. Rodino, Jr.	Rep. Clement J. Zablocki
Rep. Frank Chelf	Rep. Kathryn E. Granahan	Rep. Harold B. McSween	Rep. Byron G. Rogers	Rep. Herbert Zelenko
Rep. J. Edgar Chenoweth	Rep. Kenneth J. Gray	Rep. Walter L. McVey	Rep. Paul G. Rogers	



HONORARY CO-CHAIRMEN  
HON. WARREN R. AUSTIN • HON. JOSEPH C. GREW  
STEERING COMMITTEE

SEN. F. DOUGLAS, HON. CHARLES EDISON, REP. WALTER H. JUDD, SEN. KENNETH B. KEATING, HON. H. ALEXANDER SMITH, REP. FRANCIS E. WALTER  
TREASURER DR. B. A. GARSIDE • SECRETARY MR. MARVIN LIEBMAN

**THE COMMITTEE OF ONE MILLION**  
*Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations*

SUITE 909 • 79 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK 16, NEW YORK • MURRAY HILL 5-0190

MEMORANDUM

January, 1962

TO: Steering Committee

FROM: Marvin Liebman, Secretary

RE: Report on Activities and Progress during 1961

We begin this report with a conclusion - a conclusion which we are happy to announce. On December 15, 1961, the General Assembly of the United Nations rejected a Soviet Resolution to seat Communist China. Forty-seven nations joined with the United States in voting against the admission of Red China; 37 voted for admission; 19 abstained. This was a clear-cut victory!

A large factor in achieving these gratifying results was the constant enunciation of American public opinion in opposition to the admission of Red China to the U.N. The sentiments of the American people were brought to the attention of the United Nations time and again through the efforts of the Committee of One Million. Of particular importance was the tremendous Congressional support received by our Committee. All of us associated in this endeavor have reason to be proud of our work during the past year and to feel satisfied with the results of our efforts.

Of added interest - and of equal importance to the vote against seating Red China - was another action taken by the General Assembly which stated that the matter of Chinese representation is an "important" question, and therefore any action must receive the affirmative votes of two-thirds of the General Assembly. This Resolution gives us another weapon in our continuing efforts to keep Red China out of the U.N.

Although we have achieved a substantial victory, the fight is far from over. Those individuals and groups which advocate the admission of Communist China to the U.N. - both overseas and in the United States - have suffered what they consider only a temporary setback. They have not given up! They will continue to exert every effort to achieve international recognition of the Peiping regime through advocacy of various preliminary steps to achieve their ultimate end. Among the ideas which will be promulgated over the next months will be: increased pressure for a "two-China" policy, i.e., recognition of both the Peiping regime and Free China as two separate entities; advocacy

of increased Free World trade with Red China; a campaign to establish trade and cultural relations between the United States and Red China; continuing efforts at fostering United States diplomatic recognition of the Peiping regime; continued promotion of the concept of a "split" between Communist China and Soviet Russia; etc.

An example of this new drive was the lead editorial which appeared in THE NEW YORK TIMES of Friday, December 29th, 1961 entitled "A Policy For China." In its editorial, THE TIMES came out flatly for United States diplomatic recognition of Red China and concluded by saying "...we shall at least have adapted our diplomacy to the reality of the existence of two Chinas." THE NEW YORK TIMES editorial is a harbinger of more to come.

As Americans who are dedicated to preserving the security of our nation against the massive threat posed by Communist China, we must keep alert to such moves and counter them in every way possible during the months ahead. The work of the Committee Of One Million is far from over. Indeed, our work will become even more difficult during the months ahead. We still require the support and cooperation of all Americans who believe with us that Communist China is our enemy and, as a matter of self-preservation, we must do everything possible to keep its power from growing.

What follows is a brief report of our activities during 1961:

#### CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT

Recognizing the importance of public support of our Committee by the Congress of the United States, we exerted every effort to enlist such Congressional participation. Our Committee was uniquely successful. In January, 1961, the following Statement was submitted to all Members of Congress by the Committee with a request that they lend their endorsement:

WE CONTINUE TO OPPOSE THE SEATING OF COMMUNIST CHINA IN THE UNITED NATIONS, THUS UPHOLDING INTERNATIONAL MORALITY AND KEEPING FAITH WITH THE THOUSANDS OF AMERICAN YOUTHS WHO GAVE THEIR LIVES FIGHTING COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN KOREA. TO SEAT A COMMUNIST CHINA WHICH DEFILES, BY WORD AND DEED, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE U.N. CHARTER WOULD BE TO BETRAY THE LETTER, VIOLATE THE SPIRIT AND SUBVERT THE PURPOSES OF THAT CHARTER. WE FURTHER CONTINUE TO OPPOSE UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OR ANY OTHER STEPS WHICH WOULD BUILD THE POWER AND PRESTIGE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST REGIME TO THE DETRIMENT OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN ASIA AND OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY. ANY SUCH ACTION WOULD BREAK FAITH WITH OUR DEAD AND THE UNFORTUNATE AMERICANS STILL WRONGFULLY IMPRISONED BY COMMUNIST CHINA AND WOULD DISHEARTEN OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN ASIA WHOSE CONTINUED WILL TO RESIST COMMUNIST CHINA'S PRESSURES AND BLANDISHMENTS IS SO VITAL TO OUR OWN SECURITY INTERESTS IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD.

Some 351 Members of Congress endorsed the Statement: 55 Senators and 296 Representatives; 171 Democrats and 180 Republicans. A full page advertisement was taken in the WASHINGTON POST in February, 1961 which quoted our Committee's Statement and the names of its Congressional endorsers. Publication of the advertisement had considerable impact - particularly in U.N. circles and in the new Administration. As a direct result of our campaign, a unanimous and Concurrent Resolution was passed by both the House and Senate in the summer of 1961 opposing the admission of Communist China to the U.N. Thus, our private citizens' endeavor became an official action of the United States.

#### PETITION CAMPAIGN

In April, 1961, in order to give individual Americans the opportunity to take public action on the question of the admission of Communist China to the U.N. - or recognition of the Peiping regime by the United States - our Committee began the nationwide circulation of a Petition directed to President Kennedy. The response to our Petition campaign surpassed our most optimistic expectations. By December 10, 1961, the signatures of over 1,250,000 Americans had been gathered and transmitted to the appropriate authorities. While Congress was still in session, our office transmitted the signatures to the Senators of the fifty states and, in turn, they were sent to the White House. After Congress adjourned, signatures were sent directly to President Kennedy through the offices of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. There is no doubt that this Petition campaign exerted a great influence in stiffening the United States stand against the admission of Red China to the U.N.

#### "RED CHINA - OUTLAW!"

On August 17th the Committee Of One Million released a 30 minute, 16 mm black and white sound documentary film entitled "Red China-Outlaw!" The film was narrated by Lowell Thomas. Appearing in the film were Senators Thomas J. Dodd and Paul H. Douglas; Congressman Walter H. Judd and U.S. Narcotic Commissioner Harry J. Anslinger. This film helped further to mobilize American public opinion and action on the issue of our concern. Some 270 prints of the film were circulated throughout the country and shown before local organizations. We estimate that over two million Americans have already had the opportunity to view the film.

#### CARNEGIE HALL RALLY

On September 21, 1961, the Committee of One Million held a mass public rally in Carnegie Hall, New York City, against the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. The Rally was addressed by Senator Thomas J. Dodd; Representatives Walter H. Judd and Francis E. Walter; William F. Buckley, Jr.; Dr. Daniel A. Poling; Bishop John W. Comber, M.M. Messages were received from hundreds of distinguished American leaders including former Presidents Herbert Hoover and Dwight D. Eisenhower; Senator Barry Goldwater; Richard M. Nixon; and Admiral Arthur W. Radford.

Madame Chiang Kai-shek made a special tape recording which was played at the Rally. Representatives of various U.N. delegations were present. This most successful public meeting was influential in showing U.N. delegations at first hand the deep sentiments of the American people on this issue.

PUBLICATIONS

During 1961, the Committee Of One Million published various original pamphlets and reprints which were distributed by the hundreds of thousands throughout the United States. This literature was effectively used as ammunition on the local level by Americans who wished to take public action.

Among these publications were: "The United States and China" (a reprint of a 1951 address by Dean Rusk); "A History of the Committee Of One Million" (from its inception in 1953); reprints of a special interview granted the Committee Of One Million by President Chiang Kai-shek; "Should the Chinese Communists be Admitted into the United Nations", an examination by Geraldine Fitch; "Admit Red China At Your Peril!" by Adm. Arthur W. Radford (a reprint from the Reader's Digest). Further, in cooperation with the American Asian Educational Exchange, the Committee distributed some 50,000 copies of "China and United States China Policy" by Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck; and "What China Policy" by Professor Vladimir Petrov of Yale.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

The above are some of the main points of our work during 1961. In addition, our Committee issued press releases; carried out correspondence throughout the country and the world to mobilize action against Red China being admitted to the U.N.; provided material and information to groups from the 50 states to help them mobilize local action, etc. The Committee Of One Million undertook the responsibility of mobilizing and articulating American public opinion against seating Red China in the U.N. and did everything within its power to carry out these responsibilities successfully.

FINANCES

During 1961, The Committee Of One Million received \$79,076.74 in contributions. We expended this amount and also incurred a deficit of \$23,108.98, which we must meet if we are to continue operating in 1962. One of our major problems has been the lack of adequate and, in particular, prior financing. What with our new responsibilities, it would be of the greatest possible value if we could have maximum funds in hand in advance so that we might properly plan our program and expenditures.

...

716 on 50056-A-40  
[ ]

CONFIDENTIAL

[ SDP 10/1/1 ]

CIRCULAR No. V 2

PASSPORT CONTROL DEPARTMENT,  
Foreign Office,  
January 24, 1962.

**Applications for Visas to visit the United Kingdom or Colonies  
by Chinese in possession of Nationalist Travel Documents**

Circular No. V 182 of December 23, 1960, refers.

Although Her Majesty's Government do not recognise the Chinese Nationalist authorities in Formosa, it has been the practice in suitable cases to grant visas on affidavits to allow holders of Nationalist travel documents to visit the United Kingdom or Colonies. In order to make clear the United Kingdom policy in this respect, set out below are some of the considerations involved when the Foreign Office decide whether or not to recommend to the Home Office that visas should be authorised.

2. *Private persons:* Assuming that they are personally acceptable, visas are normally granted to private individuals (businessmen, tourists, students, &c.) if they can produce satisfactory evidence of the purpose of their visit to support their applications, have reasonable financial means, and adequate "returnability".

3. *Groups:* In the case of groups of Chinese holding Nationalist travel documents, visas are normally granted on the conditions mentioned in paragraph 2 above, unless the group is known to be an official mission or is openly sponsored by the Nationalist authorities. The Home Office are normally asked to consider the

To Her Majesty's Consular Officers  
authorised to grant visas, and  
Visa Officers.

CONFIDENTIAL



refusal of visas in the case of groups whose movements have been publicised (in Formosa, Hong Kong or elsewhere) as being "Government-sponsored".

4. *Nationalist officials*: Are normally granted visas for private visits to the United Kingdom on the same conditions as private individuals, provided that the Foreign Office are satisfied that the visit concerned is genuinely unofficial. Applications by politicians and senior Nationalist officials to make private visits will be judged in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time, bearing in mind the importance of not giving grounds for a suspicion, however ill-founded, that such visits have any political significance.

5. Since the Nationalist authorities are at present seated as the representatives of China at the United Nations, Nationalist officials who wish to come to the United Kingdom on United Nations business are normally granted visas. In these cases, as in other cases of Nationalist officials, visas when authorised may be issued *gratis* on courtesy grounds as appropriate, but no diplomatic visas will be granted. (All visas for holders of Nationalist passports must be issued on affidavits). Visa applications by members of the Chinese (Nationalist) Mission at the United Nations who wish to visit this country for reasons not connected with the United Nations are considered as in paragraph 4 above.

6. "*Third Country Trainee Scheme Students*": Under this scheme American funds are provided for trainee students in a country other than the United States of America. In practice most students from Formosa are Government officials staying in the United Kingdom for two or three weeks. The Foreign Office normally recommend that they be granted visas provided that their stay is a brief one, but the British Council have been asked to refer to the Foreign Office for applications from such students for periods of about one month or longer.

7. *Nationalist visitors to Colonies*: As the Nationalist authorities are at present particularly anxious to make contact with the Governments of Colonial territories emerging to independence, and on occasion seek to do this through ostensibly non-official individuals and groups, particular care has to be taken over visa applications by holders of Nationalist passports who wish to visit such territories. It is important that any grounds for believing that an individual or group may have a function other than the one declared, or that the person or persons concerned is or are "Government-sponsored", should be reported when the visa application is forwarded to the Government concerned.

J. G. NICHOLSON.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

File 5005  
7

Subject

Date

Publication

# Text of Kennedy-Chen Communique

WASHINGTON, Aug. 20.—The text of a communique issued today by President Kennedy and Chen Cheng, Vice President and Premier of the Republic of China.

President Kennedy and Vice President Chen have concluded a series of cordial and constructive talks on a broad range of international problems and matters of common interest to the Governments and peoples of the United States and the Republic of China.

Foreign Minister Chen (Chang-hung), Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Ambassador to the Government of the Republic of China (George K. C. Tang), Ambassador (Ernest P.) Gruening, and other Chinese and United States officials participated in the conversations, which were characterized by a spirit of understanding and mutual interest consonant with the deep and lasting friendship between the two peoples.

The President, who at his personal initiative had invited the Vice President to the United States for these discussions, welcomed this opportunity to reaffirm the close ties between the Governments and peoples of the United States and the Republic of China.

In their review of the world situation, the President and the Vice President agreed that while Berlin is the current focus of world attention, this problem can be evaluated only against the background of the world-wide Communist challenge.

They agreed that although the free world has made serious efforts to relax world tensions, the belligerency of the Communist bloc has thus far rendered these efforts fruitless. They further agreed that free-world interests require the continued presence of free-world forces in West Berlin and the maintenance of the security and the vitality of West Berlin.

The President and the Vice President discussed at length the present situation in

and expressed their concern over the future of Laos.

The President stated that while he is hopeful that the Geneva conference on Laos will result in the emergence of a truly neutral and independent Laos, the United States will not support any arrangement which would result in Communist domination of that country.

The President stated that the United States is determined that the Republic of Vietnam shall not be lost to the Communists for lack of any support which the United States Government can render.

The President and the Vice President welcomed the announced policies of the new Korean Government to continue its partnership with the free world, to oppose communism, and to attack the economic problems that face the Korean people.

In their discussion of Chinese representation in the United Nations there was a candid and comprehensive exchange of views on all relevant issues, including the pending application for United Nations membership of Outer Mongolia and Mauritania.

### U. S. Backs Taiwan

The President reiterated firm United States support for continued representation of the Republic of China in the United Nations, of which she is a founding member. He also reaffirmed the United States determination to continue to oppose admission of the Chinese Communist regime to the United Nations.

The President and the Vice President expressed their intention to support the admission to the United Nations of the nations emerging into independence which meet the qualifications set forth in the Charter.

In this connection they noted with concern the Soviet veto which has frustrated the admission of Mauritania. The Vice President declared that the Republic of China has consistently supported admission of the newly independent states and that it will continue to support the

### Opposed admission of Mauritania

The President and the Vice President reviewed conditions in the Chinese mainland. In the economic field they noted that Communist mismanagement, unworkable agricultural policies, and the commune system have brought serious food shortages and grave hardships to the Chinese people.

They noted that reports from refugees and visitors indicate the magnitude of the apathy, discontent, and disillusionment on the mainland of China. They agreed that these developments provide vivid proof that the Communist regime cannot meet the genuine needs and desires of the Chinese people for economic and social progress.

### U. S. Aid Decreased

The President and the Vice President discussed United States assistance for the continued economic growth of Free China. The President noted the remarkable achievements of the past ten years in Taiwan, which have brought unprecedented improvements in the standard of living in public health and education, and in industrial and agricultural output.

He noted that, in contrast with the disregard for human rights manifested by the Chinese Communist regime, this record was accomplished without violence to the great traditions and human values which have been cherished throughout history by the Chinese people.

The President confirmed the intention of the United States Government to continue its military aid program in the Republic of China and to provide substantial assistance to the Republic of China in support of its economic development program designed to achieve accelerated social and economic progress for the welfare of the people of Free China.

In conclusion, the President and the Vice President recognized the importance of further strengthening the close cooperation and coordination of both countries in matters affecting their common security interests.

*Mr. Hilborn to see  
H. Hill  
J.M.W.*

*Please see p 3  
lee  
20/5*

CONFIDENTIAL

May 19, 1961.

5-0056-A-40	
20	-

MEMORANDUM TO THE MINISTER

Status of Formosa

---  
In the attached letter to you of April 29, Dr. K.H.W. Hilborn of Mount Allison University, Sackville, New Brunswick, expresses the hope that Canada will continue "to oppose the expulsion of Nationalist China in favour of a Communist delegation" at the United Nations, for he feels that to recognize the Communist Government as the legitimate representative of China at the United Nations would mean acknowledging that the Communist Government is the legitimate government of Formosa. Dr. Hilborn cites statements made in the House of Commons in 1952 by Mr. Pearson to the effect that Formosa is legally part of China.

2. As you know, the present legal status of Formosa is unclear and has been the subject of considerable discussion. The Cairo Declaration of December 1943 asserted that "all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China", but this was a declaration of intent rather than a conveyance. By the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Japan renounced any right to Formosa and the Pescadores, but they were not conferred upon anyone else by the Treaty and the present legal status of Formosa remains debatable.

3. However, it does not appear necessary to take a position on the legal status of Formosa in order to deal with the matter of primary concern to Dr. Hilborn, which is to the yielding of control over the people of Formosa to the Communist Government. This question has been dealt with directly in a statement which you made in the House of Commons on April 26 of this year in .\*

.... /2

19.5.31(us)

MINISTERS OFFICE  
-9032-  
MAY 19 1961

--- which you voiced your concern for the people of Formosa in the  
China - Formosa dispute. I attach for your signature, if you  
agree, a reply to Dr. Hilborn based upon this statement. As  
the Formosa - China problem in all its aspects is of considerable  
importance at the present time and is receiving careful study,  
it does not appear desirable in replying to Dr. Hilborn to go  
beyond the public statements which have already been made on  
this subject.

*Spent*  
*by SSEA*  
*20/5*  
*hl*

*sent 23/5*  
*mm*



N.A.R.

*J. W. ...*

Ottawa, May 19, 1961.

Dear Dr. Milburn,


Thank you for your interesting letter of April 29 on the question of Chinese representation at the United Nations and its possible bearing on the liberty of the inhabitants of Formosa. I am sorry that my absence from Ottawa at the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting and the Geneva Conference on Laos has prevented me from replying before now.

The problem of the representation of China at the United Nations is, as you know, an exceedingly complicated one and one which is occupying the minds of a great many people at the present time. While the solution to this question has not yet been found, I can assure you that I share your concern over the effect which the ultimate decision may have upon the millions of inhabitants of the Island of Formosa. I had occasion as recently as April 26 of this year to discuss this very problem in the House of Commons, at which time I made the following remarks:

*April 26/1961*

"Changes keep occurring everywhere, and certainly the question of Red China is one of the most interesting and important questions now under consideration by the External Affairs Department. Everyone knows the policy we have adopted, and if and when there is a change in that policy it will be announced in the ordinary manner. One fact Canadians should remember is that there are a great many people living on Formosa who are native Formosans. No one is anxious to have

E. H. W. Milburn, M.A., D.Phil.,  
Department of History,  
Mount Allison University,  
Sackville, New Brunswick.



lb.  
MAY 24 1961

Handwritten signature or initials, possibly "D.W. 25".

- 2 -

them turned over to Red China. I think this would be a disastrous move to make, yet Red China is not interested in recognition or entry into the United Nations unless her right to take over Formosa is accepted. This, of course, has been one of the very big obstacles in the way of taking steps to change the present situation. Eventually, the wishes of the people of Formosa will have to be an important factor. In considering this whole question, I suggest that it would be wise for Canadians not to forget the important factor of Formosa in the whole picture."

I hope that what I said then will serve to reassure you as to my own views on the question.

Yours sincerely,

HOWARD GREEN



Department of History *Far Eastern*  
MOUNT ALLISON UNIVERSITY  
SACKVILLE, NEW BRUNSWICK

SEEN BY THE MINISTER

*for copy*  
April 29, 1961. *1/5*

Hon. Howard Green, M.P.,  
Secretary of State for External Affairs,  
Department of External Affairs,  
Ottawa, Ontario.

SEEN BY THE MINISTER

Dear Mr. Green:

I am writing to express my hope that on the issue of Chinese representation in the United Nations, Canada will continue in 1961 to oppose the expulsion of Nationalist China in favour of a Communist delegation. It seems to me, indeed, that Canada should not merely use her own vote to resist expulsion of the Nationalists, but should exercise all the influence at her disposal in friendly capitals - for example in London - to create a majority in the General Assembly against the admission of the Communists to the Nationalists' seat.

You may recall that in the House of Commons on April 1, 1952, Mr. Lester Pearson - speaking for the Canadian Government - made the following assertions: "we have subscribed to international agreements recognizing Formosa as part of China . . . we recognize that now sovereignty legally resides in China . . . legally Formosa is part of China." (See the Canadian House of Commons Debates, Session of 1952, Vol. I, p. 1009.)

Now if Formosa is really "part of China" as Mr. Pearson said, and if the Communists are granted the Chinese seat in the United Nations as the one legitimate Government of China, then it follows that the United Nations must be recognizing the Communists as the legitimate Government of Formosa.

Such an outcome would obviously be intolerable. As a very minimum, in my opinion, Canada should make it clear to the world that any admission of the Mao Tse-tung dictatorship to the United Nations would have to be conditional on a Communist renunciation of claims to Formosa. If the Red dictatorship is admitted without such a condition being imposed, the United Nations will be strengthening Mao's hand in the Formosa question; and there would be little point in a free nation such as ours continuing to support an organization which deliberately attacked and jeopardized the liberties of 10,000,000 people.

Yours faithfully,

*K.H.W. Hilborn*

K.H.W. Hilborn, M.A., D.Phil.





CANADA

58056-A-40	
14	✓

orig on 12412-40

FOREIGN TRADE SERVICE

Letter No. 44  
FILE.....

P.O. Box 126,  
Hong Kong.

August 11, 1959.

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,  
Ottawa, Ontario,  
Canada.

Mr. Collins

Mr. Pope Dear Sir:

D.L.(2)

JIS (through

D.L.(2)

CCOS (6)

File

J.R. Sharpe  
/dl

VISIT TO TAIWAN OF ERIK DURSCHMIED

Mr. Erik Durschmied, a Canadian freelance T.V. producer who concentrates on programmes for the C.B.C. Wednesday evening show, "Close-up", stopped over here for a day and a half on his way back to Canada from a brief visit to Taiwan. While there, he recorded a number of interviews, the most interesting of which were with Chiang Kai-shek and Admiral Smoot. He expects his half hour programme to be on "Close-up" towards the end of August or early in September and I believe it might be worth while watching, not so much for the views presented as for the forcefulness with which they were advanced. Briefly the following are the more interesting points brought out in the interviews with Chiang and Smoot.

2. The Chiang interview lasted exactly 17 minutes and took the form of questions and answers, the questions having been submitted in advance. When asked if the Nationalists would return to China, Chiang naturally replied in the affirmative and argued that this would be possible as a result of internal collapse and revolution in China. When asked if the Communists would attack the offshore islands again, Chiang again replied in the affirmative and confidently stated that the Nationalists would repel these attacks without any difficulty. In answer to a further question on this subject he asserted that no global war would result from such military action. Mr. Durschmied pointed out that a recent public opinion poll in Canada had showed that 43% of the Canadian population opposed recognition of the Communist government of China and 32% favoured it and asked for Chiang Kai-shek's comments. Chiang expressed the view that Canadians would continue to be sensible in this matter with the majority continuing to oppose recognition of the Communists. He also pointed out that only a minority of governments throughout the world had recognized them and stated that this would continue to be the case.

3. The major point of interest brought out by Admiral Smoot was that the United States had demonstrated clearly to the Chinese Communists last August that they would support the Nationalists in the offshore islands and, according to Durschmied, he was absolutely unequivocal and extremely emphatic in stating that the United States would not permit the Communists to take the offshore islands should they attempt to do so. He also said that in last year's demonstration of American power to the Communists it had been obvious that the United States could deploy tremendous power speedily anywhere in the Pacific and for this reason he argued that the Communists would not again seriously attack the offshore islands.

4. Durschmied visited Quemoy and recorded interviews there with one or two local inhabitants and a Catholic priest. He was greatly impressed by the evident state of preparedness of the defending forces on the island. His request to interview Madam Chiang Kai-shek was refused.

5. He came to Hong Kong primarily to try to record an interview with one or more Chinese Communists in order to counter-balance the picture obtained in Taiwan. He got in touch with the local Communists who initially showed some interest and promised to consider his request. However, the contact man said he would have to discuss the matter with his colleagues and when Durschmied checked back later his request was turned down. A second attempt to record an interview with Mr. Percy Chen, a local lawyer who follows the party line, followed the same pattern, with initial interest and, following a time interval, ultimate refusal. This is not in the least surprising as the Communist representatives in Hong Kong seldom, if ever, act on their own initiative, regardless of the question involved.

Yours very truly,



(C.J. Small)

Canadian Government Trade Commissioner.

File  
50056-A-40  
JM.  
12/6/59

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

- DDD 2 -

NONCOMMUNIST CHINA  
May 11, 1959

COMMUNIST ARTILLERY SHELLS QUEMOY

Taipei, CENTRAL NEWS, in English Morse to Agency Offices, May 9, 1959,  
0938 GMT--W

(Text) Taipei, May 9--The Chinese communists fired 255 rounds of high explosives at Quemoy Island on Thursday, killing three civilians and wounding two others, the Defense Ministry announced today. The ministry also reported that more than 8,000 persons were building communist military works along the Amoy coast opposite Quemoy. The laborers are said to include more than 3,000 communist soldiers and 5,000 civilians. The ministry said it was the first time civilians had been seen working in large numbers.

Meanwhile, communist guns erupted again this morning and sporadic shelling was reported continuing this afternoon.

October 28, 1957

File  
50056-A-46  
off  
*(See this from the file for note on Formosa & K. Coast)*

Canadian Relations with Nationalist China

Canada recognizes the Government of the Republic of China which now controls the island of Formosa (Taiwan), the Pescadoreas Islands and several small islands contiguous to the mainland, the largest of which are Quemoy and Matsu. The Nationalist Chinese have continued to maintain an Embassy in Ottawa and the present Ambassador is Dr. Lis Chieh. There is no Canadian representative in Formosa, and none has taken up residence there since the Nationalist Government departed from the Chinese mainland in 1949. However, Formosa is included in the territory of the Canadian Government Trade Commissioner in Hong Kong and he has visited the island from time to time in the course of his trade promotional duties.

Canadian exports to Formosa in the first six months of 1957 were valued at \$770,000, nearly double the 1956 figure for the corresponding period (\$388,000). The major export commodities were wood pulp, oats, pharmaceuticals and metal products. Imports from the island totalled \$55,000 in value in the first half of 1957 compared with \$63,000 in the same period last year. These comprised chiefly small amounts of food and agricultural products such as tea and canned pineapples.

In the United Nations we have continued to support Nationalist China through voting in favour of procedural

motions to postpone consideration of a change in Chinese representation for a fixed period. In subsidiary United Nations bodies we have supported motions of non-competence to deal with the question, or have opposed motions designed to alter the existing representation of China in such bodies.

There are several problems outstanding in Canadian relations with the Republic of China. Two of these - the Ming Sung loan and the \$60 million loan - will be dealt with separately. A third is the question of trade-marks and patents.

The Republic of China does not grant to Canadian citizens and corporations protection of their trade-marks and patents when they have made application for such purpose. Several Canadian companies have sought such protection. On the other hand, Canada, under the Trade Marks Act of May 14, 1953, grants to citizens of the Republic of China among others the full right to apply for the registration of trade-marks and patents in Canada on the same terms and conditions as are applicable to Canadians. The Republic of China, however, will not grant the same privileges until and unless there is an exchange of notes between the Government of the Republic of China and the Government of Canada, providing for the reciprocal protection of trade-mark and patent rights of the nationals of each country by the other country. There are at present no treaty

(... 3)

obligations in respect of the protection of trade-marks and patents under which the Republic of China is bound to us.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Should Canada enter into an exchange of notes concerning trade-marks and patents, it would constitute the first bilateral agreement between Canada and the National Government since the latter fled to Formosa in 1949. The National Government might attempt to exploit such an agreement for propaganda purposes by attributing to it political implications extending beyond the terms of the exchange; it might be presented as evidence of greater Canadian support for the Nationalists by the new Canadian Government.

In an interview with the Chinese Ambassador, Mr. Diefenbaker (in his capacity as Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs) asked whether it would be possible to reach a more informal understanding on this matter. The official reply from Formosa was a suggestion that Canada might wish to consider an exchange of notes - rather than a formal inter-governmental agreement - which was done in the case of Australia. This is where the matter rests.

File No. 50056-1-40  
50056-3-40  
4851-40



FILE 50056-A-40

PAGL TWO 2804

LATEST WHEN CHIANG KAI-SHEK DIES IF NOT BEFORE. MCCLINTOCK'S PAPER APPARENTLY ADVOCATES TRYING TO NEGOTIATE, WITH THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS, A SETTLEMENT INVOLVING:

- (1) RECOGNITION OF CHINA,
- (2) A NEUTRALIZED KOREA, WITH A WITHDRAWAL OF CHINESE AND USA TROOPS AND UNIFICATION OF THE TWO ZONES,
- (3) A NEUTRALIZED FORMOSA,
- (4) SOME SORT OF SETTLEMENT IN INDO-CHINA.

APPARENTLY VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES WERE SUGGESTED ON THIS LAST POINT. ONE WAS AN ATTEMPT TO GET A NEUTRALIZED AND UNITED VIETNAM, BUT MCCLINTOCK WAS NOT TOO HOPEFUL OF THE POSSIBILITY OF THIS. APPARENTLY ANOTHER POSSIBILITY WAS A NEUTRALIZED SOUTH VIETNAM.

4. ON LAOS, MCCLINTOCK SAID THAT THE STATE DEPT HAS BEEN CONSIDERING ALLOWING THE COUNTRY TO DISINTEGRATE. SOME OFFICIALS IN THE STATE DEPT AT LEAST DOUBT THE VALUE OF CONTINUING INDEFINITELY WITH THE RELATIVELY HIGH SUBSIDY (THE HIGHEST PER CAPITA USA AID OF ANY COUNTRY IN THE WORLD). BUT WITHOUT THIS SUBSIDY THE RLG WOULD PROBABLY CEASE TO EXIST. MCCLINTOCK SUGGESTED, THEREFORE, THAT CONCEIVABLY ONE SOLUTION MIGHT BE TO NEGOTIATE A PARTITION, WHEREBY PARTS OF LAOS, INCLUDING VIENTIANE, WOULD GO TO THAILAND, AND PART TO NORTH VIETNAM OR CHINA, WITH A LITTLE BIT TO CAMBODIA AND SOUTH VIETNAM AND A SLICE FOR BURMA. NEEDLESS TO SAY THESE RATHER STARTLING IDEAS SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN TOO SERIOUSLY AS INDICATIVE OF USA THINKING, THOUGH IT IS INTERESTING THAT THEY ARE AT LEAST BEING CONSIDERED BY INDIVIDUALS IN THE POLICY PLANNING GROUP.

5. ON THE GENERAL QUESTION OF EVENTUALLY REACHING SOME SORT OF SETTLEMENT ABOUT CHINA, MCCLINTOCK ATTACHED WEIGHT TO THE FACT THAT PRESENT USA POLICY INEVITABLY TENDS TO ALIENATE INDIA, A COUNTRY TO WHICH HE ATTACHES VERY GREAT IMPORTANCE.

6. MCCLINTOCK WAS OBVIOUSLY TALKING PRETTY FREELY ABOUT A PAPER WHICH HE ADMITTED WAS NOT AT ALL IN LINE WITH PRESENT STATE DEPT POLICY, AND ON WHICH THERE IS STILL PRETTY STRONG EMOTIONALISM IN WASHDC. IT IS, THEREFORE, DESIRABLE TO RESPECT HIS CONFIDENCE.

DS42/404

FM LDN NOV12/57 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY  
TO EXTERNAL 2804  
INFO WASHDC

REF YOUR TEL Y468 NOV7 AND WASHDC'S TEL 2376 NOV8

COMMUNIST CHINA

YESTERDAY WE ASKED XORLAND, ASSISTANT UNDER-SECRETARY SUPERVISING FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE, WHETHER HE HAD SEEN THE USA PAPER ON CHINA. HE HAD NOT, BUT HE CALLED IN DALTON, THE HEAD OF THE FAR EASTERN DEPT, WHO HAD DONE SO. DALTON SAID THAT THE USA EMBASSY HERE HAD GIVEN IT TO THEM IN AUG. HE THOUGHT IT A VERY INTERESTING PAPER WHICH AVOIDED WHAT HE CALLED THE EMOTIONALISM OF WALTER ROBERTSON AND BASED ITSELF ON HARD-HEADED INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS OF THE POSITION IN SOUTH EAST ASIA. HE SAID THAT AS HE RECALLED, HOWEVER, THE USA PAPER DID NOT SUGGEST THAT RECOGNITION WOULD BE APPROPRIATE WHEN CHINA'S NEIGHBOURS ARE STRONG ENOUGH TO WITHSTAND THE EFFECTS OF SUCH ACTS, BUT RATHER THAT RECOGNITION WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE UNTIL SUCH A TIME. DALTON OFFERED TO SHOW US THE PAPER, BUT SEEMED RATHER HESITANT, AND SO WE LEFT THIS OFFER PENDING.

2. TO-DAY AT LUNCH WE MENTIONED TO BREWSTER MORRIS, OF THE USA EMBASSY, THAT WE HAD HEARD THERE WAS A VERY INTERESTING PAPER ON THIS SUBJECT. MORRIS OFFERED TO LET US READ IT IF WE DROPPED ROUND TOMORROW OR THE NEXT DAY, AND WE WILL DO SO. HOWEVER, SINCE OUR EMBASSY IN WASHDC HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY OF COPYING THE MEMO, WE SUGGEST THAT THEY DO SO AND WE WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO SUMMARIZE IT FROM HERE.

3. INCIDENTALLY, ROB MCCLINTOCK, FORMER USA AMBASSADOR IN CAMBODIA NOW A MEMBER OF THE STATE DEPT POLICY PLANNING STAFF, ALSO LUNCHEDED WITH US. (HE IS ON HIS WAY BACK FROM DELHI, WHERE HE LED THE USA GOVT DELEGATION AT THE RED CROSS CONFERENCE. HE WAS VERY CRITICAL OF THE RIGID INSTRUCTIONS WHICH HE HAD TO CARRY OUT THERE REGARDING THE CHINESE QUESTION.) MCCLINTOCK MENTIONED TO US THAT HE HAD PREPARED A PAPER FOR THE STATE DEPT ON THE WHOLE QUESTION OF A FAR EASTERN SETTLEMENT. HE SAID THAT SO FAR HE WAS NOT GETTING VERY FAR WITH IT IN THE STATE DEPT. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS PROBABLY INTERESTING ENOUGH TO BE WORTH SUMMARIZING. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE PAPER MAKES THE POINT THAT PRESENT USA POLICY WILL INEVITABLY COME UNSTUCK, AT THE

"TWO-CHINA" SCHEMES SINISTER, IMMORAL  
EXPEDIENCY OF HELP TO REDS ONLY: TONG

Dr. Hollington K. Tong, Chinese Ambassador to Washington, called the "two Chinas" theory as advanced by certain writers and others "frankly a resort to expediency" and "not a proposal grounded upon any code of moral principle."

Addressing the Rotary Club in Buffalo, New York, on Oct. 24, the Ambassador explained that by this two-China formula the American people were told to admit bloody-handed Mao Tse-tung to the family of nations, to reward him while he was still technically at war with the United Nations, and to help his brutal regime build up a modern productive system by opening the doors of unlimited trade between Red China and the free nations. "All this is justified upon the dubious ground that by doing evil we can accomplish good in world affairs, or that by clasping an aggressor to our breast, such as Red China, we will produce lasting world peace," Tong asserted. "It is a pragmatist's way to solve a difficult problem."

Ambassador Tong declared that carried out to its logical conclusion, the Two-China plan would certainly lead to international chaos. "For if we are going to avoid honest solutions of our major conflicts by resorting to the 'two-China' compromise plan, the possibilities of its extension are almost endless," he pointed out. "Already we have two Germanys, two Koreas and two Viet Nams. But if the free world is going to continue to concede autonomous territory to the Communists every time they infiltrate or gain strength in a non-Communist country, this divisional process will become global."

Those who advocated the two-China plan had forgotten that the United Nations had named Red China an aggressor in Korea, that the United States forces had suffered 157,730 casualties including 50,000 killed in the Korean war, that tens of thousands of Chinese Communists were still in North Korea, and that Communist China was in the midst of a vast process of infiltration, sabotage, propaganda, trade expansion and even armed aggression through the whole region of Southeast Asia, Tong said. These advocates stressed that the Communists ruled over a vast area and a huge population and wanted stability, but they forgot that "there are no peace-loving Communists." Tong added that "when a Communist talks peace and goodwill, he is most deadly--he is preparing to catch you off balance and disarm you for the next aggressive thrust."

Tong declared that "it is the moral leadership of the United States which the appeasement advocates, wittingly or unwittingly, are throwing into the discard, and the only party to benefit from such moral abdication is Red China or Soviet Russia."

What had been overlooked by advocates of the two-China theory was that "Red China is an insecure, fear-haunted, people-hated regime which could collapse almost overnight if the West had the self-confidence to call its bluff," Tong continued. "We don't need to appease Red China. Communist China needs the outside world much more than the outside world needs it. A rigid continuance of the embargo, with the full-hearted support of all the Allies, would bring Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues whimpering to their knees in a relatively few years."

Dr. Tong was certain that "the cause of the free world will eventually prevail in the Far East, notwithstanding the present setbacks." He declared: "The Chinese people will again be free."

767 767 767

Asia 2 No. 767


Enclosures

June 5, 1957

From Minister of External Affairs

To Ambassador to Canada.

Re: Riot in Taipeh



**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REDUIT A SECRET**

On March 20 Liu Tzu Jan, an official of the Nationalist Government was shot to death by one Reynolds, a sergeant major of the U.S. Military Advisory Group. The case was tried in the U.S. military court and on May 23 Reynolds was judged to be not guilty on the ground of self-defence. The widow of Liu protested against the verdict with a placard in front of the U.S. Embassy. This demonstration touched off a riot in Taipeh on the 24th. I am forwarding you for your reference enclosures A and B which explain the circumstances surrounding the affair and "An Observation on the Riot in Taipeh".

Concerning the article, "An Observation on the Riot in Taipeh", it is difficult as yet to judge the background of the riot or its effects in the future on account of scarcity of information. The article is a hasty attempt on the part of those concerned on the basis of reports and information which they have been able to secure thus far. It is necessary to review the whole affair critically in the light of later more detailed information.

## Enclosure A.

Re: Riot in Taipei

1. On the night of March 20 Liu Tzu Jan, an official of the Nationalist Government, (Liu comes from Wu Hsi in Chiang Su Province) was shot to death by Sergeant Major Reynolds of the U.S. Military Advisory Mission on the ground that he peeped into Reynolds' bathroom. However, there was a rumour current that the reason for the shooting was trouble between Liu and Reynolds concerning black-market dealings.
2. On May 23 the U.S. military court found him innocent on the ground of self-defence. An official agreement of January 30 between the U.S. and the Nationalist Government makes the personnel of the Military Advisory Mission a part of the U.S. Embassy in its relation to the Nationalist Government. Thus, there has never been any dispute concerning the jurisdiction of the case.)
3. There have been several developments concerning the above judgment. Request for re-trial was discussed in the Legislative Yuan. It has been reported that Foreign Affairs Minister Yeh, on the morning of the 24th, summoned Counsellor Pilcher to express feelings of dissatisfaction of both the government and the people and to request a re-trial. Thus, criticism against the manner in which the trial was carried by the U.S. has been mounting.
4. In the meantime, during the morning of the 24th, the widow of Liu appeared in front of the U.S. Embassy with a placard. A crowd gathered gradually and a riot resulted shortly after mid-day. The U.S. Embassy and the office of the USIS were attacked by a mob of approximately 10,000. They tore down the U.S. flag, overturned automobiles, set fires, destroyed window glasses and furniture; further, they broke into the telegraph room of the Embassy, scattered telegraph code and other highly secret documents, raised a Chinese flag, and shouted for joy. The Gendarmes and the Police of the Nationalist Government took no

Positive action to put down the disturbance for several hours. After five o'clock in the afternoon troops (reported to be approximately 3 divisions) were called out for patrol duties; at seven p.m. the city was placed under martial law and order was generally restored by mid-night. Since the 25th the city has been under strict guard and is calm. In the U.S. Embassy several people, including Counsellor Meyer, were injured. Several of the mob were also injured. (One report mentions one death). The Reynolds family was transferred at 2 p.m. on the 24th in an army plane to the Philippines and then to the U.S. mainland.

5. Ambassador Rankin was in Hong Kong at the time. He returned to Formosa at five p.m. on the 24th and made an inspection with Foreign Affairs Minister Yeh. However, the party was stoned by the mob and forced to return and continue with the inspection tour early in the morning of the 25th. Further, the Ambassador, early in the morning of the 25th, registered a protest with the Nationalist Government. The President of the Executive Yuan, Yui, on the night of the 24th, expressed regrets and stated that subversive activities by a few dissatisfied elements were harmful to the national interest and U.S. China relations.

Generalissimo Chiang was in Jih Yueh T'an. However, he returned in the afternoon of the same day, met Ambassador Rankin and expressed his regrets. In the meantime, the Ambassador to the U.S., Tong, visited the U.S. State Department at noon of the 24th (Washington time) and expressed regrets to Assistant Deputy Robertson.

Further on the 28th, we invited Minister Yang Yueh Chu, of the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo and asked for detailed information. He stated that the riot was due to the scheming of a few hoodlums and gave an explanation of the affair similar to the above account. There was no new point brought out by him.

The immediate U.S. governmental reaction to the present affair was the announcement that Ambassador Rankin had registered a protest and that Ambassador Tong expressed regrets. On the 29th Secretary of State, Dulles, in his press conference stated that the U.S. had no intention of fundamentally changing her foreign policy towards Nationalist China. However, he expressed his belief that the problem of U.S. forces abroad would be reviewed. Judging by opinions expressed by representatives, it is clear that the incident in Formosa, where they felt that they were safe, was a strong shock. A few opinions reflected on the conduct of the U.S. forces abroad. However, the majority holds strongly to the view to pursue the responsibility of the Nationalist Government who failed to exercise control over the present affairs.

Communist China immediately took up the question. According to a Peking broadcast, newspapers of the 25th in Peking reported in detail the present affair, expressed their sympathies towards the people of Formosa, and held that they should endeavor to free Formosa. Since then, peoples' parties and various organizations have been drumming enthusiasm in support of the people of Formosa.

Moscow broadcast holds that the real reason for the present incident to be the burst of resentment of the residents against the occupation system which was imposed on the people by the U.S.A. with the aid of Chiang Kai-shek and his group.

## Enclosure B.

## An observation on the Riot in Taipei

1. The present incident cannot be interpreted simply as an alignment of people in sympathy with the protest by the widow of Liu Tzu Jan against Sergeant Major Reynolds' acquittal.

It is also hard to believe that the reason for the shooting was the fact that Liu had looked into Reynolds' bathroom. Liu Tzu Jan was a major in charge of the Special Service Section of the Kuomintang and an instructor in the Revolutionary Practice Academy.

It is reported that the mob invaded the telegraph room of the Embassy, that, on failing to break through the iron door at the entrance, they broke in by boring a hole through the wall with tools, and that important documents were scattered and lost. These indicate that the incident was not a simple demonstration by the people.

2. With reference to the reports of the present incident, one immediately thinks of the following facts:

(1) In August 1955, General Sun Li Jen of the Pro-U.S. faction in the Nationalist Government was relieved of his post being held responsible for the alleged espionage by his subordinate, Lieutenant-General Kuo Yen Liang, on behalf of Communist China. It is said that the truth is that General Sun's faction tried to establish in Formosa a regime friendly to the U.S. and that the racial faction (led by Chiang Ching-kuo) staged a counter coup d'etat branding it as a group of spies.

(2) It is said that pressure is being applied by the Kuomintang to the pro-U.S. "Free China" group of Hu Shih and Lei Chen since November last and that there is a considerable amount of friction between Mayling Soong's pro U.S. group and Chiang Ching-kuo. This spring, at the time of the communal election, the Kuomintang interfered extensively. The chasm between members of the Kuomintang and the Formosan people is deepening further.

Thus in Formosa at present within the Kuomintang there is factional strife, resentment against the U.S., and the feeling of impatience concerning the future. On the other hand, there is



deep feeling of antagonism between 2,000,000 Chinese and Formesans.

3. Since this Spring, Communist China intensified its propaganda of "the Unity between Communist and Nationalist China", and the U.S. IS NOT CERTAIN OF THE CONDUCT OF THE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT. The posting of the matador at the beginning of May is regarded as an indication of her determination to hold Formosa regardless of the conduct of the Nationalist Government. It appears as though U.S. preparation for a semi-permanent occupation of Formosa is gradually nearing completion.

4. The Nationalist Government entertains certain misgivings regarding the U.S. These are: possibility of direct trade between the U.S. and Communist China as the result of the Geneva Conference (although the U.S. attitude has recently become cool towards the conference), reorganization of the armed forces by the U.S. employing Formosan youths leaving aging and obsolescent Nationalist forces, advocacy for the construction of Formosan economy, and the suspicion that the U.S. is putting into effect the policy of retiring old Nationalist soldiers to farms and the policy of independence for Formosa.

It appears as though the distrust of the Nationalist forces on the part of the U.S. forces is also deepening. It is reported that, with respect to the Formosa independence movement, at least among those connected with the military and the intelligence there is a considerable degree of understanding concerning the movement of Liao Wen Yi's faction and other similar movements.

It can be anticipated that the Nationalist Government will look upon such an attitude on the part of the U.S. with deep misgiving.

5. The problem was brought to the fore touched off by the present incident. It is difficult to believe that in Formosa which is under a strict totalitarian regime, an organized disturbance was carried out by the National Salvation Youth Organization (led by Chiang Ching kuo) and that no one in the Nationalist Government had any concern in the affair. This is further strengthened by the fact that no measure was taken for several hours.

Note: One Formosan, resident in Tokyo, made the following observation. Liu Tzu Jan, was in possession of some information concerning "Formosan Independence Manoeuvres" (composed mainly of Formosans but not necessarily excluding the present leaders by the U.S. military authorities in Formosa).

This caused trouble between Reynolds and Liu and Liu was shot. Thus, during the disturbance, search was made of secret documents concerning these "Independence Manoeuvres".

Whatever the case may be, one wonders if the leaders of the riot were motivated by the feeling of despair concerning counterattack on the mainland, and the feeling of uneasiness concerning the gradually declining position on the part of the right wing elements in the Kuomintang, and thus intended to check the U.S. move by exploding the dissatisfaction and suspicion on the U.S. Formosa policy and at the same time to attain the leadership within the Nationalist Government.

(Even though there were Formosans who took part in the disturbance blindly, this should be regarded as due to instinctive realization on their part that it was advantageous to themselves since any trouble between the U.S.A. and Chiang, if it should become an international problem and attract attention, will result in re-discovery of Formosa.)

6. As the result of the present affair, Commander of Taipei Garrison (Lt. Gen) Huang Chen-wu, Commander of Military Police, (Lt. Gen.) Liu, and the Commissioner of the Police Administration of Taiwan Provincial Government, Lo Kan, have already been dismissed, and there would undoubtedly be further disposition of allegedly responsible parties on the pretext that the affair was engineered by the Communist Party. Should the U.S. interference or a slight hint on the part of the U.S.A. for a policy of "Formosan Independence" after re-examination of policy towards Nationalist China will hasten to drive the Kuomintang to unite with Communist China.

Thorough investigations of responsible parties by leaders of the Nationalist Government will intensify the factional strife and hasten self-destruction.

Communist China postponed to the 20th the Peoples' Representatives Assembly which had been scheduled for June 3. This move probably was made to see the attitude of the U.S.A. and Nationalist China. In any case, on account of this affair Communist China came to recognize the possibility of a riot in Formosa and no doubt will attempt, through underground activities, to stir up anti-U.S. feeling among Formosans, and to place Chiang Kai-shek in a difficult position by propaganda intended to drive a wedge between Chiang and the U.S.A. and by attacking Chiang for blindly following U.S.A. (However, should such a movement become a genuine movement for independence by the people of Formosa, it will be opposed by Communist China.)

The U.S.A. will now be forced to choose one of two alternate courses: either she launches a program of independence for democratic Formosa with a nucleus of people of Formosa regardless of the danger that Nationalist China may take refuge in the continent or may unite with Communist China, or by making a slight concession, she appeases the Nationalist Government, although maintaining a firm stand with respect to the settlement of the present affair, and makes somewhat negative efforts to maintain the best possible relation with the unstable Nationalist regime. (if she chooses the latter course, it will be impossible to prevent Communist China from ultimately liberating Formosa).

45 45 45 45

(Urgent message Top Secret No. 45)

Received May 31, 1957.

Formosa 642 May 28, 1957

To: Temporary Acting Foreign Minister Ishii

From: Horiuchi, Ambassador to Nationalist China

Re: ATTACK ON THE U.S. EMBASSY

1.1.1.1.  
DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING  
SECRET

Further to several correspondence concerning the present affair, we would make the following report based on information which the members of this Embassy have been able to gather on the cause of the riot, its background, measures taken by the Nationalist Government, and Chinese and U.S. reaction from such sources as the Legislative Yuan, the Government, armed forces, cultural groups, and information services. We would ask you to handle this correspondence with special caution.

#### 1. Causes of Riot

(1) In the Reynolds' court martial, which became the direct cause of the riot, it was made public that Reynolds shot Liu Tzu Jan because the latter peeked in the window into the bathroom while Reynolds' wife was bathing. However, there are many persons who deny that this is the truth and hold that Reynolds and Liu had prior association. Reynolds was in charge of chemicals in MAAG and had been diverting war supplies into the black market. It is rumored that Liu, who was on special duty in connection with the Revolutionary Practice Academy, had dealings with Reynolds in the black market, that Reynolds was to be transferred elsewhere, that there was a dispute between the two concerning unpaid credit sales which developed into the shooting. Possibly because the vulnerable position of the two, the above relation was brought out neither in court nor in formal statements. Since the above relationship was known widely here, it is our belief that such knowledge helped to intensify the feeling of the Chinese who held that the verdict of not guilty to Reynolds was unfair.

(2) The factors which were responsible for inflaming such a feeling still further were reports and comments of newspapers here. Every paper gave considerable coverage starting at about the start of the trial. Their tone became sharp immediately after the verdict. They went so far as to collect donations for Liu's widow. Such a campaign by the press in this country, where the expression of opinion is strictly controlled, was conspicuous. It is our belief that this was made possible because the government and the Kuomintang overlooked it.

#### 2. Background Relations

(1) There is no definite proof that the disturbance was systematically planned from the beginning. However, there is some evidence to indicate that there were several persons involved in the initial protest demonstration against the U.S. Embassy, i.e., the sit-down tactics of the widow of Liu with placards in both Chinese and English seem to suggest that 2 or 3 newspaper men instigated the move and aided her.

(2) A broadcasting station recorded the conversation with Mrs. Liu in front of the U.S. Embassy and broadcast it at once. It is reported that the broadcast increased the crowd and the station did not repeat the broadcast. This seems to have taken place, however, before the riot.

(3) It is not known how many persons threw stones at the Embassy initially. However, the number increased greatly, and finally some dozen persons, who appear to be students around twenty years of age, jumped over the wall, and broke into the building. The number gradually increased to several scores of men. However, it is not believed that the leaders were captured. It is impossible to ascertain their identities. It is believed that they belong to the Anti-Communist National Salvation Association which has many students in its membership.

(4) The fact that the mob attacked the office of the USIS after breaking into the Embassy and attempted to attack the headquarters of the MAAG (did not take place), seems to suggest that the riot was directed by someone. However, there is no evidence yet that Communists have taken any part.

(5) Since Liu was a special agent, there are some who believe that the riot was incited by Chiang Ching-kuo's faction. However, the observation of the course of the riot does not indicate any detailed planning. It appears that such a view is a little too far fetched judging objectively the situation as at present in this country.

### 3. Measures taken by Nationalist China.

It is a fact that the measures taken by Nationalist China against the riot were slow and half-hearted. It is believed that the reasons for this were as follows:

(1) According to the members of the staff of the U.S. Embassy, the Embassy, through its diplomatic section, requested throughout the morning for police action, and the police Department sent "special constables" to take Mrs. Liu away. However, they withdrew at the threat of newspaper reporters and because of this the crowd increased.

(2) It is true that a large scale anti-air raid drill happened to be held that day and police were scattered throughout the city, and that this made it impossible to gather and despatch them quickly. However, it is also true that gendarmes and police at the scene were aware of the mood of the crowd and did not check them strictly. U.S. Embassy staff were indignant at this.

(3) The number of rioters arrested were 79 of whom several were released. The commander of the garrison, the chief of the gendarmes, and the chief of the police were dismissed. It is said that, when the above officers accompanied by the deputy commander of the Peace Preservation Headquarters made a report of the incident on the morning of May 26th to Generalissimo Chiang, the Generalissimo reprimanded them severely for their negligence.

## 4. Conjecture on U.S. attitude.

(1) The U.S. will demand considerable reparation. It is generally believed that this will not matter too much since this country pays out the money which in the last analysis has been given by the U.S.A.

(2) The incident had a disadvantageous effect on the U.S.A. in South East Asia. Although the general public in the U.S. has been aroused at present, they will cool off. The present atmosphere in the Congress seems to be a reflection on the U.S. aid formula or the U.S. garrison abroad rather than anger. It is impossible to contemplate that there will be a drastic change in the U.S. policy in U.S. aid.

## 5. Reaction here.

(1) The leaders of the riot were all Chinese from the mainland. Native Formosans, although they recognized the unfairness of the judgment, showed no inclination towards direct action.

(2) After the riot all newspapers here deplored the incident and wished for re-examination of U.S.-China relationship. However, the general public, as well as the members of the armed forces, have been dissatisfied with the arrogance shown in the attitude of the U.S. officers and men of the MAAG and the privileges enjoyed even by men and non-commissioned officers. Hence, although they recognize that the present riot has gone too far, many of them hold that it gave the U.S.A. a chance for reflection.

(Urgent Message Top Secret 44)

(Received May 31, 1957)

Formosa No. 634 May 27, 1957.

To Temporary Acting Foreign Minister Ishii

From Horiuchi, Ambassador to Nationalist China.

Re: Attack on the U.S. Embassy in Taipei

The following is the account of a conversation between Counsellor Yagi and the Mayor of the city of Taipei, Kao Yu-shu. (Note: A Formosan. Defeated in the last closely contested mayoral election against a Kuomintang candidate. To vacate office on June 2) In consideration of his position, we would specially ask that the source of this report be kept an extreme secret.

1. The mayor is "skipped" concerning the details of the affair and an accurate explanation is impossible. However, there seems to be a complicated background to the "Reynolds Affair" which directly led the riot. Liu Tzu Jan came from the mainland, had a good knowledge of the English language, has acted as an interpreter in the past for the U.S. forces, and has been dealing with Reynolds in black market dealing for some time. Thus, they have been "chums" of long standing, and it is impossible for Liu to be mistaken for a thief and shot in the dark. Recently on account of Reynolds' transfer a dispute arose concerning a payment of their dealings. Liu accused him of bad faith and threatened Reynolds with exposure and Reynolds shot him. What I termed a complicated background was the fact that Liu's wife (Note: understands English a little. Her demonstration in front of the U.S. Embassy with placards both in English and Chinese led to the riot) was in court as a witness and had many opportunities to give testimony concerning the relationship between Reynolds and her husband, but for some reasons did not touch on that point. (Kao evaded a direct reply to Yagi's question as to his opinion regarding the reason).

2. Yagi tried to draw some information concerning the part played by Kuomintang by asking whether, in view of the violent nature of the riot, the leadership was provided by the party and especially in view of the rumour that Liu was related to the Direct Action Study Group ( ) of the Kuomintang.

UPGRADED TO SECRET  
 REVERT A SECRET

.Note: This is an organization which gives widely selected candidates thorough training in the principle of Sin-Min Chu-I ( ); the graduates form the elite of the party). The mayor replied that he had heard nothing concerning that point, but that the mob taking part were members of the National Salvation Youth Organization, and that the members were fanatics, more so than HitlerJugend or the Black Shirts of the Fascists who obey orders blindly. He further deplored the fact that almost all the students in higher schools in Formosa at present were members of this organization.

3. A group of men after breaking and entering into the Embassy held the building. They were arrested and detained in the City Police Station. A mob stormed the station to recapture them. The police fired warning shots and injured several persons among whom there were several formosans. The mayor was asked if the presence of Formosans contradicted the opinion which held that the rioters consisted only of Chinese from the mainland. He replied that those Formosans, who had been injured, were members of the afore-mentioned National Salvation Youth Organization, and that the masses, who took part in the riot, consisted solely of mainland Chinese.

4. As the fundamental cause of the Affair, the Mayor mentioned first of all the misconception on the part of the U.S. forces, i.e. in Japan there were many U.S.-Japanese frictions and the U.S. forces had sufficient experience to handle the Japanese, while in Formosa, there had hardly been any problem that they took the attitude that the Chinese public was easy to deal with and were contemptuous of the Chinese people. Hence, in the court martial, they worked hard to cover the guilt of the assailant, and never attempted to save the face of the Chinese people - a gesture traditional to them. This, the mayor felt was the most important factor which aroused the anger of the public. He felt that there would have been no problem if there had been corporal punishment even a suspended sentence, merely for black market dealings.



The second cause is the Hsiang Ma Yuan affair. Newspapers daily advocate changes in the agreement concerning troops similar to that which is in effect in Japan. One should not neglect the influence of this affair on the present riot by the public.

5. He was asked about his opinion regarding the outcome of the present affair. He replied that he was deeply concerned about the attitude of the U.S. He felt that there would be a considerable reprisal but stated that he had no definite ideas.

He was then asked about the rumour that the affair had been planned since the afternoon of the 23rd, day of the court martial. He replied that he knew nothing about it.

Further on the same day Counsellor Yagi called on Counsellor Meyer (Note: has forty years' service experience in China). With a forced smile he said that the affair was the biggest experience since the riot of 1928. He further stated that on the day of the riot, although the Embassy requested several times to the Diplomatic Section for extra details of police because the situation seemed serious, the police were not augmented; that Counsellor Pilcher personally visited and stayed in the Diplomatic Section from 2 to 6 p.m. to press the request without any success, and that he felt a deep sense of anger against the organs of the Nationalist government which brought about such a situation. It is said that the vault which was used to keep secret documents was not destroyed.

File no 50056-A-40

January 16, 1957

Mr. Sarfar Balwant Singh Puri  
Secretary-General  
Indian Red Cross Society  
1, Red Cross Road, New Delhi 2  
India

Dear Sir:

This acknowledges receipt of your circular dated 21 December 1956 informing us of the postponement of the XIXth International Red Cross Conference which was scheduled to take place in New Delhi this month.

A similar circular from your Society, addressed to the "Government of Formosa", was finally channelled to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China. It must be pointed out that there is no "Government of Formosa". Formosa is a geographical term (better known to occidentals) for the island of Taiwan which is one of the provinces of the Republic of China.

I wish also to take this opportunity to invite your attention to the Official Report of the XVIIIth International Red Cross Conference, Toronto, 1952, in which it included a List of Delegates Representing Governments and National Red Cross Societies. It will be noted that the Government of the Republic of China as well as its National Red Cross Society was represented by me as Head of Delegation, and that the term "Government of Formosa" did not appear anywhere in the document. It is therefore expected that in your future communications with our Government, the proper term Republic of China (whose Central Government is now located at Taipei, Taiwan, China) will be used. ))

Cordially yours,

J. Heng Liu, M. D.  
President  
The National Red Cross Society  
Republic of China

JHL : 1

cc: Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
of the Republic of China

January 17, 1957

Mr. Andre Francois-Poncet  
Chairman  
Commission Permanente  
Croix-Rouge Internationale  
7, Avenue de la Paix  
Geneva, Switzerland

Dear Sir:

This acknowledges receipt of your circular dated 22 December 1956 and of an earlier cable announcing the decision by the Standing Commission to postpone the International Conference at New Delhi. The circular to our Red Cross Society was addressed to: The President, Red Cross Society of Formosa.

I wish to call your attention to the fact that the official name of our Society is: The National Red Cross Society of the Republic of China, also known as the Red Cross Society of China for convenience. (There is no "Red Cross Society of Formosa", although at the provincial level there is the Taiwan Chapter of the National Red Cross Society of the Republic of China.) I shall appreciate it if you will use the proper name of our Society in your future communications.

A similar circular from your Commission was addressed to "Government of Formosa". This is also a misnomer. Formosa is a geographical term (better known to occidentals) for the island of Taiwan which is one of the provinces of the Republic of China. It is therefore expected that in your future communications with our Government, the proper term Republic of China (whose Central Government is now located at Taipei, Taiwan, China) will be used instead of "Government of Formosa".

I wish also to take this opportunity to call your attention to the Official Report of the XVIIIth International Red Cross Conference, Toronto, 1952, in which it included a List of Delegates Representing Governments and National Red Cross Societies. It will be noted that the Government of the Republic of China as well as its National Red Cross Society was represented by me as Head of Delegation, and that neither "Government of Formosa" nor "Red Cross Society of Formosa" appears anywhere in the document.

Cordially yours,

J. Heng Liu, M.D.  
President  
The National Red Cross Society  
Republic of China

JHL:1

cc: Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
of the Republic of China

INDIAN RED CROSS SOCIETY  
(Constituted under Act XV of 1920)

President ... The President of India.  
Chairman, Managing Body ... Rajkumari Amrit Kaur.  
Honorary-Treasurer ... Shri P. C. Padhi.  
Secretary-General ... Sardar Balwant Singh Puri.

Telegrams: INDCROSS

Headquarters:  
1, Red Cross Road.  
NEW DELHI 2.

No. 20/IC.

Air Mail.

the 8th March 1957.

The President,  
Red Cross Society, Taiwan,  
Taipei (Formosa).

Dear Sir,

In reply to your letter dated the 16th January 1957, I am desired to say that in accordance with the decision of the Standing Commission of the International Red Cross, which by virtue of the Statutes is responsible for convening and organising the International Conference in cooperation with the Red Cross Society acting as host to the Conference, your Government was to be invited solely on account of its authority in Formosa and addressed as the Government of Formosa. In the circumstances we regret we cannot adopt a different form of address.

Yours faithfully,

(signed)

Secretary-General.

T.

April 8, 1957.

Mr. Sardar Balwant Singh Puri  
Secretary-General  
Indian Red Cross Society  
1, Red Cross Road, New Delhi 2  
India

Dear Sir:

This acknowledges receipt of your official communication dated 8 March 1957. We wish to say that we are not satisfied with the explanation given in the communication and wish to repeat our protest for the following obvious reasons:

- (1) It is evident from the records that the International Red Cross, in its previous invitations to our Government to send delegates to participate in its numerous conferences, as well as in other relevant official documents, the proper term "Government of the Republic of China" has been used consistently. It follows therefore that the Government of the Republic of China has been recognized by the International Red Cross and that the Red Cross Society of any country serving as host to its conference does not have the prerogative to alter the rightful terminology on the basis of its own interpretations.

/(2) Both

(2) Both the Republic of China and India are member nations of the United Nations. The proper name "Republic of China" is clearly recorded in the U.N. Charter. It is unfortunate that the Indian Red Cross Society should take the liberty to alter at its own will the proper name of our country, because any such alteration not only fails to comply with the rulings of the International Red Cross and of the U.N. Charter, but also violates all recognized international practices.

It is hoped that your Society will see the necessity of a proper understanding in this matter and that only the proper term "Republic of China" will be used in your future communications.

Sincerely yours,

J. Heng Liu, M.D.  
President  
The Red Cross Society of China

cc: Mr. Andre Francois-Poncet

The Secretary-General,  
Indian Red Cross Society,  
1 Red Cross Road,  
New Delhi, India.

October 5, 1957.

Sir,

Further to my letter No. T7/46/828 dated May 14, 1957, I am instructed to inform you that the Government of the Republic of China takes strong exception to your addressing to it as "Government of Formosa". I wish to call your attention to the fact that the name "Republic of China" is expressly inscribed in the United Nations Charter and appears in the documents of all international organizations, including the International Red Cross. Anybody with some geographical knowledge should know that "Formosa" or "Taiwan" is merely a province of the Republic of China. Such wilful and discriminatory action on your part in insisting on calling my Government and the Red Cross Society of China in the improper manner is unwarranted and offensive, and is in contravention to the obligations of a host country under the generally recognized international practice. It is to be deplored that despite the repeated protests made by the Red Cross Society of China, your Society still cannot see to it to change your unreasonable attitude. Under such circumstances, my Government and the Red Cross Society of China have no choice but to reject your invitation.

I wish, however, to state that notwithstanding our refusal to participate in the XIXth International Red Cross Conference, we reserve our full rights as a member of the International Red Cross. My Government and the Red Cross Society of China maintain the position, as they did in the last session of the Conference, that the Peiping puppet regime and its red cross organization, by their very nature and origin, have no right whatsoever to represent China. Their illegal participation in the Conference does in no way affect the rights of the Republic of China in the International Red Cross. I request that the contents of this letter be circulated to all the members of the International Red Cross.

Wang Chih-chen  
Director  
Treaty Department  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Republic of China

c.c. M. Andre Francois-Poncet, Chairman,  
Standing Commission of the International Red Cross

A Circular to The National Red Cross Societies  
And to The  
XIXth International Red Cross Conference

The Red Cross Society of the Republic of China, on the memorable occasion of the 19th International Red Cross Conference to be held at New Delhi from 24 October to 7 November 1957, wishes to congratulate member societies for this opportunity of meeting each other to discuss problems related to the high ideals of the Red Cross; but it regrets to be unable to attend the Conference for reasons set forth below. By this letter, we wish to place our case before you and to invite your impartial judgement.

The Indian Red Cross, acting as host country to the Conference, has repeatedly addressed our Government -- the Government of the Republic of China -- as the "Government of Formosa" and ignored our protestations against the use of improper terminology. One of its circulars dated 21 December 1956, addressed to the "Government of Formosa", finally found its way to our Government. On 16 January 1957 we sent a protest to the Indian Red Cross which again persisted in its stand and replied that "... in accordance with the decision of the Standing Commission of the International Red Cross, which by virtue of the Statutes is responsible for convening and organizing the International Conference in cooperation with the Red Cross Society acting as host to the Conference, your Government was to be invited solely on account of its authority in Formosa and addressed as the Government of Formosa. In the circumstances we regret we cannot adopt a different form of address." In reply to the above, we lodged our second protest on 8 April 1957 with the Indian Red Cross and sent a copy of which to the Chairman of the Standing Commission of the International Red Cross, but they were of no avail. It is under the circumstances that our Government and the Society decided not to attend the forthcoming conference. The reasons are:

- 1) Formosa is a geographical term for the island of Taiwan which is one of the provinces now under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China.



The International Red Cross, in its previous invitations to our Government as well as in other relevant official documents (see report of the 18th International Red Cross Conference, Toronto, 1952.), the proper term of "Republic of China" has been used consistently. It follows, therefore, that the Government of the Republic of China has been recognized by the International Red Cross and that the Red Cross Society of any country serving as host to its conference does not have the prerogative to alter the rightful terminology of our country on the basis of its own whimsical interpretations.

3) Both the Republic of China and India are member states of the United Nations. The proper name of Republic of China is clearly inscribed in the U.N. Charter. It is unfortunate that the Indian Red Cross Society should take the liberty to alter at its own will the proper name of our country. Any such act of taking liberty with the name of our country is not only contrary to the practice of the International Red Cross and the U.N. Charter, but is also in contravention to the obligation of a host country under the generally recognized international practice.

4) The National Red Cross Society of the Republic of China is the only legally constituted Red Cross organization for China. As a signatory to the Red Cross Convention, we are entitled to all the privileges and prerogatives, including the right to vote. No other organization should be allowed to represent China at the forthcoming Conference in New Delhi.

In rejecting the invitation of the Indian Red Cross Society, I wish to declare, in the name of the Red Cross Society of the Republic of China, that notwithstanding our absence in the 19th International Red Cross Conference, we reserve our legal rights as a member of the International Red Cross and all the privileges and prerogatives thereof. The Red Cross Society of the Republic of China does not recognize the legitimacy of the Peiping red cross organization as well as its right to represent China.

October 7, 1957

file on: 50056-A-40

original: 50055-B-40

C O P Y

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL CANBERRA  
18 July 1956(2100-2200 JD)

SAVINGRAM 242  
London Savingram 131  
Geneva Misc. Sav. 135  
Ottawa. " " 136

CONFIDENTIAL Following from McConaughy (Director China Office) (17 July).

50056-A-40	
8	8

1. Geneva talks.

There has been no progress on ~~either renunciation of force or prisoner issues~~. At last meeting Wang indicated that Chinese would wish to pass shortly to discussion of trade. Johnson has replied that US does not wish to do so until agreement is reached on two outstanding issues.

2. Wang continues to insist that there must be early meeting of Foreign Ministers, apparently indicating that as quid pro quo Chinese may move towards accepting wording desired by US in declaration of renunciation of force.

3. Wang has indicated to UN Secretariat Geneva that he expects conference room will be required throughout the summer. This seems to indicate that Chinese are prepared to continue talks indefinitely. US of course is equally prepared to continue.

4. Cambodia - Relations with Communist Chinese representatives.

State Department has now instructed US Embassy Phnom Penh on the same lines as instructions already given to our Legation (your memo No. 145). US Embassy has been instructed to avoid all contacts or dealings with Communist Chinese. They are to indicate to Cambodians that they would be happy either to continue to discuss aid problems with Cambodia bilaterally or to serve on Committee with other "free" countries providing bona fide aid but that in their view this does not include Communist Chinese.

5. Congress.

On 29 June Senator Eastland read into Congressional Record a letter addressed to the Secretary of State (text by airmail) gist of which is that leaks from minor government officials have been appearing in press suggesting that although Administration would officially deny it, it had been decided that US would not use veto to prevent entrance of Communist China into United Nations. Particular reference was made to item in July 2nd "Newsweek". McConaughy said that reply to Eastland's letter which has now been approved by Dulles, strongly denied allegations, and defends State Department personnel. McConaughy said that strict investigation had been carried out in State Department and no evidence of any leakage of the kind suggested had been found.

6. We are commenting separately on writing in by Congress of passages opposing entry of Communist China into UN into both Public Law 603 (State Department Appropriations Bill) and Foreign Aid Bill. McConaughy remarked that similar provision had been written into Foreign Aid Bill last year but that it had not previously been included in State Department Appropriations Act. Inclusion in latter (which had been made by unanimous vote in Congress at suggestion of Foreign Affairs Committee) was clear evidence of persistent strength of Congressional feeling about Communist China

SIMPLEX  
JRR:SF:MS:11  
AIRMAIL

and served notice to State Department that failure to ensure continued exclusion of Communist China from United Nations would result in its appropriations being cut.

7. Nixon's visit to Taipei.

McConaughy said that Nixon's visit had been useful in giving Nationalists a "shot in the arm". Eisenhower's letter to Chiang (our memo 921), includes statement "let there be no misapprehension about our own steadfastness in continuing to support the Republic of China". In reply to our question whether there had been any evidence of such misapprehension, McConaughy referred to Nationalist distrust of US-Chinese talks in Geneva and fears that they cover some clandestine negotiations for an accommodation (our Savingsgram 228 para 7).

8. Prime Minister's Conference.

We told McConaughy in general terms of attitude adopted by Prime Minister in London, for which he expressed appreciation.

P. C.

DUPLICATE

*Original*  
50055-B-4

OTTAWA FILE  
~~50055-A-40~~  
N 50056-A-40

Despatch No. 353  
Date June 12, 1956

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS  
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA  
Reference: Your letter Y-224 of May 7, 1956  
Subject: Recognition of China and the Status of Formosa

Immediately on receipt of your letter under reference, we took down an Aide-Mémoire to the Foreign Ministry concerning the four points raised by you. We have now received a reply from the Foreign Ministry which states as follows:

(a) The Netherlands Government recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China on May 27, 1950.

(b) This recognition was "de jure".

(c) This recognition did not include any indication of the territory over which the Netherlands Government considered that the People's Government exercised or had the right to exercise authority.

(d) In Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace of San Francisco with Japan, to which neither the Chinese National Government nor the Chinese People's Government were signatories, Japan renounced every right, title or claim to Formosa, thus leaving the question of the sovereignty over the territory of Formosa unsolved. The Netherlands Government is of the opinion that this question has not yet been settled internationally.

2. As you will see, this reply is quite specific on three of the four points raised by you, but is not informative regarding the Netherlands attitude on the disposition of Formosa. On the other hand, it is quite evident that the Dutch do not at present wish to go beyond this guarded language in referring to this enormously complicated subject.

THOMAS A. STONE

Copies Referred To.....
No. of Enclosures
Post File 5/CHINA
No.....

DESPATCH

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.,  
Helsinki.

Reference: Your letter Y-74 of May 7, 1956.

Subject: Recognition of China and Status  
of Formosa.

*Original on  
50055-B-16*

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: 121

Date: June 5, 1956

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Courier

Post File No: 9.28


Ottawa File No. <del>50055-B-40</del> 50056-A-40	
19	—

References

I discussed your enquiry today with Enckell, the head of the Political Division of the Foreign Office, explaining the circumstances and making it clear that our present interest in Finland's position does not imply any probable change of Canadian policy.

2. Finland extended de jure recognition to the Communist Government at Peking by a telegram dated January 13, 1950 from the Finnish Foreign Minister to Chou-En-lai informing him that Finland was extending recognition forthwith "to the People's Republic of China". No reference to the territorial jurisdiction of the Peking Government was made at the time and Enckell gave me to understand that the point has never subsequently been raised. His own impression is that the circumstances of Formosa's recession by Japan carried no inference one way or the other for Finland and that the Finnish Government is completely uncommitted with regard to the Formosan question.

3. As regards Finland's attitude concerning the ultimate disposition of Formosa I received an answer that promises to become one of the stereotypes of Finnish policy within the United Nations. Finland has not defined her attitude on this question and does not wish to become involved unless that is unavoidable. It is a part of her basic policy in the United Nations not to associate herself with questions of conflict between the other powers unless Finland herself is directly concerned.

  
Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.

Internal  
Circulation

Distribution  
to Posts  
Stockholm  
Oslo  
Copenhagen  
Moscow

NUMBERED LETTER

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy,  
BELGRADE, Yugoslavia.

Reference: Your letter Y-181 of May 7, 1956.

Subject: Recognition of China and Status  
of Formosa

Security:.....

No:..... 310

Date:..... May 30, 1956.

Enclosures:.....

Air or Surface Mail:.....

Post File No:..... POL-11-1

Ottawa File No. <del>50055-B-40</del> 50056-A-40

*Original - 50055-B-40*

References

Your enquiries on the above-noted subject were put to the China desk officer, Mr. Dragan Ristic, at the Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs and the information set out below was obtained in response.

2. The Yugoslav Government accorded recognition de jure to the Central People's Government on October 9, 1949. There was no exchange of diplomatic missions at the time because the Cominform rupture also influenced Communist China's attitude to Yugoslavia and prevented at the time the development of cordial relations. Accordingly when normalization became the order of the day between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, there followed a corresponding change in the Communist Chinese attitude. On January 10, 1955, the two countries reached an agreement on the exchange of diplomatic missions. The Yugoslav mission in Peking was opened in May of last year and the Yugoslav Ambassador, M. Vladimir Popovic, arrived at the beginning of the following month. The Communist Chinese mission was opened in Belgrade in April of last year and the Ambassador, M. Wu Hsiu-Chuan, arrived in Belgrade in May.

Internal Circulation

3. At the time Yugoslavia accorded recognition of the Central People's Government, no indication was then included in this act of the territory over which the Government of Yugoslavia considered that the Central People's Government exercised authority. It has, however, always been the Yugoslav position that Formosa is legally a part of Communist China. In the Belgrade Declaration which was published at the conclusion of the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit to Yugoslavia in May of last year, the Soviet and Yugoslav leaders expressed the hope that "an atmosphere would be created which would at the same time make possible a solution by peaceful means, of such urgent problems of the first importance...the satisfaction of the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China with regard to Taiwan." The Yugoslav Government takes a pragmatic view as to the peaceful means which might be employed to reach the desired solution. It has welcomed the negotiations now going on in Geneva between the representatives of Peking and Washington and, although the further course of these talks appears uncertain at the moment, it is hoped that

Distribution to Posts

...2

they will lead to the gradual improvement of the atmosphere. Ideally, of course, the Yugoslav Government would regard the United Nations as the best forum for settling the future of Formosa but the Communist Chinese absence from the organization rules out this possibility for the present time. It remains apparently the official Yugoslav view, however sincerely it may be held, that the Korean War would not have occurred and the Formosan problem would have been solved long ago if Communist China from the start had been admitted to the United Nations.

4. The Canadian position on these matters was briefly reviewed and we mentioned to Ristic that the Canadian Government did not consider that it could be a party to any action which handed over the people or the Government on Formosa against their will to any mainland Government. The Yugoslavs are keen advocates of the principle of self-determination and Ristic was quick to respond to this point with the comment that when the legal position had been settled, provision could then be made for ascertaining the desires of the Formosan people. He did not think there was anything unusual about such an order of events. Although the example was hardly analogous, the Cyprus situation, he thought, offered some similarity. Cyprus was legally a dependency of the United Kingdom but this did not exclude the implementation of some process whereby the population of Cyprus could achieve its right to self-determination.

5. Following the comments mentioned above, Ristic offered a few generalities on the present course of Yugoslav relations with Communist China. These relations were, he said, developing quite satisfactorily and the latest instance was the conclusion of a commercial agreement on which we reported recently. At the Bandung Conference last year, the Communist Chinese had adopted a very positive position. They were showing themselves increasingly flexible in their dealings with other peoples and, in this respect, the Yugoslav mission in Peking was meeting with ready co-operation from the local authorities in the performance of its work. In the Yugoslav view, the Communist Chinese Government, in its conduct of foreign policy, was showing less dependence on Moscow. These trends, like the present ones in the Soviet Union, were praiseworthy developments and should receive every encouragement from the West. In conclusion, Ristic said in response to a question, that he did not know of any plans on the part of the Communist Chinese leaders to visit Yugoslavia, or for President Tito to visit China.

J. S. MACDONALD

The Embassy

## DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

## SUMMARY

OF: Despatch No. 236 of May 30, 1956  
from Indonesia

Insert particulars of document or file being summarized.

50056-A-6  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

SECURITY GRADING

SECRET

DATE 30 May 1956

~~17 June~~ 1956

INITIALS OF AUTHOR

RLR/ab

## CIRCULATION

COLOMBO  
HELSINKI  
NEW DELHI  
TEL AVIV  
THE HAGUE  
OSLO  
KARACHI  
STOCKHOLM  
BERNE  
LONDON  
MOSCOW  
BELGRADE  
WASHINGTON  
PARIS  
ROME  
LEGAL DIV.  
U.N. DIV.  
MR. HOLMES  
MR. MENZIES  
MR. McKINNEY  
MR. ROGERS

The attached despatch no. 236 from Djakarta arose from an enquiry we made to a number of posts concerning the date and the nature of the recognition which the governments to which they were accredited had granted to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. The despatch, besides answering the technical questions, goes on to cover a number of subjects which will be of interest to those who have been required to consider the subject of recognition of the Central People's Government or who have contemplated dealings with that government. It describes the early treatment the Indonesians received in Peking during the period 1951 to 1954. It also contains an exposition of arguments in favour of recognition as seen by an official of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs who has served in Peking. For the most part these arguments are ones very commonly used. One interesting one in support of the legal qualifications of the Central People's Government bears on the stability of the régime. Instead of regarding the execution of large numbers of Chinese as a sign of unfitness for recognition, the Indonesian official points out that by executing a number of the probable resistance leaders the Central People's Government has increased the prospect of its stability and thereby reinforced one of its legal qualifications for recognition. It is interesting that the Indonesian official made no mention of Chinese minorities in other countries of Asia as a factor affecting the political desirability of recognition.



DESPATCH

FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY

SECRET

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR,  
DJAKARTA, INDONESIA.

Reference: Your Letter No. Y-148 of May 7, 1956.

Subject: Recognition of China and Status  
of Formosa.

Security:.....

No:..... 236 .....

May 30, 1956.

Date:.....

Enclosures:.....

COURIER

Air or Surface Mail:.....

153.8 and 165.

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.

50056-A-46

19

*Original 50055-B-46*

References

In accordance with the instructions contained in your Letter under reference, a call was made on Mr. Marjonani, who occupies the "China desk" in the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to ascertain the official Indonesian position regarding diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China and the ultimate disposition of Formosa. As the information was not readily available, the questions were left with Mr. Marjonani. A few days later, after considerable research in the archives, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry was able to come up with the following verbal replies in response to our queries:

1. Q. On what date did the Republic of Indonesia extend diplomatic recognition to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China?

A. A cable extending recognition was sent by the Indonesian Government to the Chinese Government on June 9, 1950.

2. Q. Was that recognition de facto or de jure?

A. De jure.

3. Q. Did the act of diplomatic recognition contain or infer any indication of the territory over which the Indonesian Government considered that the Central People's Government exercised authority?

A. The People's Government was recognized in the usual international sense. No territorial limitation was stated or inferred. No such factors were even considered as Formosa was not the international problem in 1950 which it is now.

4. Q. If, as your answer implies, Formosa was not specifically exempted from the area recognized as being under the jurisdiction of the Peking Government, has the Indonesian Government taken any position on the ultimate disposition of Formosa?

Internal  
Circulation

Distribution  
to Posts  
New Delhi  
Oslo

A. On April 28th, 1955, upon the conclusion of the Bandung Conference, Prime Ministers Ali Sastreamidjojo and Chou En-lai issued a joint communique which inter alia included the following statement: "They express deep sympathy and support to the efforts of either of the two countries in safeguarding its own sovereignty and territorial integrity". The Indonesian Foreign Ministry declines to make any interpretation of that statement.

We trust that the above series of answers will be useful to the Department in compiling the information promised by the Minister at the April 24th meeting of the External Affairs Committee of the House of Commons.

2. In order to supplement the information obtained, on an official basis, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a call was made by Mr. Edmonds of this Embassy upon Mr. Isaak Mahdi, the Deputy Head of the United Nations Division in the Foreign Ministry, who was Indonesian Charge d'Affaires in Peking for three years. As Mr. Isaak is a close personal friend of Mr. Edmonds, he imparted some confidential information which he only wished conveyed to "your Embassy and your Foreign Office".

3. As mentioned above, Indonesia recognized the People's Republic of China in June, 1950. Mr. Isaak Mahdi, who was Indonesia's representative in Bangkok during the revolutionary period, was chosen as Indonesia's first Charge d'Affaires to People's China. He arrived in Tientsin on January 8, 1951, and presented his credentials as Charge d'Affaires to Prime Minister Chou En-lai on January 22, 1951. The two weeks' delay in the presentation of credentials was not caused by any reluctance on the part of the Chinese Communist officials to accept the new Indonesian Charge but because Mr. Isaak was stranded for funds as, effective January 1, 1951, all mainland Chinese accounts in the United States were frozen and Mr. Isaak could not cash his American Express travellers' cheques. In order to have any money upon which to live, he was forced to get an overdraft from a Chinese bank. Although the Peking Government was quite willing to "recognize" Indonesia's recognition, Mr. Isaak, as a very junior Charge, wished to present his credentials to Chinese Premier Chou En-lai himself since his Letter of Credence, as Charge d'Affaires en pied, was signed by the Indonesian Prime Minister. Moreover, he also wanted to establish an entree so that, despite his youth, he would be able to approach the appropriate Chinese officials in his capacity as Charge d'Affaires. The Indian and Burmese diplomats tried to dissuade Mr. Isaak from being so protocolaire and suggested that he present his credentials to Protocol Division instead. He refused to do so, however, and, after a delay of four days, threatened to return to Djakarta. The very next day Chou En-lai let it be known that he was willing to receive him.

4. Even with other Asian diplomats, the Chinese were at first very formal and reserved. The Indonesian Charge was considered to be the representative not only of a decadent bourgeois state but also one which, by abstaining, had given its tacit support to the United Nations' resolution which called for an embargo upon the shipment of all strategic materials to Communist China. At a formal Ministry of Foreign Affairs "social" function early in Mr. Isaak's stay in Peking, conversation was very sticky indeed. Although one of the top Foreign Ministry officials present was a graduate of the London School of Economics and was fluent in English, the whole repartee had to be translated from Chinese to English and vice versa. The English-speaking Chinese even refrained from laughing at jokes until they had been

translated. When the conversation on such innocuous topics as the weather bogged down, everyone turned in desperation to a discussion of the merits of the occupants of the gold fish bowl in the centre of the room. When that subject in turn had been exhausted, the Indian Second Secretary spoke to the official of similar rank in the Protocol Division and suggested that, when he was through his tour of duty in Protocol, he might like to be posted to India. The Chinese present fell into embarrassed silence at this sally since India was another bourgeois republic of which China did not approve. In desperation, the Protocol officer finally replied, "Well, perhaps they have gold fish in India too".

5. By the time Isaak Mahdi left Peking in January, 1954, the atmosphere had improved considerably. The Asian Heads of Mission in Peking held a weekly meeting with Ch'eng Chia-k'ang, the Head of the Asian Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Owing to the centralized nature of a Communist state, the number of officials competent to take decisions in the Chinese Government was rather limited. As the Asian Division Head belonged to this select group, the weekly meeting was of immense value in conveying and receiving the view of the two Governments on various issues. Towards the end of his tour in Peking, Mr. Isaak was able to ring the Foreign Office and ask to speak to Chou En-lai on the telephone. Moreover, the Chinese officials were quite willing to conduct both official and unofficial business in English and they expressed their apologies for the stiff-necked and truculent attitude they had adopted earlier towards their diplomatic guests. A member of the Chinese Delegation at the Asian-African Conference in Bandung approached Mr. Isaak and said, "If only we had been more sensible during your early years in Peking and welcomed diplomatic recognition more wholeheartedly we (the Chinese) would have a position in world affairs today comparable to that of the British". Isaak said that he could well understand the arrogant attitude of the Chinese officials in the early days of the Chinese Communist revolution as it was similar to that of the Indonesians during their revolutionary period. Having successfully achieved their independence, many Indonesians were headstrong, chauvinistic and impatient of outside advice.

6. The "thawing-out" of the diplomatic freeze prevalent in Peking in 1950-51 was, however, a very gradual process. As far as the Indonesians were concerned, it was partly achieved by insisting on all occasions on their rights and by refusing to grant any privileges to the Chinese in Djakarta until they were accorded the Indonesians in Peking. As the Chinese Embassy in Indonesia was established several months before the comparable Indonesian one in Peking, this was a cause of some annoyance to the Chinese. The Indonesians in Peking were subjected at first to travel and other restrictions. However, by such tactics as refusing to accept 16 Chinese Secretaries appointed to the Embassy in Djakarta, the Indonesians in Peking were able to secure a better treatment. Indonesia was the first Embassy permitted to send a diplomatic courier by train from Peking to Canton. Although members of the Embassy had to apply to the Government for permission to travel outside of Peking, this, in practice, was never refused. Actually, it would have been impossible to leave Peking without Government authorization since all hotels are now Government-operated and all room reservations are controlled by the Government. Therefore, one could not just "take off" from Peking to Shanghai on an hour's notice because, without Government priority, there would be no place to stay upon arrival.

7. The Chinese were represented in Djakarta by an Ambassador from the start. Mr. Isaak was supposed to go to Peking, as Charge d'Affaires, to open up the Mission in advance of the arrival of an Ambassador. However, owing to the fluctuating political situation in Indonesia, only one Indonesian Ambassador has ever been appointed to Peking. Mr. Arnold Monomutu, a Christian but a Nationalist Party member, was designated Ambassador by the first Ali Sastroamidjojo Government in December, 1953. He returned from Peking, at his own request, during the tenure of office of Masjumi Premier Burhanuddin Harahap, late in 1955. He has not been replaced.

8. Mr. Isaak considers that there were three main reasons why it was important that non-Communist countries, particularly the smaller powers, such as Indonesia and Canada, should have recognized the People's Government of China, shortly after its establishment in Peking on October 1, 1949. The same political, economic and diplomatic arguments still apply today, although the political and economic ones do not have the same force now as they did earlier.

9. From the political viewpoint, the former Indonesian Charge maintains that the Peking Government is basically Chinese - even though it is also Communist. Historically, the Chinese have suffered a series of invasions by barbarians from the north and all - apart from the Mongols, who soon lost power - were absorbed into the Chinese civilization and cultural pattern, despite any governmental changes they may have introduced or imposed. In other words, the Peking Government was a peculiarly Chinese version of the standard Communist model. The Chinese were quite conscious of the mistakes that had been made by their Russian mentors and were anxious to avoid them. Traditionally, "China", in the Chinese language, has always been termed the "middle country" - the country of enlightenment surrounded by barbarians who paid tribute to the Chinese emperor and aped the Chinese way of life. Now, however, with the advent of the Korean War and the division of the world into Communist and non-Communist blocs, a new interpretation of the "middle country" concept has been made, viz., China is a country surrounded by hostile enemies. This need for protection from its acknowledged or potential enemies has thrown China into the waiting arms of the Soviet Union. This close alliance is not the position in the international world desired by China. When asked whether there was any chance of "Titoism" developing in Communist China, Isaak replied that, although Chinese Communism had a Chinese flavour, China, in 1956, is not in the bargaining position that Tito was, in 1949, to make a break from Moscow. After all, Yugoslavia was a relatively developed country which was geographically accessible to the Western powers. When the Soviet Union ordered Yugoslavia to import 30% of its outside requirements from the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia could afford to thumb its nose at the Soviet Union as it was well aware of the fact that both the United States and Great Britain were able and willing to be alternate sources of supply.

10. The political argument is, of course, closely allied with the economic argument. In 1949, after the long period of the Sino-Japanese War and the hostilities between the Nationalist and Communist armies, China was a physically exhausted and depleted country. China was and is anxious for a period of peace in order to reconstruct its economy and accelerate the process of industrialization. China, in common with Indonesia and other under-developed countries, has always regarded industrialization as the key to the solution of economic problems in the twentieth century. Everything in China in 1949 was in short supply and the Peking Government wanted help of all kinds and hoped that the

sources of supply would be as diverse as possible, in order to lessen China's dependence on any one country. In fact, right through 1952, it would have been possible (except for the limitations implicit in the United Nations' embargo regulations) for any country to ship large amounts of equipment to China. After that date, however, under the terms of the Sino-Soviet agreement, China was obliged, to obtain at least 70% of its imports from the Soviet bloc. The Chinese are duly grateful for the fact that, while other countries refused to help China in its hour of need, the Soviet Union, despite considerable economic strain at home, gave large scale economic and capital aid to China - the much-publicized 141 industrial projects, for example. Although a few Western countries have recently indicated their eagerness to export to China, it is now somewhat late since, with the aid of the Soviet Union, China has made rapid economic strides. China now has a huge industrial complex of its own in operation in Manchuria, which reduces China's need for large-scale capital assistance from abroad.

11. When Mr. Isaak was asked about the Chinese reluctance to accept the early recognition extended the Peking regime by the United Kingdom, the Indonesian diplomat replied that the Communists had made an extensive review of the international treaties and agreements subscribed to by the Chiang K'ai-shek Government and announced that it would not honour any treaties which implied an unequal relationship between the contracting parties. The Chinese were therefore reluctant to grant full negotiatory powers to the British diplomatic mission in Peking because that action might be construed as being tacit permission for the imperialistic British firms, who first went to China under semi-colonial conditions, to continue in full operation. Mr. Isaak clearly implied that the Chinese were originally most reluctant to channel Sino-British trade through the "Old China Hand" firms. Now, however, even though the Chinese were most anxious to discuss trade on almost any basis, the market is not as open as it once was because, in the intervening period, the Russians have effectively cornered the "China Trade".


12. The Indonesian Foreign Ministry considers it important for the smaller powers to have diplomatic representatives in Peking. The Indonesians make no attempt to conceal their irritation at the spectacle of a Western Big Power forcing its smaller allies to abstain from negotiating with the Chinese Communists. The realities of the current international situation demand that the strong position of Communist China be considered in any important negotiations concerning the Far East. Indeed, in recognition of this truism, all the Western Big Powers have dealt, to a greater or lesser extent, with the Chinese Communists. The United Kingdom has, of course, recognized Communist China and has conducted many confidential negotiations with Chinese officials in Peking. The French, through the Sainteny mission in Hanoi, have maintained relations with the Viet Minh and the French are believed to be interested in establishing a commercial office in Peking. (Incidentally, here in Djakarta, there are always a minimum of two Chinese diplomats at most of the larger cocktail parties given by the French.) For some months, too, the United States and China have been conducting talks at the ambassadorial level in Geneva. Other smaller powers, however, are forbidden from making such contacts in order to solve problems of interest to them.

13. After Mr. Isaak had conveyed these three non-legal arguments in favour of extending diplomatic recognition to Communist China, a short discussion took place on the qualifications, under international law, which a government must meet before it is eligible for diplomatic recognition by other states. Mention was made of such general criteria as effective control and administration over the generally recognized borders of the national

territory, willingness to honour its international obligations and the obedience of the people to the edicts of the Government concerned. The latter point provoked a discussion concerning the amount of support which the Peking regime has among the people. Before reporting to the Indonesian Foreign Ministry on the extent of the purges in China, the Indonesian Embassy in Peking asked some pointed questions of the Chinese regarding the number of people killed since the revolution. The Chinese Nationalists claim that 37 million people have been exterminated by the Communists; the British in Peking estimated 17 million. Chinese Communist officials themselves admitted to Mr. Isaak that at least two million people had been systematically liquidated. Even if this figure was accepted at face value, the ruthless "judicial" execution of two million selected people would indicate that most of the potential "resistance" leaders had been exposed and eliminated. By way of analogy, Mr. Isaak mentioned that the Japanese had a plan to murder three thousand intellectuals and semi-intellectuals in Indonesia (of which Mr. Isaak was one) but the plan was never put into effect owing to the rapid end of the Japanese War. Assuming that China's population is seven times greater than that of Indonesia, the slaughter of 21,000 intellectuals would effectively dampen any little fires that might be smouldering. By this systematic massacre, Mr. Isaak said, the Chinese have succeeded in doing something which the Dutch in Indonesia and the French in Indochina had planned but had not been able to put into operation. In this connection, he mentioned that Captain "Turko" Westerling, in killing 40,000 Indonesians in Celebes was not engaged in indiscriminate butchery. All the intellectuals and potential village leaders in southern Celebes were systematically sought out. (Mr. Isaak's brother - a physician - just managed to escape.) Fortunately for the Indonesians, Westerling's activities in this connection were confined to Celebes. The French had a similar plan in Indochina but they were not able to implement it. (Mr. Isaak mentioned, however, that while passing through Paris last year, he had heard from a Madagascar expatriate that the French had succeeded in exterminating 10,000 intellectuals and semi-intellectuals in that island colony which had very effectively squelched the nationalist movement there. Although Mr. Isaak had not seen any confirmation of this report elsewhere, he had no reason to doubt the word of this Madagascar native.)

14. Although no territorial limitation had been placed on Indonesia's recognition of the People's Government of China, Indonesia is aware that Formosa does constitute an international problem. However, Formosa is one of those "cold war" disputes in which Indonesia, because of its policy of non-alignment, does not wish to become involved. In fact, Indonesia is not at all convinced that it is, technically, an international dispute since the civil war between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists has never really stopped. It can therefore be claimed that the dispute is a domestic issue between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists. The question of whether or not Formosa is an integral part of China has been a matter of dispute within Indonesian Government circles from time to time. The correct "line" on this issue has varied in accordance with the particular political orientation of the Government of the moment. (Mr. Isaak was somewhat evasive about Formosa - not, as he said, because he wanted to conceal anything but because he was not sure what the current Ali Government thinks about the issue.) Generally speaking, Indonesia prefers to offer its impartial good offices in disputes of this nature rather than try to adjudicate the substantive issues involved.

15. Indonesia's "active and independent" foreign policy, in Mr. Isaak's words, involves acting as a mediator rather than as a whistle-blowing referee. (It will be recalled, in this connection, that Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo, when he was last Prime Minister, offered his mediatory services in the Formosan dispute to both the United States and Communist China, following the Bandung Conference last year.) Indonesia rather fancies its self-enunciated role of international peacemaker. For example, during the Korean War, Mr. Isaak himself was able to play a not inconsiderable role (in his own modest opinion) in the Korean prisoners-of-war dispute. He advised the Chinese Government that the United Nations' principle of voluntary repatriation was a fair one and was the minimum which American public opinion was prepared to accept. The Chinese were very reluctant to accept this proposal because they believed that their prisoners had been tortured and thoroughly "brainwashed". It was thus inevitable that China would suffer some "loss of face" on the issue. Every success which Indonesia scores in negotiations of this nature inevitably serves to reconfirm Indonesia's belief in the virtues of its "active and independent" foreign policy.



A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "G. Heasman". Below the signature is a stylized flourish or scribble.

3

THE AMBASSADOR

Confidential

Received OCT 21 1955  
From CRO

FC 1041/681  
CHI 29/1955

May 31/55

2  
file  
26  
80056-A + do

THE STATUS OF (i) FORMOSA AND THE  
PESCADORES, (ii) THE ISLANDS FRINGING  
THE CHINESE MAINLAND COAST

Formosa's status as a part of the Chinese Empire was first made definite in 1684 when the Imperial Chinese Government made the island a prefecture subordinate to the province of Fukien on the opposite mainland. Troops were stationed on Formosa and the Pescadores.

2. The island had been occupied by the Dutch from 1624 to 1661 and earlier by the Portuguese, but in 1661 the Dutch were expelled by Koxinga, the Chinese pirate and adventurer who fought against the Imperial Chinese Government, allying himself with the lost cause of the previous dynasty of the Mings. Then followed twenty years' of rule by Koxinga and his successors. This brief independence is nowadays recalled with affection by those Formosans who claim independent status for the island, but they are mostly outside Formosa and not numerous.

3. Koxinga's grandson submitted to Peking in 1682. The Imperial Chinese Government's effective control was at first limited to the Western coastal areas but by the 18th century it extended to the greater part of the island. Until the Japanese arrived on the scene in the last quarter of the 19th century there was no-one to question Chinese sovereignty; it was for example recognised by implication in the Sino-British Treaty of Tientsin (1858) under which the Chinese Government opened Formosa to British subjects for trade. By this time the population was predominantly Chinese, as a result of the steady flow of Chinese immigrants from the opposite parts of the mainland which had begun more than two centuries before. In 1895, out of a population estimated at rather less than 3 million, about 94% were Chinese, being descendants of immigrants from Fukien and Kwangtung provinces, and only about 6% were aborigines.

4. Those Formosans who today claim independence are inclined to assert that the Formosans are not of Chinese race, on the ground that they are descended from Koxinga and his followers whose blood was thoroughly intermingled with the aborigines, Spaniards, Portuguese, Dutch and Japanese. It is true that Koxinga had a Fukienese father and a Japanese mother and that the Chinese immigrants have mixed sufficiently with some of the aborigines in the plains to assimilate a part of them. Fifty years of Japanese rule and the long separation of the Formosans from their homeland have also partially changed their outlook. But the Formosans cling tenaciously to the customs and dialects which their ancestors brought with them, perhaps generations ago, from the mainland, so much so that those from Fukien (over 75%) are still distinct in customs and dialect from those who came from Kwangtung.

5. With the decline of the Manchu government in the latter half of the 19th century its control over Formosa weakened. In 1871 there was a Sino-Japanese dispute over the island which deemed likely to result in its seizure by the Japanese. Some natives of the Liuchiu Islands, which the Japanese claimed, had been murdered at the hands of Formosan aborigines after being shipwrecked, and the Japanese took the view that if the Chinese could not maintain order others should do so. The

matter

NB



The matter was settled by Chinese payment of an indemnity. During the Sino-French war of 1884 certain of the Formosa ports as well as the Pescadores were occupied by the French, but they withdrew after the peace. The Chinese then decided to strengthen the position and one result of this was that in 1885 Formosa was made a province directly under the Imperial government at Peking. But the Chinese were unequal to the Japanese attack when it came less than ten years later.

#### JAPANESE ANNEXATION, 1895

6. After China's defeat at Japanese hands in the war of 1894-95, the Chinese were compelled to cede Formosa and the Pescadores to Japan as part of the peace terms. The treaty of Shimonoseki, signed on April 17, 1895, stated in part:-

#### Article II

"China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territory, together with all fortifications arsenals and public property thereon:-

(b) The island of Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said Island of Formosa.

(c) The Pescadores Group, that is to say, all islands lying between the 119th and 120th degrees of longitude east of Greenwich, and the 23rd and 24th degrees of north latitude".

#### Article V.

"The inhabitants of the territories ceded to Japan who wish to take up their residence outside the ceded districts shall be at liberty to sell their real property and retire. For this purpose a period of two years from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the present Act shall be granted. At the expiration of that period those of the inhabitants who shall not have left such territories shall, at the option of Japan, be deemed to be Japanese subjects".

7. When these terms became known in Formosa the local people exhibited great dissatisfaction and the garrison offered resistance to the Japanese expedition which came to annex the island, but the Japanese soon gained control though it was some years before the island was pacified as a whole. Morse, the historian of China who was at that time Commissioner of Customs on the island, records the curious fact that a deputation of local gentry offered a protectorate of the island to England on the basis that China should retain the sovereignty; the offer was declined. The Formosans also made a feeble attempt to establish a Republic and this is sometimes now adduced as evidence of a persistent desire for independence.

8. The next half-century of Japanese rule brought stable political conditions to the island in sharp contrast to the political disorder on the Chinese mainland. Integration with the Japanese Empire gave Formosa a high level of material prosperity compared with other Asian countries. The number of Japanese immigrants was relatively small, and they were more administrators and technicians than settlers on the land. By 1935 the population had risen to 5.2 million, composed as follows:

Chinese

Chinese from Fukien:	3.9 million;
Chinese from Kwangtung:	700 thousand;
Japanese:	270 thousand;
Aborigines:	200 thousand.

Despite Japanese attempts to spread the use of the Japanese language and Japanese institutions the population continued overwhelmingly Chinese in culture and language. The population virtually doubled in the 35 years up to 1940, and this growth was almost wholly due to the natural increase of the Chinese.

#### CAIRO DECLARATION

9. Japan's war of aggression launched at Pearl Harbour in 1941 determined the Allies to deprive her of her Empire. At the same time the United States acknowledged China as a Great Power. A combination of these two factors, to which was perhaps added the desire to encourage China to continue the struggle which for her had started as far back as 1937, led to the Cairo Declaration issued by the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, on December 1, 1943. The relevant portion reads as follows:-

"The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914 and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China".

This was a statement of intention only and it could not of itself transfer sovereignty over Formosa from Japan to China.

#### POTSDAM DECLARATION

10. This declaration was issued on July 26, 1945, in the names of the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain and Chiang Kai-shek, and was subsequently adhered to by the Soviet Union. It laid down conditions for the Japanese surrender and the relevant part states:-

"The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the Islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine".

#### JAPANESE SURRENDER

11. The Japanese Emperor accepted the Potsdam terms and the Japanese surrender was received on September 25, 1945, by General MacArthur "for the United States, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. and in the interests of the United Nations at war with Japan". The Japanese forces in Formosa were then instructed to surrender to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek which they did on October 25, 1945. Japanese

acceptance

acceptance of the Potsdam declaration did not effect a change regarding the sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores, but merely constituted an advance recognition and acceptance of such steps as the Allies might eventually take for the purpose. Therefore in law Formosa's special status was that of enemy territory under military occupation. Chiang Kai-shek assumed the administration of Formosa responsible to the whole body of the Allies pending the conclusion of a Peace Treaty, or if the status of Formosa was not finally settled by that treaty (which it was not), pending an eventual settlement.

12. The Republic of China proceeded to take unilateral action, however, as if the sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores had passed to it as from October 25, 1945. The National government announced (on January 12, 1946) that the inhabitants of Formosa had regained Chinese nationality as from October 25, 1945. The Administrative Office for the Province of Formosa which had immediately been set up made arrangements for an oath of loyalty to the National Government to be taken by each citizen, and claimed that 2,409,560 persons (91.8% of the population over 20 years of age) had taken the oath when registration ended on February 15, 1946.

13. H.M. Government's view of the legal position was made clear to the Chinese Government when the question arose of passport facilities for Formosans. H.M. Government declined to regard them as Chinese nationals, and compromised by treating them as "friendly aliens". In strict law they still remained Japanese nationals. It cannot be said however that there was a general tendency on the part of other governments to question the unilateral action which the Republic of China took about Formosa, and in the circumstances it was reasonable to assume that it was only a matter of time before a formal treaty of peace would regularise the legal position. Afterwards in January 1951, Mr. Acheson (then United States Secretary of State) expressed his view in the following words:

"The Chinese have administered Formosa for 4 years. Neither the United States nor any other ally ever questioned that authority and that occupation. When Formosa was made a province of China nobody raised any lawyers' doubts about that. That was regarded as in accordance with the commitments".

14. The Chinese administration of Formosa in the first post-war period left much to be desired and on February 28, 1947, the Formosans broke out in a serious revolt against their rulers from the mainland. In the process of settling this trouble, the island was given a full provincial form of government and a provincial governor replaced the former administrative commissioner who was recalled. An aftermath of the 1947 revolt has been the agitation for independence which a small number of Formosans have continued to carry on from outside the island; within the island such agitation is not tolerated.

15. In 1949 the communists gained the upper hand in the civil war on the mainland against the Nationalists, and established at Peking the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic. The National Government of the Republic of China withdrew from the mainland to Formosa. Thenceforth there have been two governments claiming to represent China and their

competing

competing claims to Formosa are the root of the present trouble. The Republic of China continues to be recognised as the de jure government of China by a large group of countries including the United States of America and, on the other hand, the Government of the People's Republic of China is recognised as the de jure government of China by another group of countries, including the United Kingdom. Whilst recognizing the People's Republic of China (on January 6, 1950) H.M. Government retained their consul in Formosa (at Tamsui) on the basis that he was in relations with the de facto local authorities, and not with the Nationalist Government itself.

16. Upon the withdrawal of the Nationalists to Formosa the United States Government made no commitment to defend the island against the communists, although it continued to give the Nationalists economic aid. President Truman stated on January 5, 1950, that the U.S. Government would not pursue a course which would lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. But as a direct result of the outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950, the United States immediately undertook to defend Formosa from any mainland attack and for that purpose disposed naval units in the Formosa Strait; the United States also called on the Nationalists to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. It was explained that this action was without prejudice to the long-term political status of Formosa.

#### JAPANESE PEACE TREATY

17. Most of the states which had been at war with Japan signed a Peace Treaty with her at San Francisco on September 8, 1951, but in the absence of agreement as to which of the two governments claiming to represent China should participate, China was excluded from this Treaty, and the U.S.S.R. refused to participate. Article 2 stated: "Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores," but the Treaty did not assign them to any other state. Formosa and the Pescadores ceased from that date to be Japanese territory, but remained of undetermined or uncertain status in law. They were in the occupation of an entity which in the view of H.M. Government did not represent the Chinese state and could not therefore acquire rights of sovereignty. On the other hand the entity which in our view did represent the Chinese state was not in occupation of Formosa and could not derive any rights from occupation of that territory.

#### PEACE TREATY BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE "REPUBLIC OF CHINA"

18. On April 28, 1952, Japan concluded a bilateral Peace Treaty with "the Republic of China" at Taipei, but this instrument cannot be accepted as valid by those governments (including that of the United Kingdom) which had earlier withdrawn recognition from the Nationalists. Article 1 terminated the state of war between the "Republic of China" and Japan; Article 2 recognised that under the San Francisco Treaty Japan had renounced all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores; Article 10 stated that "for the purposes of the present Treaty" nationals of the "Republic of China" shall be deemed to include all the inhabitants and former inhabitants of Formosa and the Pescadores and their descendants who are of the Chinese nationality in accordance with the laws and regulations which have been or may hereafter be enforced by the "Republic of China" in Formosa and the Pescadores.

19. From the point of view of those countries including the United Kingdom who do not recognise the "Republic of  
China"

China", this "Treaty" did nothing to clear up the uncertain status of Formosa in law as described in paragraph 17 above. The United States government share this view. Mr. Dulles said at a press conference on December 1, 1954: ".....technical sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores has never been settled. That is because the Japanese Peace Treaty merely involves a renunciation by Japan of its right and title to these islands. But the future title is not determined by the Japanese Peace Treaty, nor is it determined by the Peace Treaty which was concluded between the Republic of China and Japan..."

20. On February 2, 1953, President Eisenhower stated that the United States fleet in the Formosa Strait would no longer be used to "shield Communist China" though it was retained there to protect Formosa from invasion. In the summer of 1954 the Chinese communists renewed agitation for the "liberation" of Formosa and Chou En-lai stated that Formosa was "sacred" and inalienable Chinese territory, that its "liberation" was an internal matter of Chinese sovereignty and that interference by other countries would not be permitted. The United States Government then made clear that it was prepared to use its armed forces to protect Formosa and the Nationalists by concluding with the Nationalists the Mutual Security Treaty of December 1954. But by an exchange of notes attached to the Treaty both parties agreed that neither would take action except in self-defence, which in effect meant that the United States Government could prevent the Nationalists from attacking the mainland. The United States commitment was further underlined when on January 29, 1955, the United States Congress authorised the President to use American armed forces for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack. The Congressional resolution stated that Formosa was part of the "Western Pacific Island Chain" whose secure possession by friendly governments was vital to the interests of the United States and all friendly nations in or bordering upon the Pacific Ocean.

21. Neither of the contestants for sovereignty shows willingness to withdraw. The Nationalist Government's claim to be the lawful government of China would be seriously impaired in the eyes of its supporters if it recognised that Formosa was not Chinese, and the Chinese as a nation would condemn such a step. The Communists agree with the Nationalists in holding that sovereignty passed to the National Government on October 25, 1945, but maintain that by virtue of the Government of the People's Republic of China having since succeeded to de jure sovereignty over China, the title to Formosa has passed to it. In a matter which in their view concerns territorial sovereignty and integrity it is hardly likely that the Communists will compromise and it is impossible to be sure that they will not recklessly translate their bold words into deeds, at the cost of war. Although hostilities have so far been limited to the islands which fringe the mainland coast (the Communists captured Yi Chiang Shan island on January 18, 1955, and have been making military preparations on the mainland opposite Quemoy and Matsu), numerous Peking spokesmen have repeatedly declared that their government "will not rest" until Formosa itself has been "liberated".

22. In order to reduce tension efforts have been made to bring the conflicting parties to a conference table in the hope of inducing them to agree to a cease-fire. On January 31, 1955, the United Nations Security Council invited the Peking Government to send a representative to participate in the Council's

discussions

Discussions of the "question of the hostilities in the area of certain islands off the Chinese mainland". Peking declined on the ground that the "liberation" of Formosa and the coastal islands was an exercise of Chinese sovereignty and that the tension had been caused by United States "aggression" against Formosa and interference in internal Chinese affairs. The U.S.S.R. proposed on February 4, 1955, a ten-power conference to discuss the "dangerous situation in the area of Formosa and other Chinese coastal islands", but since their conference would have included Peking but not the Nationalists it offered no hope of progress and Her Majesty's Government informed the Soviet Government that their proposal was not acceptable in its present form. On April 23 Chou En-lai issued a statement at Bandung expressing willingness to negotiate with the United States Government about a relaxation of tension in the Formosa area, while reserving the sovereign right to China to "liberate" the island. On April 26, Mr. Dulles announced that the United States Government would not rule out bilateral talks about a cease-fire provided Nationalist interests were not involved.

23. It is impossible to see how these deeply conflicting interests can be reconciled, but various suggestions as to the lines of a long-term settlement have appeared in the press:-

(a) International Trusteeship for Formosa and the Pescadores. This would presumably be exercised under the United Nations. Since the mere idea is bitterly opposed by both Chinese parties the prospects are extremely poor. Moreover it seems unlikely that any nation would be willing to undertake the task of acting as trustee.

(b) Consultation of the wishes of the Formosans with a view to possible independence. There can be no doubt that the mass of native-born Formosans would be glad to be saved from involvement in an internal Chinese struggle in which they have no part. But this course would not be acceptable to Peking or, at any rate for the time being, to the Nationalists. The practical problems of establishing an independent government would be very great. There is moreover no strong independence movement to start with since the handful of Formosans who agitate for it from outside appear to have no appreciable following either within the island or outside it. In support of the independence proposal it is sometimes stated that the Formosans are of a different race from the Chinese, but this is a misconception. The composition of the total population estimated at about 10 million in 1955 is roughly as follows:- Aborigines: under 200,000; Native-born Formosans: approximately 8 million; Mainland Chinese: approximately 2 million. The native-born Formosans are descended from Chinese immigrants from the mainland provinces of Fukien and Kwangtung; they still cling to the customs and dialects of the districts on the mainland whence their ancestors came; Nationalists and Communists alike regard them as Han Chinese, i.e. of Chinese race and not as a minority. The mainland Chinese fall into roughly three categories: first, those who moved in to the island after it came under Chinese administration in 1945, as officials, merchants and others; next,

those .

those civilians who fled there in much larger numbers as a refuge from Communism in 1949 and after; and lastly the military establishment (about 600,000 strong) which was withdrawn from the mainland. All these categories of mainland Chinese are distinct from the native-born Formosans not only by their different attitude in general but also by their inability to speak the southern dialects; they have brought with them the standardised form of Northern Chinese dialect based on Mandarin. But written Chinese is universal to all Chinese, and this fact and their common culture bind all Chinese together and there is no reason to suppose that Formosa is an exception.

24. With the passage of time a separate independent Formosa might become logical and practicable. At present the Government of the Chinese People's Republic would resist it to the utmost. It is to be hoped that a cease-fire, if only tacitly accepted, may come about and that the elements of a more lasting settlement might then gradually appear.

#### THE ISLANDS FRINGING THE CHINESE MAINLAND COAST

25. In May 1955, the Nationalists still hold the following islands off the coast of Fukien province: Quemoy, Little Quemoy, Ta Tan, Matsu, Okseu, Pai Ch'uan (White Dog), and some smaller ones of little significance. Quemoy and Matsu lie across the approaches to the two mainland ports of Amoy and Foochow and are garrisoned by about 50,000 and 10,000 Nationalist regulars respectively. The communists attempted to seize Quemoy in October, 1949, but were repulsed. Quemoy and Little Quemoy are within artillery range of the mainland and the communists have shelled them on various occasions in the past 5 years, and in September 1954, their fire was intensified for a short period, causing the Nationalists to retaliate by bombing positions on the mainland.

26. The Nationalists have lost all the islands which they held off the coast of Chekiang province. The Communists captured Yi Chiang Shan on January 18, 1955 and by the end of February the Nationalists had successively evacuated the Tachen, Pishan and Nanchishan groups of islands, which were of little use to them.

27. The legal position as to the costal islands is relatively simple. From first to last they have been undoubtedly Chinese territory and therefore in our view part of the territory over which the People's Republic of China is entitled to exercise authority. In the view of H.M. Government, however, any attempt by the Government of the People's Republic of China to assert its authority over the islands by force would endanger the peace; and H.M. Government hope that the matter will be settled by negotiation. Sir Anthony Eden expressed the view in the House on March 8, 1955, that the Nationalists should withdraw from the islands as one of the elements in progress towards a peaceful solution.

28. Instead of welcoming this suggestion the Peking news commentators affected to be suspicious of it as an attempt to bargain away the coastal islands in order to keep Formosa. They have repeatedly stated that Peking will not bargain about Chinese territory.

29. On January 29, 1955 the Congress of the United States authorized the President to "employ the armed forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defence of Formosa and the Pescadores". This leaves to the President the decision as to whether the United States should take military action to defend Quemoy and Matsu.

May 31, 1955.

Research Department,  
Foreign Office.



NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy,  
Tel Aviv, Israel

Reference: Your letter No. Y-132 of May 7, 1956

Subject: Recognition of China and Status of  
Formosa.

Security:.....CONFIDENTIAL.....

No:.....188.....

Date:.....May 29, 1956.....

Enclosures:.....---.....

Air or Surface Mail: By Bag.....

Post File No:.....12-1-14.....

Ottawa File No.

50056-A-4.

19

## References

In response to my enquiry, the Foreign Ministry has advised me that Israel recognized the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China on January 9, 1950. The recognition which was made in the form of a telegram from Mr. Moshe Sharett to Mr. Chou En Lai stated that, "the Government of Israel has decided to recognize your government as the de jure government of China". No indication of the territory over which the Government of Israel considered that the Chinese Government exercised authority was included in this act of recognition.

2. With regard to the settlement of the Formosan question, the Foreign Ministry at the official level has considerable doubts as to the justification for the island's existence as an independent state. However, no policy has as yet been formulated here concerning the legal status of Formosa, and in general Israel would favour a settlement of this issue under United Nations auspices. Until some international decision has been reached on this question, Israel has no present intention of recognizing Formosa as part of Communist China.

3. For the reasons you suggested and since we would be making public information supplied by another government, I considered it wise to explain the origin of our enquiry. Accordingly in providing the above information my Foreign Ministry informant indicated that there would be no objection to the factual details of the act of recognition being made available to the External Affairs Committee of the House of Commons, but that the views expressed on Formosa were for the information of the Department of External Affairs alone.

4. In a separate despatch dealing with Israeli policy in Asia, which is in course of preparation, we will discuss Israel's relations with Communist China at greater length.

GEORGE P. KIDD

Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Internal  
Circulation

Distribution  
to Posts

133

FM EMBASSY CAIRO MAY 26/56 UNCLAS

TO: EXTERNAL 43

REF YOUR TEL MAY 23

RECOGNITION OF CHINA STATUS OF FORMOSA (UNDERLINE) DEJURE (END

UNDERLINE) RECOGNITION MAY 16

TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION NOT STIPULATED

KIRKWOOD

50056-A	40
19	-

*Original 50055-B-46*

DUPLICATE

*Original on  
50056-A-40*

OTTAWA FILE No. 50056-A-46
-------------------------------

19

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <u>CONFIDENTIAL</u>
--

Letter No. 170  
Date May 25, 1956

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, Oslo, Norway  
 TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA  
 Reference: Your Letter No. Y-149 of May 7  
 Subject: Recognition of China and Status of Formosa

As requested, we had a talk with Ansteensen of the Foreign Ministry on the above-mentioned subject along the lines suggested in your letter under reference.

2. Norway extended de jure recognition to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China on January 6, 1950. Cabled instructions to the Consul General of Norway in Shanghai to this effect referred to Chou En-lai's statement of October 1st, 1949 on the establishment of diplomatic relations with all countries and stated that Norway would be prepared to exchange Chargé d'Affaires at the earliest opportunity. Ansteensen told us that the approach had incidentally been made through the Consul General because of the absence from China of their diplomatic representative who, apart from being accredited to the Nationalist authorities, was also Norwegian Minister in Bangkok and the Philippines. The Norwegian Minister was in fact visiting Manilla at the time.

3. There then followed an exchange of telegrams between Oslo and Shanghai which, even at this late stage, sheds an interesting light on the attitude of the Communist Chinese authorities. We have, incidentally, been promised copies of these telegrams which we propose to pass on to you in due course. We might possibly add for the time being that the Norwegian Consul General's reply to the Foreign Minister's instructions of January 6, 1950, conveyed the information that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China were prepared to establish diplomatic relations with Norway "after the latter's severance of the ties with the Kuomintang reactionaries". The Foreign Ministry's reply was to the effect that Norway had formally severed relations with the Government of Chiang Kai-Shek on January 6, 1950.

4. The question of the exchange of

Copies Referred To.....
No. of Enclosures .....
Post File No.....

diplomatic representatives between the Central People's Government and Norway then followed by now familiar lines. Shortly after the Norwegian Vice-Consul in Shanghai had arrived in Peking to commence negotiations with a view to the establishment of regular relations between Norway and Communist China, however, Peking on January 24th chose to link the exchange of diplomatic representatives with the question of Chinese representation then being considered in the United Nations. In retaliation against Norway's vote in the Security Council, the Norwegian Vice-Consul who was merely empowered to conduct negotiations, was left to cool his heels in semi-diplomatic status in Peking for the next four years. As with the British, it was only after the Geneva Conference on Indochina that the situation was finally clarified and that the exchange of diplomatic representatives between Oslo and Peking took place.

5. Ansteensen also told us that Norway's recognition of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China was made without reservation, i.e., no indications were at any time given as to the territory over which Norway considered that the Central People's Government exercised authority.

6. To our question as to the attitude which the Government of Norway took concerning the disposition of Formosa, Ansteensen replied that this was a matter which had yet to be considered. There had been, of course, the case of a Norwegian merchant ship which had been attacked by Nationalist planes off the coast of Formosa a few years ago with attendant loss of lives. The matter had been disposed of, however, through the good offices of the United States Government who had been approached to this effect by the Norwegian Ambassador in Washington.

**C. A. RONNING**

The Embassy

This copy

50086-A 40
RSL. ROGERS

EXTRACT FROM "MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE  
No. 3  
STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MAY 23 1956  
FAR EASTERN DIV.

HON. VESTER B. PEARSON (Secretary of State):

Mr. Chairman, certain questions were put to me at the previous meeting concerning the Far East and the Middle East and I can deal with them now.

One question which was asked while we were discussing the situation in Formosa was whether or the Formosans who serve in the Chinese Nationalist forces on that island were conscripted, and the answer confirms what I then said, tentatively, that Formosans are liable to military service in the forces maintained by the National Government of China. I was also asked the distance of the offshore islands from the mainland and from Formosa--the islands of Quemoy and Matsu--and I gave tentative figures which were not entirely accurate, though they were reasonably close to the truth.

Quemoy is five miles from the mainland--I think I said four miles. There is, however, one small island of the group which is closer somewhat to the mainland. The islands are roughly 100 miles from Formosa.

I was also asked whether we had any reliable information about the numbers of communist Chinese who have escaped from Formosa. That, as I indicated the other day, is a very difficult question to answer. It has been estimated that since 1952 about 26,000 Chinese have moved from the mainland to Formosa, for the most part through Hong Kong. It is, of course, impossible to say categorically if any of those could be described as communist Chinese but I suspect all of them were Chinese who were dissatisfied with the form of government now in China, and anxious to escape from it.

The estimate of the movement of Chinese to Formosa from the time the Chiang Kai Shek government was driven off the mainland and an estimate which we believe to be reliable--is as follows: there were approximately two million troops and dependants in the original withdrawal. That would be about 1950. Subsequent arrivals included troops and dependants from Indo-China--27,000 in 1953 or thereabouts, troops and dependants from Burma, 7,000 prisoners captured in Korea who preferred to go to Formosa rather than return to communist China, 14,000.

Mr. Fleming: A moment ago the minister gave us a figure and said "t

"troops and dependants". Is the figure given the figure for the troops only, or is it an inclusive figure?

Hon. Mr. Pearson: The figures cover troops and dependants. The dependants are included in the total figures.

To continue the list, the total includes civilians evacuated from Tachen island, 17,000 in 1955; overseas Chinese students who chose to go to Formosa rather than to the Chinese mainland, 15,000; refugees sponsored by the Council for the Protection of Intellectuals, about 15,000 and other refugees from Hong Kong, about 17,000, totalling in all about 2,092,000.

I was also asked the other day how many Canadian Nationals were still in China. According to the records of our department there are 46 Canadian Nationals in mainland China at the present time. Five of these are Canadian missionaries---two protestant women missionaries and three catholic nuns. The remaining 41 Canadian Nationals are Chinese Canadians---Canadians of Chinese race--and of that number of 41, ten have proceeded to China within the last two years.

I was also asked about the status of Canadian property in China--I had made some reference to our government property there. In so far as unofficial property is concerned it is very hard, of course to get accurate information. We understand that a large portion of the Canadian missionary property once held in China was progressively turned over to Chinese congregations and adherents during the years preceding and following the Japanese war. We have received only one claim for compensation in respect of confiscation of property by the government of China. No, I am wrong about that, Mr. Chairman. We received one claim in 1954, and since then we have received one additional enquiry relating to alleged misappropriation of Canadian-owned property. That enquiry has not, however, been followed up yet by a claim for compensation.

Those, I think, were the only questions that arose with regard to the Far East with which I did not deal.

COPY FOR File 50056-A-40.

8 8

DS30/124

FM EXTERNAL OTTAWA MAY 22/56 CONFD

TO EMBASSY CAIRO YY13

INFO EMBASSY WASHINGTON

HIGH COMMISSIONER LONDON

EMBASSY PARIS

PERMANENT MISSION NEWYORK

BEIRUT LEBANON BAG

RECOGNITION OF CHINA AND STATUS OF FORMOSA

PLEASE REPORT BY TELEGRAM DATE OF RECOGNITION OF CENTRAL PEOPLE'S  
GOVERNMENT BY EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT AND WHETHER RECOGNITION DE FACTO  
OR DE JURE. <sup>DID</sup> ~~PLEASE ALSO ATTEMPT TO LEARN WHETHER~~ ACT OF RECOGNITION  
INCLUDE# ANY INDICATION OF ~~THE~~ TERRITORY OVER WHICH EGYPTIAN  
GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THAT ~~THE~~ CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT EXERCISES  
AUTHORITY? WE ARE SPECIFICALLY INTERESTED TO KNOW WHETHER FORMOSA  
IS CONSIDERED TO BE PART OF TERRITORY OF ~~THE~~ PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF  
CHINA.

This Tel went to Info addressees without change but to Cairo  
as an unclassified message with changes indicated.

Signed: R. L. Rogers  
May 23, 1956  
Far Eastern Div

50056-A-40

*8/9*  
*Robert*

*File LH*

R. L. ROGERS

MAY 22 1956

FAR EASTERN DIV.

EVIDENCE

Tuesday, May 22, 1956,  
11.00 a.m.

THE CHAIRMAN: Well gentlemen we are very lucky to have a quorum this morning. We will start with the minister and he will answer one question which was put last week by Mr. MacKenzie.

HON. ~~MR.~~ LESTER B. PEARSON (Secretary of State for ~~the~~ ~~Department of~~ External Affairs): Yes, Mr. Chairman I think that at the meeting before last both Mr. MacKenzie and Mr. Fleming asked some questions ~~regarding~~ regarding the recognition of Red China -- the number of governments which have recognized communist China, and so on, and I have answers to ~~this~~ this. The first question I was asked -- I think it was by Mr. Fleming -- was which of these countries distinguish between qualified and unqualified recognition of China, that is to say, some governments include Formosa and some exclude Formosa.

The governments which have recognized the Peking regime

*External*  
**Estimates**



have done so by correspondence between themselves and that regime and that correspondence, with one exception, has not ~~of~~ unnaturally not been disclosed to the Canadian government. Even if it were disclosed the interpretation of the correspondence and the question of determining whether the countries granting recognition were including or excluding Formosa would be a matter with regard to which only the governments concerned would be competent; that is, unless the matter was dealt with explicitly the interpretation ~~of the~~ would depend entirely upon the intent of the government granting the recognition and that interpretation could only be given by the government itself.

The one exception, <sup>whose declaration</sup> ~~whose declaration~~ which we have seen, makes no specific mention of the status of Formosa.

There is another question which is related to the one I have just tried to answer and that was asked by Mr. Knowles. He asked: which countries recognize communist China but claim that the status of Formosa remains to be determined. The United Kingdom government has publicly stated that it considers that the status of Formosa remains to be determined. The treaty of ~~of~~ peace with Japan which came into force in

A - 3

April of 1952 removed Japanese sovereignty <sup>from</sup> ~~of~~ Formosa,  
as members of the committee know, but it did not ~~do~~  
transfer that sovereignty to any other country. Therefore  
the 50 states which are parties to that treaty may well  
share the United Kingdom view that the status of Formosa  
remains to be determined but, there again, that is a  
matter for each government to decide for itself and  
in the absence of some public statements such as was  
made by the United Kingdom foreign minister a little over  
a year ago in which he ~~he~~ defined the United Kingdom's  
position there is no way in which this information is  
available to us.

THE CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions?

MR. KNOWLES: Mr. Chairman, may I ask Mr. Pearson  
this question -- I am picking my words carefully because I do

not want it to appear to be a leading question; if I want to ask a leading question I will make it plain that it is ~~only~~ one. I take it that any consideration which the Canadian government might be giving to the recognition of China on any basis whatsoever would be similar to that accorded by the United Kingdom in that it would separate Formosa from the mainland of China on the basis that the status of Formosa is something yet to be settled, say, in the United Nations?

HON. MR. PEARSON: Mr. Chairman, I think the government has made it quite clear that in its view the status of Formosa remains to be determined and that any recognition which might conceivably be given to the government of Peking at some time in the future -- and I am choosing my words very carefully -- would not necessarily extend to Formosa. We have gone a little further than that and we have said on more than one occasion that we would certainly not be a party to any action which would <sup>hand over</sup> ~~hand over~~ the people of Formosa against their will <sup>to</sup> ~~with~~ a communist regime centred in Peking; in other words in the determination of the status of Formosa in the future the will of the people

of Formosa should be a governing consideration.

MR. KNOWLES: You will agree that that would also apply with respect to the regime that now claims control of Formosa? Eventually the people of Formosa would have "the say"?

HON. MR. PEARSON: I think <sup>this</sup> ~~that~~ consideration would apply to the relationship of Formosa to any Chinese regime.

MR. MacKENZIE: I take it you mean by that, the so-called free vote?

AN HON. MEMBER: Why <sup>a</sup> free vote?

MR. MacKENZIE: Because some of these countries donot have a free vote.

HON. MR. PEARSON: I think the people there should be given the opportunity to determine their future in some appropriate way when the time ~~comes~~ comes for such determination to be made. At the present time about the only thing on which the two regimes agree is that Formosa is a part of China; the nationalist government of Formosa is as emphatic on that subject as the communist

government in Peking.

MR. KNOWLES: Just for the record, and since the minister has referred to the fact that some 50 countries were signatory to the peace treaty with Japan which removed Japanese ~~the~~ control over Formosa, but without handing it back to the Peking regime, which are the most important countries not signatory to that treaty?

HON. MR. PEARSON: The most important of them was the Soviet Union; I cannot remember, offhand, the other countries which did not sign the treaty. ~~the~~ India did not sign at that time but I think she has acceded to it since. But I would like to check that.

MR. KNOWLES: Canada was of course a signatory?

HON. MR. PEARSON: Canada was a signatory.

MR. FLEMING: If we have finished with that subject -- a subject <sup>through</sup> which Mr. Pearson has had to <sup>tread</sup> ~~walk over~~ as carefully as if he were stepping over broken glass --

PEARSON:  
HON. MR. ~~PEARSON~~: In my bare feet, too.

NUMBERED LETTER

**CONFIDENTIAL**

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.  
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA IN CEYLON,  
FROM: .....  
COLOMBO  
Your Letter Y-240 of 4 May 1956  
Reference: .....  
RECOGNITION OF CHINA  
Subject: .....

Security:.....  
No:..... *640*  
15 May 1956  
Date:..... *1*  
Enclosures:..... *Air*  
Air or Surface Mail:.....  
Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.	
50056-A-4	
19	-

*Original 50055-13-4*

References

I found your letter a decided stimulant since it raised questions about which I was none too certain myself and presented me with a good opportunity to discuss these questions with the Prime Minister and Ceylon External Affairs. I am at present prepared to answer only part of your letter, but I thought it best to deal with this portion now for this week's bag and continue with the remaining questions after I have seen and discussed the matter with the Prime Minister.

2. I met this morning with Gunasena de Soyza, the Permanent Secretary of External Affairs, for about an hour, and for a short period with his Assistant Secretary, Neville Jansz of the same Ministry. The questions you raise in paragraph one of your letter are simply answered by a copy (which I enclose) of Ceylon's External Affairs telegram to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations in London, under date of 5 January 1950. Gunasena de Soyza was good enough to give me a copy of this telegram despite the fact that a copy was addressed to you under the same date.

3. In effect, the answers to your questions in paragraph one only are as follows:

(a) Ceylon did establish full recognition (de jure) to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. I stress the fact that this was de jure recognition and not de facto.

(b) The date of this recognition which you mention in your letter is substantially correct; the telegram from Ceylon was sent on 5 January asking that GRO convey it to the Government of China about the same time as the UK's recognition was to be extended. So while Ceylon considers the date to be 5 January in all probability the telegram from GRO was sent at a later date.

(c) At the same time as this recognition was extended to the People's Government of China relations with the Chinese Nationalist Government in Formosa were terminated. You will note the inclusion of this decision and the notification of such termination to the Consul, at that time

...../2

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

2.

representing the Chinese Nationalist Government in Ceylon, of this action.

4. I explained fully the reasons which you gave me for the questions asked and they were readily accepted and understood by Mr. de Soya.

5. Now for the questions raised in paragraph 2 of your letter which I shall be able to answer at a later date: Mr. de Soya is arranging for an early opportunity for me to discuss these matters with the Prime Minister, Mr. Bandaranaike, and, in fact, welcomes the occasion since the members of the Ministry are none too sure themselves of the stand which this Government, and particularly Mr. Bandaranaike, will take on these questions. So, in discussing these matters with the Prime Minister I shall in effect be killing two birds with the same collection of stones.

6. I am only able to answer one of the questions in paragraph 2: that being that there was no mention of any "territorial definition" in the telegram sent conveying recognition.

7. I shall report further as soon as I have seen Mr. Bandaranaike. I ask your permission to raise with him the question of the establishment in Canada of a Ceylon Mission which I discussed with Sir John last year and which was the subject of my letter 676 of 3 June 1955. Doubtless the announced intention of Mr. Bandaranaike to establish Missions in Soviet Russia and China, and to accept reciprocal action by these countries will have an effect on this matter. In any case, unless I hear from you to the contrary, I shall presume that you approve; it may well be that my conversation with Mr. Bandaranaike will take place before you receive this letter.

Original Signed By  
J. J. HURLEY

HIGH COMMISSIONER



TOP SECRET

Copies to S/D & E.A. f.i.  
S/G.G f.i.

From: Secretary to the Ministry of External Affairs, Ceylon

To: Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, London

Date: 5 January 1950

MOST IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET. Addressed Crosse, London No. 2 repeated to External Ottawa No. 5, External Canberra No. 1, External Wellington No. 6, Foreign New Delhi No. 1, Foreign Karachi No. 1, Primus Pretoria No. 7, Ceyloncom London No. 6 (Crosse please pass) Ceyloncom New Delhi No. 2 (Foreign New Delhi please pass) Ceyloncom Canberra No. 3 (External Canberra please pass) Ceylonmomb Washington No. 4, Ceylonmin Rangoon No. 2.

Your telegram No. 268. Recognition of Chinese Communist Government. Ceylon Government desires accord recognition at about same time as United Kingdom Government propose to do so. Grateful, therefore, if you will arrange for following message to be conveyed to Chinese Government on behalf of Ceylon Government, soon after United Kingdom message of recognition has been delivered.

Message begins. The Ceylon Government, noting that the Central Peoples' Government in the Peoples' Republic of China is willing to establish diplomatic relations with Foreign Governments on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect for territorial and sovereign rights, desires to establish relations with the new Government of China. The Ceylon Government accordingly accords recognition to the Central Peoples' Government in China, and is simultaneously notifying the Consul of the Chinese Nationalist Government in Ceylon that the relations which have hitherto existed between the Ceylon Government and the Chinese Nationalist Government are terminated. Ends.

Ministry of External Affairs,  
Colombo, 5th January, 1950.

ACCESS SECTION / SECTION DE L'ACCES

DOCUMENT REMOVED FROM FILE / DOCUMENT RETIRE DU DOSSIER

RG 25

Volume 90-91/008  
Box 173

File/ 50056-A-40-pt4  
Dossier

Nature of document/ PEA NUMBERED LETTER TO CANADIANS  
Description du document

EMBASSY (JAPAN) - # Y288

No. of Pages/  
Nbre de pages

1

Date/ May 8, 1956

Exempt/Exception, 19(1) - 15(1)  
Access To Information Act/

Reason for Removal/ Loi sur l'accès à l'information  
Retrait en vertu de

Review Officer/  
Agent(e) d'examen

R.M. Fell

ACCESS SECTION / SECTION DE L'ACCES

DOCUMENT REMOVED FROM FILE / DOCUMENT RETIRE DU DOSSIER

RG 25      Volume 99-91/008      File/ 50056-A-40 pt 4.  
                                     Box 173      Dossier

Nature of document/ DEPT. of SEC. of STATE TELEGRAM # 29760  
Description du document

---

No. of Pages/ 3  
Nbre de pages

Date May 1, 1956

Exempt/Exception, 19(1) - 15(1)  
Access To Information Act/  
Reason for Removal/ Loi sur l'accès à l'information  
Retrait en vertu de

Review Officer/ R.M. Fall  
Agent(e) d'examen

Far Eastern/R. L. Rogers/1h  
 DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA. (FILE COPY)  
 NUMBERED LETTER

TO:.....THE CANADIAN EMBASSY,.....  
 .....THE HAGUE.....  
 FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
 EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.  
 Reference:.....  
 Subject:.....RECOGNITION OF CHINA AND STATUS...  
 .....OF FORMOSA.....  
 .....

Security:.....CONFIDENTIAL.....  
 No:.....Y-224.....  
 Date:.....MAY 7, 1956.....  
 Enclosures:.....  
 Air or Surface Mail:.....AIR.....  
 Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.	
50055-B-40	
→ 50056-A-40	
8	8

References

At a meeting of the External Affairs Committee of the House of Commons on April 24, 1956, the Minister was asked to provide a list of the countries which have extended recognition to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, together with the date on which each extended recognition and a statement whether the recognition was de facto or de jure. According to our records the Government of the Netherlands extended recognition about March 27, 1950, but we are not absolutely certain. I should be grateful if you could find out from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the date on which recognition was extended and whether the recognition was de facto or de jure. You might consider it wise to indicate the origin of this question in order to avoid any suggestion that the policy of the Canadian Government differs or is at the present time expected to differ from that stated by the Minister in the House of Commons on January 31, 1956.

2. At the same time the Minister was asked to include in his information "a list of the countries which, though they may recognize the Peking regime as the de facto Government of China contend at the same time that the question of Formosa should be settled separately - the number of governments who contend that the question of Formosa should be settled by the United Nations, or in some way by the people of Formosa themselves whatever stand they may have taken on the question of recognition". I should be grateful if, when you are making the enquiry mentioned in the preceding paragraph, you would at the same time enquire whether the act by which the Government of the Netherlands extended recognition to the Central People's Government included any indication of the territory over which the Government of the Netherlands considered that the Central People's Government exercised authority. If, as seems likely, the act of recognition contained no territorial definition, I should be grateful if you would enquire what attitude the Government of the Netherlands takes concerning the disposition of Formosa.

Internal  
Circulation

Distribution  
to Posts

*R. L. Rogers*

for Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY,  
BEIGRADE, YUGOSLAVIA.

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference: .....  
Subject: RECOGNITION OF CHINA AND STATUS  
OF FORMOSA.

CONFIDENTIAL

Security: .....

No: Y-181

MAY 7, 1956.

Date: .....

Enclosures: .....

Air or Surface Mail: .....

Post File No: .....

Ottawa File No. <del>50055-B-40</del> 50056-A-40	
4	19

References

At a meeting of the External Affairs Committee of the House of Commons on April 24, 1956, the Minister was asked to provide a list of the countries which have extended recognition to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, together with the date on which each extended recognition and a statement whether the recognition was de facto or de jure. According to our records the Government of Yugoslavia extended recognition probably in October, 1949, but we are not absolutely certain. I should be grateful if you could find out from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the date on which recognition was extended and whether the recognition was de facto or de jure. You might consider it wise to indicate the origin of this question in order to avoid any suggestion that the policy of the Canadian Government differs or is at the present time expected to differ from that stated by the Minister in the House of Commons on January 31, 1956.

Internal Circulation

2. At the same time the Minister was asked to include in his information "a list of the countries which, though they may recognize the Peking regime as the de facto Government of China contend at the same time that the question of Formosa should be settled separately - the number of governments who contend that the question of Formosa should be settled by the United Nations, or in some way by the people of Formosa themselves whatever stand they may have taken on the question of recognition". I should be grateful if, when you are making the enquiry mentioned in the preceding paragraph, you would at the same time enquire whether the act by which the Government of Yugoslavia extended recognition to the Central People's Government included any indication of the territory over which the Government of Yugoslavia considered that the Central People's Government exercised authority. If, as seems likely, the act of recognition contained no territorial definition, I should be grateful if you would enquire what attitude the Government of Yugoslavia takes concerning the disposition of Formosa.

Distribution to Posts

A. H. MENZIES

for Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO:.....THE CANADIAN EMBASSY,  
.....OSLO, NORWAY.....

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference:.....

Subject:.....RECOGNITION OF CHINA AND STATUS  
.....OF FORMOSA.....

Security:.....CONFIDENTIAL.....

No:.....V-149.....

Date:.....MAY 7, 1956.....

Enclosures:.....

Air or Surface Mail:.....AIR.....

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.	
50055-B-40	
→ 50056-A-40	
8	8

References

At a meeting of the External Affairs Committee of the House of Commons on April 24, 1956, the Minister was asked to provide a list of the countries which have extended recognition to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, together with the date on which each extended recognition and a statement whether the recognition was de facto or de jure. According to our records the Government of Norway extended recognition before April 20, 1950, but we are not absolutely certain. I should be grateful if you could find out from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the date on which recognition was extended and whether the recognition was de facto or de jure. You might consider it wise to indicate the origin of this question in order to avoid any suggestion that the policy of the Canadian Government differs or is at the present time expected to differ from that stated by the Minister in the House of Commons on January 31, 1956.

2. At the same time the Minister was asked to include in his information " a list of the countries which, though they may recognize the Peking regime as the de facto Government of China contend at the same time that the question of Formosa should be settled separately - the number of governments who contend that the question of Formosa should be settled by the United Nations, or in some way by the people of Formosa themselves whatever stand they may have taken on the question of recognition". I should be grateful if, when you are making the enquiry mentioned in the preceding paragraph, you would at the same time enquire whether the act by which the Government of Norway extended recognition to the Central People's Government included any indication of the territory over which the Government of Norway considered that the Central People's Government exercised authority. If, as seems likely, the act of recognition contained no territorial definition, I should be grateful if you would enquire what attitude the Government of Norway takes concerning the disposition of Formosa.

Internal  
Circulation

Distribution  
to Posts

*R. L. Rogers*

for Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY;  
 .....  
 DJAKARTA, INDONESIA.  
 .....  
 FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
 EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.  
 Reference:.....  
 Subject: RECOGNITION OF CHINA AND STATUS OF  
 .....  
 FORMOSA.  
 .....

Security: CONFIDENTIAL  
 No: 7-148  
 Date: MAY 7, 1956  
 Enclosures:.....  
 Air or Surface Mail: AIR  
 Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.	
50055-B-40	
→ 50056-A-40	
8	8

References

At a meeting of the External Affairs Committee of the House of Commons on April 24, 1956, the Minister was asked to provide a list of the countries which have extended recognition to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, together with the date on which each extended recognition and a statement whether the recognition was de facto or de jure. According to our records the Government of Indonesia extended recognition in March or April, 1950, but we are not absolutely certain. I should be grateful if you could find out from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the date on which recognition was extended and whether the recognition was de facto or de jure. You might consider it wise to indicate the origin of this question in order to avoid any suggestion that the policy of the Canadian Government differs or is at the present time expected to differ from that stated by the Minister in the House of Commons on January 31, 1956.

Internal Circulation

2. At the same time the Minister was asked to include in his information "a list of the countries which, though they may recognize the Peking regime as the de facto Government of China contend at the same time that the question of Formosa should be settled separately - the number of governments who contend that the question of Formosa should be settled by the United Nations, or in some way by the people of Formosa themselves whatever stand they may have taken on the question of recognition". I should be grateful if, when you are making the enquiry mentioned in the preceding paragraph, you would at the same time enquire whether the act by which the Government of Indonesia extended recognition to the Central People's Government included any indication of the territory over which the Government of Indonesia considered that the Central People's Government exercised authority. If, as seems likely, the act of recognition contained no territorial definition, I should be grateful if you would enquire what attitude the Government of Indonesia takes concerning the disposition of Formosa.

Distribution to Posts

*R. L. Rogers*  
 for Under-Secretary of State  
 for External Affairs.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(FILE COPY)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY,  
TEL AVIV, ISRAEL.

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference:  
Subject: RECOGNITION OF CHINA AND STATUS  
OF FORMOSA.

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: 4-132

Date: MAY 7, 1956.

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: AIR

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.	
50055-B-40	
50056-A-40	
8	8

References

At a meeting of the External Affairs Committee of the House of Commons on April 24, 1956, the Minister was asked to provide a list of the countries which have extended recognition to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, together with the date on which each extended recognition and a statement whether the recognition was de facto or de jure. According to our records the Government of Israel extended recognition before March 9, 1950, but we are not absolutely certain. I should be grateful if you could find out from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the date on which recognition was extended and whether the recognition was de facto or de jure. You might consider it wise to indicate the origin of this question in order to avoid any suggestion that the policy of the Canadian Government differs or is at the present time expected to differ from that stated by the Minister in the House of Commons on January 31, 1956.

Internal Circulation

2. At the same time the Minister was asked to include in his information "a list of the countries which, though they may recognize the Peking regime as the de facto Government of China contend at the same time that the question of Formosa should be settled separately - the number of governments who contend that the question of Formosa should be settled by the United Nations, or in some way by the people of Formosa themselves whatever stand they may have taken on the question of recognition". I should be grateful if, when you are making the enquiry mentioned in the preceding paragraph, you would at the same time enquire whether the act by which the Government of Israel extended recognition to the Central People's Government included any indication of the territory over which the Government of Israel considered that the Central People's Government exercised authority. If, as seems likely, the act of recognition contained no territorial definition, I should be grateful if you would enquire what attitude the Government of Israel takes concerning the disposition of Formosa.

Distribution to Posts

*R. L. Rogers*  
for Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs.



NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE CANADIAN LEGATION,  
 HELSINKI, FINLAND.

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
 EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference:

Subject: RECOGNITION OF CHINA AND STATUS OF  
 FORMOSA.

CONFIDENTIAL

Security:.....

No:..... V-74

Date:..... MAY. 7. 1956.

Enclosures:.....

Air or Surface Mail:..... AIR

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.	
50055-B-40	
→ 50056-A-40	
/	/

References

At a meeting of the External Affairs Committee of the House of Commons on April 24, 1956, the Minister was asked to provide a list of the countries which have extended recognition to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, together with the date on which each extended recognition and a statement whether the recognition was de facto or de jure. According to our records the Government of Finland extended recognition before April 20, 1950, but we are not absolutely certain. I should be grateful if you could find out from the Foreign Ministry the date on which recognition was extended and whether the recognition was de facto or de jure. You might consider it wise to indicate the origin of this question in order to avoid any suggestion that the policy of the Canadian Government differs or is at the present time expected to differ from that stated by the Minister in the House of Commons on January 31, 1956.

Internal Circulation

2. At the same time the Minister was asked to include in his information "a list of the countries which, though they may recognize the Peking regime as the de facto Government of China contend at the same time that the question of Formosa should be settled separately - the number of governments who contend that the question of Formosa should be settled by the United Nations, or in some way by the people of Formosa themselves whatever stand they may have taken on the question of recognition". I should be grateful if, when you are making the enquiry mentioned in the preceding paragraph, you would at the same time enquire whether the act by which the Government of Finland extended recognition to the Central People's Government included any indication of the territory over which the Government of Finland considered that the Central People's Government exercised authority. If, as seems likely, the act of recognition contained no territorial definition, I should be grateful if you would enquire what attitude the Government of Finland takes concerning the disposition of Formosa.

Distribution to Posts

*R.L. Rogers*

for Under-Secretary of State  
 for External Affairs.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, COLOMBO, CEYLON.

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference: RECOGNITION OF CHINA AND STATUS OF FORMOSA.

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: 7-240 Date: MAY 4, 1956.

Enclosures: AIR Air or Surface Mail:

Post File No:

Ottawa File No. 50056-A-40

Copy 50055-B-40

References

At a meeting of the External Affairs Committee of the House of Commons on April 24, 1956, the Minister was asked to provide a list of the countries which have extended recognition to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, together with the date on which each extended recognition and a statement whether the recognition was de facto or de jure. According to our records the Government of Ceylon extended recognition about January 6, 1950, but we are not absolutely certain. I should be grateful if you could find out from the Department of External Affairs the date on which recognition was extended and whether the recognition was de facto or de jure. You might consider it wise to indicate the origin of this question in order to avoid any suggestion that the policy of the Canadian Government differs or is at the present time expected to differ from that stated by the Minister in the House of Commons on January 31, 1956.

Internal Circulation

2. At the same time the Minister was asked to include in his information "a list of the countries which, though they may recognize the Peking regime as the de facto Government of China contend at the same time that the question of Formosa should be settled separately - the number of governments who contend that the question of Formosa should be settled by the United Nations, or in some way by the people of Formosa themselves whatever stand they may have taken on the question of recognition". I should be grateful if, when you are making the enquiry mentioned in the preceding paragraph, you would at the same time enquire whether the act by which the Government of Ceylon extended recognition to the Central People's Government included any indication of the territory over which the Government of Ceylon considered that the Central People's Government exercised authority. If, as seems likely, the act of recognition contained no territorial definition, I should be grateful if you would enquire what attitude the Government of Ceylon takes concerning the disposition of Formosa.

Distribution to Posts

A. R. MENZIES

for Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

50056-A-40  
8 8

MR. MENZIES

April 30, 1956

Secret

FAR EASTERN DIV./R.L.Rogers/lr

Original → 50055-B-40  
This copy → 50056-A-40

Projection of the Minister's Policy on Recognition: China

In an effort to pursue the logic of the Canadian Government's policy on the recognition of Chinese governments, as stated in the House of Commons on January 31, I have prepared the attached draft of a paper on the attitude which the Canadian Government might adopt if the National Government of the Republic of China should seek to replace its present ambassador by another ambassador.

2. I am submitting it for preliminary consideration now. If you agree that the idea has merit, I should like to see it pursued in due course up to the Minister. I feel that there is some virtue in working out possible practical courses of action in the light of our China policy from time to time. It might, for example, be advisable at some future date to work up another paper on the effect of recognition of the Central People's Government on the Chinese community in Canada, depending upon what comes out of tomorrow's meeting with the R.C.M.P.

3. The attached draft is of the nature of a cockshy.

R. L. ROGERS

R.L. Rogers

SECRET

D R A F T

April 20, 1956

ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE APPOINTMENT  
OF A NEW NATIONALIST CHINESE AMBASSADOR

During the last twelve months the National Government of the Republic of China has made fifteen changes among its heads of posts. The most recent and the most noteworthy change has been in the position of Chinese Ambassador in Washington: Dr. Wellington Koo is shortly to be replaced by Dr. Hollington Tong, at present Chinese Ambassador to Japan. These developments suggest that there is a possibility that before long the National Government may wish to change its Ambassador to Canada. Mr. Liu Chieh, who is now the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps in Ottawa, presented his Letter of Credence on July 7, 1947.

2. It might be wise to consider in advance the implications of a change in Chinese representation in Ottawa. It is possible that the National Government, in the light of the known opinions of the Canadian Government on the fitness of the National Government to represent all of China, might consider it wise to leave the present situation undisturbed in order to avoid the possibility that the Canadian Government would refuse to accept a new Ambassador. If a change did become necessary, however, it is always possible that the Mission would be left under a Charge d'Affaires. This course would have the advantage of avoiding difficulties both for the National Government and for the Canadian Government. If, however, the present Ambassador were withdrawn and agreement were sought for the appointment of a new Ambassador, the Canadian Government would be forced to decide whether it would wish to accept a new Ambassador from the National Government.

3. The problem of recognition of Chinese Governments is such a difficult one that it is unwise to try to anticipate more than one or two steps in the development of the situation. The policy of the Government of Canada as announced in the House of Commons on January 31, 1956, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs may be summarized as follows:

- (a) "Rejecting on the one hand immediate diplomatic recognition" of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China; but
- (b) "Rejecting on the other hand the view that a Communist regime in Peking can never be recognized as the Government of China"; and
- (c) "It should not, however, be assumed that Canadian recognition of the Peking Government - even if it were to be granted at some time in the future - would extend to the Island of Formosa. As we see it, the legal status of Formosa is still undecided and no step taken vis-a-vis the Communist regime should prejudice that issue. In particular, we would not be a party to any action which handed over the people or the government of Formosa, against their will, to any mainland government, let alone to a Communist Chinese Government".

It would seem that the logical projection of this statement does not militate against the acceptance of a new Ambassador from the National Government provided his Letter of Credence is suitably worded. The statement in the House of Commons leaves open the possibility of recognizing two governments made up of Chinese-speaking people. If one of these governments chooses to call itself "The National Government of the Republic of China" and the other chooses to call itself "The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China", these choices are presumably of no concern to Canada provided that it is always understood that when these two governments use these resounding titles they are, as far as we are concerned, merely the governments of the territories over which they have administrative control. That is to say, there is no reason why we should insist that the government headed by Chiang Kai Shek should change its title and call itself something like "The Government of Formosa". The continued use by that government of the title of "The National Government of the Republic of China" need not make any practical difference to us, provided we know that the Republic of China is for practical purposes the Island of Formosa.

4. The main objection to the acceptance of a new Ambassador appointed by the National Government is that such acceptance might tend to give offence to the Central People's Government. It is difficult to see so far into the future but it would seem probable that the Central People's Government would be unlikely to consent to enter into direct diplomatic relations with a government which accepts a representative from the National Government even if there is a tacit, or even an explicit, statement that the Canadian Government considers that the National Government is the government of the territory which it administers and not of all the territory over which it purports to have authority, i.e., the mainland. If the prospect of recognizing the Central People's Government as either the de facto or the de jure government of the mainland of China were closer, this objection might carry considerable weight. On the other hand, we might find it to our advantage to be in a position where we have stated the common-sense case for recognizing the two governments as the governments of the areas which they really govern and to have the Central People's Government bear the responsibility for not entering into direct diplomatic relations because they refuse to accept this common-sense approach. This is a possibility because the presence of a Communist Chinese mission in Canada opens up a very real problem in the form of pressure on Canadians of Chinese descent and on Chinese immigrants who have not yet become Canadian citizens.

5. However, until the prospect of recognizing the Central People's Government becomes more immediate, and until we have decided, consequent upon that recognition, that it is in the Canadian interest to enter into direct diplomatic relations, it is suggested that the prospective dislike of the Central People's Government for our acceptance of a new Ambassador from the National Government should not debar us from accepting him.

6. The official translation of the Letter of Credence by which Chiang Kai Shek accredited Liu Chieh as Ambassador of China in 1947 (the translation was provided by the Chinese Foreign Ministry) would require only one or two changes in order to make

Acceptable as a Letter of Credence for an Ambassador appointed by the National Government of the Republic of China, it being understood that "The Republic of China" does not extend to the mainland. Attached is a copy of the Letter of Credence of 1947 showing both the original language and the changes which would be required.

7. These changes are small but they would certainly indicate a determination on Canada's part to imply a limitation on the area over which the National Government purports to exercise authority. It is always possible therefore that the changes would be unacceptable to the National Government and that either no fresh appointment would be made or that the National Government's embassy might be withdrawn entirely. This development would be unfortunate in the sense that it would mean that the National Government intended to resist the Two-Chinas solution. Sooner or later that solution must be put to the test, however, and as the contacts of the present Chinese Embassy in Ottawa with the Canadian Government are almost nil there would be little practical loss in its withdrawal. If the whole affair were done quietly or even if our intentions were made known, the loss would probably be counter-balanced by the removal of one problem in relation to the Central People's Government which might then find it easier, after recognition and if direct diplomatic relations are agreed upon, to send a mission to Ottawa.

8. This problem, at the moment, is hypothetical. It is, however, a problem which might have to be considered on fairly short notice and on which preliminary thinking should be done, subject to review at frequent intervals. It is, therefore, recommended that if Mr. Liu Chieh is withdrawn and if agreement is sought for a successor, agreement will be given only "in the quality of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of China". It is understood, of course, that the present memorandum would not be the basis for action. If a request for agreement for a successor for Mr. Liu Chieh were sought, the request would be submitted to the S.S.E.A. for his instructions, but the recommendation would be along the lines of this memorandum unless some new circumstance should arise.

////////

REDRAFT

(Proposed deletions indicated by scoring; additions by underlining)

CHIANG KAI SHEK  
PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT  
OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

TO

HIS MAJESTY GEORGE THE SIXTH,  
BY THE GRACE OF GOD, OF GREAT BRITAIN, IRELAND  
AND THE BRITISH DOMINIONS BEYOND THE SEAS  
KING, DEFENDER OF THE FAITH, EMPEROR OF INDIA,  
&C., &C., &C.

Great and Good Friend,

Being desirous of Maintaining the long existing friendly relations and good understanding between Canada and the Republic of China, I have made choice of Mr. Liu Chieh to reside near the Government of Canada in the quality of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of China.

Having already had ample experience of Mr. Liu's eminent qualities, I am convinced that he will fulfill the important duties of his mission in such a manner as to merit Your Majesty's approbation and esteem and to prove himself worthy of this fresh mark of my confidence. I therefore request Your Majesty to receive him favourably and to give full credence to all that he shall communicate to You wither in my name or in the name of the National Government of the Republic of China.

I avail myself of this opportunity to wish Your Majesty good health and prosperity to the Canadian Nation.

Given at Nanking the twenty-ninth day of the fifth month of the thirty-sixth year of the Republic of China (May 29, 1947).

Signed : CHIANG KAI SHEK  
Countersigned: WANG SHIH CHIEH



FILE: 50056-A-40

CONFIDENTIAL

*File. L.R.*  
R. L. ROGERS

April 26, 1956.

~~MAY 15~~ 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER FAR EASTERN DIV.

Questions on China Asked in  
The External Affairs Committee

50056-A-40  
4 4

The following are proposed answers to questions which were asked of you in the Committee on External Affairs of the House of Commons:

Question 1: Do governments distinguish between qualified and unqualified recognition of Communist China, e.g. some including Formosa and some excluding Formosa?

Answer: The governments which have recognized the Peking regime have done so by correspondence between themselves and that regime. This correspondence, with one exception, has not been disclosed to the Canadian Government. Even if it were disclosed, the interpretation of that correspondence to determine whether the countries granting recognition were including or excluding Formosa would be a matter on which only the governments concerned were competent. Unless the matter were dealt with explicitly, interpretation would depend entirely upon the intent of the government granting recognition and this is something that only the governments concerned could interpret authoritatively. The one exchange of correspondence which we have seen makes no specific mention of the status of Formosa.

Question 2: What were the dates of recognition of the Peking regime de jure and de facto by all countries which have granted recognition?

Answer: Recognition has been granted by the following members of the United Nations:

Afghanistan	Before April 20, 1950
Albania	Probably October, 1949
Bulgaria	Probably October, 1949
Burma	About December 17, 1949
Byelorussian S.S.R.	Probably October, 1949
Ceylon	About January 6, 1950
Czechoslovakia	Probably October, 1949
Denmark	January 9, 1950
Finland	Before April 20, 1950
Hungary	Probably October, 1949
India	December 30, 1949
Indonesia	March or April, 1950
Israel	Before March 9, 1950
Netherlands	About March 27, 1950
Norway	Before April 20, 1950
Pakistan	January 5, 1950
Poland	Probably October, 1949
Roumania	Probably October, 1949
Sweden	January 14, 1950
Ukrainian S.S.R.	Probably October, 1949
United Kingdom	January 6, 1950
U.S.S.R.	October, 1949
Yugoslavia	Probably October, 1949

The following have in addition granted recognition:

Switzerland	January 17, 1950
North Korea	Probably 1949
Outer Mongolia	Probably 1949
East Germany	Probably 1949
North Vietnam	January 15, 1950

It is known that the recognition granted by Denmark, India, Pakistan, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom was de jure recognition. There is no specific information available to confirm that the recognition granted by the other states was de jure but it is almost certain that it was. exchange of diplomatic notes

A question concerning de facto recognition is much more difficult to answer. De facto recognition is a matter of deliberate statement, not of implication or inference. Some of the governments which participated in the Geneva Conferences

of 1954 on Korea and Indochina specifically stated that their presence there in company with representatives of the Peking regime did not constitute recognition of that regime in any form. Similarly I believe that the U.S. Government, before allowing its Ambassador to Czechoslovakia to enter into negotiations with the Chinese Ambassador to Poland in Geneva in 1955, was careful to state that this action did not constitute recognition. Nevertheless the fact, that other governments which do not formally recognize the Peking regime have held discussions with it, suggests that they have taken cognizance of the existence of the Peking regime as a government administering a territory and carrying weight in international affairs. Moreover, in 1950 a representative of the Peking regime appeared in New York with the concurrence of some states members of the United Nations which did not recognize the Peking regime in order to state the case of that regime, in a matter which closely concerned it, before the Security Council. Here again those states, and the United Nations itself, were taking cognizance of the existence of the Peking regime as an entity to be reckoned with. So was the United Nations when it sent its Secretary-General to Peking to negotiate for the release of prisoners of war in 1955. Some states which do not extend recognition to the Peking regime have sent trade and other non-diplomatic missions to Peking which have, by their very presence, implied the recognition of the existence in fact of a government in Peking. If the foregoing situations do not constitute de facto recognition in a legal sense, they are certainly very close to it in a practical sense.

(Explanation of dates of recognition: While it has been necessary from time to time to take note of the countries which have accorded recognition to the Peking regime, there has been no need to keep track of the exact date on which recognition was granted. The information available is, therefore, incomplete.)

Question 3: How many members of the United Nations recognize Communist China?

Answer: Twenty-three.

Question 4: Which countries recognize Communist China but claim that the status of Formosa remains to be determined?

Answer: The United Kingdom Government has publicly stated that it considers that the status of Formosa remains to be determined. The Treaty of Peace with Japan which came into force on April 28, 1952, removed Japanese sovereignty from Formosa but did not transfer that sovereignty to any other country. The fifty states which are parties to that treaty, therefore, may well share the United Kingdom view that the status of Formosa remains to be determined. This, however, is a matter which each government must decide for itself and in the absence of some public statement such as that made by the British Foreign Secretary a little more than a year ago, in which he defined the United Kingdom's position, there is no way in which this information would become available.

(In case the text of Sir Anthony Eden's statement of February 4, 1955, is required, a copy of it is attached.)

(SGD) R. M. MACDONNELL

J.L.

TEXT OF SIR ANTHONY EKEN'S STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 4, 1955.

Formosa and the Pescadores were ceded to Japan by China in the Shimonoseki Treaty of 1895. In the Cairo Declaration of November, 1943, the Allies stated that it was their purpose "that all the territories which Japan has stolen from the Chinese such as . . . Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China . . ." This declaration was a statement of intention that Formosa should be retroceded to China after the war. This retrocession has, in fact, never taken place, because of the difficulties arising from the existence of two entities claiming to represent China, and the differences amongst the Powers as to the status of these entities.

The Potsdam Declaration of July, 1945, laid down as one of the conditions for the Japanese Peace that the terms of the Cairo Declaration should be carried out. In September, 1945, the administration of Formosa was taken over from the Japanese by Chinese forces at the direction of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers; but this was not a cession, nor did it in itself involve any change of sovereignty. The arrangements made with Chiang Kai-shek put him there on a basis of military occupation pending further arrangements, and did not of themselves constitute the territory Chinese.

Under the Peace Treaty of April, 1952, Japan formally renounced all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores; but again this did not operate as a transfer to Chinese sovereignty, whether to the People's Republic of China or to the Chinese Nationalist authorities. Formosa and the Pescadores are therefore, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, territory the de jure sovereignty over which is uncertain or undetermined.

The Nationalist-held islands in close proximity to the coast of China are in a different category from Formosa and the Pescadores since they undoubtedly form part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. Any attempt by the Government of the People's Republic of China, however, to assert its authority over these islands by force would, in the circumstances at present peculiar to the case, give rise to a situation endangering peace and security, which is properly a matter of international concern.

- - - -

for file 50056-A-40.  
R. L. ROGERS  
MAY 1956

TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENCE AT A MEETING  
OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,  
TUESDAY, APRIL 24th, 1956

RE: RECOGNITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA

---

MR. DIEFENBAKER: I would like to ask the minister some further questions regarding this matter of the recognition of China. Last August the minister made a speech in Vancouver, as I recall it, in which he held out an olive branch, as it were, with regard to this question of recognition. A step with which many of us were in disagreement. Then subsequently in the house -- I think it was in February -- the minister reviewed the situation and said, in effect, that having regard to events which had occurred in the last year or so no case had been made out for any recognition or for the admission of "Red" China into the United Nations.

Then there was the meeting in Washington between the Prime Minister, the President of Mexico and the President of the United States. At that time there were reports in the press which have never been clearly dealt with, as I see it, by the minister, but there was some strong disagreement offered by the United States authorities regarding the situation taken up by the government of Canada in this regard, and I would like to ask the minister whether he can give us an assurance that there is no immediate prospect or intention of recognizing communist China or of anything being done to admit communist China to the U.N.

HON. MR. PEARSON: Mr. Chairman, I have already said something about the White Sulphur Springs conversations. That was, I think, at the first meeting of the committee but I am quite willing to repeat what I said then about that aspect of the question. On the general question I have already made a statement in the House of Commons to which I have nothing to add. I think, however, that in view of what Mr. Diefenbaker has said I should add briefly to the background of that statement especially to the suggestion that in Vancouver -- I think it was last August -- I offered what Mr. Diefenbaker has called an olive branch, which I interpret as a suggestion that I indicated that the Canadian government at that time was about to recognize the communist government of China.

I have not a copy of my speech here, but there is a text of it in existence and I hope that any member of the committee who is interested might have a look at it and find out what I actually said. I wish I had it here because I would like to read the paragraph in question. But, paraphrasing what I said, I suggested that we should have another look at the question of the recognition of the Chinese communist regime. I do not think I went further than that -- an intimation that in my view another look was desirable because

of what had happened in the months previous to the speech. Members of the committee will recall that we had the Geneva Conference which dealt with the war in Indo-China, and that at that Conference the communist representatives from China were present, and that there was also present a representative of the United States. This, of course, was a change because the United States representative and the representative of the communist government of China were sitting around a table in discussions and that, in itself, constituted if not diplomatic recognition, recognition of the fact that in certain circumstances the United States would talk with the representatives of communist China. Indeed, they have continued to talk with the communist representatives in Geneva since that time. That is one change in the situation.

Another change in the situation was that there had been an improvement of the military position in the Formosa Straits in the sense that things had quietened down there, and the communist government in Peking had also given the impression of being somewhat more peaceful in its sentiments -- at least in words -- than it had been previously. Therefore, in the light of these circumstances I thought it would be a good idea to have another look at this question of recognition. That look has been taken, and the result has been made public in my statement in the House of Commons.

That does not mean that any final policy has been decided because I think it is wise -- and I have said this before -- not to take any irrevocable stand in respect to the recognition or non-recognition of any particular government. Conditions change. I understand, from what Mr. Diefenbaker said on one occasion, that this would seem to be his view, and I hope I am not misquoting him when he put it this way: "Recognition if necessary, but not necessarily recognition."

MR. DIEFENBAKER: I was para-phrasing someone else in another connection.

HON. MR. PEARSON: This matter of the recognition of a particular government which is in control of a particular part of the world is a question which any government should keep continually under review, and we are doing that.

The other aspect of this question is the situation in which we find ourselves at the United Nations, especially, when a representative of the nationalist government of China is accepted as the spokesman for all of China. That, as I have said at White Sulphur Springs, is causing increasing embarrassment because more and more governments are recognizing the Peking regime as the government of China and to any government which does not recognize the communist regime as being the government of China -- and that does not include the Canadian government -- the necessity for accepting the spokesman of another regime produces embarrassment.

MR. DIEFENBAKER: How are these embarrassments resolved? What is the arrangement used to get around the difficulties to which the minister has referred?

HON. MR. PEARSON: At the beginning of each session of the United Nations there is always a debate as to who should fill the Chinese seat and the delegations have to take a stand either for or against the nationalist representative. When that issue has arisen we have always voted either to postpone the question or in favour of the existing nationalist regime as providing the spokesman for China because that is the regime which, at the present time, we recognize as the government of China. There was one occasion last autumn which indicated that, in certain circumstances, the fact that China is represented by the national government which has no practical jurisdiction over continental China can cause some difficulty. The occasion was the discussion of a proposal for the admittance of additional members and that particular Chinese representative was able to veto the proposal in the security council because he spoke for China. That particular proposal was accepted by some 50 or 60 other members; I cannot recall the exact number.

MR. KNOWLES: Was that not a source of embarrassment, particularly to the Canadian delegation?

HON. MR. PEARSON: It called attention to the fact that a Chinese veto could be exercised by the representative of a government which has no authority in continental China. I would not like to say we were embarrassed by that, as were those governments which recognize the Peking regime.

MR. KNOWLES: Does this government recognize the Chiang Kai Shek regime as having jurisdiction over Formosa only or do they recognize that regime as in control of the whole of China?

HON. MR. PEARSON: We recognize that regime as the government of China.

MR. KNOWLES: Would you define what you mean by this?

HON. MR. PEARSON: The government of the geographical area of China, including continental China.

MR. KNOWLES: Are you not in a somewhat ridiculous position?

HON. MR. PEARSON: We have been in that position before -- I hasten to add that I do not use the word "ridiculous" in connection with it but we have had on more than one occasion to recognize governments as being the de jure government of countries in which they have no de facto control. During the war this was quite common.

At White Sulphur Springs there was no disagreement or difference of views expressed by any United States spokesman -- the President, or the Secretary of State, or anybody else -- with regard



to Canadian policy. I have said this before, and I am glad to state it once again. Canadian policy, as I have said, was not even mentioned. There was a very forthright and frank expression of United States views on this matter by the President and by the Secretary of State along lines which had previously become familiar. We knew what their attitude was, and at the end of the statement of their views it was stated by me that while we could appreciate their position the situation was in my view becoming increasingly embarrassing at the United Nations for many members; and I did not include Canada because we recognize Chiang Kai Shek. But for many members the recognition as spokesman of China of a representative of a government which they do not recognize as being in control of China is an embarrassment, and the United States representatives agreed that it was an embarrassment and an obvious embarrassment. But there was no difference of opinion over the Canadian position which was not, in fact, stated at that time. This position is well known to the United States because we have made it clear to them what our views are with regard to recognition and with regard to the off-shore islands which were mentioned also at White Sulphur Springs.

MR. DIEFENBAKER: I think possibly there was disagreement on interpretation in connection with the A.P. dispatch issued immediately afterwards which purported to be quoting the minister's words and which was capable of misconstruction. I think this particular dispatch has been drawn to his attention; all of us have received letters from various groups regarding the alleged statement and that is the reason I brought this matter up today.

HON. MR. PEARSON: I received a great many letters myself and some of the difficulty may have occurred because of the fact there was a difference of opinion expressed, but that again was not in regard to recognition.

MR. FLEMING: The minister has referred to the increasing number of countries which are recognizing the so-called Peoples Government at Peking. Have any of these governments distinguished between recognition of that government as the government of mainland China and the question of the recognition of a government exercising control over Formosa and the neighbouring islands?

HON. MR. PEARSON: I do not think so, Mr. Chairman, but I would have to check on that. It is my impression that recognition of the communist government in Peking as the government of China has not been qualified by the kind of reservation you have mentioned. But, as I say, I would like to look into that. It is also interesting to note that certain governments which have not in any way recognized the communist government in Peking either diplomatically or de jure have sent official trade missions to Peking. I think there has been one from Italy and one from France.

MR. FLEMING: Obviously not for the purpose of doing business in Formosa. I wonder whether the minister could bring to us, as a matter of record, the dates of recognition of the Peking government by the various countries who have recognized it in the course of examining this question, and whether that extends to a recognition of control over Formosa as well?

HON. MR. PEARSON: I would be glad to get that information for you.

MR. FLEMING: Could the minister distinguish, in that respect, between types of recognition -- whether there has been recognition of the de facto existence of the government or whether it is de jure recognition?

HON. MR. PEARSON: I would be glad to do that, but it might not be quite so easy, because, for instance, attending a conference with the Peking government is a form of de facto recognition in the sense that it is an acknowledgment that a representative of a particular government can discuss with them certain diplomatic matters. I am thinking of Indo-China and also of the sending of an official trade delegation to Peking which is, in a sense, de facto recognition because you are dealing with that government in trade matters. There is a good deal of confusion caused by differing views as to what we mean by de jure and de facto recognition. You can certainly make a clear differentiation between diplomatic recognition and other forms of recognition.

MR. DIEFENBAKER: Is there any international concept at all of recognition de facto and de jure?

HON. MR. PEARSON: There is such a differentiation but at times it becomes a little shadowy. We shall try to see what information we can get on it.

MR. FLEMING: I can see that diplomatic recognition is easy to define because it involves an outward act -- the exchange of representatives. I can well understand the difficulties the minister has mentioned in speaking about other types of recognition. However, I do not think he would include the visit of a Canadian minister not going into China on any official basis as included within the general sphere of de facto recognition in any measure?

HON. MR. PEARSON: No, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sinclair's visit to China did not in any way shape or form constitute de facto recognition because he was only in transit through China as the most convenient way of getting home.

MR. FLEMING: It was quite unofficial.

HON. MR. PEARSON: Quite unofficial.

MR. DIEFENBAKER: He was shanghaied in Peking.

MR. CANNON: The minister has told us his views about the recognition of communist China, so I do

not propose to elaborate but I do think that when, as he said, he takes a good look at the question whether or not we should recognize the communist government of China that he will look particularly at the way religion has been persecuted there and the way in which the intelligentsia and anybody who might have been in a position to resist the communist regime have been murdered wholesale. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that any such look will only fortify him in the position he seems to have taken, at least for the time being, not to recognize that government.

I was very interested in what the minister was saying with regard to the difficulty which arises through the existence of the two governments of China -- the government of the mainland and the government in Formosa -- and I was wondering whether he would like to give the committee his views on the suggestion which has been made that China should be replaced on the security council by some other great Asiatic country such as India, and whether that would not have the result of solving this problem.

HON. MR. PEARSON: I do not know, Mr. Chairman, whether I can usefully give my views on whether or not that should be done but it does not seem to me to be a practical proposition in any event because the replacement of China on the security council as a permanent member of the council would require an amendment to the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the United Nations could not be amended without the approval of the five permanent members of the security council, one of which is China. That constitutes quite an obstacle.

MR. CANNON: From a practical point of view, then, it could never be done?

HON. MR. PEARSON: I never like to use the word "never". Certainly it would be very difficult to do.

MR. STICK: You have made Canada's position clear with regard to this question of the recognition of China. It seems to me, however, that the recognition of China is a question which is really up to the United Nations, where China is asking for a seat. I think both these matters go together, and if China becomes a member of the United Nations I think Canada and other countries will have to take another look at the matter. I think the whole question is up to the United Nations.

HON. MR. PEARSON: I agree with that, Mr. Chairman.

MR. STICK: This subject of the recognition of China is a "live" subject in Canada. Is it necessary for the government to get the consent of parliament before recognition takes place or would a statement be made, first, in the House of Commons to that effect?

HON. MR. PEARSON: I cannot conceive of any government taking a position of this kind -- one which would certainly have important political consequences -- without parliament being consulted if that were physically possible, but I can conceive of this

matter coming to a head, in the way you have suggested -- not through any action on the part of an individual government but through action on the part of the United Nations assembly at the beginning of some session. It might be that on the report of the credentials committee Mr. "A" would be chosen to represent China and not Mr. "B". And there you are. You would still have China represented at the United Nations, but the representative would be a person appointed by a communist government in Peking whose credentials are accepted by a majority of the United Nations assembly -- a person who would thereafter sit as the delegate of China.

MR. KNOWLES: You would certainly take a new look at it then, would you not?

MR. DIEFENBAKER: Without regard to the government which he represents, he is just the representative of China.

MR. MACKENZIE: Among the members of the United Nations what percentage recognize "Red" China as such and what percentage do not?

HON. MR. PEARSON: I have not got the exact figures with me; I think it is between 25 and 30 per cent but I would like to check that. What I am suggesting is that if the time comes when a majority of the members -- that majority may not include Canada -- decides that the credentials of the representative from Peking should be accepted, then those governments which continue to recognize the nationalist government of Formosa as the government of China would be in exactly the same position as those governments are now who have recognized the Chinese government in Peking as the government of China.

MR. CRESTOHL: Would you care to comment on the anomaly which apparently exists in the United Nations when some countries do not recognize other countries, both being members of the United Nations, but sit with each other in consultation, voting on various problems?

HON. MR. PEARSON: It is an anomalous position but it does not prevent the functioning of the United Nations. Not all the governments go as far as the communist representatives go; they always make a statement that they do not recognize as valid anything which is said or done by the representative of China. Most of the representatives at the United Nations who have recognized the Peking regime accept the verdict of the majority and do not allow the presence of a Chinese representative appointed by a government which they do not recognize to interfere with the functioning of the United Nations. They will, nevertheless, vote on issues raised by this gentleman whom they do not recognize.

MR. KNOWLES: It is just like parliament.

HON. MR. PEARSON: Yes, they will vote on issues if a resolution is proposed by the representative of a China which they do not recognize, but they usually vote against it.

MR. STICK: A question which has been before us for some time is the position of Great Britain. As I understand it, Great Britain has recognized communist China. What is their position with regard to Chiang Kai Shek? Do they recognize him in any way at all?

HON. MR. PEARSON: I think they do. They recognize him as in de facto control of the island of Formosa and that is shown by the fact that there is a British consul on Formosa and I think he has been accepted by the national government of Formosa.

MR. STICK: So they recognize both -- one directly and the other indirectly.

MR. KNOWLES: I wonder whether when you are getting the information Mr. Fleming asked for you would include in it a list of the countries which, though they may recognize the Peking government as the de facto government of China contend at the same time that the question of Formosa should be settled separately -- the number of governments who contend that the question of Formosa should be settled by the United Nations, or in some way by the people of Formosa themselves whatever stand they may have taken on the question of recognition.

HON. MR. PEARSON: Yes, Mr. Chairman, we shall try to get that information. I may say that it is our view that the status of Formosa has not yet been determined. We do not accept Formosa as a de jure part of the continent of China. In other words, there would be governments which would disagree on the question of who should be recognized as the government of the mainland of China but which would agree that Formosa is an issue by itself.

MR. KNOWLES: Yes.

April 17, 1956.

EXTRACT FROM MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE NO.2, STANDING  
COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

For files: 50055-B-40 (Recognition of Communist China) 50056-A-40  
50056-A-40 (Policy of the Western Powers towards the  
Status of Formosa)  
50056-B-40 (Formosa and the Coastal Islands)

Mr. COLDWELL: This brings up the question I asked also with regard to the information on China and Asia, that was discussed at this conference, as I understand from the press.

Hon. Mr. PEARSON: Yes, it came up. Mr. Dulles spoke of it at our morning meeting, when the three groups were there. These meetings were very informal. We did not even sit around a table: we were in a room sitting informally in chairs. The morning meeting was devoted largely to a report of Mr. Dulles on his recent visit to Asia, where, as you know, he touched at a good many countries. He spoke for about 45 minutes or an hour and we interrupted, asking questions. In that report he mentioned his visit to Formosa and at that time he was asked some questions about their attitude towards Formosa and Peking.

That initiated an exchange of views on that subject. As has been stated already, there was no dispute---that was suggested in one newspaper report in the United States---or anything approaching ill feeling between the Canadian and United States representatives when we discussed this matter. Not at all. There was a very friendly exchange of views in which there was no reference to any change of Canadian policy. The United States, through the President and the Secretary of State, made its position quite clear. We have heard it before, but it was reaffirmed. We have heard their attitude towards recognition of Peking and toward the off-shore islands. There was a reference on our side to the growing embarrassment---this is quite true and has been accurately mentioned in the press---to a growing difficulty, as we saw it, at the United Nations. We were not talking about the recognition of Peking, so much as the growing embarrassment at the United Nations of a good many countries which had recognized Peking, at the continued representation of China there by the representative of Chiang Kai-shek. The events of last autumn showed that this difficulty was increasing. That was said and that was all.

Mr. COLDWELL: Did the Canadian delegation share the embarrassment?

Hon. Mr. PEARSON: We have not recognized the communist government of Peking. We recognize the Chiang Kai-shek representative as the representative of China at the United Nations. You had better ask Mr. Martin if he felt embarrassed.

Mr. KNOWLES: You were glad to be away at the time.

Mr. COLDWELL: I asked a question last week about the situation in and around Formosa.

Hon. Mr. PEARSON: You did. I have a few notes on that. I hope I have dealt sufficiently with the question of "down-grading".

Mr. KNOWLES: I do not wish to interrupt your continuance on Formosa. I wish to know at some time you might give a more complete report on what went on at White Sulphur Springs. I suggest that you proceed with the statement on Formosa.

Hon. Mr. PEARSON: During the past year there seems to

be little outward change at least in the situation on Formosa and the islands of Quemoy and Matsu. The nationalist government continues to hold these islands with large forces. I am talking now about Formosa and the off-shore islands. Most of the men are still drawn from those who evacuated to the mainland (sic) in 1949 but some have been recruited from the mainland in recent years and there is an increasing proportion of Formosans in Chiang Kai-shek's forces.

Mr. COLDWELL: Are the Formosans conscripted?

Hon. Mr. PEARSON: I think they are but we will find that out. The United States is, under its Mutual Defence Treaty with the nationalist government, helping to train and supply those forces and provide sea and air protection for Formosa, in accordance with United States policy which has already been declared. Quite a high proportion of the forces of the nationalist government---I do not mean a majority of the forces but a substantial proportion---are stationed on the off-shore islands---to defend those islands, I take it, against attack from the mainland. It seems to me that the principal change which has taken place in this area during the last 12 months has been the growth of the hope that the Chinese communists have realized now that there would be serious dangers involved in an attack on Quemoy and Matsu. There is still irregular firing from the mainland at the islands and vice versa but in some quarters the hope has grown that the communists will not attack those islands, with all the risk of conflict which is involved.

Mr. COLDWELL: How far are they from the mainland and how far from Formosa?

Hon. Mr. PEARSON: The nearest off-shore island is, I think, about four miles from the mainland. I hope I will be permitted to correct that figure if it is wrong. I think it is about 80 or 90 miles from Formosa. The United States of course is committed to the defence of Formosa against attack by the Chinese communists and the fact that no attack has materialized during the last year may suggest that the Chinese communists realize the probable effect of such an attack. There has been some encouragement, as I have said, drawn from the fact that no attack has taken place.

The United States position in regard to Formosa is quite clear; the United States position in regard to Quemoy and Matsu is less clearly defined. United States policy is based on the assumption of responsibility to make secure and protect the position of territories which, in the judgment of the President of the United States, are necessary or related to the defence of Formosa. As Mr. Dulles himself has said, that is not in itself a commitment to defend the coastal islands as such. Those words "as such" may turn out one day to be pretty important. The Chinese communists may have decided---I hope they have---that an attack on Quemoy and Matsu or an attack on Formosa would be too dangerous, but it certainly would be premature to come to any categorical conclusion on that matter. While therefore the potential for a Chinese communist attack on Quemoy and Matsu remains, there is reason to hope that the Peking authorities have decided that any advantage which they might gain from such an attack would not justify the risk involved. That is the present position. It is quiescent. There is no evidence that we have been able to secure from any quarter which would indicate that an attack on these islands, let alone an attack on Formosa, a full-scale attack, is imminent; but the possibility of such an attack remains.

Mr. COLDWELL: These islands are adjacent to important Chinese mainland ports---Amoy, for example.

Hon. Mr. PEARSON: Yes, they are not far from Amoy. The position which the Canadian government has taken is that an attack on Formosa would be one thing, while an attack on Quemoy and Matsu would be something else. An attack on Formosa might conceivably be aggression, if it were so determined by the United Nations, as the position of Formosa has not been decided finally in international law. We do not necessarily accept the Chinese communist position, or indeed the Chinese Nationalist position that Formosa is part of China. That is something to be decided and in that decision, as has been said we think that the wishes of the Formosans should be considered. Anyway, it is indeterminate at present. An attack on Formosa might therefore be considered by the United Nations and if so, we as members of the United Nations would be under obligation to take an appropriate part in any action the United Nations might decide.

Mr. COLDWELL: It would be very difficult, with the veto in the Security Council.

Hon. Mr. PEARSON: There is always the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. So far as Quemoy or Matsu are concerned, we consider this as part of continental China and that the struggle between the two Chinese armies for these islands is incidental to the Chinese civil war, and therefore we have no obligation to intervene in any way, shape or form. Our policy has been pretty clearly laid down. It is understood, and it has not changed.

Mr. COLDWELL: It is the same thing with the recognition of the Peking government?

Hon. Mr. PEARSON: I do not think I will go beyond the very clear statement I made on this matter a few weeks ago in the House of Commons.

Mr. STEWART (Charlotte): You mentioned there were some citizens of communist China who went down to Formosa. Have you any idea of the numbers involved?

Hon. Mr. PEARSON: I can get some reports. I have no idea how accurate they are. I will see if I can get some information in regard to those who may have trickled in through Hong Kong.

Mr. STEWART (Charlotte): There was some discussion on that but we were not given the figures involved. It would be interesting to know the numbers dissatisfied with the way of life in communist China and who are making that move.

Hon. Mr. PEARSON: It is hard to find out, because a good many have come to Hong Kong, because they are dissatisfied with the communist regime. They have stayed there, and the population has grown. Some have gone on through Hong Kong.

Mr. STUART (sic) (Charlotte): The same thing is referred to in that article in regard to Hong Kong.

Mr. COLDWELL: What about Canadian nationals and property in China?

Hon. Mr. PEARSON: There are very few left. We will get figures. Our Canadian embassy property in Nanking is still intact. We get reports about it occasionally and it is still looked after by our custodian, a Chinese employee who has been there for years. As far as we know, the property is intact.

Mr. COLDWELL: Has the Minister anything to say about the Pescadores?

Hon. Mr. PEARSON: Anything I have said regarding Formosa includes the Pescadores which is not part of the continent of China.

-----



~~1-14-1956~~  
~~Mr. Johnson~~

Chine Formose

LA PRESSE

APR 12 1956

50056 A-46  
8 8

# L'invasion de Formose improbable

**Mais les rouges chinois continuent de vastes préparatifs, dit M. W. Robertson.**

(De notre édition finale d'hier)  
Washington, 11. (AFP) — Les communistes chinois se mettent en mesure de constituer "une menace formidable" contre Formose, a déclaré M. Walter Robertson, secrétaire d'Etat adjoint, à la Commission des affaires étrangères de la Chambre.

Toutefois, M. Robertson, qui est le grand spécialiste du secrétariat d'Etat des questions d'Extrême-Orient, a ajouté qu'à son avis les communistes chinois ne tenteront pas d'invasion à travers le détroit de Formose dans un avenir immédiat.

Le secrétaire d'Etat adjoint, qui est venu devant la commission pour soutenir la demande formulée par le président Eisenhower d'environ \$5,000,000,000 de nouveaux crédits pour l'aide à l'étranger, a prédit que l'Union soviétique ferait des offres commerciales attrayantes aux pays d'Asie durant les prochains mois.

Près de la moitié des \$5,000,000,000 demandés par le président est destinée à l'Asie pour l'année fiscale commençant le 1er juillet prochain, dont quelque \$1,200,000,000 pour la seule aide économique.

## Longs entretiens de Genève

Le secrétaire d'Etat adjoint a ensuite rappelé que les longs entretiens de Genève de M. U. Alexis Johnson, représentant des Etats-Unis avec M. Wang Pin-Han, représentant de la Chine communiste, visaient à la libération de 13 prisonniers américains détenus par le gouvernement de Pékin en dépit de la promesse faite en septembre dernier de les relâcher rapidement.

M. Robertson a ajouté que l'ambassadeur Johnson tentait également d'obtenir une déclaration écrite du gouvernement communiste chinois aux termes de laquelle il renoncerait à l'emploi de la force contre Formose.

Un membre de la Commission lui demandant quelle pourrait être l'attitude du gouvernement communiste chinois au cas où la situation au Moyen-Orient entraînerait une intervention des troupes américaines, M. Robertson a déclaré qu'il exprimerait son avis sur ce sujet au cours de la session à huis clos de la commission demain.

*file*  
*APM*

S E C R E T

OUTWARD TELEGRAM FROM COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE

TO: U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN CANADA  
U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN AUSTRALIA  
U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN NEW ZEALAND  
U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN SOUTH AFRICA  
U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN INDIA  
U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN PAKISTAN  
U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN CEYLON

RPTD: MOSCOW )  
WASHINGTON ) (SAVING) (VIA FOREIGN OFFICE)  
PEKING )  
NEW YORK )

(Dated 28th March, 1955)

Y. No. 78      SAVING      SECRET

Repeated Saving to Moscow, Washington, Peking and New York.

My telegrams Y. No. 124, Y. No. 122 paragraph 2 and Y. No. 55 Saving.

FORMOSA STRAITS - PROPOSALS FOR  
POSSIBLE CONFERENCE

Attached memoranda give substance of reports from U.K. Ambassador at Moscow on his further interview with Molotov on March 9th (Memorandum) and report of Indian Ambassador's interview with Molotov on 25th March (Memorandum No. 2).

(Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington, Cape Town)

2. Please pass copy of Memoranda Nos. 1 and 2 to Commonwealth authorities. Copies have been given to High Commissioners in London.

(Delhi, Karachi, Colombo)

3. Please pass copy of Memorandum No. 1 only repeat only to Commonwealth Authorities. Copy of Memorandum No. 1 has been given to High Commissioners in London for India, Pakistan and Ceylon.

-----

SECRET

REPORT FROM U.K. AMBASSADOR AT MOSCOW OF HIS  
INTERVIEW WITH MOLOTOV ON 9TH MARCH ABOUT  
SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR CONFERENCE ON  
SITUATION IN FORMOSA STRAITS

Molotov had no comment on your message to Chou En-lai except to say that he had seen Chou's answer.

2. Molotov said so far as he knew both sides were already engaged in studying ways of making progress. I said I hoped they would be successful and that he would let us know if he arrived at any conclusions. He said he thought that negotiations were making some progress, if rather slowly, and that he expected positive results. One point he hoped had been sufficiently clarified by our last meeting was that of Chiang Kai-Shek's participation in the conference; he hoped that this could now be considered settled in a negative manner. The Government of the Chinese People's Republic regarded this as an internal question and were unable to accept Chiang Kai-shek as a partner in international negotiations.

3. I said I had had nothing more from you on this specific point, but that I knew you continued to think it necessary that both sides should be fully represented. Moreover, your speech in the House of Commons on 8th March showed that you considered that the Chinese Nationalist authorities still had an important part to play.

4. Molotov asked if you had any new proposals to make about Formosa as a result of your discussions with various countries at the Bangkok conference, including a representative of the United States. I said that I understood that Formosa had not been discussed at the conference but that you had had conversations outside the conference with Mr. Dulles. Your speech in the House of Commons on 8th March (Commonwealth Relations Office telegram Y. No. 124) showed your present view on the Formosa question.

5. Copies of this Memorandum have been communicated to the Governments of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan and Ceylon.

-----

Commonwealth Relations Office Memorandum (No. 1)  
dated 28th March, 1955.

SECRET

REPORT FROM U.K. AMBASSADOR AT MOSCOW OF INDIAN  
AMBASSADOR'S INTERVIEW WITH MOLOTOV ON 25TH MARCH  
ABOUT SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR CONFERENCE ON SITUATION  
IN FORMOSA STRAITS

Indian Ambassador was sent for by Molotov yesterday.

2. Molotov gave him a reply to a recent Indian Note about Formosa. This reply noted that the Indian Government did not insist on Nationalist participation in a conference about Formosa, on a basis of equality. It added that an Indian suggestion of possible Nationalist participation on a basis less than full equality would not be acceptable to the Chinese Government, and that the Soviet Government shared this view.
3. The Note also rejected an Indian proposal that the Security Council should be associated with the proposed conference, on the grounds that recent experience had shown that the Council was incapable of dealing with the Formosa question either effectively or impartially.
4. Although the Note was thus very negative in substance, it was friendly and even effusive in tone, and expressed the desire of the Soviet Government to continue to collaborate with the United Kingdom and Indian Governments in the search for a peaceful solution of the Formosa question.
5. Indian Ambassador told Molotov that his Government's preoccupation with the question of membership of the conference was inspired, not by any love of Chiang Kai-shek, but by the desire to escape from the impasse that one party would certainly not agree to a conference without Chiang, while another would not attend if he came. In these circumstances, the Ambassador could not see how the conference could meet, and he wondered how Molotov would solve this problem. Molotov evaded this question, saying he hoped that the three Governments would continue their search for a solution.
6. Copies of this Mémorandum have been communicated to the Governments of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.

-----

Commonwealth Relations Office Memorandum (No. 2)  
dated 28th March, 1955.

*Mr. [unclear] [unclear]*  
*File [unclear]*  
*AGM*

CONFIDENTIAL

February 2, 1956.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CROSS  
Prime Minister's Office.

50056-A-40
65 ✓

I attach the original copy of a petition addressed to the Prime Minister by the President of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Formosa, together with a copy of a covering letter from our Ambassador in Tokyo.

2. This so-called "Provisional Government" has Headquarters in Tokyo, and claims to represent the aspirations of the Formosan people for independence. It was established on November 27, 1955, by a predecessor body known as the Formosan Democratic Independence Party. This latter group addressed a similar petition to the Prime Minister just before the Geneva conference in 1954; this petition was not acknowledged.

3. We understand that the so-called "Provisional Government" has no substantial support outside the group of expatriate Formosans and Chinese in Tokyo who make it up. The United States Embassy in Tokyo, in particular, keeps it at arms length. In the circumstances, we would recommend against acknowledging the attached petition.

*Thank you. No acknowledgment  
will be made.  
J.S.C.*

*Arthur Mungui*  
Far Eastern Division,  
External Affairs.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(DUPLICATE)

DESPATCH

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Ambassador to Japan  
Tokyo

Reference: My Despatch No. 45 of January 13, 1956

Subject: Letter to the Prime Minister of Canada  
from Officials of the Provisional Govern-  
ment of the Republic of Formosa.

Security:.....  
70  
No:.....  
Date: January 14, 1956  
Enclosures:.....  
Air or Surface Mail:.....  
Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No. 50056-A-40-

References

Attached is the original and envelope of the letter of January 5, 1956, received today, addressed to the Prime Minister of Canada in care of this Embassy, from Thomas W. I. Liao and Chin-lam Go, designated as the President and vice-president respectively of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Formosa. The letter contains a diatribe against Chiang Kai-shek, impugns the motives of Mao Tse-tung in relation to Formosa and appeals to the Prime Minister of Canada for sympathy and support. You will note also that it indicates the Provisional Government of the Republic of Formosa, which was the subject of my despatch under reference, has already been organized.

2. I have not acknowledged receipt of the letter. I should be grateful if you would inform me whether any action should be taken by this Embassy in respect of this letter. A copy has been made and retained on file here.

(Sgd.) T.C. DAVIS  
Ambassador.

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

The Prime Minister of Canada

Dear Sir:

We, the eight million Formosan natives, all admire your courage and effort in establishing the world peace, and Your Excellency as the champion of democracy and racial self-determination. A small nation though we are, we never forget to share the same responsibility.

It seems that this year, the year of 1956, the destiny of the unfortunate people of Formosa, the original inhabitants of the island, will be decided. However, we believe it will be decided according to the principle of democracy and racial self-determination. The people of Formosa had been miserable in the past, being a colonial subject of Manchu Dynasty and Japan, and so is at present under Chiang Kai-shek group.

Chiang Kai-shek is not only a war-lord but also a war-monger. In order to realize his personal ambition of regaining his lost "throne" in Nanking, he is driving our native people to be killed by the Communists and dragging the whole world into a most treacherous A- and H-bombs world-war. His eldest son, Chiang Chin-kou, with his Moscow-trained brain, commanding his thousand of secret police, is enslaving our people in the big concentration-camp of Formosa. His Prime Minister, O.K. Yu, the henchman of the dictatorial regime is exploiting our people. Yen Chia-ken, the Governor of Formosa, acting as his mouth-organ, is telling a lie to the world that the Formosans are contented and well-satisfied under his "democratic rule." In fact, today inside Formosa everyone is so closely watched and guarded that a word of truth from his heart means death to him. The Chinese Nationalists' half a million armed forces might not be able to rule the Chinese continent with iron and blood efficiently, but in Formosa at present these forces plus hundred thousand secret police is easy to enforce slave-life to the eight million native Formosans and control the island vacuum-tight.

Taking advantage of the above facts inside Formosa, the Chinese Communist Regime, with their peace offensive as a front of its world policy, is trying to let the Formosans have an impression that Mao Tse-tung is a hero fighting for liberty and emancipation of the Formosans from the tyrannous dictator of Chiang Kai-shek. This is a sorry sight. In fact the Formosans are looking for the neutral nations in the United Nations to take away the iron-chain put on us by Chiang Kai-shek. We, on behalf of our people, want to appeal to you to help the native Formosans immediately.

To help the Formosans to regain their twice-lost independence is not only heroic in assisting a small nation to stand up, but also a long-range Formosan policy. We would like to reiterate that the Formosans are neither Chinese nor Japanese but Formosans as a race with its own identity, traditions, and culture.

Confronting with the fact that the legal status of Formosa is not decided, and there is no free election in Formosa as present, the Provisional National Congress of Formosa had, on November 27th, 1955 adopted a resolution of rules to establish the Provisional Government of the Republic of Formosa, and elected Dr. Thomas W. I. Liao its President and Dr. Chin-lam Go Vice-President on December 18th, 1955, in Tokyo, Japan.

After ten years' struggle with tears and blood the Formosans have determined to stand up and declare Independence of Formosa in accordance with the principle of racial self-determination, and appeal for Your Excellency and your country sympathy and support. We, at the same time, believe that God helps those who help themselves.

Most respectfully yours,

*Thomas W. I. Liao*

Thomas W. I. Liao  
The President of the Provisional  
Government of the Republic of Formosa

*Chin-lam Go*

Chin-lam Go  
The Vice-President of the Provisional  
Government of the Republic of Formosa

January 5th, 1956

608, YMCA Bldg., 7, Mitoshiro-cho  
Kanda, Tokyo, Japan



*file*  
*J.R. McKinney*  
CONFIDENTIAL

January 30, 1956

Memorandum to the Minister.

50056-19-40  
65 ✓

Subject: The Effect of Recognition on the Status of Formosa.

We have suggested that in your statement in the House you might make it clear that, in the Canadian view, the legal status of Formosa is still undecided and that by recognizing the Peking regime, we would not prejudice the issue of Formosa's future. The following notes amplify our position on this matter.

Historical Factors

2. The present uncertainty regarding Formosa's legal status begins with the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations. At Cairo the United Kingdom, the United States and China stated their joint intention that Formosa was to be stripped from Japan and restored to the Republic of China and this was re-affirmed in the Potsdam Declaration. In accordance with this general statement of intentions, Chiang Kai-shek accepted the surrender of the Japanese forces on Formosa on October 25, 1945. In the British view Formosa then became an enemy territory under military occupation. The Nationalist Government, however, proceeded to take unilateral action as if the sovereignty over Formosa had actually passed to it from that date. This action was never questioned by any of the powers directly interested, although the United Kingdom Government did protect its legal position by declining to regard Formosans as Chinese nationals for passport purposes, and compromised by treating them as "friendly aliens". A consensus of the Western allies taken in, say, 1947 would, however, undoubtedly have been that the Chinese Nationalists were properly installed on Formosa in accordance with the Cairo and Potsdam statements of intentions, which it was reasonable to expect would be

regularized in due course by a treaty of peace with Japan. In the event, because of a disagreement as to which of the two Governments claiming to represent China should participate, China was excluded from the San Francisco Peace Treaty of September 8, 1951. Under this Treaty Japan formally renounced her rights to Formosa but the Treaty did not assign them to any other state. Nor did the subsequent bilateral Peace Treaty between Nationalist China and Japan do anything to clear up the uncertainty.

3. The Canadian view of the present legal position is that Formosa's de jure status is uncertain and undetermined. Our right to take this view would seem to be justified by the fact that we signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and it may be that for the same reason we are under an obligation to state it. We consider that the Nationalist Government is in de facto control of Formosa and that it is properly installed on the basis of a military occupation which has not been legally terminated. This is also roughly the position of the United States and United Kingdom Governments.

#### Previous Statements

4. While you have never given a detailed enunciation of this doctrine to the House, you have stated it generally on several occasions. For example on January 25, 1955 you said:

"In this area of tension and danger a distinction can validly be made between the position of Formosa and the islands off the China coast now in Nationalist hands. The latter are indisputably part of the territory of China; the former, Formosa and the Pescadores, which were Japanese colonies for fifty years prior to 1945 and had a checkered history before that, are not".

5. Inclosing the External Affairs debate at the last session of the House, you said on April 21, that:

"So far as Canadian responsibility is

concerned over Formosa - I think this had better be repeated, and I will try to make it clear - we have no other commitment in regard to Formosa than that which arises from our membership in the United Nations. That was the position a year ago and that is the position today. We feel that the status of Formosa has not yet been finally determined, but we also feel that the Communist Government in Peking should not use force to bring about that determination."

6. On the specific issue of the effect of possible Canadian recognition on the future of Formosa, the following paragraph from your statement to the "People's School" of St. Francis Xavier University on November 7, 1954 is relevant:

"I would also stress that any recognition of the Peking Government does not have to include a commitment to support the handing over of Formosa to the control of that government."

7. Speaking in the House last April 21 you also said:

"We do not in this Government have to subscribe to the policies of Chiang Kai-shek - we also have a fairly open mind about the future of Formosa and indeed we have been criticized because we have not been more specific in our policy in this regard. But I certainly do not subscribe to any policy which would ask us to share in the ejection of Chiang Kai-shek and half a million Chinese Nationalist soldiers from Formosa."

JULES LÉGER

J.L.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: ~~XXXX~~ THE CANADIAN EMBASSY, TOKYO, JAPAN.....

Security: **Confidential**.....

FROM: ~~XXXXXX~~ THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

No: **X- 50**.....

Date: **January 26, 1956**.....

Reference: **Your Despatches No. 45 of January 13 and 70 of January 19.**

Enclosures:.....

Air or Surface Mail:.....

Subject: **Formosan Democratic Independence**.....

Post File No:.....

**Party**.....

Ottawa File No. <b>50056-A-40</b>	
65	65

References

We would judge from your Despatch No. 45 and from Washington's letter No. 69 of January 16, a copy of which has been referred to you, that the Formosan Democratic Independence Party has no influential outside support. We are inclined to hope that it will not gain any; the Formosan question is difficult enough as it is and surely the last thing we need is another political organization claiming to represent the hopes and aspirations of the Formosan people. The Party nevertheless appears to have a certain skill in getting publicity for its aims and objectives, and for that reason alone bears watching, albeit from a distance. We should therefore be grateful if you would continue to report from time to time on its activities. You should not, however, acknowledge Dr. Liao's letter to the Prime Minister.

T. R. MENZIES

*for the*  
 Under-Secretary of State  
 for External Affairs.

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

DESPATCH

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Ambassador to Japan  
Tokyo

Reference: My Despatch No. 45 of January 13, 1956

Subject: Letter to the Prime Minister of Canada  
from Officials of the Provisional Govern-  
ment of the Republic of Formosa

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: 70

Date: January 19, 1956

Enclosures: 2 [Signature]

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No: 210-3-1

Ottawa File No.	
500 5'6 A - 40	
19	✓

References

*Refer  
(with enclosure)*

*PM's Office*

*SSEA*

*WSEA*

*Washington*

*New Delhi*

*J.L. (2) Div*

*JIS (Thru J.L. 2)*

*Mr. Manning  
to see [unclear]  
[unclear]*

*[Handwritten initials]*

Attached is the original and envelope of a letter of January 5, 1956, received today, addressed to the Prime Minister of Canada in care of this Embassy, from Thomas W. I. Liao and Chin-lam Go, designated as the president and vice-president respectively of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Formosa. The letter contains a diatribe against Chiang Kai-shek, impugns the motives of Mao Tse-tung in relation to Formosa and appeals to the Prime Minister of Canada for sympathy and support. You will note also that it indicates the Provisional Government of the Republic of Formosa, which was the subject of my despatch under reference, has already been organized.

2. I have not acknowledged receipt of the letter. I should be grateful if you would inform me whether any action should be taken by this Embassy in respect of this letter. A copy has been made and retained on file here.

*[Handwritten signature]*

Ambassadorsy

Internal Circulation

*Mark on reference slip  
to the PM and within the  
Dept: The letter to the  
Prime Minister will not  
be acknowledged.*

*J. R. MANNING  
Done  
3/17/56.*

Distribution to Posts

*✓*

The Prime Minister of Canada

Dear Sir:

We, the eight million Formosan natives, all admire your courage and effort in establishing the world peace, and Your Excellency as the champion of democracy and racial self-determination. A small nation though we are, we never forget to share the same responsibility.

It seems that this year, the year of 1956, the destiny of the unfortunate people of Formosa, the original inhabitants of the island, will be decided. However, we believe it will be decided according to the principle of democracy and racial self-determination. The people of Formosa had been miserable in the past, being a colonial subject of Manchu Dynasty and Japan, and so is at present under Chiang Kai-shek group.

Chiang-Kai-shek is not only a war-lord but also a war-monger. In order to realize his personal ambition of regaining his lost "throne" in Nanking, he is driving our native people to be killed by the Communists and dragging the whole world into a most treacherous A- and H-bombs world-war. His eldest son, Chiang Chin-kou, with his Moscow-trained brain, commanding his thousand of secret police, is enslaving our people in the big concentration-camp of Formosa. His Prime Minister, O.K. Yu, the henchman of the dictatorial regime is exploiting our people. Yen Chia-ken, the Governor of Formosa, acting as his mouth-organ, is telling a lie to the world that the Formosans are contented and well-satisfied under his "democratic rule." In fact, today inside Formosa everyone is so closely watched and guarded that a word of truth from his heart means death to him. The Chinese Nationalists' half a million armed forces might not be able to rule the Chinese continent with iron and blood efficiently, but in Formosa at present these forces plus hundred thousand secret police is easy to enforce slave-life to the eight million native Formosans and control the island vacuum-tight.

Taking advantage of the above facts inside Formosa, the Chinese Communist Regime, with their peace offensive as a front of its world policy, is trying to let the Formosans have an impression that Mao Tse-tung is a hero fighting for liberty and emancipation of the Formosans from the tyrannous dictator of Chiang Kai-shek. This is a sorry sight. In fact the Formosans are looking for the neutral nations in the United Nations to take away the iron-chain put on us by Chiang Kai-shek. We, on behalf of our people, want to appeal to you to help the native Formosans immediately.

To help the Formosans to regain their twice-lost independence is not only heroic in assisting a small nation to stand up, but also a long-range Formosan policy. We would like to reiterate that the Formosans are neither Chinese nor Japanese but Formosans as a race with its own identity, traditions and culture.

Confronting with the fact that the legal status of Formosa is not decided, and there is no free election in Formosa at present, the Provisional National Congress of Formosa had, on November 27th, 1955 adopted a resolution of rules to establish the Provisional Government of the Republic of Formosa, and elected Dr. Thomas W. I. Liao its President and Dr. Chin-lam Go Vice-President on December 18th, 1955, in Tokyo, Japan.

After ten years' struggle with tears and blood the Formosans have determined to stand up and declare Independence of Formosa in accordance with the principle of racial self-determination, and appeal for Your Excellency and your country sympathy and support. We, at the same time, believe that God helps those who help themselves.

Most Respectfully yours,

(Sgd.) Thomas W. I. Liao  
The President of the Provisional  
Government of the Republic  
of Formosa

(Sgd.) Chin-lam Go  
The Vice-President of the  
Provisional  
Government of the Republic  
of Formosa

January 5th, 1956  
608, YMCA Bldg., 7 Mitoshiro-cho  
Kanda, Tokyo, Japan

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Reference: Your Letter Y-1309 of Sept. 13, 1955.

Subject: Activities of the Formosan Democratic  
Independence Party.

JAP

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: 69

Date: January 16, 1956

Enclosures: ✓

Air or Surface Mail:

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.	
50056-A-40	
19	19

References

Refer

Tokyo ✓  
New Delhi ✓  
D.L. (2) Div ✓  
JIS ( thru D.L. ) ✓  
Mr Holmes ✓  
Mr Spangier ✓  
J. R. McAWNEY ✓  
Done ✓  
24 Jan 56 ✓  
[Signature]

We raised with the State Department the matter of Dr. Liao and his Formosan Democratic Independence Party shortly after we received your letter under reference. However, as a result of changes of staff in the relevant section of the State Department and our failure to follow up the matter, there has been a long delay between question and answer.

2. We raised the matter again recently with Clough, the Assistant Director of the State Department's Office of Chinese Affairs. He told us that the State Department does not regard either Dr. Liao or his organization very seriously. What Clough gave us by way of background information on Dr. Liao you already know from Tokyo's letters (e.g., Tokyo's letter No. 967 of Sept. 2). The State Department has no evidence to suggest that the Formosan Democratic Independence Party has deep roots in Formosa. Certainly, the State Department does not believe that the party has "the full support of eight million Formosans". Clough admitted that State Department intelligence on the extent of Formosan opinion in favour of independence is weak. There have been so many other Formosan problems on which information has been necessary that this particular area has been somewhat neglected. From our conversation with Clough we would be virtually certain that United States agencies have had nothing to do with the Formosan Democratic Independence Party (Tokyo's letter No. 967 of Sept. 2). We did not, of course, discuss this suggestion directly with Clough.

3. Our conversation led naturally to the other aspect of internal Formosan politics, which is always a matter of interest to the State Department, i.e., the question of what comes next when the Generalissimo leaves the scene. You may have noticed from press reports that the London Daily Mail carried a story early in January to the effect that secret peace talks "supported by the Generalissimo's son, Chiang Ching-kuo, and influential people in the Nationalist Party and the Nationalist armed forces" were going on. A spokesman for the Nationalist government immediately denied the report as "the product of lurid imaginations" and as a report which was deliberately spread to create misunderstanding. Clough said that to the best of the State Department's knowledge there was no truth in the London news report. There had been disaffections from the Nationalist cause in the last year, but some of these were to be expected. The State Department, however, knew of no

CONFIDENTIAL

...2

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

[Handwritten mark]



JAN 19 9 AM 5:57

DISBURSMENT

DISBURSMENT (RECEIPT)

*[Handwritten notes and signatures on the left margin]*

The following information is being furnished to you for your information only. It is not to be used for any other purpose. This information is being furnished to you for your information only. It is not to be used for any other purpose. This information is being furnished to you for your information only. It is not to be used for any other purpose.

ENCLOSURE

Form box with fields for name and address.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
MAIL STOP 2100  
FORT MONMOUTH, NEW JERSEY

EVALUATION MEETING ONLY  
TO THE UNDER SECRETARY OF ARMY FOR

NUMBERED LETTER

DEPARTMENT OF EVALUATION MEETING ONLY

recent developments which would suggest mass disaffection or disaffection of really prominent Nationalist Chinese leaders. The State Department's estimate of Chiang Ching-kuo's position remained that which was given us earlier in the year and reported in our letter No. 468 of March 17, 1955. The State Department believed that powerful though Chiang Ching-kuo was, there would be so many shifting alliances formed with the passing of the Generalissimo that Chiang Ching-kuo could not take over.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, likely belonging to an official at the Embassy.

The Embassy

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

DESPATCH

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Ambassador to Japan  
Tokyo

Reference: My Despatch No. 1007 of September 15, 1955

Subject: Establishment of the "Provisional Government of the Republic of Formosa"

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: 45

Date: January 13, 1956

Enclosures: 2

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No: 210-3-1

Ottawa File No.	
50056-A-40	
19	19

*Handwritten:* The Japanese... 5-25

References

*Refer (without enclosure)*  
Washington  
New Delhi  
J.S. (from Dh r)  
#  
Arend etc  
copy with encl.  
to  
Mr. Holmes  
D.L. (2) Division  
#  
Mr. Georges  
to see file 105

Attached is a story from this morning's The Mainichi by a staff writer, stating that Dr. Thomas Liao's Formosan Democratic Independence Party will organize a "provisional government" on February 28, 1956. This will be followed by a "Declaration of Formosa's Independence". It appears that the decision to create such a government was contained in a resolution of December 18, 1955 of the Provisional National Congress of Formosa, which was described in my despatch under reference. The new government will apparently be called a "Political Executive Commission" and will be organized as a cabinet, with portfolios for foreign affairs, interior, finance, overseas residents, and cultural affairs and information. The headquarters will be in Tokyo.

2. You will note that the Japanese Government is said to be abstaining from interference, that the Chinese Nationalists are said to be attempting to interfere and that Dr. Liao asserts that the United States would "fully support his movement in the event of Formosa's neutralization". It is difficult, of course, to comment on how much truth there is in these statements, but one of my officers learned not long ago from an officer of the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo that there is probably some truth in the statements about the Japanese Government and the Chinese Nationalists. The U.S. Embassy officer stated that while he was not directly concerned in affairs relating to Formosa, he was aware that Dr. Liao's movement was anxious to gather as much encouragement from the U.S. as possible. He said that representatives of the Formosan Democratic Independence Party attempted to contact the U.S. Embassy frequently and regularly but that the Embassy, for obvious reasons, maintained only formal and distant relations. He said that he had been told by the responsible officer in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that on the occasion of the establishment of the Provisional National Congress on September 13, 1955, the Chinese Nationalist Ambassador, Mr. Hollington K. Tong, had made a personal request to the Ministry for the suppression of the inaugural meeting and that the Ministry's reply had been that nothing could be done because the Formosans' political activities could not be considered illegal under Japanese law.

3. The U.S. Embassy officer added that he believed the Chinese Nationalists were considerably exercised about Liao's activities. He explained that one of the reasons for this was that while the party appeared to have only about 2000 active members in Japan, the Formosan population of Japan constituted the greater part of what is generally regarded as the Chinese resident population.

Internal Circulation

*Done*  
8/2/56

*Handwritten initials*

Distribution to Posts


*Handwritten number 4*

9:10 AM JAN 27 1976

... ..

... ..

... ..



... ..

... ..

... ..

2.

If one accepted the Chinese population as being somewhere between 40,000 and 44,000, which is the common estimate, then about 28,000 of them were in fact Formosans. A good many of these could be assumed to be passive sympathizers with the Formosan Independence movement of Dr. Liao. The officer pointed out that the U.S. Embassy had had reports of two other groups of independence-seeking Formosans, but that the pattern established by their reported existence looked a little too natural to be convincing. One group was said to have the covert support of the Nationalist Chinese, the other that of the Communists. The Embassy was by no means convinced that either or both existed in any effective form.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'H. J. ...', written in a cursive style.

Ambassador

# CANADIAN EMBASSY

TOKYO

Subject.....

Date..... JAN 13 1956

Publication..... THE MAINICHI

## For Independence Of Formosa

# 'Provisional Government' To Be Inaugurated Here

By Rene Georges Trucchi, Staff Writer

A Provisional Government of an independent Republic of Formosa, organized by exiled Formosa nationalists, is to be formally installed in Tokyo on February 28, the 50th anniversary of the abolition of 1947 anti-Chinese provisions in the Japanese Constitution.

The transitional government is to be followed by a Declaration of Independence and the formation of a Provisional National Congress.

Establishment of this Provisional Government will signify the first step in the independence movement of the Republic of Formosa. It is expected that 10,000 members of the Provisional Government will be organized in Formosa, Taiwan, and other islands in the Pacific Ocean.

This Provisional Government National Congress, formed a resolution on December 10 to organize an exile government and elected Dr. Chiang Kai-shek to be President and Dr. Guo Chin-wei as Vice President.

It is expected that the Provisional Government will be organized in Tokyo, Japan, and other islands in the Pacific Ocean. The Provisional Government will be organized in Tokyo, Japan, and other islands in the Pacific Ocean.

The Provisional Government will be organized in Tokyo, Japan, and other islands in the Pacific Ocean. The Provisional Government will be organized in Tokyo, Japan, and other islands in the Pacific Ocean.

Dr. Guo Chin-wei, who has been elected Vice President, is widely supported within Formosa, and hopes that the Provisional Government will come when the UN agrees to complete the independence of Formosa.

It is expected that the Provisional Government will be organized in Tokyo, Japan, and other islands in the Pacific Ocean.

This exile Cabinet is to be called a Political Executive Commission, and will have eight members besides the President and the Vice President. They will be the Secretaries of the Departments of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Education, Economic Relations, Cultural Affairs and Information, and the Secretary General and the Deputy Secretary General.

The headquarters of the Provisional Government will be located in the Hansa Building No. 17, Ginza, Shinjuku-ku, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo.

The Japanese Government is reported to have agreed to provide the Provisional Government with a building.

Problematists, however, are generally opposing the development in order to prevent clashes among various Chinese and Japanese factions.

Dr. Guo Chin-wei's move to establish his government in Tokyo is widely known. It is expected that the Provisional Government will be organized in Tokyo, Japan, and other islands in the Pacific Ocean.

He was called by SCAP for seven months upon arriving in Formosa in 1945. He is the husband of the Nationalist Chinese delegate on the Allied Council.

Dr. Guo says that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's son, Gen. Chiang Chao, who tried to buy his cooperation as a wartime ally, is in the lobby of the Imperial Hotel two weeks ago.

~~For Eastern~~

STEIN  
L. B. PEARSON

SECRET

file  
143  
Nov

50056-A-40	December 23, 1955.
143	✓

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER:

For Eastern

Consultations with the State Department on China Policy.

You will have seen Mr. Heeney's telegram of December 21 (copy attached) reporting that Mr. Dulles has shown some personal interest in the proposed consultations on China policy. In view of this, you may agree that it would now be appropriate to indicate to Mr. Heeney that we agree in principle to Canadian participation in these consultations, subject to a final decision when we have worked up an all-embracing paper on our policy and points of differences with the United States position.

2. One of the pitfalls will be the difficulty of conducting really useful consultations if someone holding the entrenched views of Walter Robertson speaks for the United States side. We are not likely to impress someone like Robertson with the Canadian point of view, and might only leave ourselves open to criticism of particular aspects of Canadian policy with which the Americans do not agree. On the other hand, if Mr. Dulles maintains a personal interest in the consultations, perhaps this would be reflected by his advisers taking a less rigid position than we have encountered during such discussions in the past.

3. A telegram making this point and asking for Mr. Heeney's views is attached for your signature if you approve of it.

*h.l.*

Tel sent from  
Min Office  
23-12-55

23-12-27 (SSM)  
23-12-35 (OS)

COPY

FM EMBASSY WASHINGTON DEC 21/55  
TO EXTERNAL OTTAWA 2069

SECRET ONE OF TWO

REF YOUR TELEGRAM Y2112 OF DECEMBER 20/55.  
SUB CHINA POLICY.

WHEN, IN MY CONVERSATION WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE THIS MORNING, WE HAD DISPOSED OF THE U.N. NEW MEMBERS (MY TELEGRAM 2068), WE WENT ON TO DISCUSS IN MORE GENERAL TERMS THE PROBLEM OF CONSULTATION BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. MR. DULLES, ONCE MORE, EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE WHICH HE AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT ATTACHED TO THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE CONTACT WITH US, PARTICULARLY RESPECTING SUBJECTS UPON WHICH OUR ATTITUDES MIGHT DIVERGE.

2. GIVEN THIS OPPORTUNITY, AND BECAUSE I HAD RAISED PREVIOUSLY WITH MERCHANT IN A PURELY PERSONAL WAY THE SUGGESTION PUT FORWARD IN OUR TELEGRAM NO. 2051 OF DECEMBER 16, I THEN PUT TO MR. DULLES, VERY TENTATIVELY AND ON MY OWN RESPONSIBILITY, THE OUTLINE OF OUR PROPOSAL. I SAID THAT AT THE MOMENT YOU WERE CONSIDERING WHETHER OR NOT TO SUGGEST THAT WE SIT DOWN AND EXAMINE TOGETHER THE PROCESSES BY WHICH OUR RESPECTIVE ATTITUDES ON CHINA HAD BEEN REACHED AND THE ELEMENTS OF WHICH OUR RESPECTIVE POLICIES WERE COMPOSED. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT OCCURRED TO US IN THE EMBASSY HERE THAT SUCH A DELIBERATE AND INFORMAL EXERCISE MIGHT BE OF VALUE ON BOTH SIDES.

3. MR. DULLES REACTED VERY FAVOURABLY AND WITHOUT HESITATION. HE SAID THAT IT WAS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE THAT WE SHOULD DISCUSS AND EXAMINE OUR DIFFERENCES (AND HE REFERRED PARTICULARLY TO THE FAR EAST)



# COPY

PAGE TWO NO. 2069.

WITH A VIEW TO SEEING WHETHER THEY COULD NOT BE COMPOSED. FREQUENTLY THERE WERE DIFFERING APPRECIATIONS OF FACT WHICH LED TO CONFLICTING CONCLUSIONS. YEARS AGO, WHEN HE WAS ADVISING THE STATE DEPARTMENT IN CONNECTION WITH JAPANESE TREATY, HE HAD BEEN "BRASH" ENOUGH TO SUGGEST IN A MEETING THAT A SIMILAR EFFORT BE MADE TO PREVENT U.K. AND U.S. POLICIES COMING INTO CONFLICT IN THE FAR EAST. THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN A USEFUL EXERCISE BECAUSE U.K.-U.S. DIFFERENCES HAD OPERATED TO FRUSTRATE THE OBJECTIVES OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS. BUT IT HAD NOT BEEN UNDERTAKEN.

4. CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES, MR. DULLES WENT ON, SHOULD PROFIT BY EXPERIENCE. HE WOULD BE GLAD TO HAVE A JOINT STUDY, SUCH AS I HAD SUGGESTED, UNDERTAKEN. IT WOULD HAVE TO BE MORE THAN A "ONE SHOT" EXERCISE - RATHER A CONTINUING PROCESS (AFTER THE FIRST THOROUGH-GOING JOINT EXAMINATION HAD BEEN MADE).

5. I SAID THAT, WHEN I HAD HEARD FROM YOU ON THE SUBJECT, I WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND, IF YOU HAD GIVEN YOUR APPROVAL, WOULD THEN CONSULT HIS ADVISERS ON THE NEXT PROCEDURE TO ADOPT. BOTH OVER AND MERCHANT WERE PRESENT DURING THIS CONVERSATION AND I TOLD THEM THAT THEY WOULD BE HEARING FROM US BEFORE VERY LONG.

6. IN VIEW OF THE SECRETARY'S FAVOURABLE REACTION I AM SATISFIED THAT WE SHOULD PUSH ON AND SEE WHAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED. AT THE WORST, AS I SAID TO MERCHANT AFTERWARDS, WE WILL HAVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE REASONS WHICH HAVE LED US TO DIFFERENT CONCLUSIONS. HEENEY.

SECRET

December 13, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

United States Policy on China

As you know, I was a little disturbed by the rigid attitude of the Americans - especially Walter Robertson and Admiral Radford - when we were discussing China at the recent Meeting of Consultation in Washington. It would appear that opinion in the State Department has not altered very much in the direction of what we would consider to be a more realistic China policy. The following points emerged:

- (a) The Nationalists have been increasing their strength on Quemoy and Matsu: about one-third of Chiang's army is now committed on them;
- (b) The Americans do not think the Nationalists are willing to withdraw from the offshore islands, and they are not pressing them to do so;
- (c) The State Department does not agree with us that the Chinese have become less threatening during the last six or eight months or so; they say the build-up opposite Formosa is obviously warlike in intent, and that it has, moreover, progressed to the point where both American and Nationalist air power over the Formosa Straits will soon be seriously challenged; and
- (d) The gap between the Canadian and United States points of view on recognition of Peking is widening.

. . . 2

14-12-23(55)  
13.12.8(U.S.)

2. On the other hand, it may be significant that the day after Robertson, Hoover and Radford were vigorously pointing out to me the aggressive build-up of Communist striking potential opposite Formosa Mr. Dulles seemed to play down this threat at a press conference. Perhaps this is another indication that he is not quite as inflexible as his State Department advisers. I do not know whether you will wish or, indeed, have an opportunity to discuss China with Mr. Dulles in Paris, but if you do, the following points may be helpful:

3. The point of view of Robertson et al has to be seen against the background of the Sino-American talks at Geneva, which are stalled, and a few recent public demands from the Communist side that Formosa be "liberated". On the other hand, we have received a reliable informal tip that a search is going on in Washington for a formula which the Chinese Communists could be reasonably expected to accept in conceding that Formosa lay outside their control for ten or fifteen years.

4. Regardless of any long-range policy making which may be under way, it would be my guess that the State Department has nothing more at the moment than a "sit tight and hope for the best" policy, and that they may intend to rely on it throughout the presidential election year. This certainly involves a risk that the Chinese Communists will take advantage of the election campaign to damage the China policy of the Administration; one way to do this would simply be to stir up trouble over the offshore islands while the campaign is going on. Against this risk the Americans probably hope that the firmness which paid off for them during the Formosa crisis of last spring will see them through another one - if it comes to that - next spring. Otherwise, it is difficult to understand why they have permitted Chiang to commit himself so heavily on the offshore islands.

5. For us this means that we will be unable to recognize Peking before 1957 without serious detriment to our relations with Washington.

6. If you should be speaking to Mr. Dulles it might be worthwhile saying something along the following lines:

- (a) If it is true that Communist Chinese air power opposite Formosa is rapidly getting strong enough to drive the Nationalists from the air and challenge United States air power in the area, then it is very probable that tension there will increase during the coming months.
- (b) If there is another Formosa crisis, we foresee the same or even more serious divisions among the Western allies as last time; for one thing, the behaviour of the Nationalist Chinese during the current Assembly has lost them a good deal of sympathy.
- (c) We do not like to seem to be forever opposing the Americans on their China policy, but in the absence of any knowledge of their long-term objectives, we have no alternative except to feel uneasy about it.
- (d) We still think that the withdrawal of Nationalist forces from the offshore islands and progress in the discussions at Geneva on some issue other than American prisoners in China would do a great deal to remove some of the uncertainties which would precipitate another Formosa crisis.

*J.H.L.*

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Subject

*China - Formosa, etc.*

50056-A-1-6  
4 8

DEC 13 1955

Date

Publication

N. Y. TIMES

**U. S. CURB ANNOYS QUEMOY COMMAND**

**Restrictions on Artillery Fire Permit Reds to Fortify Forward Positions**

By HENRY B. LIEBERMAN  
Special to The New York Times.

QUEMOY, China, Dec. 11—The Chinese Nationalist commander here declared today United States policy was keeping him from harassing construction work designed to increase the Communist artillery potential against this island.

Gen. Liu Yu-chang, chief of the Quemoy defense command, said the United States "renunciation of force" approach had put him in a position of being able to shoot at the Communists building a three-mile causeway to an island four miles from Quemoy.

"If our artillery was not restricted they would not be building the causeway," the 53-year-old general said.

The causeway, on which work is believed to have been started about two months ago, is being built from a point southeast of Hengtso on the China mainland to Tienchien on Communist-held Tateng Island.

General Liu told two visiting United States correspondents the Communists were building this causeway to make it easier to supply short-range artillery on Tateng. He said the Communists, who are credited here with long-range 152-mm. howitzers and 122-mm. guns of a Soviet type, could reach Quemoy from Tateng "even with 75-mm. pack howitzers."

**Second Causeway Ready**

According to General Liu, the Communists have completed another supply causeway linking the mainland with Amoy Island west of Quemoy. He said this causeway, which runs from Chimei to Kaochi on the northwest tip of Amoy Island, was finished in September after eighteen months of construction work.

Although the general said he had to pull his punches on obstructing the building of the Hengtso-Tienchien causeway, his hands are apparently not tied completely. Nationalist officers here said retaliatory fire was being directed against this project no matter where the Communists shot from first.

Daytime work on the Communist project is reported to have been temporarily disrupted by Nationalist harassing fire on Dec. 4. This counter-fire, the Nationalists say, followed a Communist barrage of 681 shells on Nov. 28 that drew a 240-round response against Tateng from Quemoy.

The situation here is said to have been pretty quiet during the last week. On this warm and sunny Sunday, with a number of islanders urging their two-saddled donkeys down the road past mounds of scarp, black rock and camouflaged shelters,

seemed like a good place to relax.

But at the hostel of the United States Military Advisory Group detachment here, sporadic explosions punctuated a lunch of meatloaf, macaroni salad, doughnuts and coffee. Someone explained that the Nationalists were blasting rock for more shelters.

General Liu said there were no signs at present of any substantial Communist troop build-up opposite Quemoy. He added in reply to a question that there had been only one Communist reconnaissance plane over Quemoy—in September.

Asked about the possibility of a Communist invasion attempt soon, he replied:

"We have not found any indications that the Communists are planning to attack us in the near future. But you can not tell for sure because they may want to surprise us. We are ready, even if they attack us tomorrow."

While there are no signs of Communist troop expansion, General Liu and members of his staff pointed to a continuing Communist build-up along other lines. The Communists, they noted, are developing their air, artillery and supply capacities in the coastal area facing Quemoy and Nationalist-held Matsu Island, 150 miles up the Fukien Coast.

There is now an improved field at Foochow, 120 miles northeast of Quemoy and forty miles southwest of Matsu.

**Jet Airfields Listed**

In addition, according to qualified military sources, the Communists have been developing six new jet fields within a 125-mile radius of Quemoy: Lungtien, 100 miles northeast; Hweian, forty-two miles northeast; Sha Ti, twenty-five miles northeast; Lungki, forty miles west; Chenghai, 115 miles southwest; and Liencheng, 125 miles northwest.

Various military men regard the southward extension of the Communist airfield chain as the inevitable result of a steady coastal defense development. They recognize that the fields can be used for offensive as well as defensive purposes.

Thus far, with the exception of Canton, the southernmost coastal point for the permanent stationing of Communist aircraft is believed to be Liuchiao. Liuchiao lies on the Chekiang coast about 340 miles northeast of here.

According to the Nationalist command in Quemoy, the Communists have built up a considerable artillery potential in this area. A briefing officer here said the Communists had rimmed this island with almost 700 artillery emplacements and about 300 artillery pieces in addition to anti-aircraft guns.

"They can cover two-thirds of this island with their artillery now," General Liu said. He added that the anticipated establishment of long-range guns at the emplacements on the Weitow peninsula to the northeast would eventually bring the uncovered part, including the Quemoy airstrip, within artillery range.

**Reds Building New Railroad**

Meanwhile, the Communists are further developing their military supply capacity through construction of the Yingtan-Amoy railway. This will bring

**Fukien's first railway to the front facing Quemoy.**

Eight divisions of railway construction troops of 12,000 men each and tens of thousands of civilian laborers are now working on the line. Work on this railway, which begins at Yingtan about seventy-five miles east of Nanchang on the existing Hangchow-Nanchang line, began in the fall of 1954.

Once the railway is pushed through the Fukien Mountains to Amoy, the Communists will have an easier time supplying their troops and airfields in this area. The Nationalists expect the line to be completed by early 1957 and possibly before the end of 1956.

It is estimated here the Communists still have about 125,000 troops opposite Quemoy along a 100-mile axis from Hweian southwest to Changpu. Nationalist strength in this sector is unofficially reckoned at about 70,000 men.

The indications are the Communists would have a rough time in trying to take this island as matters now stand. But they have more troops to spare besides those now facing Quemoy.

Furthermore, the Communists are steadily closing in with artillery and airfields that raise the possibility of steady poundings. Some of the new coastal airfields are already closer to Quemoy than the Nationalist fields that lie across the Formosa Strait, 140 miles or more from this outpost island.

PRESS CLIPPING SERVICE *OK*

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

*OK for file*

S E C R E T

October 28, 1955.

file no  
50056-A-40SECOND DRAFTFORMOSA

Canada's main concern with the Formosa problem has, in the past, been to prevent the outbreak of further conflict, leading to general war, between the Chinese Communist Government and the National Government on Formosa, backed by the United States. Broadly speaking, Canada has avoided taking any initiative towards a long-range settlement of Formosa's status. Our legal position, namely that the island's juridical status is indeterminate, has been publically stated by Mr. Pearson, and the Canadian Government was, of course, a party to the Japanese Peace Treaty which removed Formosa from Japanese sovereignty. Moreover, we continue to recognize the Nationalist Government on Formosa as the Government of China. Apart from these rather tenuous connections, Canadian policy has reflected not only our geographical remoteness from Formosa but also our belief that <sup>in so far as Western influence extends into</sup> the area is primarily an American <sup>concern</sup> as opposed to an international sphere of influence. Canada has no obligations respecting Formosa other than those which arise from our membership in the United Nations.

2. Although a thaw has set in during recent months in relations between the United States and Communist China, the problem of the future status of Formosa seemingly remains as far from a solution as ever. Eventually, however, Canada will have to participate in the ultimate settlement so perhaps there are important reasons why a survey of the question should now be attempted, with the development of an identifiable Canadian policy on Formosa as the end in view. In the first place, eventual Canadian recognition of the Chinese Communist regime may require us to state our attitude on Formosa and our position vis-a-vis the Nationalist Government. Secondly, it might possibly be

useful if Canada were soon to suggest to its closest allies, particularly the United States, that the time has come to establish a common Western perspective of the problem. United States policy on the long-term status of Formosa appears deliberately ill-defined and vague, possibly for good reasons. Whenever it has been interpreted as unwarranted support for a corrupt regime (i.e. the Nationalists) there has been a tendency for a break to be opened between the United States and its Western allies or, possibly more important, between the United States and the uncommitted states of Asia. On the other hand, it may not be sufficiently appreciated by the Western allies that United States efforts, and theirs alone, have prevented Formosa's fall to the Communists, with all that that might mean to morale and stability elsewhere in Asia, particularly Southeast Asia.

3. What seems to be required is an agreed Western (and uncommitted Asian) view of what Formosa's ultimate status is to be. If there were such a view, it would mean that one more potential source of conflict within the non-Communist world would have been removed. It may be that Canada could play an active role in establishing the common perspective.

#### Historical Notes

4. *Handwritten: The first* The first occupiers of the island of Formosa, *with a large flourish* were the Dutch and the Portuguese, but from 1684 until 1895, when the territory was ceded to Japan, Chinese sovereignty over it was complete and unquestioned. By 1895, 95 per cent of the population was Chinese by origin, and there was no extensive colonization by the Japanese during their 50 years' rule. Thus it was still predominantly Chinese in language and culture in 1945. Moreover, the spectacular growth in the island's population, which virtually doubled in the 35 years up to 1940, was almost

entirely due to the natural increase of the Chinese. At the present time there are about 10 million people on Formosa, composed roughly as follows:

Aberigines	under 200,000
Native-born Formosans	approx. 8 million
Mainland Chinese	approx. 2 million

This very brief discussion of the ethnic history of Formosa suggests one inescapable conclusion: No matter what the pretensions of the competing Chinese factions to govern the island, the bulk of its inhabitants are linguistically, culturally and ethnically part of the Chinese race and that proposals for Formosa's independence cannot be based on ethnic principles. The fact that Formosa is part of China is about the only thing on which the Communist Government and the Nationalist Government agree.

*Legal* The present uncertainty regarding Formosa's ~~jurisdictional~~ status begins with the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations. At Cairo the United Kingdom, the United States and China stated their joint intention that Formosa was to be stripped from Japan and restored to the Republic of China and this was re-affirmed in the Potsdam Declaration. In accordance with this general statement of intentions, Chiang Kai-shek accepted the surrender of the Japanese forces on Formosa on October 25, 1945. In the British view, Formosa then became an enemy territory under military occupation. The Nationalist Government, however, proceeded to take unilateral action as if the sovereignty over Formosa had actually passed to it from that date. This action was never questioned by any of the powers directly interested, although the United Kingdom Government did protect its legal position by declining to regard Formosans as Chinese nationals for passport purposes, and compromised by treating them as "friendly aliens". A consensus of the Western allies taken in, say, 1947 would, however, undoubtedly



have been that the Chinese Nationalists were properly installed on Formosa in accordance with the Cairo and Potsdam statements of intentions, which it was reasonable to expect would be regularized in due course by a treaty of peace with Japan. In the event, because of a disagreement as to which of the two Governments claiming to represent China should participate, China was excluded from the San Francisco Peace Treaty of September 8, 1951. Under this Treaty Japan formally renounced her rights to Formosa but the Treaty did not assign them to any other state. Nor did the subsequent bilateral Peace Treaty between Nationalist China and Japan do anything to clear up the uncertainty.

~~6~~ The Canadian view of the present legal position is that Formosa's de jure status is uncertain and undetermined. Our right to take this view would seem to be justified by the fact that we signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and it may be that for the same reason we are under an obligation to state it. We consider that the Nationalist Government is in de facto control of Formosa and that it is properly installed on the basis of a military occupation which has not been legally terminated. This is also roughly the position of the United States and United Kingdom Governments.

#### Practical Objectives

7. It is probably idle to dwell at great length on the legal aspects of the Formosa question. It is sufficient to note that there are good legal arguments to support the U.K., U.S. and Canadian view that the de jure status of Formosa is indeterminate at the present time. Possibly an equally good legal case could be made out by the Nationalist Government to prove that they are in sovereign control of the island as part of the Republic of China, and by the Communist Government to show that its claims to Formosa are a mere extension of the civil war. Against

all three of these positions, it could be argued that the practical realities of the problem being what they are, the world community of States can alone determine the future of Formosa; and this would naturally suggest a collective agreement reached through the United Nations and one in which the wishes of the inhabitants would be taken into account.

8. A pragmatic and practical approach has much to recommend it. In the first place, it is doubtful that the various legal arguments bearing on the case can ever be made effective. Secondly, it follows that if Canada and its Western allies need a goal towards which they can work in harmony, they will not find it by rigidly adhering to previously stated positions, however well they may be defended on purely legal grounds. It is one thing to say that Formosa's status is now indeterminate, but quite another to be prepared to accept the status quo for an indefinite future period, particularly when to do so would mean the prolongation of international tension in the Formosa area.

#### A Western Solution

9. For obvious reasons, the "liberation" of the mainland from Formosa or the "liberation" of Formosa from the mainland are not solutions which Canada would wish to advocate. In the first place a successful attack on the mainland by Nationalist Forces is judged impossible on purely military grounds, and an invasion of Formosa, if attempted by the Communists in the face of United States resistance, would raise a grave risk of general war. It is true that there is already a risk that the Chinese Communists will succeed in breaking Nationalist morale on Formosa, in which case the island might be peacefully integrated with the mainland, and a recent remark by Chou En-lai to the British Charge d'Affaires in Peking would indicate that the Com-

munists have high hopes for just such a solution. For reasons which are manifest, however, it would be wrong and unwise for Canada to adopt this as its "solution" or to do anything which would make it easier for the Communists to undermine the morale of the Nationalists. On the contrary, our aim should be to protect those elements on Formosa who have taken refuge from Communist oppression and, if we can, to perpetuate the spirit of "free China" on Formosa. Whether we regard the Nationalist regime as fit to assume the mantle of Chinese freedom is a question which has little or no bearing: there are enough humanitarian and strategic considerations involved in Formosa's status to support a policy based on the hope, if not the determination, that Formosa shall not come under Communist domination.

10. Assuming, then, a presumption in favour of a non-Communist Formosa, what ultimate solution should Canada advocate and what steps might be taken now? There is little left to suggest but that we should work towards a Formosan state juridically divorced from mainland China. Whether such a state came into existence as a creature of the United Nations, as a state created by a re-convened conference of the parties to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, or simply evolved from the present stalemate, would be immaterial: the end achieved would be roughly the same in each case. Its government would, of course, have to disclaim any rights on the mainland. It is altogether certain that the Chinese Communist Government could not swallow the creation of such an entity right now, but it might do so after a suitable cooling-off period and especially if it were made known in advance that Formosa would not constitute a threat to its security. This latter provision would preclude foreign (i.e. United States) bases on Formosa, whose national military establishment would be limited to a size considered sufficient for the defence of the territory. The history of the United States strategic interest in

Formosa would suggest that this concept might eventually be acceptable even to the Pentagon. It will be recalled that until the outbreak of the war in Korea, and the nature of the threat from Communist China became plainly apparent, Formosa was not considered a part of the United States defensive system in the Western Pacific. Both the State Department and the Defence Department were, in fact, resigned to its fall to the Communists. The fact that the United States, Australian and New Zealand Governments now pitch their estimate of Formosa's strategic importance much higher may be only a reflection of heightened tensions in the area during the past five years: it may not be too extreme to forecast that at the end of another five or ten years, given continued detente and moderation on both sides, they would be willing to give up their strong military position on Formosa in exchange for a Communist undertaking not to attack it. They could not, of course, be expected to do so in the face of the present pressure, and it is abundantly clear that they will not. This proposal for an independent Formosa is, therefore, a long-range projection and it would depend for its success on a considerable improvement in Sino-American relations.

*Does it the strategic importance of Formosa to-day derive to a large extent from the racial aspects - how? it would be considered an American defeat, whether the strategic reality.*  
 J. W. B.

11. Nevertheless it may not be too early to make a start. The status quo is a dilemma for all concerned with the problem, and one of the most dangerous threats to peace at the present time.

12. A discomfiting, not to say incongruous, aspect of the status quo is the continuing pretensions of the Nationalists to liberate the mainland, which were re-stated in strong terms by Chiang Kai-shek on October 10. After emphasizing that U.S. aid to Formosa had reached a higher level than ever, he went on to say that an eventual counter-attack on the mainland was certain, and that it would be carried off without direct United States assistance.

"Everything we have done and everything we are doing is for no other purpose than that of increasing production and preparing for our counter-attack against the enemy". This raises a question as to what the United States is encouraging the Nationalists to think about their own future.

13. That the Nationalist Army can be restrained from attacking the mainland is clear from <sup>Mutual</sup> National Defence Treaty between the Republic of China and the United States, and the ancillary understandings reached at the same time. We may be confident that the United States will see that they are enforced. On the other hand, little has apparently been done to induce Chiang Kai-shek to play down his propaganda. Undoubtedly this propaganda must be used (in the absence of anything else to propagandize for) to keep up the morale of the Nationalist Army, but from the wider viewpoint this advantage must be set off against its effects on the mainland, where it encourages intransigence and counter-threats on the part of the Peking regime. The Robertson-Radford mission to Formosa in the spring of 1955 provided evidence that the Nationalist leaders are themselves ready to admit that they have no future except on Formosa, but nothing seems to have been done to bring this home to Formosans generally. The suggestion here is that the United States should soon begin to prepare them for their ultimate fate by making it generally clear that the most they can hope for is an independent, non-Communist state.

14. A campaign to disabuse the Nationalists of their pretensions to regaining control of the mainland need not be inconsistent with maintaining the morale of Chiang's armed forces. The defence of an independent Formosa, while admittedly a less swashbuckling objective than the invasion of the mainland, is an infinitely more practical one, and in the long run would be a more certain motivation. So

well-qualified an observer as Sir Robert Scott (formerly Minister at the British Embassy in Washington and now U.K. Commissioner-General in Southeast Asia) has given it as his opinion that the United States must eventually disengage itself and its prestige from the Formosa Straits, and that in an age of highly mobile strategy, there will indeed be a tendency to withdraw from areas of marginal strategic significance. Sir Robert also thinks that Nationalist morale will indeed collapse unless Chiang Kai-shek's forces get an attainable objective for which to fight, and the only practical objective now left to them is an independent Formosa. It would be hard to dispute this view.

*1st then some validity in the U.S. argument about the effect of withdrawal from Formosa on morale in Saigon, Hanoi, Bangkok and Seoul? L.W.H.*

Conclusions

15. Unless the Chinese Communists succeed in their avowed aim of bringing down the Nationalist regime on Formosa by undermining its morale, the status quo, or something akin to it, will probably continue on Formosa for several years. Canadian policy during this period should be based on the assumption that the extension of Communism from the mainland to Formosa would be inimical to our interests and that to aid or acquiesce in that objective would be morally indefensible. We ought, therefore, to support the basic determination of the United States to defend Formosa and the Pescadores, while remaining free to exercise whatever influence we can on U.S. policy to achieve limited objectives, such as a withdrawal from Quemoy and Matsu. As we see an independent Formosa juridically separated from mainland China as the only practical and possible ultimate solution, we might make this view known to our Western allies. Specifically, Canada might urge the United States gradually to do what is necessary to convince the Nationalists to give up their pretensions to the mainland in

*My statement*  
favour of a guaranteed status on Formosa. In doing so we should emphasize the desirability of the United States taking the lead in formulating a common Western perspective of the problem which would have the desirable effect of removing an ever-present source of conflict between the nations of the free World.

16. If, during the cooling-off period, i.e. before the juridical status of Formosa is finally established, we recognize Communist China, we are bound to say that in Canada's view the status of Formosa is undetermined in law but that we are searching for a practical solution in the light of our own interests and the interests of peace.

*My own inclination would be to remain pretty non-committal about the defence of Formosa. So long as we do not know more about the cost of defending it, I think we should keep men and matter about the necessity of peaceful solution. This does not mean that we should verbally hand it over or that we should deny the right of self-determination to the Formosans.*

*Could we use this very good analysis as the basis of a study which would lead to the ~~assessing~~ of proposals as to what we should do in certain foreseeable situations? Perhaps we might have a meeting to argue about this as a state.*

*D.W.*

Subject *China*

Date *OCT 4 - 1955* Publication

TORONTO STAR

# 'SHOOT TO KILL' ORDER GIVEN BRITISH NAVY MADDENED BY CHIANG

By WILLIAM STEVENSON  
Star Staff Correspondent

Hong Kong, Oct. 4—British warships are under secret "shoot to kill" orders which give ships' commanders wide powers of discretion at the scene of any attack against merchant vessels in the Formosa straits, it was reliably reported here today. While the silent service refused to unbutton its mouth, other authoritative sources said the navy was prepared to shell or shoot down any Nationalist plane or warship that ignored orders to break off action against any British merchantman.

### May Soon Change

During the past two years when 54 British ships have been attacked off the China coast by guns and bombs, identified as Nationalist Chinese, there has been no case of conflict between British and Nationalist forces. This may be merely a tribute to the patience of British commanders whose job is "to protect commerce on the high seas."

The feeling grows, though, that all this may soon change unless Chiang Kai-shek stops playing at war by sending his Formosan forces against unarmed ships.

Right now, relations between the British and U.S. navies could hardly be better and most senior officers in the Nationalist Chinese navy were trained in those cradles for British mariners at Greenwich and Dartmouth. But the clamor for positive action is rising here among British traders. Although local naval commanders are not infatuated with their countrymen ashore whose consciences can be so accommodating to the Communists, they may find it necessary to administer a reproof to Nationalist raiders in the shape of a well-placed shell or two.

### Divided Loyalties

This is certainly the hope of Communist officials on mainland China, who feel prospects have never been brighter for a lifting of the embargo against strategic goods from the West. An open clash between British forces, no matter how small, and the Nationalist Chinese would have tremendous repercussions on world opinion. Since all of Formosa's defence equipment comes from the U.S., every Nationalist attack on British and other Western shipping is another propaganda victory for the Communists. They would score even more heavily among 12,000,000 overseas Chinese if gunfire were exchanged between the Nationalists and the British since the world dramatize the extent to which Chiang Kai-shek has become an outcast.

These overseas Chinese have divided loyalties but their presence in unstable countries of Southeast Asia is of vital importance and their aid is of

Nationalist attack further effect of fo... tion on Formosa... against Communis... China coast. So... China is badly ser... rate roads and ra... ports opposite Formosa whi... main vital sources of supply. Chiang Kai-shek is defeating his own purpose by hitting defenceless ships running into these ports when his powerful forces could be employed against legitimate targets. Unfortunately his fleet is ill-equipped and limited by the U.S. Government to no more than 10,000 tons. The British navy has more powerful ships and more speed and maneuverability.

50056-A-40  
4 1 p

*An...  
file on 50056-A-40  
my*

*This is interesting and  
I have asked J.I.B. to  
check its veracity.  
my*

PRESS CLIPPING SERVICE *OR*  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

*OK for file*



File  
TLC

July 15, 1955.

50056-A-40	
65	✓

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. POPE AND FILE

Subject: Status of Formosa - File 50056-A

The question of the status of Formosa has arisen a number of times in the last few months and it has, of course, some bearing upon the various attempts that have been made to reach some modus vivendi in the Formosa Straits.

Canadian Attitude

2. The attitude of the Government has been set out in Mr. Pearson's statements in Parliament of January 28, March 24 and April 21, and more recently in an answer to a question submitted by Mrs. Tabouis by Mr. Pearson on May 13. In this reply to Mrs. Tabouis, Mr. Pearson said "The position of the Canadian Government is that Formosa's status is still indeterminate de jure, although it is now admittedly occupied de facto as the result of an international decision, by the Chinese Nationalist Government." The Legal Division has done memoranda of February 10, March 21 and April 26 on this subject which developed the legal basis for the attitude the Minister has taken.

United Kingdom Attitude

*Parliamentary* 3. ~~Parliamentary~~ The United Kingdom attitude is set out in a preliminary answer by Sir Anthony Eden of February 4 and in a note contained in telegram No. 110 of January 28 from Canada House. I believe that there is a further explanation of the United Kingdom attitude in one of the preparatory papers for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference at the beginning of February. This may be on file. The United Kingdom attitude is similar to our own, and indeed our legal views are based on the legal views of the Foreign Office.

United States Attitude

4. Although there may be an exposition of the United States attitude on file, in winding up work in the Division I have not had enough time to search the file to look for it. In an article by Thomas Hamilton in the New York Times of

April 17 there is an indication that the State Department might be willing to accept the British Foreign Office position. However, the governing factor in the United States attitude is the Mutual Defence Treaty with the Republic of China, and this treaty certainly makes more difficult the ultimate acceptance by the United States of the theory that Formosa is separable from China. This subject is developed in a memorandum by Benjamin C. Cohen which was distributed by the Democratic National Committee early in 1955 and was reproduced in the Congressional record of the Senate and the text of the memorandum is on file 50056-A.

#### French Position

5. Letter 622 of April 4 from Paris sets out the French view on the status of Formosa, which differs from the British view. The French legal experts feel that the British view cannot be sustained without some modifications. It should be mentioned also that such Asian countries as India have accepted the view of both Chinese factions that Formosa is part of China. Accordingly, in the United Nations General Assembly it is quite doubtful if there would be a general acceptance of the British legal view on the status of Formosa.

*Position in UN*  
6. This leads on to the question of the likely developments in the United Nations in the event of an attack by the Communists on Formosa. This subject was canvassed by the United Kingdom authorities in C.R.O. telegrams Nos. 412 and 467-470 in April, 1955. These telegrams are on File 50056-B. The subject was examined because the United States was at that time pressing the British for an indication of what they would be prepared to do about Formosa. The British, therefore, developed the line that in the event that the Nationalists withdrew from the coastal islands and that thereafter an attack took place on Formosa this matter would, of course, be raised in the United Nations. The British were confident that the General Assembly would find the attack to be a "breach of the peace" (Chapter VII of the Charter), and that a majority could be found for rallying the United Nations in support of resisting the attack (I do not have telegrams 412 and 467-470 before me, and this wording may not be quite exact).

3.

(i.e. after a Nationalist withdrawal from the islands).

7. It is quite likely that the subject of possible United Nations action in the event of an attack on Formosa may be revived should the Nationalists withdraw from the coastal islands. After such a withdrawal, consultations between the principal Western powers to consider possible United Nations action in the event of an attack on Formosa would be very likely. Our own attitude in this case would doubtless be that the Security Council or the General Assembly should pass a resolution calling on all parties to seek the resolution of their differences in the Formosa area by peaceful means. The purpose of such a resolution would be an attempt to gain the support of India and other Asian countries for the principle of peaceful solution, and thus to add to the deterrent to direct action by the Chinese Communists. However, the question of United Nations action in the event of an attack on Formosa might well arise again. In this case, it would be well to raise with the British authorities the question of the legal basis for any United Nations action. There are two possible legal bases. The first is that the Nationalist Government represents China in the United Nations, and hence an attack upon its territory brings into operation the Charter articles on an attack on a territory of United Nations members. The second argument is that the status of Formosa is, to use the expression of the British preliminary answer of February 55, "uncertain or undetermined". It is obviously in the interests of the international community that the determination of the status of Formosa should be effected by peaceful means, rather than by military ones. In other words, the Chinese Communists should seek to establish their title to this territory by negotiation, legal argument, etc., rather than by seizing it by force. As can be seen, these two arguments are to some extent incompatible; in other words, if Formosa is Chinese territory, then the second argument does not apply. If Formosa is not Chinese territory, but territory the status of which is uncertain and undetermined as we and the British argue, then an attack upon Formosa is not an attack on Chinese territory, but upon territory occupied by the Nationalist Government, and the issue might not be quite as clear in the United Nations as it would otherwise be. If the question of possible United Nations action in the event of an attack on Formosa arises, therefore, these legal aspects should be thoroughly gone into. It should be borne in mind particularly that a large number of United Nations members regard Formosa as Chinese territory and would regard an attack upon Formosa

Parliamentary

11

4.

by the Communists as a re-activation of the Chinese Civil War, and for these reasons might well be disposed to vote against any United Nations action. Unless, therefore, the legal aspect is thoroughly examined in advance, it may well be that the Foreign Office is quite optimistic in anticipating that the United Nations would find an attack upon Formosa to be a breach of the peace under Chapter VII of the Charter.

8. The purpose of these rather rambling comments is to set down a few impressions on this legal aspect which should help the officer concerned in case the question became active again. As one can see by the file, these questions were very active up until the latter part of April, when the statement by Chou En-lai at Bandung set in train new developments in the Formosa issue. Since then there have been no consultations or interchanges on the foregoing aspects of the Formosa issue.

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a stylized, cursive script that appears to be the initials 'RC' followed by a long, sweeping horizontal stroke.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

NUMBERED LETTER

*Handwritten signatures and initials*

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, Tokyo, Japan

Reference: Our Letter No. 448 of April 30, 1954.

Subject: Activities of the Formosan Democratic  
Independence Party

Security: UNCLASSIFIED

No: 770

Date: June 29, 1955

Enclosures: One (in duplicate)

Air or Surface Mail: AIR

Post File No: 210-3-1

Ottawa File No.	
50056-A-46	
91	91

*Mr. Carter*

References

*Mr. Neuzies -*  
*London -*  
*Wash -*  
*CPDUN -*  
*Tokyo*  
*Rainis -*  
*New Delhi -*  
*Oslo -*  
*Wellington -*  
*Canberra*  
*Done July 13/55/ST*

The Formosan Democratic Independence Party seems to be continuing its activities. Attached is a clipping from yesterday's The Mainichi containing a letter to the editor from the President, Thomas W. I. Liao, explaining the errors in both the Nationalist and the Communist Chinese view of Formosa. While the letter does not give the writer's address, we assume that it would still be the YMCA in Tokyo as in the case of the Party's petition forwarded with our letter under reference.

*Handwritten signature*

The Embassy.

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

*y*

# CANADIAN EMBASSY

TOKYO

Subject.....

Date.....

June 28, 1955

Publication.....

The Mainichi

## READERS' FORUM

### Formosans' Demand For Independence

To the Editor:

Sir:—Though the legal status of Formosa remains undecided, even at the conclusion of the Peace-treaty with Japan and its eventual separation from China, the Chinese have claimed the Island to be China's recovered territory and denied the native Formosans their right to self-determination and independence. To the Chiang Kai-shek regime, the country is too rich to be lost; to the Mao Tze-tung regime, it is a place where Moscow wants to spread the red curtains over the Western Pacific with Formosa as the first outpost. Bitter enemies as they are, they have advanced such implausible arguments against Formosan independence on the bases of racial affinity and historical contiguity, geographical proximity and economic interdependence.

**RACIALLY**, they maintain that because the native Formosans are Chinese in blood Formosa is inseparable from China. As a matter of fact, non-Chinese aborigines including the assimilated ones number almost one-tenth of the total population. As to the rest, though Chinese blood dominates, constant absorption of Dutch, Spanish, and Manchu elements in the remote past and of Japanese immigrants in the recent time through inter-marriage is indisputable. Thus, in both race-psychology and physical appearance the native Formosans have become as different from the Chinese as—if not more than—the Americans are from the English and the Brazilians from the Portuguese.

Even the same race can segregate into different nations just as several races often combine into one nation. To uphold any lofty idealism the Chinese might as well advocate the establishment of a world-federation since all nations and all peoples are traceable to the same ancestry. In view of common sense realism, they must discard their inverted form of aggressive expansionism and never revive any dream of colonial reconquest by denying the Formosans the right to self-determination. Nearly eight-million (minus the refugees) in population and next only to Japan throughout Asia in industrial development, Formosa houses a people of over 90 per cent literacy, well-regimented and law-abiding. Therefore, if the Formosans, possessed of all essential requirements for forming an independent nation, want complete independence, they have the right to struggle for it.

**HISTORICALLY**, Formosa was part of China in the past and must, therefore, become part of China at present and in the future, both Mao Tze-tung and Chiang Kai-shek argue. As a matter of truth, prior to the Dutch occupation of Formosa in 1624 the Chinese had neither claimed any suzerainty nor exercised any sovereignty over the country. Fol-

lowing the mass-influx of Ming patriots into the Island under the leadership of Koxinga and his successors, Formosa became a sovereign Kingdom from 1661 to 1683 when China formed the bulk of the new Manchu Empire.

Between China and Formosa there was constant feud war, and bloodshed. From 1683 to 1895 Formosa fell under Manchu conquest and from 1895 to 1945 under Japanese rule, during which period of history there occurred "one rebellion every five years and one disturbance every three years" in the continuous struggle for liberty and prosperity. In 1895 the Formosans even declared independence to defy the Manchu betrayal and resist the Japanese invasion. Thus, Formosa has never been a part of the Republic of China. If she is under no obligation to become part of China now, but, instead, wants complete independence, she has the right to such self-determination.

**GEOGRAPHICALLY**, they argue, Formosa being a small island lying close to the continental mainland of China, should not be separated from China but become part of it by force of nature. To be sure, from 80 to 200 miles in width ranges the Formosa Strait, which thus makes a natural national boundary comparable to the Pyrenees and the Rhine not to mention the Chinese Great Wall. Besides, it was not any Chinese expeditionary forces that crossed the Strait by themselves, effected a successful landing on the Formosan coast, and brought the Japanese garrisons to their knees, and thus recovered the lost territory across the border by military conquest; but U.S. men-of-war and planes that brought the first groups of Chinese take-over officials and occupation forces into the Island by diplomatic favor...

**ECONOMICALLY**, the Chinese assert not only the interdependence of China and Formosa but even the dependence of Formosa on China. On this ground, also, they deny the Formosan right to independence. In fact, the rehabilitation of Formosan industries and the reconstruction of the Formosan economic system is much too great a task for the Chinese to accomplish.

First of all, China is too poor to revive her own industries, not to mention Formosan industries. Formosa has more industrial plants than China minus Manchuria; the total length of modern highways in Formosa exceeds that in China.

Secondly, China has insufficient personnel for the task of reviving Formosan industries the more so because the take-over officials, corrupt and incompetent, jealous and arrogant, have failed to make use of native talent, while ignoring the fact that Formosa has as many doctors and engineers as the whole China has.

Thirdly, the agricultural products and industrial raw

materials, with rare exceptions, of China and Formosa fail to supplement each other but, instead, compete always and everywhere.

Finally, the economic and industrial systems of Formosa as regimented by the Japanese were so tightly tied with the Japanese systems that the efficient transfer of the linkage from Tokyo to Peking lies far beyond the technical and financial ability of the present-day Chinese administrators...

The Formosans now want to govern themselves and direct their own destiny. With their group-consciousness growing into Formosan Nationalism, neither Chinese-made nor Japanese-imported, the Formosan patriots now want complete independence through a plebiscite under neutral supervision in accordance with the principle and practice of self-determination and democracy, failing which recourse of military force will be the only alternative.

THOMAS W. I. LIAO,  
President, Formosan  
Democratic  
Independence Party

Referred to: Washington ✓  
London ✓  
New-Delhi ✓  
Tokyo ✓  
Moscow ✓  
Oslo ✓  
CPDUN ✓  
Mr. Carter ✓

Far Eastern Division/A.R.Menzies/MB

*Handwritten:* 50056-1-40  
3/65  
JWB

**CONFIDENTIAL**

May 27, 1955

*Handwritten:* file  
AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

50056-1-40  
65 ✓

Rumour regarding Chinese Communist Formula for Future Status of Formosa.

Harry Hussey, retired Canadian with independent means who has been closely associated with the Chinese Nationalist cause for a good many years, has brought back a rumour from Hong Kong about an alleged Chinese Communist formula for the future status of Formosa. This rumour, which he got in Hong Kong about a month ago, alleges that the Chinese Communists might put forward a proposal for the establishment of a Chinese Union patterned to some extent after the Soviet Union. They would hope to be able to re-incorporate Outer Mongolia (Mongolian People's Republic) by this device. And they would give a measure of nominal autonomy to Outer Mongolia, Tibet and Formosa. They would suggest that for a transitional period Formosa might be given practical independence provided it was legally recognized as part of the Chinese Union. The Chinese Communists would expect to get the Chinese seat in the United Nations and, in addition, would, in view of their total population of some 600,000,000 suggest that separate seats should be given to Outer Mongolia, Tibet and Formosa in the same way that separate seats have been given to the Ukraine and Byelo-Russia. It is alleged that the Chinese Communists might even be prepared to accept the continuation for a while of a certain amount of non-Communist political activity in Formosa and have this reflected in statements in the U. N. provided that the major powers accepted the general legal formula of the Chinese Union.

2. Mr. Hussey said that a proposal of this kind would, of course, be quite unacceptable to Chiang Kai-shek and some of his supporters. However, it was possible that other Chinese in Formosa might be prepared to make a face-saving agreement along these lines behind the Generalissimo's back. He suggested that this formula combined the advantages of a two Chinas approach while, at the same time, recognizing the unity of China.

He observed that the fortunes of the Nationalists were bound to continue to ebb in the coming years and that many Chinese in Formosa who were by nature a practical and compromising lot, would be disposed to accept some face-saving formula. He was inclined to think that such a formula might be worked out between the Chinese Communists and Nationalists regardless of outside views in the matter.

3. This formula is a rather ingenious one and we may hear more of it when Krishna Menon gives his report as it is along the lines of his thinking. At the same time, it should be added that a proposal of this type would be quite unacceptable to Chiang Kai-shek and the United States Government at this time.

JULES LÉGER

J. L.



May 13, 1955 50056-A-40  
65 ✓

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO MR. PEARSON BY MRS. GENEVIEVE TABOUIS  
OF L'INFORMATION

---

1. How do you relate the problem of Formosa to the United Nations Charter? Does Canada think that the problem of Formosa can be solved within the framework of the United Nations,

Unless the view is held that Formosa is legally and constitutionally already part of China, its final status could appropriately be worked out through the United Nations. Until this status is finally determined, an attack on that island could be an aggression within the meaning of the United Nations Charter, which would call for consideration by the United Nations. The difficulty, of course, is that there is a deep and decided division of opinion over these premises. Both Chinese Governments agree on one thing, if on nothing else, namely that the status of Formosa has already been determined and that the Island is a part of China. If that view is accepted (and it is certainly not universally accepted) then an attack on Formosa by the Chinese Communist Government is merely an incident in a Chinese civil war, and in that case it would be more difficult to bring the United Nations Charter into the problem as it would be argued that it was a matter of domestic jurisdiction.

The position of the Canadian Government is that

31.5.22 (os)

Formosa's status is still indeterminate de jure, though it is now admittedly occupied de facto, as a result of an international decision, by the Chinese Nationalist Government. We have also stated that the only obligation Canada has in respect of Formosa is that which would arise from our commitments under the United Nations Charter.

2. What is, in your view, the best way of approaching the German problem at the Four Power Conference in order to reach a long term solution?

It would be presumptuous for me to offer advice as to the best way of approaching the German problem at a conference which includes the four powers which are, apart from Germany itself, the most concerned with this problem. I do not see, however, how any long-term solution can be reached except on the basis of the unification of Germany with boundaries accepted by a government of a united Germany, and agreed to internationally. I also do not see how any such unification can be brought about until all parties concerned accept, without qualification, and as a matter of first priority, the necessity for free elections throughout East and West Germany so that a government for a united Germany can be democratically established. Only when this condition is agreed to by the four powers,

and I have no illusions about the difficulty in reaching such an agreement, could consideration be given to other conditions which might be acceptable to Germany and which might be put forward by one or other of the four powers as a requirement before a united Germany comes into being.

Far Eastern/T. Lem. Carter/wp

May 10, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE:

Status of Formosa

50056-A-40
65 ✓

In a speech in the Indian Parliament on February 25, Nehru gave the following Indian views on the status of Formosa. He said: "It is patent that we cannot recognize two Chinas. We have deliberately recognized one China because that was the real China. Obviously Formosa is not China. For hundreds of years Formosa has been a part of the Chinese State, except for a little less than half a century when the Japanese occupied it. China has always looked upon it as its own and claimed it."

"In Cairo and in Potsdam it was clearly stated that Formosa should go to China. Subsequently, it was also stated under the Japanese surrender terms. And - I speak from memory - in the San Francisco Treaty also some kind of reference was made to it. At no time has there been any doubt cast on the fact that Formosa is a part of the Chinese State. What has happened in the last year or two, or if you like three years, to change that position? I am not aware of anything, unless one says that one does not like the present Chinese State. Therefore, it follows logically for a country which recognises the present Government of China, that Formosa is a part of that State. At the present moment it is in possession of Marshal Chiang Kai-shek, supported by a great power. That is the fact as it exists today. What is to be done about it? Whatever is done, one should try to negotiate a settlement peacefully."

Far Eastern Division.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Subject *China - Formosa, etc*

N. Y. HERALD TRIBUNE

Date MAY 5 1955

Publication

# Trusteeship Arguments For Formosa Are Refuted

TO the N. Y. Herald Tribune: There is talk about putting Formosa under some sort of a trusteeship, as though the title to Formosa, the Pescadores and some small adjacent islands once held by Japan were a matter of doubt and were somewhere in dispute. It seems to be wholly forgotten that Secretary of State Dean Acheson forcefully and impatiently disposed of this question, when there was some mumbling about it more than five years ago.

Formosa and the Pescadores are the Chinese Province of Taiwan, an integral part of China, and the sovereignty over that province is vested in the de jure government of the Republic of China. So far as this country and a good many others are concerned, that is the government headed by President Chiang Kai-shek in Taipei. Let's look at the record.

On the morning of Jan. 5, 1950, President Harry Truman tore loose with a statement on China, saying that this country would do nothing whatever to support the government on Formosa. And, later that same day, Secretary Acheson called a press conference at which he denounced quibblers about China's sovereignty over Formosa. What he said applied to any recognized China; and since President Chiang's regime was then recognized as the legal government of all China, and still is, his remarks then served to declare American recognition of that government's sovereignty over Formosa.

The following are passages from his remarks at that press conference:

"In the midst of the war the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain and the President of China agreed at Cairo that among the areas stolen from China by Japan was Formosa, and that Formosa should go back to China. . . . That statement was incorporated in the declaration at Potsdam, and that declaration at Potsdam was conveyed to the Japanese as one of the terms of their surrender and was accepted by them, and the surrender was made on that basis.

Shortly after that the island of Formosa was turned over to the Chinese in accordance with the declarations made and with the conditions of the surrender. The Chinese have administered Formosa for four years. Neither the United States nor any other authority ever questioned that authority or that occupation. When Formosa was made a province of China nobody raised any doubts about it. It was regarded as an integral

part of China, and in accordance with the commitments "Now, in the opinion of some, the situation is changed. They want to say: 'Well, we have to wait for a treaty. We did not wait for a treaty on Korea. We did not wait for a treaty on the Kuriles. We did not wait for a treaty on the is-

lands over which we have trusteeship."

"Whatever may be the legal situation, the United States of America, as Mr. Truman said this morning, is not going to quibble on any lawyer's words about the integrity of our position. This is where we stand."

It will be noted that in the passages quoted above, Secretary Acheson, thinking of the gentry who had been quibbling about Formosa's status because it had not then been defined in a treaty (as the Soviet Union's title to southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands has not been confirmed to this day), used the phrase "whatever may be the legal situation." He wouldn't have to qualify his contemptuous comment on the quibblers in that way today.

In our peace treaty with Japan the return of Formosa to China was not mentioned because China was not a party to that treaty and because the orderly surrender of Formosa by the Japanese governor of Taiwan to the appointed Chinese governor was a long accomplished fact and was no longer any of this country's or any other country's business. But then the governments of Japan and China, both recognized as sovereign powers by the United States, negotiated their own peace treaty, signed on April 28, 1952, and ratified in Taipei, on Formosa, after its approval by both houses of the Japanese Diet in July, on Aug. 5, 1952.

The instruments of ratification exchanged on that occasion did not describe Dr. George K. C. Yeh as the agent of a fly-by-night outfit that happened to be roosting on Taiwan island, but as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, and when Mr. Yoshizawa, shortly thereafter arrived in Taipei as the first post-war Ambassador, his credentials were to the government of the Republic of China, as they are at this writing.

Now, in view of all the foregoing, one may ask how talkative quibblers in this country think that the United Nations, or the Colombo group, or any one else can be given authority to step between Japan and China and say: "Look here, we don't agree that you two had any right to make a deal trans-

*File 5005A B*  
*RZ*

60056-A 40

PRESS CLIPPING SERVICE  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
*O.L.*

*this is a good pt.*

*- not decisive - treaty see Cheng's govt as de jure govt of China not necessarily of Formosa*

from one to the other. You've got to denounce that transfer so that we can revise the status of this island." It would make just as much sense if the Dalai Lama were, at Mao Tse-tung's instigation, to step forward and say that he wasn't at all happy about the deals with Czarist Russia, Spain and Denmark through which the United States had acquired Alaska, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, and that he'd like to see a commission appointed at Bandung to assume a trusteeship over these properties.

HEP:LSA  
New York, May 3, 1955

File 50056A

FAR EASTERN DIVISION

SECRET

April 26, 1955

LEGAL DIVISION

Your memorandum of April 25, 1955

50056-A-40
65 ✓

Formosa and the Coastal Islands

The following are our views on the questions raised in your memorandum.

Possible attack by the Chinese Communists on the coastal islands

2. We agree with the United Kingdom that the coastal islands form part of the territory of the Chinese State. Because the Nationalists are in control of these islands and because of the differences in our recognition policies, an attack on these islands by the Communists must necessarily be regarded from different points of view although amounting in either case to civil war.
3. However, there seems to be no reason why we could not support the action proposed by the U.K. in such an eventuality (e.g. U.K. draft resolution in Telegram 468). For the United Kingdom the Communists are lawfully entitled, as the de jure government of China, to assert authority over the coastal islands; they are not, however, justified in resorting to force to establish their claims. For Canada, the Communists have no lawful claim, under existing circumstances, to assert authority over the coastal islands since we do not recognize them as the de jure government of China, and they are not, in any event, entitled to use force to assert their claim.
4. Consequently, we could support the United Kingdom in any move designed to bring such hostilities to an end and prevent any recurrence. It seems to us that the substance of any

resolution on this particular aspect would be unobjectionable from both the U.K. and Canadian viewpoints provided it is confined to seeking an end to hostilities and resort to peaceful methods in order to prevent a recurrence of such hostilities. Action on these lines avoids any direct reference to the legal right of either the Communists or the Nationalists to exercise authority over the coastal islands - it is on this point, in present circumstances, that we differ with the United Kingdom because of our recognition policies.

5. It should be appreciated that while there is no legal objection to our supporting a United Kingdom proposal on these lines we could, if necessary, go further than it is possible for the United Kingdom to go. Since the U.K. does not deny the legal claim of the Communists to these islands, it could not support action under Chapter VII of the Charter. The furthest the U.K. can go is to support action under Chapter VI of the Charter which is apparently what their draft resolution in Telegram 468 proposes. This resolution is framed so as to take advantage of Article 36 of the Charter which provides, in effect, that the Security Council may, at any stage of a "situation" the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment. This deliberately avoids terming the hostilities a "dispute". For Canada, these limitations are not present. Since we recognize the Nationalists as the de jure government of China and, like the U.K., consider the islands Chinese territory, an attack by the Communists would be similar to the attack on South Korea (the recognized authority) by forces from North Korea (an unrecognized authority). It would therefore be legally possible for us to support stronger action under the Charter than is possible for the United Kingdom. There is, however, no legal objection to our supporting the proposed United Kingdom action which is simply designed to bring hostilities to an end and prevent their recurrence.

Possible attack by the Chinese Communists  
on Formosa and the Pescadores

6. In the case of a Communist attack on Formosa and the Pescadores this would also be civil war. The significant difference for the United Kingdom in this situation is that whereas the

United Kingdom cannot deny the legal claim of the Chinese Communists to assert authority over the coastal islands, it does not recognize that the Communists have a valid claim to Formosa and the Pescadores, the status of these territories being uncertain or undetermined at the present time, and under the control of the Nationalists as the de facto administering authority. Consequently the United Kingdom could, if necessary, support action under Chapter VII of the Charter in this eventuality. This might result in a determination that a breach or threat of international peace had occurred and a decision as to measures to be taken to restore peace. Such action could also be supported by Canada. For us such an attack would represent hostilities by an unrecognized authority against an authority which we recognize as the lawful government of China and as the authority which we acknowledge to be in de facto control of Formosa and the Pescadores. The Communists have, at the present time, no legal claim to assert authority over these territories in our view.

#### Conclusions

7. You will note that in both situations the hostilities, in our opinion, would be civil war, from both the Canadian and United Kingdom viewpoints. It seems to us that this must be so as long as the single State, China, continues to exist judicially. So far as the Charter is concerned this appears to be no limitation on action under Chapter VII for although Kelsen maintains that in the case of civil war it is only appropriate for the Security Council to determine a threat to international peace (a "breach of the peace" in his view can be committed only by a State in relation to another State), the fact is that in the case of Korea the Security Council did determine that the attack constituted a breach of the peace (Resolution of June 25, 1950). This indicates that whether hostilities in the Formosan straits are regarded as civil war or not, the Security Council has a precedent for declaring that they amount to a "breach" of the peace (see Telegram 412). In any event, there is nothing to prevent the Council from finding that a "threat" to the peace exists, and Kelsen agrees that "Article 39 authorizes the Council to interfere by enforcement measures in a civil war", or take other appropriate measures (not necessarily enforcement measures).
8. We agree with your view that in the case of an attack on Formosa and the Pescadores the essential consideration for the United Kingdom is that these territories have an undetermined



legal status - consequently the Communists have no legal claim to assert authority over them and no right to determine their status by force. These basic considerations also apply for us. In the case of an attack on the coastal islands we agree with the U.K. that the islands are Chinese territory. The U.K. cannot deny the legal right of the Communists to assert authority over these islands but is fully entitled to oppose any attempt to take the islands by force. We can support the U.K. in any move opposing the use of hostilities by the Communists to take over these islands and, if need be, we could support stronger action because we do not recognize that the Communists have any legal claim to exercise authority over the islands.

9. For the above reasons it would appear open to us to accept the distinction made by the United Kingdom authorities between an attack on the coastal islands and an attack on Formosa and the Pescadores. A possible difficulty for us would occur in the event of a move to declare that an attack on the coastal islands constitutes a breach or threat of the peace calling for enforcement measures under Chapter VII. We might find it embarrassing not to support such action whereas, in the case of the U.K. any such move could be opposed by reason of their different attitude on recognition.

Legal Division.

Far Eastern/T. Le M. Carter/wp  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
MEMORANDUM

*7/50056A*

TO: .....LEGAL DIVISION.....  
.....  
FROM: .....FAR EASTERN DIVISION.....  
.....  
REFERENCE: .....  
.....  
SUBJECT: ..FORMOSA AND THE COASTAL ISLANDS.....

Security .....~~SECRET~~.....  
Date ...April 25, 1955.....

File No.		
50056 - A - 40		

I attach copies of C.R.O. telegrams 467 to 470 and a copy of the proposed Security Council Resolution on the New Zealand item on Formosa, the terms of which have been agreed upon between the United Kingdom, the United States and New Zealand, but which has not been tabled in the Security Council. We sent you over several days ago a previous C.R.O. telegram No. 412, together with a draft memorandum on the United Kingdom proposals.

2. Two legal questions arise from the United Kingdom proposals. They concern possible United Nations action arising out of (1) an attack on the coastal islands by the Chinese Communists, and (2) an attack on Formosa or the Pescadores by the Chinese Communists. In each case such an attack would constitute a renewal of the civil war and thus it can be argued that the ensuing fighting is a matter of domestic Chinese concern and not appropriate for action by the United Nations. The issue is complicated for the United Kingdom by their view of the present status of Formosa and the Pescadores. They maintain the legal sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores is uncertain or undetermined as Japan has renounced the title to these territories but the title has not been transferred to China. They further maintain that the Chinese Nationalist authorities are the de facto administering authorities. Despite our differences with the United Kingdom on the point of recognition, according to your memorandum of February 10 we concur in the United Kingdom view on the status of Formosa.

...2

3. In the United Kingdom view, accordingly an attack by the Chinese Communists upon the coastal islands constitutes a renewal of the civil war on territory that is undoubtedly Chinese. The United Kingdom, recognizing the Chinese Communist Government, would accordingly tend to maintain that the Nationalists have no right to occupy Chinese territory like the coastal islands, and that the United Kingdom could not, therefore, support a finding in the United Nations that attack by the Chinese Communists upon the coastal islands constituted aggression. Our attitude upon this point is slightly different. We would agree that the coastal islands are Chinese territory and that an attack upon them by the Chinese Communists constitutes renewal of the civil war, but as we recognize the Nationalists, we cannot have quite the same view as the United Kingdom as to the right of the Nationalist forces to retain the coastal islands. Nevertheless, we might well agree with the United Kingdom that we would be unlikely to support a contention that an attack by the Chinese Communists upon the islands constitutes aggression under the United Nations Charter.

4. The second hypothetical case is that of a possible attack on Formosa and the Pescadores by the Chinese Communists. This could also be construed as a renewal of the civil war, but this time on territory the status of which is uncertain or undetermined, but upon which the Nationalists are established as the de facto administering authority. It appears to be the United Kingdom view (from telegram No. 412) that owing to the peculiar status of the territory of Formosa and the Pescadores and the legitimate position of the Nationalists as administering authority, an attack upon Formosa or the Pescadores by the Chinese Communists would be legally different from an attack on the coastal islands and might be construed as aggression under the United Nations Charter. In other words, it appears to be the United Kingdom view that such an attack would be like an attack on the territory of an ordinary sovereign state. I should be obliged for your opinion as to whether, despite our differences on recognition, we might accept this apparent United Kingdom view.

5. As I have indicated, the United Kingdom authorities maintain that there is an important difference between the renewal of the civil war on the islands and the renewal of the civil war on Formosa, in that they cannot say that the former

3.

would constitute aggression, whereas the latter might do so. In the Canadian view, the Nationalist forces have, of course, just as much, if not more, right to be on the coastal islands (as we recognize the Nationalists as the government of China) as to occupy Formosa. However, there may be a distinction between re-opening the civil war on Chinese territory and re-opening the civil war on territory with an uncertain or undetermined status.

6. Accordingly, I should be glad to know if in your view we could accept the distinction made by the United Kingdom authorities between Chinese Communist attack on the coastal islands and Chinese Communist attack on Formosa and the Pescadores, despite our differing view on recognition.

Far Eastern Division.

cc-United Nations Division.

DESPATCH

UNCLASSIFIED

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Security:.....  
335

THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I:

No:.....  
April 22, 1955

FROM: .....  
MOSCOW

Date:.....

My Despatch No. 285 of April 7

Enclosures:.....

Reference:.....

Air or Surface Mail:.....

Canada in the Soviet Press

Subject:.....

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.

50056-A-40 Y

42

*12106-40  
"S"*

References

Mr. Attlee's comments on Far Eastern matters to a press conference in Winnipeg were reported in Pravda as follows:

"STATEMENT BY ATTLEE AT WINNIPEG PRESS CONFERENCE"

"According to a Reuters Agency report, Attlee, leader of the British Labour Party, speaking at a press conference in Winnipeg (Canada), criticized the policy of the USA with regard to the Chinese People's Republic. Concerning reports to the effect that Britain would allegedly participate in the "defence" of Taiwan (i.e. the occupation of Taiwan by American troops. - Ed.), Attlee stated that this "was not our undertaking, nor that even of the United Nations. This was purely a dangerous American undertaking".

"At the same time Attlee declared that it was possible to hold a "plebiscite" on Taiwan and that it was desirable "to neutralize" this territory, though it is well known that Taiwan is an inseparable part of the Chinese People's Republic and no one has the right to interfere in the internal affairs of the CPR."

Internal Circulation

J. M. CÔTE

Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Distribution to Posts

Subject China - Formosa, etc

N. Y. TIMES

Date APR 17 1955

Publication

File 6744  
50046744  
6

# U.N. RELUCTANT TO TRY AGAIN IN FORMOSA CASE

## Peiping's Refusal to Take a Part In Negotiations Has Killed Hope Of Reaching Agreement There

### DEBATE MIGHT BE HARMFUL

By THOMAS J. HAMILTON

Despite Adlai E. Stevenson's call for action, the United Nations is clearly in no mood to take on the Formosa problem again. More than two months have elapsed since the Security Council broke off its discussions to permit "traditional diplomacy" to have a try; although this method has been equally devoid of result, neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly has shown any signs of wanting to assume responsibility for an issue which, if not settled, might precipitate a third world war.

The basic reason is, of course, that the Chinese Communists rejected the Security Council's invitation to take part in the discussion. Obviously, the Chinese Communists would reject an invitation by the General Assembly. Yet it would clearly be unrealistic to expect a settlement in the United Nations or anywhere else, unless the Peiping Government took part.

Lester B. Pearson, the Canadian Minister of External Affairs, who is a stalwart champion of the United Nations, emphasized this point in his lecture at Princeton on Wednesday. Mr. Pearson noted that Communist China's participation had been found necessary to obtain settlement for Korea and Indochina; and he declared that if the United Nations was to deal with Formosa, "either the Communist Chinese must come to the United Nations, or the United Nations must go to them."

#### Varied Difficulties

Mr. Pearson's meaning was obvious, for the United Nations, as represented by its Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold, has already gone to Peiping. Since Mr. Hammarskjold's mission last January has not yet resulted in the release of the American airmen and other defenders of South Korea who are held in violation of the armistice, there is certainly no occasion for him to repeat his visit.

Apart from the unwillingness of the Communists to come to the United Nations, there are other difficulties. The Security Council can be counted out, except as a preliminary to presenting the question to the General Assembly, since the Soviet Union would veto in the Council any and all resolutions acceptable to the West.

There is no veto to stop action in the General Assembly, but Western delegates are an

prehensive about the results of an Assembly debate. With a few exceptions, notably among the Latin American delegates, the prevailing belief is that Quemoy and Matsu are simply part of China, and that the United Nations ought not to intervene in the matter of those unquenched sparks of the civil war.

Other difficulties would arise over the legal status of Formosa. Although the State Department seems ready to accept the British Foreign Office argument that the island of Formosa is not part of China, and that the United Nations, therefore, has jurisdiction, the one thing on which both the Nationalists and Communists of China agree is that Formosa does belong to China.

However, a General Assembly debate would not only bring demands from Asian and Arab spokesmen for evacuation of Quemoy and Matsu by the Nationalists, but would enable the Soviet bloc to accuse the United States and Britain of bad faith in failing to carry out their promise at Cairo that Formosa would be restored to China.

#### Tangled Precedent

And if the Western powers were able to make a convincing case with the argument that Formosa is simply unclaimed territory, which the United Nations has the duty to defend against an attempt to take it over by force, this would expose Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to an attack from another direction. For if Formosa is not Chinese territory, then the Nationalists are simply a government-in-exile and they no longer have the right to represent China in the United Nations.

It could be argued, of course, that the London Governments of Norway, the Netherlands and other countries invaded by the Nazis were likewise Governments-in-Exile and continued to be recognized by the Free World.

Nevertheless, the prestige of Peiping has greatly increased as a result of the Communist victory in Indochina. There would be a strong current in the General Assembly, in other words, against action on Formosa unless the United States were ready to agree to an arrangement under which, as a minimum, elections were held to determine whether or not Generalissimo Chiang should continue to govern the island.

United States influence in the Assembly is so strong, to be sure, that a resolution such as Mr. Stevenson suggested, which would oppose any attempt to change the status of Formosa by force, probably would get a majority. Abstentions by Asian and Arab and some Western European delegates, however, would reduce its effectiveness. It is hardly surprising that Secretary of State Dulles, once it became evident that Peiping would give no commitment not to attack Formosa, has addressed himself instead to obtaining a guarantee of Formosa outside the United Nations.

#### Dulles Program

Mr. Dulles remarked the other day that he would like to substitute a general Pacific defense agreement for the present series of defense agreements radiating from Washington, and it may be assumed that this time he hopes to have Formosa included. The recent United States-Nationalist treaty guaranteed Formosa and the Pescadores. However, this area was not specifically included in the Anzus treaty with Australia and New Zealand, or the separate treaties with the Philippines and Japan; and it was deliberately excluded from the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.

Mr. Dulles is running into the same difficulties with these negotiations that he would meet in the general Assembly: Britain and other prospective guarantors are insisting not only on a prior Nationalist commitment for the abandonment of Quemoy and Matsu, but on some change in the status of Formosa.

The Quemoy-Matsu issue is really one of timing, for Mr. Dulles and Mr. Stevenson apparently would agree on the abandonment of the islands after arrangements were made for the defense of Formosa.

These negotiations take time, and it may be assumed that, since United States negotiators have not been able to say that the Nationalists would give up Quemoy and Matsu, such a commitment has been refused by Generalissimo Chiang. Mr. Dulles is said on good authority to be confident that the Nation-

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
PRESS CLIPPING SERVICE

o.f.

6

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Subject.....

Date..... APR 17 1955

Publication.....

N. Y. TIMES

alists will agree to give them up  
in three or four months; but the  
Asian-African conference gets  
under way at Bandung tomor-  
row, and nobody can predict  
what the Communists will do  
after that.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

*File*  
*File 622*

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY,  
Paris, France.

Reference: .....

Subject: French view on the sovereignty  
of Formosa.

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: 622

Date: 4th April 1955

Enclosures: .....

Air or Surface Mail: .....

Post File No: .....

Ottawa File No.	
50056-A-40	
91	91

APR 13 1955

*M. Carter*

References

- Mr Holmes*
- Mr. [unclear]*
- Legal Div*
- London*
- Washington*
- UN Del*
- Tokyo*
- New Delhi*
- Cambodia*
- Oslo*

23

The question of who has the right of sovereignty over Formosa comes up from time to time in our conversations at the Quai d'Orsay. Recently the Officer on the Formosa desk referred to this subject by saying that it appeared to him that the only real point of divergence between French and Canadian views on Formosa was that the Canadians subscribed to the English thesis that sovereignty was in suspense pending the conclusion of the Peace Treaty with Japan, whereas the French did not believe in this argument.

On that occasion there was not an opportunity to investigate the French view thoroughly or to discuss its consequences. As presented to us the French seemed to be saying that, because of the Cairo declaration and the subsequent de facto delivery of Formosa into Nationalist Chinese hands, it was no longer possible for the Western allies to contend that Formosa was not Chinese territory. It would naturally follow from such an argument that, once the Communist regime is recognized as the Government of China, they would become entitled to claim the sovereignty of Formosa. The French have never suggested this as the termination of the Formosa problem, so we took an opportunity to raise the question with de MARGERIE. He carried the French view further. While stating at once that it was certainly not the French intention to call the United Kingdom argument into question publicly, he agreed entirely with the French legal experts that, in the face of recent events, the legal argument was not a good enough foundation for the case. He repeated that it was ridiculous for the allies to expect others to believe that they had not made up their minds to attach Formosa to Continental China at the time when Chiang Kai Shek was allowed to take over the administration of the island under conditions of violence which de Margerie described as "horrible". It was the French view, therefore, that it did not strengthen the allied position to rely on the legalistic argument that the sovereignty of Formosa was yet to be decided upon by the Peace Treaty with Japan.

3. On the other hand he did not think it necessary to accept, as a consequence of setting aside

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

London  
Washington



this argument, that sovereignty over Formosa would fall inevitably to the recognized Government of continental China, the Communist regime. He contended that the Communists, by their intervention in Korea and in Indo-China, had altered the situation in the East, and called for a re-examination of the question of the sovereignty of Formosa.

4. No doubt this line of argument is not new to you and it would seem to offer several advantages. It relates directly to the practical steps which have been taken in the area and thereby seems to gain strength. On the other hand, of course, the French line is inherently dangerous in that it admits that the allies were at one point decided that the sovereignty of Formosa should go to continental China. This would leave it open to the Chinese to argue that, once the Korean and Indo-Chinese situations have been settled, their record would be clear and Formosa should fall to them, and to argue otherwise would be to treat Formosa as a penalty for Chinese intervention in Korea and Indo-China.

5. As we interpret the French line, they are thinking that while the legal argument does seem to have some technical validity, allied action has made it clear that at one point Formosa was thought of as being linked to Continental China although this decision was never formalized in any treaty or agreement. The illegal action of Communist China in intervening in the war in Korea and in Indo-China has now given cause to re-open the question of the sovereignty of Formosa, on which the final seal had not been set.

6. We realize that the difference between the French and the United Kingdom cases is largely a matter of presentation because it remains clear that the French are not arguing that the sovereignty of Formosa should be transferred to the Communist Chinese in the present situation. Nevertheless their views might influence their attitude in an allied discussion of this subject, so we thought it might be worthwhile to report them to you. We are enclosing an additional copy of this despatch in the event that you should wish to send one to the Delegation in New York.

*Henry D. Davis*  
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

File 50056-42  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
MEMORANDUM  
also memo Feb 10

TO: FAR EASTERN DIVISION

Security S E C R E T

Date March 21, 1955

FROM: LEGAL DIVISION

File No.		
50056-A-40		
65		✓

REFERENCE: Your memorandum of March 9, 1955...  
(received March 17)

SUBJECT: Sovereignty over Formosa

We are grateful for an opportunity to comment on Letter No. 287 of March 3 from Tokyo. Our observations follow the order of events discussed by Mr. Davis.

- (a) The Cairo Declaration, irrespective of whether it contained binding legal obligations or a statement of intentions, did not bind Canada after its conclusion. In the House of Commons on March 13, 1944 Prime Minister Mackenzie King said that Canada was not bound by the Cairo decisions, adding "but obviously any conclusions relating to the conduct of the war reached by the representatives and heads of governments participating in these conferences (Cairo and Teheran) will carry very great authority with all members of the United Nations". The present view of the U.K. Government is that the Cairo Declaration "contained merely a statement of common purpose. Since it was made a lot of things have happened" (P.M. Churchill in the U.K. House of Commons on February 1, 1955.)
- (b) The Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, as noted by Mr. Davis, specified that the terms of the Cairo Declaration should be carried out. This again appears to be a statement of policy since it is a document of a similar nature to the Cairo Declaration.

. . . 2

(c) The Japanese Instrument of Surrender provided for the acceptance of the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration by Japan. Canada was a signatory. The question is whether by signing the Instrument we accepted the Potsdam and Cairo Declarations so far as they relate to Japan. A copy of a 1951 opinion given by Legal Division on this question is attached.

One might start with the assumption that if it had been possible to arrange a peace treaty at the time providing for the implementation of the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations in full, so far as they concerned Japan, we would have considered ourselves as precluded from raising any objection by virtue of our signature of the Surrender Instrument. Was this a legal obligation or a policy commitment?

In deciding whether Canada had thereby incurred any legal obligation, it is useful to refer to the interpretation of the United States which was, unlike Canada, a party to both the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations. Four days after the signing of the Surrender Instrument a carefully prepared message was sent to General MacArthur. It was drafted jointly by the State, War and Navy Departments and had been approved by the President. It read:

- " 1. The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State is subordinate to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied powers. You will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission. Our relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis, but on an unconditional surrender. Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any question on the part of the Japanese as to its scope.
2. Control of Japan shall be exercised through the Japanese Government to the extent that such an arrangement produces satisfactory results. You may enforce the orders issued by you by the employment of such measures as you deem necessary, including the use of force.

3. The statement of intentions contained in the Potsdam Declaration will be given full effect. It will not be given effect, however, because we consider ourselves bound in a contractual relationship with Japan as a result of that document. It will be respected and given effect because the Potsdam Declaration forms a part of our policy stated in good faith with relation to Japan and with relation to peace and security in the Far East. "

This indicates that at the time of the Surrender Instrument the United States regarded the Potsdam Declaration as a statement of intentions. It also implies that the United States did not consider itself as having become bound contractually with Japan to carry out the Potsdam terms as a result of the Surrender Instrument plus the Potsdam Declaration. On this latter point the United States interpretation would seem to be justified. The Instrument is a unilateral act by Japan - a surrender on certain terms, and not an instrument creating reciprocal rights and obligations.

If the United States, which was a party to Cairo and Potsdam, did not regard itself, after the Surrender, as under any legal obligation to carry out the Potsdam provisions there is far less justification for concluding that Canada assumed any legal obligations thereby. The question then is, did we, by signing the Surrender, make the Potsdam Declaration part of our policy, to be carried out in good faith, not as a matter of legal relationships? The only reasonable conclusion is that the carrying out of the Potsdam provisions by Japan was accepted Canadian policy at the time, as indicated in our signature of the Surrender Instrument. It was not, however, equivalent to the assumption of legal obligations.

(d) Mr. Eden's statement in the U.K. House of Commons on February 4, 1955 indicates that the administration of Formosa was taken over from the Japanese by Chinese forces in September 1945, at the

direction of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers and was ~~in the nature of a military occupation~~ pending further arrangements which did not, of itself, constitute the territory Chinese. It is clear that there was no actual vesting of sovereignty at the time; the de jure sovereignty remained vested in Japan until she renounced it in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952.

(e) Since de jure sovereignty remained with Japan until it was renounced in 1952, it is very doubtful if the Canadian Government could have taken any action in the years from 1945 to 1952 which would, in law, have amounted to de jure recognition. Any such action, it should be appreciated, would have been quite inconsistent with our participation in the Japanese Peace Treaty, which implied that Japan was, until the moment when the Treaty came into force, the legal sovereign.

It was, however, open to Canada during these years to recognize that the Republic of China was in de facto control of Formosa and the Pescadores and this is what appears to have happened.

In 1946 and again in 1947 financial agreements were entered into between the Minister of Finance, on behalf of the Canadian Government, and the Government of China. These agreements made no reference to the status of Formosa. In 1946 an Exchange of Notes was arranged to constitute a Commercial Modus Vivendi between Canada and China. Again there was no reference to Formosa. However in 1948 another Exchange of Notes took place extending the 1946 arrangements to Formosa. This followed a complaint from the Chinese Embassy that the Department of National Revenue of Canada was refusing to subject exports from Formosa to the 1946 Modus Vivendi provisions. The Legal Adviser concluded that China had de facto control over Formosa, but not de jure jurisdiction (see memo of February 23, 1948 on File 9030-A-40c). Order in Council P.C. 1400 of April 6, 1948, adopted following the Chinese representations,

provided that articles of Formosa origin should be considered, for the purposes of the 1946 *modus vivendi*, as articles grown, produced or manufactured in China. The Submission to Council, on which this Order in Council was based, specifically stated that "Canada recognises de facto that the administration of Formosa is a part of Chinese administration and that the jurisdiction of China, in passport matters, covers Formosa". The Exchange of ~~Notes of April 30 and May 25, 1948 confirmed these arrangements.~~ The Canadian Note did not make the intention of the Canadian Government clear viz. to recognize that Formosa was de facto, but not de jure, a part of China. However, there is no doubt concerning the intentions of the Canadian Government and this would be sufficient to rebut any implication that *de jure* recognition might have been intended. // // //

The correspondence in 1948 on this matter appears to be the clearest indication of our intentions regarding Chinese administration of Formosa. We have not been able to locate the Note referred to in para (e) of Mr. Davis' letter and would be grateful for your assistance in locating it. Standing alone, we do not believe that acceptance of this Note could be construed as *de jure* recognition, in the absence of any intention on the part of Canada to extend such recognition.

*Allen Smith*

Legal Division.

( C O P Y )

Legal/J.S.Nutt/hb  
File No. 50056-A-40

S E C R E T

March 13, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR AMERICAN AND FAR EASTERN DIVISION

Re: Formosa

I refer to my memorandum of February 19 concerning Formosa, and in particular paragraph 8, in which I stated that in my opinion Canada had accepted the Potsdam Proclamation by signing the Japanese Surrender which provided for carrying out the provisions of Potsdam. By signing the Surrender, however, there was not necessarily any implication of an acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation except insofar as that Proclamation relates to Japan, and in the interests of precision that should have been stated in paragraph 8.

--- You will see from the attached copy of the Japanese Surrender that Canada joined with China, and others of the Allies, in accepting the Japanese surrender, whereby Japan accepted the provisions of the Potsdam Proclamation and undertook to carry out its provisions. Thus in effect Canada has said to China, "We agree that Japan should carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Proclamation insofar as they relate to Japan and one of those provisions is that Formosa shall be returned to you".

"J. P. Erichsen-Brown"

Legal Division

RESTRICTED

File No.:

50056-A/6  
911

MATERIAL RELATING TO MR. DULLES' VISIT TO OTTAWA, MARCH, 1955  
FROM MR. DULLES PRESS CONFERENCE, MARCH 18, 1955

Q. Mr. Dulles, I wanted to revert to the Formosa question. According to the account of your last press conference in Washington, you said that if the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese communists agree not to use force this would not necessarily mean they would have to abandon their sovereignty claim. I wonder if you could just express this better and if it represents a new statement?

A. I figure it represents the same point of view which we have held and which has been generally accepted in relation to the other countries which are divided. Korea is divided, and there are some on both sides who want to use force to determine the outcome. The United States has worked very hard to bring about an armistice and use its influence in favor of a renouncement of force as a means of settling that matter. However, we do not ever dispute the contention of the Government of the Republic of Korea, which the United Nations found to be the only lawful government in Korea, to claim the right to govern all of Korea.

In the case of Germany, the Federal Republic claim the right to unite the Germans and to be the only lawful government qualified to speak for Germans in general. However, Chancellor Adenauer has said that they will not use force to bring about that unification, but that he believes it can be brought about -- I believe it can be brought about by peaceful processes of negotiation once the strength of the West is made clear.

In the case of Vietnam, it is divided. It is agreed force should not be used to bring about unification to settle what might otherwise be regarded as a civil war. ~~There has been no announcement of the Government of Vietnam or any Government of the Viet Minh up North to renounce their claims to have a united country which they will govern.~~

Q. I ~~am interested in the right~~ of the Chinese communists to maintain their claim on ~~Formosa~~

A. Yes



CONFIDENTIAL

File No.:

50056 A 1/6

MATERIAL RELATING TO MR. DULLES' VISIT TO OTTAWA, MARCH, 1955

FROM THE SUMMARY OF THE ~~CLOSED MEETING~~ FOR MEMBERS OF  
PARLIAMENT UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE  
ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS IN HONOUR OF MR. DULLES, MARCH 17, 1955.

\*\*\*

Question: Will the defense of the off-shore islands be possible without attacking the Chinese mainland?

Answer: The Secretary replied that a defense of the off-shore islands probably would require knocking out the batteries on the mainland which were in a position to pour direct fire on the islands.

\*\*\*

Question: Did not the Cairo conference decide that Formosa go to China?

Answer: The Secretary replied that the Cairo conference, at which the Soviet Union was not represented as stated by the questioner, had agreed that Formosa should go to Chiang Kai-shek's China. He added that ~~in principle this agreement had never been implemented and that the legal status of Formosa had not been determined. The Secretary referred to the contributions of the United States to victory in the Pacific War and that the United States did not fight the war to turn Formosa over to the Chinese.~~

#### QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Question: The Secretary was asked to comment on the fact that many Canadians although sympathetic to the defense of Formosa were not sympathetic to the defense of the coastal islands.

Answer: The Secretary referred to his previous remarks, expanded on them and said that depending on circumstances the defense of the coastal islands might be essential to the defense of Formosa with which the questioner was in sympathy.

\*\*\*

Far Eastern/T. LeM. Carter/wp

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(DUPLICATE)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: The Canadian Embassy, Japan

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference: Your letter No. 287, March 3

Subject: ~~Sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores~~

*J. L. ...*  
CONFIDENTIAL  
*50056-A*  
Date: ~~March, 1955~~

Security: .....

No: .....

Date: .....

Enclosures: .....

Air or Surface Mail: AIR .....

Post File No: .....

Ottawa File No.	
50056-A-40	
65	✓

References

I should like to thank you for the views on the ~~status of Formosa~~ which are set out in your letter number 287. We are taking up this question again with the Legal Division and will send you later a considered reply to your comments.

A. R. Menzies

*for the* Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

50056-A-40  
65

February 28, 1955.

ANSWER BY THE HONOURABLE L.B. PEARSON IN REPLY TO A QUESTION  
BY MR. ALISTAIR STEWART, M.P., HOUSE OF COMMONS

file  
SP

The answer to this question is complicated and made more difficult by differences over the ~~present legal status~~ of ~~Formosa~~. Both the Chinese Nationalist Government and the Chinese Communist Government agree - it is about the only thing on which they do agree - that ~~Formosa is legally part of China~~. Therefore, both Governments could argue that a conflict between them over its possession is a domestic rather than an international dispute. Other Governments feel, however, that the ~~status of Formosa, has not yet been finally and legally determined,~~ and that the ~~Chinese Nationalist Government is,~~ at the present time, ~~merely occupying and administering the island by a mandate~~ given to it by the victorious allies after the war with Japan.

Until this question of status is cleared up, it would not be easy to agree that an aggression, within the meaning of the United Nations Charter, had been committed ...

~~against Formosa by an attack by Chinese forces from the mainland.~~

It should not be forgotten, however, that the United Nations has also authority to consider the existence of any threat to the peace or breach of the peace, and to make recommendations under Chapter VII of the Charter or under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution of the General Assembly.

The Canadian Government has a commitment when such threat to the peace or breach of the peace has been submitted to it at the United Nations to join in considering what recommendations, if any, should be made. We have also a commitment to give serious consideration as to how recommendations which have been approved under Chapter VII of the Charter can be implemented.

Legal Division

SECRET

23 February, 1955.

Far Eastern Division

50056-A-60

Formosa

I should like to thank you very much for your memorandum of February 10th about the status of ~~Formosa~~. I think that this is a very good summary of the position. I should, however, like to make several comments and you might want to prepare a second edition of your memorandum, bearing these in mind.

2. The Minister referred to the ~~status of Formosa~~ in the House of Commons on April 1st, 1952. He said, "Of course we cannot overlook the fact I have just mentioned that ~~legally Formosa is part of China~~. Both Chinese Governments insist on that." On June 20th, 1952, he made a slightly different statement in the House as follows: "If I remember correctly, I said we ~~recognized Formosa as being under the jurisdiction of Chiang Kai-shek and, as such, part of China~~. It is ~~de facto~~ part of China." I think these statements might be included in the memorandum.

3. There is a moral aspect, if one might call it so, of the question which you do not touch upon. Perhaps it is outside the ~~purview of a legal memorandum~~. The point is that ~~the Chinese do think of Formosa as part of China~~ and that the ~~Formosans~~ are themselves Chinese people, speaking Chinese. If an attempt is made to create a ~~separate state~~, many Chinese might feel that legal deviations were being used to separate the territory from China.

4. In a former legal memorandum, written I believe in 1950 by ~~M. N. W.~~, it was maintained that Canada's signature on the peace treaty was in some sense an acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. You might care to consider this point.

5. I think with respect to the final point you make concerning the ~~competent authority~~ ~~of sovereignty~~ over Formosa, it can be argued that Article 23 of the ~~peace treaty with Japan supports the claim of the~~ ~~Allies~~ ~~competent authority~~. I would question, moreover, whether it would be reasonable to consider the United Nations as the proper representative of the international community in this question, in view of the fact that Communist China is not represented there.

Far Eastern Division.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

~~Legal 7/5 (February)~~  
JOP  
Date: February 16, 1955

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA.  
FROM: THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, LONDON.

Security... UNCLASSIFIED  
Date... February 16, 1955  
Air or Surface... Air  
No. of enclosures... 1

The documents described below are for your information.

Despatching Authority... B.M. MEAGHER/BP 20

50056-1-15  
9/1/97

Copies	Description	Also referred to:
1	Correspondence in <u>The Times</u> of February 9 on the legal status of Formosa.  7	Mlata file 65 JOP

## INSTRUCTIONS

1. This form may be used in sending material for informational purposes from the Department to posts abroad and vice versa.
2. This form should *NOT* be used to cover documents requiring action.
3. The name of the person responsible for authorizing the despatch of the material should be shown opposite the words "Despatching Authority". This may be done by signature, name stamp or by any other suitable means.
4. The form should bear the security classification of the material it covers.
5. The column for "Copies" should indicate the number of copies of each document transmitted. The space for "No. of Enclosures" should show the total number of copies of all documents covered by the transmittal slip. This will facilitate checking on despatch and receipt of mail.

1955 FEB 21 PM 2:32



THE TIMES,  
February 9, 1955.

# THE CHINESE ON FORMOSA

## ORIGINS OF NEW STATES

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

Sir.—Cynics have said that respectable authority can be cited for almost any proposition in international law, and I have no intention of rushing into the controversy which has been raging in your columns on the status of Formosa.

It might, however, be helpful to those unfamiliar with the dialectics of this subject to point out that there is nothing at all revolutionary or even unorthodox in Mr. [redacted]'s conception of two separate States created by the political dismemberment of a single International Person. That is, in fact, generally accepted by jurists as an essential basis for the succession to international obligations, as explained clearly by Sir Thomas Holland in one of his famous lectures, given at Oxford between 1875 and 1910 and published in 1933. "Derivative commencement of a State," he says, "may take place . . . (b) by the separation into several of a State previously single," and he goes on to give as examples the Declaration of Independence, the secession of the South American colonies from Spain, and the recognition of Texas as a new State (p. 91, &c.).

All these were of course cases where only the standing of the new or seceding State was in question, and no one could doubt the survival of the original or parent State. In the present case, however, it seems to be assumed by some people, for reasons I have never been able to gather, that the Chiang

It is therefore interesting to see how this aspect of the matter is treated by Holland. He points out that mere disappearance of a State does not mean the disappearance of a State, the question being whether a sufficient part of the territory, with the capital and government, remains. . . . Judging by this test, with some seven millions of people supporting the régime in a clearly defined geographical area, it is quite impossible to accept its disappearance as a legal *fait accompli*, and the irresponsibility of the talk about "liquidating Chiang" becomes apparent.

One more quotation from Holland seems in point, when he says in this same connexion: "Diplomacy must accept the facts of history" (p. 93). It is surely not much good arguing about the legal effect of what was said or thought in 1945, when [redacted] have so completely altered the position. The existence of two distinct entities of Government, each claiming with apparent justification to represent China, can certainly not have been in the contemplation of the parties to any agreement at that time.

The very fact that world opinion now appears to recognize, even in Russia, that a hot war over Formosa is something which can and must be prevented suggests that we are at least approaching the time when it is a question no longer of civil war but of a dispute between two rival States—whether spelt with capital letters or not—who must somehow be persuaded to "agree to differ," just as in the case of any other two whose differences may endanger world peace.

Yours faithfully,

House of Commons

Sir.—Dr. Schwarzenberger, in his interesting letter in your issue of February 2, omits one vital but all-important fact, a fact which attacks and destroys the foundation of his argument, *i.e.* that China had ceded Formosa to Japan by the Treaty of Shimonoseki. On December 8, 1941, China formally proclaimed itself in a state of war with Japan. At the same time it solemnly declared the abrogation of all treaties, including the Treaty of Shimonoseki, between China and Japan. . . .

The Cairo Declaration was a recognition of this, for otherwise it would be difficult to find a legal—as apart from a moral—justification of the term "stolen territories." The Republic of China, after the occupation of Formosa on October 25, 1945, completed this process of reversion to the sovereignty of the Chinese Government, of China over what had been until ceded to Japan, a Chinese prefecture since 1684, and a province of China since the nineteenth century. . . .

Yours faithfully,

Paris, Shanghai, . . .

not true  
see  
Aide  
Memoire  
US  
EMB  
Tokyo  
Ros  
EMB  
Tokyo

JP 50056-A 1/6  
9/1 9/1

FE.26/93/1  
CONFIDENTIAL

25 FEB 1955  
COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE,  
DOWNING STREET.

15th February, 1955.

Dear Stan,

You will perhaps have seen the statement by the Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons on 4th February on the ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ situation (Cols. 159 - 160 of Hansard).

You may now like to have the enclosed copy of a slightly expanded version of that statement entitled "~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ aspects of the Formosa situation" dated 7th February. Copies of the note are enclosed for transmission, at your discretion, to Commonwealth authorities.

I am sending copies of the note, also for transmission at their discretion to Commonwealth authorities, to Reddaway, MacLehose, Mills, Whitwell, Bruce and Adair.

Yours sincerely,  
21 11:51

(G.D. Anderson)

S.J.G. FINGLAND, ESQ.,  
CANBERRA.

SECRET  
CONFIDENTIAL

(CONFIDENTIAL)

1955 FEB 24 PM 4:27

... ..  
... ..  
... ..  
... ..

... ..  
... ..  
... ..  
... ..


... ..  
... ..  
... ..  
... ..

... ..

... ..

SECRET  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



JURIDICAL ASPECTS OF THE FORMOSA SITUATION

Formosa and the Pescadores

1. Formosa and the Pescadores were ceded to Japan by China in the Peace Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895. The validity of this cession can hardly be contested. The Cairo Declaration of December, 1943, with its reference to Formosa as one of the territories which Japan had "stolen from the Chinese" was a retrospective moral condemnation of an international transaction which, at the time and long afterwards, was never questioned as being in any way contrary to international law.

2. In the Cairo Declaration, the Allies stated that it was their purpose "that all the territories which Japan has stolen from China, such as . . . . Formosa and the Pescadores shall be restored to the Republic of China . . . .". This declaration was simply a statement of intention that Formosa should be retroceded to China after the war. ~~It was never retroceded~~ because of the difficulties arising from the existence of two entities claiming to represent China and the differences among the Powers as to the status of these two entities. The Potsdam Declaration of July, 1945, laid down as one of the conditions for the Japanese Peace Treaty that the terms of the Cairo Declaration should be carried out. In September, 1945, the administration of Formosa was taken over from the Japanese by Chinese forces pursuant to the Japanese Instrument of Surrender and General Order No. 1 issued by the Japanese Government at the direction of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, dated September 2, 1945. ~~This was not a change of sovereignty~~. The ~~arrangements made with China~~ put ~~the territory under~~ military occupancy, responsible to the whole body of the Allies, pending a peace treaty with Japan or, if the status of Formosa was not finally settled by that treaty (which it was not), the pending an eventual settlement about Formosa which has not yet taken place. The arrangements did not of themselves constitute the territory Chinese. In the Japanese Peace Treaty of April, 1952, Japan formally renounced all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores, but again this did not operate as a transfer to Chinese sovereignty, whether to the Chinese People's Republic or to the Chinese Nationalist authorities. ~~The Japanese Peace Treaty meant that the title to the territory, other than the Japanese, was transferred to the Chinese.~~ This seems doubtful. The Peace Treaty merely removed Japan's title without making any alterations in the existing arrangements for its administration.

3. Formosa and the Pescadores are, therefore, in the view of the United Kingdom Government, territory the de jure sovereignty over which is uncertain or undetermined. In the meantime the United Kingdom Government do in practice recognise the Chinese Nationalists as the ~~de facto government of Formosa~~; but they do not regard Formosa, whether as part of China or on any other basis, since they do not regard Formosa, as such, as constituting a separate State.

4. The logical corollary of our view as to the basis on which the Chinese Nationalists occupy Formosa is that although they are entitled to be in Formosa, they exercise a ~~limited authority~~ there. As we do not recognise the Nationalists as the Government of China, they are ~~not~~, in our view, ~~entitled to use Formosa for~~

/trying

~~trying to get back into the mainland of China. The ~~implications~~~~  
in respect of ~~Formosa~~ are, or should be, strictly confined to  
administering ~~Formosa~~ and not using it as a base for  
outside activities.

5. On the future of Formosa, Mr. Morrison when Foreign Secretary in the late Labour Government, took the line in the House of Commons on May 11, 1951, that it had now become "an international problem in which a number of nations apart from those signatory to the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations are closely concerned" and which could usefully be considered by the United Nations at the appropriate time. The Prime Minister said in the House of Commons on February 1 of this year that "the ~~problem of Formosa~~ ~~had~~ become an international problem in which a number of other nations are closely concerned".

#### The Coastal Islands

6. The Nationalist-held islands in close proximity to the China coast are in a ~~different category~~ from Formosa and the Pescadores, ~~since they are undoubtedly Chinese territory~~ and therefore, in our view, part of the territory over which the People's Republic of China is entitled to exercise authority. Any attempt by the Government of the People's Republic of China, however, actually to assert its authority over these islands by force would, in the circumstances peculiar to the case, give rise to a situation endangering peace and security, which is properly a matter of international concern.

7th February, 1955.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
MEMORANDUM

*file 144*

TO: FAR EASTERN DIVISION

Security **S E C R E T**

FROM: LEGAL DIVISION

Date **February 10, 1955**

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum of February 4, 1955

File No.		
50056-A-40		
131	-	7

SUBJECT: Status of Formosa and the Pescadores

--- As requested, I am attaching a memorandum giving our views on the status of Formosa and the Pescadores.

*Statements that Formosa is part of China*

*J. O. Parry*  
Legal Division.

*Moral aspect  
Former paper 1950  
Candell's sig. of peace  
Treaty constituting special  
acceptance of Potsdam*

~~Article 23 could be used to argue that Allied has a superior claim to title~~

c.c. Mr. Wershof  
Mr. Holmes

STATUS OF FORMOSA AND THE PESCADORES

(a) China ceded Formosa and the Pescadores to Japan in the Shimonoseki Treaty of 1895 following a war between these two states (1). This appears to have been a valid cession, vesting sovereignty over these territories in Japan. In reference to the validity of this treaty, Professor Schwarzenberger comments, in a letter printed in The Times, February 2, 1955: "The joint communique which was issued at the Cairo Conference (December 1, 1943) and referred to Formosa as one of the territories which Japan had 'stolen from the Chinese' and which were to be restored to China was a retrospective moral condemnation of an international transaction which, at the time and long afterwards, was never questioned as being in any way contrary to international law."

(b) The Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, subscribed to by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Churchill, states the purpose of "the three great Allies" that "Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War since 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China".

In form this Declaration, which was issued as a joint communique, is a statement of common aims and intentions. In the U.K. House of Commons on February 1, 1955, Prime Minister Churchill, in an oral answer to a question as to what extent the declaration remained the policy of the U.K. Government, explained: "It contained merely a statement of common purpose. Since it was made a lot of things have happened." Three days later a written reply by the Foreign Secretary, in response to a further question, stated: "This declaration was a statement of intention that Formosa should be retroceded to China after the war. ~~This retrocession has in fact never taken place,~~ because of the difficulties arising from the existence of two entities claiming to represent China, and the differences among the

Powers as to the status of these entities". On the basis of these explanations one may conclude that the Cairo Declaration was in the nature of a statement of policy rather than an instrument intended to lay down legal rights and obligations. It did not create binding legal obligations comparable to a treaty relationship. Further, the commitments could only have effect as among the three Powers concerned.

(c) The Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, laid down as one of the conditions of peace with Japan that the terms of the Cairo Declaration should be carried out. This Declaration, concluded between the same three parties, i.e. China, the United States and the United Kingdom, stated in part: "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we determine." On entering the war against Japan, the Soviet Union associated itself with this declaration. In relation to Japan this inter-allied understanding became binding by Japanese acceptance of the Potsdam proclamation in the Unconditional Surrender of September 1, 1945 (2). ~~The Potsdam Declaration, like the Cairo Declaration, would appear to be a statement of policy, not a binding legal agreement.~~

(d) On October 25, 1945, as a result of an order issued on the basis of consultation and agreement between the allied powers concerned, ~~the Japanese forces in Formosa surrendered to General Chiang Kai-shek and, with the consent of the Supreme Allied Commander in the Far East, the administration of Formosa was undertaken by the Government of the Republic of China.~~ Until the Treaty of Peace with Japan, nothing further appears to have occurred that could affect the legal position of Formosa and the Pescadores. The situation after Potsdam was that China, the United States, the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. had undertaken commitments and Japan was under an obligation to recognize whatever steps might be taken pursuant to the Declaration. However, nothing had been done to formally divest Japan of sovereignty and the ~~U.S. Foreign Office could therefore state, in reply to a question published by the Times on August 10, 1950, that Formosa was not a part of Japan (3).~~



On the other hand, Mr. Acheson expressed the view that "the island of Formosa should be regarded as part of the territory of China. It was not necessary to wait for a peace treaty before handing Formosa to China . . . Whatever sort of China was recognized Formosa should be regarded as part of it" (4).

The present United Kingdom interpretation of the position prior to the Japanese Peace Treaty is as follows:

"The Potsdam Declaration of July, 1945 laid down as one of the conditions for the Japanese peace that the terms of the Cairo Declaration should be carried out. In September, 1945, the administration of Formosa was taken over from the Japanese by Chinese forces at the direction of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, but this was not a cession, nor did it in itself involve any change of sovereignty. The arrangements made with Chiang Kai-shek put him there on a basis of military occupation pending further arrangements, and did not of themselves constitute the territory Chinese" (5).

(e) By Article 2 (b) of the Treaty of Peace signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951, Japan renounced "all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores". Nothing could be more explicit; Japanese sovereignty was completely divested. There was, however, no intention in the Peace Treaty to make a final settlement of the Formosan problem (6). As Mr. K. C. Younger, Delegate of the United Kingdom, explained to the San Francisco Conference:

"The treaty also provides for Japan to renounce its sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores Islands. ~~The treaty itself does not determine the future of these islands.~~ The future of Formosa was referred to in the Cairo Declaration but that Declaration also contained provisions in respect to Korea, together with the basic principles of non-aggression and no territorial ambitions. Until China shows by her action that she accepts those provisions and principles, it will be difficult to reach a final settlement of the problem of Formosa. In due course a solution must be found, in accordance with the

purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In the meantime, however, it would be wrong to postpone making peace with Japan. We therefore came to the conclusion that the proper treatment of Formosa in the context of the Japanese peace treaty was for the treaty to provide only for renunciation of Japanese sovereignty." (7)

Mr. Dulles expressed similar views at San Francisco (8).

CONCLUSIONS:

Status:

At the present time, ~~de jure sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores has not vested in any state.~~ Japan, which was the sovereign until the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into force, has renounced all right and title to these territories but this renunciation was not in favour of any state. Consequently Mr. Eden's statement, that Formosa and the Pescadores are "territory the de jure sovereignty over which is uncertain and undetermined" appears to be the only correct view. We do not think these territories are res nullius because ~~there is a governmental authority in control.~~ The Foreign Office brief for the Prime Ministers' meeting appears to confirm this point. ~~What is the status of Chiang Kai-shek's occupation? He is there on a basis of military occupation.~~ The United Kingdom Government (who recognize the Central People's Government as the de jure and de facto government of the Republic of China) acknowledge the Nationalists to be "the administering authority on a de facto basis". This is consistent with the conclusion that ~~de jure sovereignty over these territories was never vested in the state, China, and is in abeyance.~~ Moreover, the strictly limited recognition of the Nationalists as the administering authority cannot prejudice the final disposition of these territories ~~because the Nationalist Government acting alone and unilaterally has no right to determine their status unilaterally.~~

Where does Canada stand? We recognize the Nationalists as the de jure government of the Republic of China. This does not mean that we acknowledge that Government to be the de jure sovereign of Formosa and the Pescadores. If the above analysis is correct, ~~and the "China" has a valid claim~~ to these territories because nothing was done to ~~lose~~ the title renounced by Japan. Consequently, the position would seem to be that while we still recognize the Nationalist Government as the de jure government of the Republic of China, we do not concede them to be anything more than the de facto authority in control, so far as Formosa and the Pescadores are concerned. In view of our participation in the Japanese Peace Treaty we can hardly take any other position, because that treaty clearly did not determine the future of these islands. Since no agreement has been concluded between the Nationalist Government of China and ourselves which could be construed as recognition of their de jure claim to Formosa and the Pescadores, our position is not prejudiced in this respect, it seems to us. The dangers of any such formal recognition of these islands as "territories of the Republic of China" are indicated by Mr. B. V. Cohen's memorandum on the proposed Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and Nationalist China.

Disposition:

Perhaps the most difficult question to answer is: ~~who is competent to dispose of sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores?~~

In the opinion of Professor Schwarzenberger the States who were parties to the Peace Treaty, other than Japan, are at present exercising in law a condominium over Formosa and "are free agents worldwide collectively on the future of this territory outside the United Nations or, with the consent of the latter, to transfer their condominium to the United Nations" (letter in The Times, February 24, 1955). In his view, Chiang Kai-shek is exercising a ~~de facto authority~~ in Formosa on behalf of those parties to the Peace Treaty who recognize his Government either as that of China or at least in relation to Formosa. These

conclusions have been challenged by [redacted] who contends that there is nothing in the Peace Treaty to support these conclusions and adds, "even if there were, I do not see how it could be binding either on the Soviet Union or upon any Chinese authority, since China was not invited to San Francisco at all and the Soviet Union did not sign the treaty". He concludes:

"It is, therefore, incorrect to suggest that the States who signed the San Francisco Treaty are legally free agents to decide collectively on the future of this territory', though as a matter of military power they may be able to do this, just as the Russians may be able to decide on the future of the Kurile Islands." (letter in The Times, February 4, 1955)

In our opinion, Mr. Younger is probably correct. In the Peace Treaty there is ~~no express renunciation~~ by Japan in favour of the other parties; there is simply ~~abandonment of sovereignty~~. None of the recent U.K. Government statements lends support to the view that there was a ~~vesting in favour of the States which participated in the treaty with Japan.~~

?  
No one else  
benefit by treaty.

If the intentions of the Potsdam and Cairo Declarations are to be carried out, Formosa and the Pescadores should be restored to the "Republic of China". At the present time it is very doubtful if these instruments can be regarded as anything more than statements of policy, whose present validity is questionable because of changed circumstances.

If the power to dispose of Formosa and the Pescadores cannot be clearly shown to rest with the States who were co-parties with Japan in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, it is doubtful whether it would rest any more logically with the allied nations who jointly waged the war against Japan. On the whole it would seem preferable to argue that the world community of States can alone determine the future of these territories -- this would naturally suggest a collective agreement reached through the United Nations and one in which the ~~interests of the inhabitants should be taken into account.~~

? of Com. China  
not being a member.

One other possibility should be noted -- if the Nationalist Government should continue to occupy Formosa and the Pescadores and maintain control over many years, it is likely that in time a conviction would arise that this state of things was in accordance with international order and therefore lawful. This process of legitimization could only become effective after a long period of undisturbed control.



REFERENCES:

- (1) "China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territories - - -
  - (b) The Island of Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said Island of Formosa.
  - (c) The Pescadores Group, that is to say, all islands lying between the 119th and 120th degrees of longitude east of Greenwich and the 23rd and 24th degrees of north latitude."

Treaty of Peace between China and Japan signed at Shimonoseki, April 17, 1895; British State Papers, Vol 87, p.799

- (2) "We, acting by command of and in behalf of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese Government, and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, hereby accept the provisions in the declaration issued by the heads of the Governments of the United States, China and Great Britain on July 26, 1945, at Potsdam, and subsequently adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics".

- (3) ~~Civil Air Transport Inc. v. Chennault (1950)~~

The question put by Chief Justice Gibson was, "What is the status of Formosa? Is Formosa part of China or is it foreign territory vis-a-vis China?"

The Foreign Office replied on February 15, 1950:

"In 1943 Formosa was a part of the territories of Japanese Empire and H.M. Government consider ~~Formosa as still de jure part of that territory.~~ On December 1, 1943, at Cairo, President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek and Prime

Minister Churchill declared all territories that Japan had stolen from China including Formosa should be restored to Republic of China. On July 26, 1945, at Potsdam, the heads of the Government of United States of America, the United Kingdom and Republic of China reaffirmed 'The terms of Cairo Declaration shall be carried out'. On ~~October 25, 1945, as a result of an order issued on the basis of consultation and agreement between Allied Powers concerned, Japanese forces in Formosa surrendered to Chiang Kai Shek. Thereupon with the consent of the Allied Power Administration, Formosa was undertaken by the Government of Republic of China.~~ At present, actual administration of the island is by Wu Kuo Cheng, who has not, so far as H.M. Government are aware, repudiated superior authority of Nationalist Government."

- (4) The Times, January 6, 1950. This statement was made at a Press Conference held just before the United Kingdom recognized the Central People's Government as the de facto and de jure Government of the Republic of China.
- (5) Taken from Sir Anthony Eden's written reply to Mr. Shinwell in the U.K. House of Commons, February 4, 1955. Full text of reply attached.
- (6) Prior to the signing of the Peace Treaty, Mr. Herbert Morrison had explained that no attempt would be made in the Treaty "to find a final solution to an issue (Formosa) which must be given careful consideration later in the general context of the Far Eastern situation". (Parl. Debates, H. of C. (1950-51) p.2302; May 11, 1951)
- (7) Record of Proceedings of the San Francisco Conference, p.93; Verbatim Minutes for September 5, 1951.

- (8) "Some Allied Powers suggested that article 2 should not merely delimit Japanese sovereignty according to Potsdam, but specify precisely the ~~ultimate disposition~~ of each of the ex-Japanese territories. This, admittedly, would have been neater. But it would have raised questions as to which there are now no agreed answers. We had either to give Japan peace on the Potsdam Surrender Terms or deny peace to Japan while the Allies quarrel about what shall be done with what Japan is prepared, and required, to give up. Clearly, the wise course was to proceed now, so far as Japan is concerned, ~~leaving the future to resolve doubts by invoking international solvents other than this treaty.~~"

Record of Proceedings, p.78.



Text of statement made in the United  
Kingdom House of Commons by Sir Anthony  
Eden on Friday, February 4, 1955.

" The Foreign Secretary, in a written reply to ~~Mr. Shin-~~  
~~well, on the present legal status of Formosa,~~ said:-

Formosa and the Pescadores were ceded to Japan by China in the Shiminoseki Treaty of 1895. In the Cairo Declaration of November, 1943, the allies stated that it was their purpose "that all the territories which Japan has stolen from the Chinese such as . . . . Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China . . . ." This declaration was a statement of intention that Formosa should be retroceded to China after the war. ~~This retrocession has in fact never taken place, because~~ of the difficulties arising from the existence of two entities claiming to represent China and the differences among the Powers as to the status of these entities.

The Potsdam Declaration of July, 1945, laid down as one of the conditions for the Japanese peace that the terms of the Cairo Declaration should be carried out. ~~In~~  
~~September, 1945, the administration of Formosa was taken~~  
~~over from the Japanese by Chinese forces at the direction~~  
~~of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, but this~~  
~~was not a cession, nor did it in itself involve any change~~  
~~of sovereignty. The arrangements made with Chiang Kai-~~  
~~shek put him there on a basis of military occupation~~  
~~pending further arrangements, and did not of themselves~~  
~~constitute the territory Chinese.~~

~~Under the peace treaty of April, 1952, Japan formally~~  
~~renounced all right, title, and claim to Formosa and the~~  
~~Pescadores; but again this did not operate as a transfer~~  
~~to Chinese sovereignty, whether to the People's Republic~~  
~~of China or to the Chinese Nationalist authorities. For-~~  
~~mosa and the Pescadores are therefore, in the view of her~~  
~~Majesty's Government, territory the de jure sovereignty~~  
~~over which is uncertain or undetermined.~~

The Nationalist-held islands in close proximity to the coast of China are in a different category from Formosa and the Pescadores, since they undoubtedly form part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. Any attempt by the Government of the People's Republic of China, however, to assert its authority over these islands by force would, in the circumstances at present peculiar to the case, give rise to a situation endangering peace and security, which is properly a matter of international concern.

(The Times, February 5, 1955)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

NUMBERED LETTER

*Legal 11.5*  
~~TOP SECRET~~  
 Security: *TOP*  
 No: *250*  
 Date: *Feb 8 1955*  
 Enclosures: *4*  
 Air or Surface Mail: *Air*  
 Post File No: *AR.204/1*

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
 EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER  
 FOR CANADA, LONDON.

Reference: Our telegram No. 110 of January 28.

Subject: ~~Legal status of Formosa~~

FEB 11 1955

*M. Carter*

Ottawa File No.	
<i>50056.A. 6</i>	
<i>91</i>	<i>91</i>

References

L	
1	✓
2	✓
3	✓
4	✓
5	✓
6	✓
7	✓
8	
9	✓
10	
11	
12	

*13* - 8 1955

On February 2 ~~The Times~~ carried an interesting letter by ~~Georg Schwarzenberger~~ Reader in International Law in the University of London, on the legal status of Formosa. Schwarzenberger's opinions brought forth comments, also in ~~The Times~~ correspondence section, from ~~Kenneth Younger~~ and ~~H.W. Wickenden~~. On February 4 the Foreign Secretary gave a Written Answer in the House to a Question concerning the legal position of Formosa and this gave rise to some correspondence. I am enclosing, as of possible interest to the Legal Division, the relevant clippings from The Times and the text of Sir Anthony Eden's Written Answer in the House.

*Circulate  
 in legal  
 + file  
 TOP.*

*B. Margaret Meagher*  
 CANADA HOUSE

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

*M*

1955 FEB 11 11 11 : 11

1955 FEB 11 AM 11:44

Spec 8

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	
29	
30	
31	
32	
33	
34	
35	
36	
37	
38	
39	
40	
41	
42	
43	
44	
45	
46	
47	
48	
49	
50	
51	
52	
53	
54	
55	
56	
57	
58	
59	
60	
61	
62	
63	
64	
65	
66	
67	
68	
69	
70	
71	
72	
73	
74	
75	
76	
77	
78	
79	
80	
81	
82	
83	
84	
85	
86	
87	
88	
89	
90	
91	
92	
93	
94	
95	
96	
97	
98	
99	
100	

Faint, mostly illegible text, possibly a list or report.

FEB 11 1955

Faint text, possibly a signature or header.

W. J. ...

...

# FORMOSA AND CHINA

THE TIMES,  
February 2, 1955.

## EXAMINATION OF LEGAL STATUS

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

Sir.—At the present stage of the discussion on Formosa it may be advisable to pay closer attention to the status of Formosa in international law.

(1) China had ceded Formosa to Japan by the peace treaty of Shimonoseki of April 16, 1895. In order to judge the validity of this cession subsequent developments in international law which may, or may not, have affected the validity of cessions achieved as the result of aggressive war must be disregarded. Thus, the validity of this cession can hardly be contested. The joint *communiqué* which was issued at the Cairo conference (December 1, 1943) and referred to Formosa as one of the territories which Japan had "stolen from the Chinese" and which were to be restored to China was a retrospective moral condemnation of an international transaction which, at the time and long afterwards, was never questioned as being in any way contrary to international law.

(2) The understandings reached at the Cairo conference of 1943 were at the most legal commitments entered between the three parties to the statement—i.e. China, the United States, and the United Kingdom—regarding their intention to restore, *inter alia*, Formosa to China. The three Powers reaffirmed this intention in the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, and, on entering the war against Japan, the Soviet Union associated herself with this declaration.

In relation to Japan, these inter-allied understandings became binding by the Japanese acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation (August 14, 1945). Thus whatever final arrangements would be made by the other parties to this instrument of unconditional surrender were to be carried out by Japan. These Powers were China, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom. On October 25, 1945, as a result of an agreement between the United Powers concerned, the Japanese forces in Formosa surrendered to General Chiang Kai-shek, and with the consent of the Supreme Allied Commander in the Far East, the administration of Formosa was undertaken by the Government of the Republic of China.

(3) Until the treaty of peace with Japan of San Francisco (September 5, 1951) nothing further appears to have happened that in any way affected the legal position of Formosa. Some of the States until then still legally at war with Japan had undertaken commitments *inter se* on the future of Formosa, and Japan was under an obligation to recognize whatever steps might be taken by the other parties to the instrument of unconditional surrender. It was, therefore, completely in accordance with the legal position as it then existed for the Foreign Office of the United Kingdom to state in reply to a questionnaire submitted to it by the Chinese Government that Formosa was under the administration of the Republic of China (Civil Affairs Department, *Foreign Affairs and Overseas*, 1950). On the other hand, Mr. Acheson expressed the view that Formosa had become Chinese territory (*The Times*, January 6, 1950).

Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace of San Francisco of 1951 Japan renounced "all right, title and claim to Formosa." This meant that Japan renounced all her rights in Formosa and the outer islands and the outer banks.

(4) The position as it has existed since is similar to that after the renunciation by Germany of her rights, titles and claims and assets in her possessions and titles over her former possessions under the peace treaty of Versailles or that of Turkey since the peace treaty of Lausanne in relation to those parts of the Ottoman Empire which had been detached from it. Until the Powers other than Japan who are parties to the peace treaty of San Francisco decide otherwise, it is in those of them who entered commitments at Cairo and Potsdam regarding Formosa with China intend to honour them and in relation to which of the two Chinas is perhaps a complicated but in any case a separate issue.

It is to be noted that the Government of the Republic of China exercises jurisdiction over Formosa and the outer islands and the outer banks on those parts of the peace treaty of San Francisco which recognize the Government of the Republic of China as the Government of Formosa. It is to be noted that the Government of the Republic of China has decided to continue to exercise jurisdiction over Formosa and the outer islands and the outer banks on those parts of the peace treaty of San Francisco which recognize the Government of the Republic of China as the Government of Formosa.

## THE FORMOSA CRISIS

### VIEWS ON LEGAL POSITION

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

Sir,—I am mystified by the final paragraph of Dr. Schwarzenberger's useful analysis, in his letter to-day, of the legal position of Formosa.

I do not understand how it can be said that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is exercising sovereignty over Formosa "on behalf of those parties to the peace treaty of San Francisco who recognize his Government. . . ." There is not a word in the peace treaty to support this and even if there were, I do not see how it could be binding either on the Soviet Union or upon any Chinese authority, since China was not invited to San Francisco at all and the Soviet Union did not sign the treaty.

It was the purpose of the Japanese peace treaty to give legal form to the Japanese renunciation of all claims to certain territories and I believe that the treaty effectively did this so far as the parties to the treaty were concerned. The Japanese never did not affect sovereignty over any other than the Japanese Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores (or indeed to the Kurile Islands and South Sakhalin which are occupied by the Russians). Presumably, therefore, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek will not be able to claim sovereignty over any territories of the Japanese peace treaty, but in any case he has no authority to do so. It is his duty to administer the island pending a peace treaty.

The other arguable thesis is that, as the Government of China, he was simply re-taking possession of Chinese territory, and this is what was commonly believed at the time. It is, therefore, incorrect to suggest that the States who signed the San Francisco treaty are legally free agents to decide collectively on the future of this territory, though as a matter of military power they may be able to do this, just as the Russians may be able to decide on the future of the Kurile Islands.

I believe it is most important not to make ill-founded legal claims in this matter now, lest they should some time in the future form the basis of proposals for action through the United Nations or otherwise.

Yours, &c., KENNETH CLAYTON GIER,  
House of Commons, 11th Feb.

Sir,—In the two currently held legal views of Formosa, that the island is under a condominium of the parties signatory with Japan to the San Francisco treaty and that its defence is inter-continental civil war—there seems to be some confusion and oversight. Dr. Schwarzenberger states, in his letter to-day, that the treaty of Shimonoseki handing over Formosa to Japan "was never questioned as being in any way contrary to international law. . . ." At the same time, the people of Formosa themselves declared through their representatives that they were a free people and wished to recognize their independence through Taiwanese resistance collapsed in 1945, the most virile of the mountain tribes, the Hailal, fought the Japanese to a standstill.

This, however, should not be taken as a sign of solidarity with the mainland regime, nor as a contradiction of Dr. Schwarzenberger's main thesis. The Japanese were most concerned at the time of the San Francisco treaty, 1953, in the same way as many mainlanders fled more recently at the overthrow of the Kuomintang. Mainland regimes have rarely exercised more than superficial *de facto* rule in the island, certainly never over more than about a third of Formosa at any time. The major part of the island east of the coastal strip was, until Japanese rule, the preserve of the seven distinct mountain tribes who still live there and who did most to resist the Japanese. Thus Formosa has always been largely independent from the mainland and was first ruled as an entity not by China but by Japan.

Secondly, some confusion appears to have arisen, particularly in the mind of Mr. Attlee, in that all the territories mentioned on the map of Formosa are not under the same administration.

As the Governor of Formosa, he obviously heads an administration at odds with the present mainland regime. This, surely, is the only precise support for contending that protection of Formosa is intervention in purely Chinese affairs. Previous to this role of the United States, the island was administered by the United States Military Forces, including China and Russia, who were the only powers to have a formal role in the island. Finally, he is the only member of the 45 States which accepted the San Francisco Treaty and other islands.

It is this confusing and changing legal position rather than the simple historical and legal position of Formosa which is properly the root of current issues, and it is to be hoped that this will be the subject of a future article in the Times. Because of long Japanese rule they are comparatively politically backward but they should be respected by all who value a tradition of independence from tyranny.

Yours faithfully, HENRY BENDEN,  
46, Cranley, Cranley, Cranley.

Friday, 4th February, 1955

## FAR EAST

**Formosa and the Pescadores  
(Treaties)**

Mr. Shinwell asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will include in the OFFICIAL REPORT a factual statement on the legalistic and military aspects of the situation on the South-East China coast.

Sir Anthony Eden: Formosa and the Pescadores were ceded to Japan by China in the Shiminoseki Treaty of 1895. In the Cairo Declaration of November, 1943, the Allies stated that it was their purpose "that all the territories which Japan has stolen from the Chinese such as . . . Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. . . ." This Declaration was a statement of intention that Formosa should be retroceded to China after the war. This retrocession has, in fact, never taken place, because of the difficulties arising from the existence of two entities claiming to represent China, and the differences amongst the Powers as to the status of these entities.

The Potsdam Declaration of July, 1945, laid down as one of the conditions for the Japanese Peace that the terms of the Cairo Declaration should be carried out. In September, 1945, the administration of Formosa was taken over from the Japanese by Chinese forces under the direction of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in the Pacific. This was not a cession, nor did it in itself involve any change of sovereignty. The arrangements made with Chiang Kai-shek put him in the basis of military occupation pending further arrangements, and did not constitute the territory Chinese.

Under the Peace Treaty of April, 1952, Japan formally renounced all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores; but again this did not operate as a transfer to Chinese sovereignty, whether to the People's Republic of China or to the Chinese Nationalist authorities. Formosa and the Pescadores are therefore, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, territory the ~~sovereignty over~~ which is uncertain or undetermined.

The Nationalist-held islands in close proximity to the coast of China are in a

different category from Formosa and the Pescadores since they undoubtedly form part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. Any attempt by the Government of the People's Republic of China, however, to assert its authority over these islands by force would, in the circumstances at present peculiar to the case, give rise to a situation endangering peace and security, which is properly a matter of international concern.

**American Warships  
(Hong Kong Repairs)**

Mr. Collins asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, to avoid involving this country in incidents arising from the presence of a United States fleet in Chinese waters, he will give instructions that United States war vessels shall not be repaired or refuelled in Hong Kong.

Mr. Turton: No.

# OWNERSHIP OF FORMOSA

THE TIMES,  
February 7, 1955.

## WHICH CHINA?

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

Sir,—The written answer given by Sir Anthony Eden to-day in the House of Commons setting out the legal position of Formosa as now accepted by the Foreign Office must cause considerable concern both here and in the United States.

It would appear that the Foreign Office is proposing to depart from the hitherto accepted principle of international law that declarations signed by heads of States or Governments and embodying agreements reached are binding in international law on those who have signed them. Instead the Foreign Office suggests that they should only be regarded as "statements of intention."

If this view is accepted it destroys the whole legal basis of the United States position in regard to Formosa, which depends upon that island being under international law a part of the Republic of China. The Foreign Office view is also almost exactly contrary to that taken by Professor Lauterpacht in his eighth edition of Volume 1 of *Oppenheim's International Law*. He writes (page 788):

"Official statements in the form of reports of conferences signed by the heads of States or Governments and embodying agreements reached therein may, in proportion as these agreements incorporate definite rules of conduct, be regarded as legally binding on the States in question. The reports of the conferences of the heads of Governments of Great Britain, the United States, and Russia at Crimea in February, 1945, and at Potsdam in August of that year may be mentioned as examples."

The intention to return Formosa to China was set out in the Cairo Declaration to which Great Britain, the United States, and China were parties. It was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration to which the U.S.S.R. was also a party. In the House of Commons on December 14, 1945, in a debate on the Cairo Declaration Sir Anthony Eden (Hansard, col. 1,427), after referring to a statement of the Prime Minister's prior to Pearl Harbour in regard to the Japanese possible entry into the war, said: "From that moment (the Japanese entry into the war) we have been committed to the objectives which are set out now, for the first time, internationally in the Cairo Agreement."

The same view was taken by Mr. Acheson when Secretary of State of the United States. His views are reported by *The Times* (January 6, 1950) thus: "Mr. Acheson made it clear that whatever sort of China was recognized Formosa should be regarded as part of it, and that the United States was not going to alter its opinion on this subject merely because those in control in China were not friendly to the United States."

This view has been maintained consistently by the United States Government and their recent mutual defence treaty with the Nationalists on Formosa is based upon an interpretation of it. This treaty, made between the United States of America and the Republic of China in December, 1954, provides in Article 2 for mutual aid to resist armed attack against "the territorial integrity" of either Power. Article 6 limits the territory to which the treaty shall apply "in respect of the Republic of China" to "Taiwan and the Pescadores" and "in respect of the United States of America" to "the island territories of the West Pacific under its jurisdiction."

If the Foreign Office interpretation of the position of Formosa in international law is correct then the United States treaty, which is based upon Formosa being part of the territory of China, is invalid. Can this be what the Foreign Office really means? Surely both in international law and in common sense the position is as put by Mr. Acheson? Formosa, as a result of the binding effect of the Cairo Declaration, must be acknowledged in international law to belong to whatever Government is recognized by the Power concerned as the Government of China. I am, Sir, &c.,

GEOFFREY BING.

House of Commons, Feb. 4.

Sir,—Prior to the surrender of Japan Formosa was undoubtedly Japanese territory. Mr. Aneurin Bevan may protest at an international law that recognizes the fruits of aggression, but the rest of us are where we are by reason of historical aggression.

The Cairo declarations represented an agreement between the Powers then at war with Japan as to the disposal of expected territorial booty. American moral objections to annexation resulted in annexation being described by other words, but did not alter the substance of the agreement. Still less did these other words alter the legal fact that Formosa was then Japanese territory and so continued until the Japanese surrender.

Upon the surrender of the Japanese Empire, the Japanese Empire including Formosa became the joint property of her conquerors. The question is what did they choose? It is here that I part company with Dr. Schwartzberger. The Allies could have retained their condominium and administered Formosa as a trust territory. They did not do so. They chose to divide the island between the United States and with Taiwan after the 1950-45 War.

In fact they did not do so. They handed over Formosa to China to own and recognized Formosa as part of China. They may have been historically and juridically wrong in stating that Formosa had always been an integral part of China, but in recognizing Formosa as a part of China after the surrender they were doing that which they had both the right and power to do.

In 1945 Formosa became Chinese territory and Mr. Attlee was clearly right in so stating. But for the civil war the fact would never have been questioned. When in Article 2 of the San Francisco Treaty Japan renounced all right, title, and claim to Formosa she was merely renouncing any revisionist claim to territory which had ceased to be hers both in fact and in law some seven years before. The San Francisco Treaty did not have and was never intended to have, any effect upon the status of Formosa. Dr. Schwartzberger's convenient theory that General Chiang Kai-shek only exercises authority delegated by the parties to the San Francisco Treaty (who incidentally are not the same parties as those to whom Japan surrendered her territories) simply will not do.

Formosa since 1945 has been Chinese, but this leaves the real question: which China? I believe that the answer in international law is as follows. The Chinese civil war has resulted in the creation of a new State, Communist China, and has left in being an old State, Nationalist China. Both these States are firmly in control of different parts of pre-civil war China and both give the appearance of permanent establishment with their defined areas save only for the coastal islands, which, their future being still unsettled, should not in law be recognized as the territory of either.

Both Communist and Nationalist China are in my view entitled to international recognition and the sooner both are brought to the United Nations the better. The title to the disputed coastal islands can then be settled. I am, &c.,

House of Commons. R. T. PAGET.

*Quincy  
Norton  
was settled*



*File status*

# WRITTEN ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS

Friday, 4th February, 1955

*of the month*

50056-A-40
------------

## FAR EAST

### Formosa and the Pescadores (Treaties)

Mr. Shinwell asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will include in the OFFICIAL REPORT a factual statement on the legalistic and treaty aspects of the situation on the South-East China coast.

**Sir Anthony Eden :** Formosa and the Pescadores were ceded to Japan by China in the Shiminoseki Treaty of 1895. In the Cairo Declaration of November, 1943, the Allies stated that it was their purpose "that all the territories which Japan has stolen from the Chinese such as . . . Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. . . ." This Declaration was a statement of intention that Formosa should be retroceded to China after the war. This retrocession has, in fact, never taken place, because of the difficulties arising from the existence of two entities claiming to represent China, and the differences amongst the Powers as to the status of these entities.

The Potsdam Declaration of July, 1945, laid down as one of the conditions for the Japanese Peace that the terms of the Cairo Declaration should be carried out. In September, 1945, the administration of Formosa was taken over from the Japanese by Chinese forces at the direction of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers; but this was not a cession, nor did it in itself involve any change of sovereignty. The arrangements made with Chiang Kai-shek put him there on a basis of military occupation pending further arrangements, and did not of themselves constitute the territory Chinese.

Under the Peace Treaty of April, 1952, Japan formally renounced all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores; but again this did not operate as a transfer to Chinese sovereignty, whether to the People's Republic of China or to the Chinese Nationalist authorities. Formosa and the Pescadores are therefore, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, territory the *de jure* sovereignty over which is uncertain or undetermined.

The Nationalist-held islands in close proximity to the coast of China are in a

different category from Formosa and the Pescadores since they undoubtedly form part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. Any attempt by the Government of the People's Republic of China, however, to assert its authority over these islands by force would, in the circumstances at present peculiar to the case, give rise to a situation endangering peace and security, which is properly a matter of international concern.

### American Warships (Hong Kong Repairs)

Mr. Collins asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, to avoid involving this country in incidents arising from the presence of a United States fleet in Chinese waters, he will give instructions that United States war vessels shall not be repaired or refuelled in Hong Kong.

Mr. Turton : No.

### SOUTH GOODWIN LIGHTSHIP (LOSS)

Mr. Deer asked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation whether he will institute an inquiry into the loss of the South Goodwin lightship.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter : I have seen the Report of the Inquiry carried out by the Corporation of Trinity House and I do not think that an investigation under the Merchant Shipping Acts would add to our knowledge as to the cause of this tragic occurrence. In their Report the Elder Brethren find that the cause of the disaster on 26th November, 1954, was the parting of the lightship's cable about midnight. The parting may have been due to one or more of three causes, exceptionally bad weather, a fault in the cable or the fouling of the cable by wreckage or other obstruction. They find also that the lightship was in proper and sound condition before the accident and that her equipment and moorings had been properly maintained and all instructions and regulations for the safety of the ship complied with. The Report makes a number of recommendations designed to reinforce the measures already current for the safety of lightships and their crews. I am placing a copy in the Library.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

SUMMARY

OF: Letter No. 57 of February 3, 1955 from Norway.

Subject: Norwegian opinion on Formosa

*Insert particulars of document or file being summarized.*

*J. Pope - HGT*  
UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY GRADING

DATE 24 February/55

INITIALS OF AUTHOR

T. Pope/HGT

CIRCULATION

Mr. Ronning reports on press comments in Norwegian newspapers on the Formosa question.

2. The Norwegian point of view seems to be fairly close to that of the British Labour Party, as expressed by Clement Attlee. The principal Norwegian Labour Party newspaper is of the opinion that the coastal islands should not be allowed to bring about a threat of war. The Chinese attitude, in this newspaper's opinion, is no excuse for the United States to behave in the same manner. An independent newspaper has reported a comment by Foreign Minister Lange that he regarded Formosa to be, without a doubt, part of China.

Ext. 105  
(Rev. 2/53)

WHEN THIS FORM IS USED TO SUMMARIZE A DOCUMENT IT MUST BE STAPLED TO, AND FILED BY DATE OF THAT DOCUMENT.

Ext. 182A

*Copy to file - 56.5-6*

OTTAWA FILE  
No. 50056-A-10

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  
Unclassified.

Letter No. 27

18

Date February 3, 1955.

FEB 8 1955

FROM: The Canadian Legation, Oslo, Norway.

*M. Carter*

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference.....

Subject: Norwegian Opinion on Formosa.

*Mr. Holman*  
*Mr. [unclear]*

Copies Referred To  
*[Handwritten names]*

No. of Enclosures  
*[Handwritten numbers]*

Post File No. 320 Nov

1955 FEB 8 11:50 AM

Considerable concern has been expressed in many quarters in Norway about the renewed intensification of hostilities between the Chinese Communists and Nationalists in the Nationalist held islands off the coast of China and the recent pronouncement by President Eisenhower on Formosa. The official Norwegian point of view would seem to be fairly close to that of the British Labour Party as expressed by Clement Attlee.

2. Under the heading "Frisivolous Play at War and Peace in the Formosa Straits" the principal Labour Party newspaper, Arbeiderbladet, which usually expresses the Norwegian Government's point of view, wrote on January 31st that strong national and ideological feelings and considerations of prestige had brought about a very serious situation in the Formosa Straits. Commonsense and moderation were being thrown overboard and emotions were getting the upper hand. The paper found it completely senseless that a number of small islands without any military or other importance should be allowed to bring about a threat of war. The crisis was due to the fact that Chiang Kai-shek was occupying a number of small islands close to the Chinese mainland so that the parties got into too close contact with each other. There was in actual fact general consent that these islands should be transferred to Chinese jurisdiction as indicated in Eisenhower's recent declaration. Unfortunately Eisenhower had not pointed out the logical conclusions of his viewpoint which would have been to advocate an immediate evacuation. It might, of course, be tempting to "solve" the whole difficulty by saying that not only the small islands but also Formosa really belonged to China. No doubt this would be the best solution if only it were possible. China would never allow Formosa to remain in foreign hands and it was utterly shortsighted and unwise to allow such a serious conflict to mature until the time when China became a really modern great military power. The American proposal that evacuation should take place in connection with an armistice seemed fair enough but China was unlikely to agree to an armistice not giving Formosa back to China. China's hard and irreconcilable attitude provided no excuse for the United States to behave in the same manner.

1955 FEB 8 AM 9:20

for the United States to remain in the same manner.  
 such and telecommunication systems provided no exclusive  
 authority nor financial resources back to China. China, a  
 last number and China was permitted to agree to an  
 large house in connection with an agreement seemed  
 better. The American proposal that election agreement should  
 give when China receive a result would be less permitted  
 action and a certain condition to matter until the  
 point and it was offered to be a result and matter to  
 China would never action resources to remain in certain  
 would be the best solution it only it were possible.  
 Resources result returned to China. No longer after  
 it ending first not only the small number and agree  
 course, it referring to "action" the more difficult  
 evidence an immediate election. It might be of  
 form of the agreement which would rule been to  
 agreement had not occurred and the joint agreement  
 agreement, a recent decision. Unofficially  
 referred to Chinese investigation as indicated in  
 general consent that these actions should be taken  
 course with each other. There was in certain fact  
 waiting so that the matter for into too close  
 a number of small actions close to the Chinese  
 due to the fact that Chinese set-aside was occurring  
 to point about a number of men. The state was  
 and permitted of other involvement should be allowed  
 agreement that a number of small actions would  
 the other hand. The better long it completely  
 were being through clearly and emotions were being  
 the resources efforts. Common sense and moderation  
 after had shown about a large certain agreement in  
 and political feelings and considerations of the  
 of them. More on January 21st that about national  
 largely expresses the Norwegian Government, a joint  
 person had remained. "Agreement" which  
 and peace in the resources efforts, the British  
 2. Under the heading "Action" had at the

as expressed by Clement Attlee.  
 be fairly close to that of the British person had  
 the official Norwegian joint of them would seem to  
 prominence of President Eisenhower on resources.  
 next actions of the coast of China and the recent  
 commitment and nationalities in the national  
 representation of positions between the Chinese  
 in many matters in Norway about the renewed  
 consideration concern has been expressed

Norwegian Opinion on Resources

THE AMERICAN-NOVIKOV AGREEMENT... THE CHINESE DELEGATION... NORWAY.


February 8, 1955

FEB 8 1955

URGENT

If China refused an armistice, the United States should start an evacuation on its own initiative. It would be a senseless frivolity to risk a war over Quemoy and Matsu.

3. On its front page of January 31st the independent Oslo newspaper Verdens Gang carried a two column headline stating "Norway is of the Opinion that Formosa Belongs to Peking China". The article called attention to the difference of opinion between Mr. Eden and Mr. Attlee and pointed out that whereas Attlee held that Formosa belonged to the Chinese People's Republic, Eden held the opposite view which was shared by the American Government. The article concluded: "However, the Norwegian Government holds a view which corresponds with that of the British Labour Party leader. At any rate the Government held that view a few months ago. Before Foreign Minister Lange left Norway for the last General Assembly of the United Nations Verdens Gang asked what he meant about the ~~formal status of Formosa~~. He then declared that he regarded the island as part of China. He had not the slightest doubt about that."

  
The Legation.

INCOMING MESSAGE

ORIGINAL *File*

FROM: THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, LONDON. 17  
 TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA  
*copy in 50085-D-40*

Security Classification
SECRET
File No.
50056-A-40
91   91

JAN 28 1955

*M. Carter*

Priority IMPORTANT	System CYPHER-AUTO	No. 110	Date January 28, 1955.
-----------------------	-----------------------	---------	------------------------

Departmental Circulation  
 MINISTER UNDER/SEC  
 D/UNDER/SEC  
 A/UNDER/SEC'S  
*Mr. [unclear]*  
*Jan. 28 1955*  
*[Signature]*

DONE - COMM'S SECTION  
 Done  
 Date JAN 28 '55

Reference: Your telegram No. 92 of January 18th.  
 Subject: Formosa.

The following note on the legal status of Formosa has been drafted by the Foreign Office as part of a brief prepared for the Prime Ministers' meeting.

"Formosa and the Pescadores were ceded to Japan by China in 1895. In the Cairo Declaration of November 1943 the allies stated that it was their purpose 'that all the territories which Japan has stolen from the Chinese such as ..... Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China....'. The Potsdam Declaration of July 1945 laid down as terms for the Japanese that the terms of the Cairo Declaration should be carried out. In September 1945 the administration of Formosa was taken over from the Japanese by Chinese forces at the direction of the Supreme Commander of the allied powers, but this was not a cession, nor did it in itself involve any change of sovereignty. Under the peace treaty of April 1952 Japan formally renounced all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores; but again this did not operate as a transfer to Chinese sovereignty.

It is quite incorrect therefore to suggest that the United Kingdom has recognized Formosa as Chinese territory. The Cairo Declaration was merely a declaration of intention that Formosa should be retroceded to China after the war. This retrocession has in fact never taken place, and the situation in the Far East is very different from that envisaged by the allies in 1943. The arrangements made with Chiang Kai-Shek in September 1945, when he was invested with the administration of Formosa, were made on the basis of military occupation pending further arrangements and did not of themselves constitute the territory Chinese. The Japanese peace treaty brought about a formal renunciation of Japanese sovereignty without any transfer to China. Formosa and the Pescadores are therefore in our view - if not exactly res nullius - territory, the de jure sovereignty over which is undetermined. In the meantime we do in practice recognize the Nationalists as the administering authority on a de facto basis.

References  
*Far East*  
*UN D/O*  
*CCO S (A)*  
*J 15*  
*Washington*  
*UN Del N. 4*  
*Tokyo*  
*New Delhi*  
*Wellington*

*Canberra*  
*Paris*  
*[Signature]*  
*31/1/55*

FROM Austamba, Washington  
TO Australian High Commission, Ottawa  
DATE 26th January, 1955  
NO. 12

SECRET

file  
Aghuey  
11578-E-10

SX

Miscellaneous 12. Following from Canberra begins:

SECRET.

Austamba Washington 46 (please pass to Austunst New York 13 and Ottawa 12) repeat London 164 and Wellington 13.

Formosa.

We are attracted by Hammarskjold's suggestion that Security Council operation might be taken in two stages - first to be a request to Secretary-General to explore with both Communist and Nationalist Chinese possibilities of successful United Nations action to bring about a cease-fire.

2. Such a move would be less likely to be vetoed than a straight out resolution for a cease-fire. While we do not hold out much hope that it would be successful it would at least delay rest of operation which is full of risks. It may put off need to face sort of questions put in para 2 of our 44. Furthermore, we must not forget that Hammarskjold has his foot in door in Peking and might be listened to if he counsels caution.

3. Please make these views known to Americans, United Kingdom and New Zealand.

Ends.

FROM AUSTENBA, WASHINGTON  
TO AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMAND, OTTAWA  
DATE 26th January, 1955.  
NO. Misc. 12.

SX

Decyphered by: MG.

Miscellaneous 12. Following from Canberra begins:

Addressed Washington 44 Crotonat London 155,  
Karachi 37 (for Tange). SECRET.

President Eisenhower's message to Congress is better than at one stage appeared likely but message and draft resolution of Congress could cover any action United States administration decided on. As such it can be regarded as an internal United States measure to give president powers to act which he might not necessarily use. We for our part now have to watch how Americans intend use these powers. We must continue to press importance of not getting involved in large scale hostilities over off shore islands. While we can accept United States action to assist in withdrawing Nationalists from Tachen we hope this will not lead to United States commitment defined or undefined to defend others of these islands. We have hitherto been able to view proposed action in United Nations Security Council as part of a process of disengaging United States and other countries from any obligations to support Nationalists anywhere except in Formosa and Pescadores. Yet Americans now seem to be drifting towards widening obligations for example towards defence of Quemoy. As I said in telegram 34 I do not think these islands are worth risk of war and I notice Eden in message to United Kingdom Ambassador, Washington has said United Kingdom wants to see Nationalists abandon all these islands.

2. On proposed resolution in United Nations Security Council we continue to have doubts. Resolution will call upon both Communist and Nationalist Chinese to terminate hostilities. If communists do not do so will an attempt be made by nationalists or Americans to call for United Nations action to meet this situation. Might United States claim to have secured more moral backing - at least from sponsors of resolution - for enforcement action even if United Nations resolution is vetoed by Russians. These points will need watching.

3. Wireless today reports State Department spokesman giving as an example of action that might be taken the bombing of troop concentrations on mainland if these were thought by United States to be preparat to attack on Formosa. I assume nothing of



FROM

TO

DATE

NO.

this sort is under contemplation in operation to evacuate Taohan.

Pages 455 & 456

9 File

50056 A-172  
911 v

CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL IN THE FORMOSAN STRAITS

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, I was very much interested in the statement by President Eisenhower on Wednesday night indicating his support for a cease-fire move in the Formosan Straits by the United Nations. It is interesting to note that the American Association for the United Nations made this same proposal in a statement presented to the United States delegation to the General Assembly as far back as September 19, 1954. It is also noteworthy that the Honorable Benjamin V. Cohen, former counselor of the State Department, advanced this same idea in a speech delivered before the Washington Ethical Society on October 24, 1954.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that pertinent excerpts from these two documents be printed in the body of the RECORD. I also ask, Mr. President, that a very cogent and absorbing memorandum on this whole subject prepared by Mr. Cohen, who is one of the most noted experts on international affairs and a native-born citizen of our country, be printed in the body of the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the excerpts and memorandum were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXCERPT FROM U. N. DAY SPEECH BY HON. BENJAMIN V. COHEN, PRESIDENT, WASHINGTON ETHICAL SOCIETY, OCTOBER 24, 1954

There has been fighting in the straits of Formosa. That fighting threatens our peace and the peace of the world. That fighting which in fact threatens a major international war cannot be passed by as a matter of essentially domestic concern. It is a matter of vital concern to the peace of the world and to the United Nations. But we cannot expect the United Nations to act if we ourselves bypass the United Nations and discourage its use. No nation which is unwilling to use the processes of the United Nations has a right to attribute its own failure to use those processes to any alleged ineffectiveness or alleged impotence of the United Nations.

Possibly the Security Council may be unable to act because of the lack of unanimity among its permanent members. But there is no veto in the General Assembly. If we have the courage to put to the test our faith in the United Nations, we should ask the United Nations to demand a cease-fire in the Straits of Formosa. We should be prepared to join in sponsoring a proposal that the United Nations, without regard to the question of recognition, as to which its members are divided, should at once call upon the authorities now in control of the government on the mainland of China and the authorities now in control of the government on Formosa to cease the use of armed force against each other in this area in the interest of world peace.

Then it would become the responsibility of the United Nations to recommend a peaceful settlement of the Formosa question in accordance with the principle of the charter, that is the principles of world peace and security, justice, and the responsibility of Formosa is today in fact independent of the mainland of China and its future status should be determined by the United Nations having regard to the wishes and interests of the people of Formosa in a manner which will advance and not endanger world peace and security.

There can be no peace in the Straits of Formosa as long as Mao Tse-tung asserts the right to use force to unite Formosa with the mainland or Chiang Kai-shek asserts the right to use Formosa as a base for armed operations against the mainland. The use of force in either case is contrary to the spirit if not the letter of the charter. The only hope for and the only way to peace in the Far East is through the United Nations which alone has the authority and standing to call

for a cease-fire. If we continue to bypass the United Nations, we incur the risks of war with grave and unforeseeable consequences and under circumstances which will deprive us of the aid of our best friends and allies in the free world. Formosa is the test not only of our faith in the United Nations but our faith in the ideals which have made us a leader of the free world. President Eisenhower would have us have a good partner in the concert of free nations.

We are living through one of the most critical periods in all history. The fission and fusion of the atom gives warning that civilization must rise above war or it will be overwhelmed and destroyed by war. Civilization's hope for survival depends upon the United Nations. With God's help let us reverently and courageously turn to the United Nations and determine, before it is too late, to justify our faith by our works.

EXCERPT FROM STATEMENT PRESENTED TO THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS BY THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE UNITED NATIONS, SEPTEMBER 19, 1954

IX. FIGHTING IN THE STRAITS OF FORMOSA

There is fighting in the Straits of Formosa. World peace and security are thereby threatened and endangered. It is unquestionably the function of the United Nations to deal with such threats to the peace. It is imperative that this situation be brought at once to the attention of the United Nations. If there is delay as in the case of Indochina, it may be too late for the United Nations to avert conflict and catastrophe.

The Security Council should be asked to act to restore peace and security in this area, and if the Council cannot act, the matter should be brought promptly before the General Assembly. The United States should join in sponsoring or supporting a proposal that the United Nations, without regard to the question of recognition, as to which its members are presently divided, should at once call upon both the authorities now in control of the government on the mainland of China to cease the use of armed force against each other in this area in the interest of world peace, and further, to accept the proposition that Formosa and the mainland of China shall not be united by force, nor without the free consent of the people of Formosa and under conditions approved by the United Nations as consistent with world peace, security, and justice.

MEMORANDUM ON THE PROPOSED MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

(Prepared by Benjamin V. Cohen)

1. This memorandum raises some questions concerning the desirability of the ratification of the recently negotiated mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China.

It should be stated at the outset that this memorandum does not question (1) the vital importance to the United States of having Formosa and the Pescadores remain in friendly hands, or (2) the policy of defending these islands from unprovoked armed attack. The purpose of the memorandum is to consider whether the proposed mutual defense treaty on balance will aid or embarrass the United States in protecting its vital interests in Formosa and the Pescadores, in deterring any armed attack on these islands, and in opposing such attack if it occurs.

2. The proposed mutual defense treaty, if ratified, would for the first time constitute a formal recognition of Formosa and the Pescadores as territories of the Republic of China. Heretofore, the United States has been careful to avoid any formal recognition of the transfer of these islands to China and to reserve a high degree of freedom in regard to its position on the future status of these

Refer  
London  
Tokyo  
New Delhi  
Wellington  
Cairo  
Paris  
Brussels

Done  
Feb 4/55  
mk

islands. Under the Japanese Peace Treaty Japan gave up all claim to these islands but no attempt was made to define their present or future status.

It is true that the Cairo declaration, which was reaffirmed in the Potsdam proclamation, asserted the purpose of the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Nationalist China to restore Formosa and the Pescadores to the Republic of China. But such purpose has not yet been carried out by any duly ratified peace treaty, and much has happened in the meanwhile. The situation has been so altered on the mainland of China as to raise grave doubt whether that purpose can now be carried out, as it was assumed it could be, with due regard to the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the Charter of the United Nations. The mainland of China has become involved in civil war and revolution, and the involvement of Formosa and the Pescadores in that civil war and revolution was neither foreseen nor contemplated at the time of the Cairo declaration. Such a situation would not be in the wishes and interests of the people of the islands.

3. The formal recognition of Formosa and the Pescadores as territories of the Republic of China would give substance to the claim of the Chinese Communists that an armed attack on these islands is not international aggression on their part but civil war in which the right and purpose of other nations forcibly to intervene would be open to serious doubt and question. Formosa and the Pescadores are geographically separated from the mainland of China. It would seem to be very definitely not only in the interest of the United States but in the interest of peace to keep them separate and independent and not to enmesh them inextricably with the rights and claims of the mainland of China. It has been stated in the press that Chiang Kai-shek has given assurances that he would not engage in provocative attacks on the mainland, but such assurances are not found in the text of the treaty. Indeed it would be very awkward by treaty to impose restraints on the exercise of sovereign rights in China proper by any government claiming to be the lawful government of all China. Assurances outside the text of the treaty will be subject to debate, shifting executive interpretations and waivers. A China whose rights to Formosa and the Pescadores are recognized, cannot be expected to forswear its rights to the mainland of China. But what is more important, a China, which controls the mainland will most assuredly assert its rights to Formosa and the Pescadores if those islands are formally recognized as territories of China. What we recognize as territories of Chiang's China, other countries including our allies which recognize Mao's China, may feel compelled to recognize as territories of Mao's China.

The formal recognition of Formosa and the Pescadores as territories of the Republic of China would preclude effective control and jurisdiction by the United States and by the United Nations over these islands. The United States and the United Nations would seem very unwise for the mainland of China under Communist control to tie

up the islands to the mainland. Since Communist control of the mainland of China is not likely to be broken for some time, it would seem to be in the interest of the United States to favor and work for the separation of the islands from the mainland, at least for the time being.

Any treaty which inseparably ties these islands to the mainland would seem to be detrimental to the interests of the United States in this area.

5. Most of our friends and allies want to have peace not war in the straits of Formosa. It would probably be possible to evoke wide support in the United Nations and throughout the free world for the calling of a cease-fire by the United Nations in the straits of Formosa. Many nations, including nations which have recognized Red China, probably could be induced to support a cease fire which would preclude the uniting of Formosa and the Pescadores with the mainland by force. It would therefore seem to be in the interest of the United States to separate Formosa and the Pescadores from the power struggle for control of the mainland of China and to base our position on the United Nations Charter which forbids the use of force in international relations and calls for peaceful settlement of international disputes and the right of self-determination of peoples. This would seem to be the best if not the only way of harmonizing our positions and that of our friends and allies and of avoiding grave risks of becoming involved in war without their support and assistance. This would not involve the withdrawal of the United States from Formosa and the Pescadores. It would have a better chance of retaining the favor of the United Nations if he did not involve them in war with the mainland.

6. In his statements in support of the proposed mutual-defense treaty with the Republic of China (Department of State press release No. 686, December 1, 1953), Mr. Dulles contends that this treaty is similar to the defense treaties made with the Republic of Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, and he particularly stresses the similarity between the Korean Treaty and the proposed treaty. But there are vital differences in the situations with which the two treaties deal.

Our recognition of the Republic of Korea on January 1, 1949, was based on the United Nations General Assembly resolution of December 12, 1948, which declared "that there has been established a lawful government (the government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in which great majority of the people of all Korea reside; that this government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which was observed by the temporary Commission; and that this is the only such government in Korea."

Mr. Dulles does not mention the practical limitations which we have placed on our recognition of the Republic of Korea when he states that "we recognize the Republic of China as the only lawful government of China, just as we recognize, and the United Nations recognizes, the government of the Republic of Korea as the only lawful government in Korea." We and the United Nations have never recognized the right of the Republic of Korea to extend its effective control and jurisdiction by force to other parts of Korea, and it is clear therefore that any attempt on the part of the Republic of Korea to do so by force would be contrary to article 1 of the mutual defense treaty which forbids the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

It is not at all clear that any attempt by the Republic of China to extend its effective control and jurisdiction from Formosa to the mainland of China would be contrary to article 1 of the mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China.

Asked whether the Republic of China to sovereignly govern the mainland, Mr.

Dulles replied that "it does not deal specifically with that matter one way or another." Asked whether there is any understanding in connection with this treaty that the Chinese nationalists before attacking the mainland must consult with us and act only by agreement with us, Mr. Dulles replied that "we expect that there will be worked out practical arrangements so that neither will take action in this area which would jeopardize the other and that we would generally act in an agreed pattern of conduct. Having undertaken to defend the islands, we would not expect, nor would the Chinese Nationalists expect to act rashly in a way to jeopardize the islands. We anticipate that under the operation clause of the treaty there will be a good deal of consultation and agreement as to just how the situation is to be handled."

Mr. Dulles' remarks in no way suggest that an attack on the mainland by the Chinese Nationalists from Formosa would be contrary to article I of the treaty. Mr. Dulles' remarks in no way suggest that the policy announced in the state of the Union message of 1953 regarding noninterference by the Seventh Fleet with attacks on the mainland by the Chinese Nationalists from Formosa has in principle been abandoned.

To make the proposed treaty at all comparable with the Korean treaty it would have to be amended, or subjected to reservations, to make clear that the Republic of China in Formosa and the Pescadores would not attempt to extend its effective control and jurisdiction by the use of force from areas now thereunder to areas not now thereunder, and that any such attempt would be regarded as contrary to article I of the treaty.

7. While there may be countervailing arguments, the above considerations would seem to suggest that the proposed mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China, in its present form, would on balance embarrass rather than aid the United States in protecting its vital interests in Formosa and the Pescadores and in avoiding war in that area. It would seem that the treaty as presented would be more of an obstacle than a help in working for a peaceful settlement in the Formosan Straits in the interests of the United States, the United Nations, the inhabitants of the islands, and world peace. It would seem highly desirable before attempting to agree on any mutual defense treaty for this disturbed area to seek through the United Nations to obtain a cessation of armed hostilities in the waters between the mainland of China and Formosa and the Pescadores so that it will be clear that we are seeking peace and not trying to shield Formosa and the Pescadores while attacks on the mainland are in course of preparation there.

**MESSAGE FORM  
OUTGOING**

File No. <b>50056-A-40</b>	
<b>65</b>	<b>65</b>

**FROM:** THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA  
**TO:** THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA IN THE UNITED KINGDOM,  
LONDON

Message To Be Sent AIR CYPHER EN CLAIR CODE CYPHER <i>cut</i>	No. <b>92</b>	Date <b>18 January, 1955.</b>	For Communications Section Only <b>SENT - JAN 18 1955</b>
Priority .....	REFERENCE: Your telegram No. 1597 of Dec. 31st		
ORIGINATOR (Signature) <b>T. LeM. Carter/HGT</b> (Name Typed) Div. <b>Far Eastern</b> Local Tel. <b>7359</b>	SUBJECT: <b>Formosa</b>  We should be glad to have a more detailed legal opinion from the Foreign Office setting out their view as to the status of Formosa which is dealt with in paragraph three of your telegram.		
APPROVED BY (Signature) <b>A.R. Menzies</b> (Name Typed)			
Internal Distribution: S.S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A.			
Done..... Date... <i>Jan 19/55</i>			
Copies Referred To:			
Done..... Date.....			

1822 JAN 18 1955 3:12

RECEIVED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
SECTION

EX-103 (Rev. 1955)

Date: .....

Time: .....

RECEIVED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
FEDERAL AFFAIRS

1955 JAN 18 PM 3:45

Copies Referred To:

Date: *Jan 14/55*

Time: *10:00*

CLASS - DISSEM  
Foreign Distribution:

(Name Label)

A.B. Menzies

(Signature)

APPROVED BY

Local Tel: 2322

Dist: For Esafeln

(Name Label)

I. G.M. Carter/HCL

(Signature)

ORIGINATOR

dealt with in paragraph three of your telegram.  
Their view as to the status of Formosa which is  
legal opinion from the Foreign Office setting out  
we should be glad to have a more detailed

SUBJECT: FORMOSA

REFERENCE: your telegram no. 1222 of Dec. 31st

Priority

CLASSIFICATION  
CODE  
BY SERVICE  
VIA SERVICE

XX

Message To Be Sent

No. <i>1222</i>	Date 18 JANUARY 1955	For Communications Section Only
-----------------	-------------------------	---------------------------------

TO: LONDON  
THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

OUTGOING  
MESSAGE FORM

File No.	<i>2022-4</i>

SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL

*file - Ref*

Security RESTRICTED

MESSAGE FORM  
OUTGOING

File No. 50056-A-40	
65	65

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, CANADIAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON

Message To Be Sent	No. <i>R X</i> <i>8/7</i>	Date 18 January/55	For Communications Section Only SENT - JAN 18 1955
--------------------	------------------------------	-----------------------	---

AIR CYPHER  
EN CLAIR  
CODE  
CYPHER *auto* **XX**

Priority

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: Status of Formosa

ORIGINATOR

(Signature)

T. LeM. Carter/HGT  
(Name Typed)

Div. Far Eastern

Local Tel. 7359

APPROVED BY

*A.R. Menzies*  
(Signature)

A.R. Menzies  
(Name Typed)

Internal Distribution:  
S.S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A.

Done *P.R.*

Date *Jan 19/55*

Copies Referred To:

We are interested in the story in the New York Times of January 12th entitled, "Democrats wary of China Treaty" by James Reston. We found particularly interesting the argument allegedly included in the memorandum of the Democratic National Committee that it was inadvisable to recognize formally Formosa as part of China now because in a few years it might be desirable to consider a separate status for Formosa. This attitude is in line with the position of the United Kingdom Government. In answer to a question in the House of Commons on December 20th, the United Kingdom Government spokesman said that Japan had renounced sovereignty over Formosa but that this sovereignty had not been granted to China. In other words, the Government felt that the commitment of the Cairo Declaration no longer holds.

2. We are also struck by the emphasis in the Democratic memorandum on a policy which would be acceptable to the allies of the United States.

3. I should be obliged if you could confirm the existence of this memorandum and naturally we would like to have a copy. We would also be interested in your comments, particularly some indication as to who had a hand in its preparation.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Reference:.....

Subject:..... United States-Republic of China  
..... Mutual Defence Treaty.

Security: RESTRICTED

No:..... 48

Date:..... January 10, 1955

Enclosures:..... 5

Air or Surface Mail:.....

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.	
50056-A40	
111	111

*copy - 50056-40*

References

*cross ref on 11578-D-40. ~~Mr. Carter~~*

President Eisenhower on January 6 submitted to the Senate the Mutual Defence Treaty between the United States and Nationalist China with a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to its ratification. We attach for your information copies of a Senate publication containing the text of the treaty together with the texts of a number of relevant documents exchanged between the United States Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of Nationalist China. The enclosure also contains the Secretary of State's report to the President on the Defence Treaty. This report and the texts of the Notes exchanged on December 10, 1954, between the United States Secretary of State and the Nationalist Chinese Foreign Minister had not been made public prior to submission of the treaty to the Senate.

2. Mr. Dulles' report to the President on the treaty makes the following general points with respect to the treaty:

- (a) The treaty is entirely defensive in character and intent;
- (b) The treaty represents another link in the chain of collective defence arrangements in the West Pacific binding the nations of the free world in a common determination to resist further communist expansion;
- (c) The treaty, even though bilateral and limited in scope to one area of the world, reaffirms the intention of the signatories to work towards the fulfilment of the principles and purposes of the United Nations;
- (d) The treaty is based upon the understanding of the parties that the use of force from the territories of Nationalist China will be a matter of joint agreement subject to action of an emergency character in the exercise of the right of self-defence;
- (e) The treaty is designed to prevent hostile miscalculations on the part of potential aggressors and thus contribute to the peace and security of the area.

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

X

1922

securities of the area.

...and ...to the peace and ...of ...

(e) The treaty is intended to prevent hostile

exercise of the right of self-defense; ...

(f) The treaty is based upon the understanding

purposes of the United Nations; ...

(g) The treaty is intended to prevent

best of further communist expansion;

(h) The treaty represents another link in the

and interest;

(i) The treaty is entirely defensible in character

to the treaty: ...

...to the treaty to the Senate ...

United States Republic of China

... 10, 1955

RESERVED



3. The Notes exchanged on December 10 between Mr. Dulles and the Foreign Minister of Nationalist China are important in that they seem to limit the freedom of the Nationalist Government of China to take offensive action against the mainland of China. While they recognize the right of the Nationalist Government of China to defend "all territory now and hereafter under its control", they specify that the use of force from Nationalist Chinese and United States territories covered by the treaty "will be a matter of joint agreement". An escape clause does exist for action of an emergency character but the Notes seem clearly designed to ensure that offensive action by the forces of Nationalist China cannot be taken without United States consent. It can be expected that, in the course of Senate consideration of the treaty, the pros and cons of this point will be thoroughly examined.

*(Signature)*  
The Embassy

MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH THE  
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

M E S S A G E

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

TRANSMITTING

A MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF  
AMERICA AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, SIGNED AT WASHINGTON  
ON DECEMBER 2, 1954

JANUARY 6, 1955.—The treaty was read the first time and the injunction of  
secrecy was removed therefrom, and together with all accompanying papers  
was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed  
for the use of the Senate

THE WHITE HOUSE, *January 6, 1955.*

*To the Senate of the United States:*

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to  
ratification, I transmit herewith the Mutual Defense Treaty between  
the United States of America and the Republic of China, signed at  
Washington on December 2, 1954.

I transmit also for the information of the Senate a document con-  
taining statements made by the Secretary of State and the Chinese  
Minister for Foreign Affairs on the occasion of the initialing of the  
treaty on December 2, 1954, together with a joint statement regarding  
conclusion of negotiations for the treaty issued simultaneously in  
Washington and Taipei on December 1, 1954.

There is further transmitted for the information of the Senate the  
report made to me by the Secretary of State regarding the treaty.

Finally, there are transmitted for the information of the Senate  
texts of notes exchanged by the Secretary of State and the Minister  
for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China on December 10, 1954,  
which, while not a part of the treaty, express agreed understandings  
as to certain phases of its implementation.

The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America  
and the Republic of China is defensive and mutual in character, de-  
signed to deter any attempt by the Chinese Communist regime to bring  
its aggressive military ambitions to bear against the treaty area.

2 MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

This Mutual Defense Treaty, taken in conjunction with similar treaties already concluded with Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Australia and New Zealand, reinforces the system of collective security in the Pacific area. It is also complementary to the action taken in the signing of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty at Manila on September 8, 1954.

I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to the treaty submitted herewith, and advise and consent to its ratification.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

(Enclosures: (1) Report of the Secretary of State, (2) Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China, (3) joint statement regarding conclusion of negotiations for the Mutual Defense Treaty, (4) statements by the Secretary of State and the Chinese Foreign Minister on the occasion of the signing of the treaty, (5) texts of notes exchanged on December 10, 1954.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
Washington, December 22, 1954.

The PRESIDENT,  
*The White House:*

I have the honor to submit to you, with a view to the transmission thereof to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China, signed at Washington on December 2, 1954.

The history of the negotiation of this treaty extends over the past year. Preliminary consideration of such a treaty was given following a proposal first made by the Republic of China in December 1953. Following the signature of the Manila Pact on September 8, 1954, it seemed more than ever appropriate that this treaty should be made. I, therefore, visited Taipei on September 9, 1954, and discussed the scope and nature of the projected treaty with President Chiang Kai-shek. Following my return to the United States, it was decided in principle to proceed actively to conclude the treaty, and to this end the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Mr. Robertson, went to Formosa (Taiwan) in October 1954. Subsequent negotiations were conducted at Washington. The principal negotiator for the Republic of China was His Excellency Yeh Kung-ch'ao, Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was available in Washington concurrently with his work as head of the Chinese delegation to the United Nations.

This treaty represents another link in the chain of collective defense arrangements in the West Pacific which bind the nations of the free world together in their common determination to resist further encroachments by the forces of communism. The treaty is entirely defensive in character and intent. It is based on a mutuality of interest and responsibility. Even though bilateral and limited in scope to but one area of the world, the treaty reaffirms, in the first paragraph of the preamble and repeated elsewhere through the text of the treaty, the signatories' faith in, and deep sense of responsibility in working toward fulfillment of, the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

The treaty consists of a preamble and 10 substantive articles. The preamble reaffirms the adherence of both Governments to the aims of the United Nations and their peaceful intentions, ~~recalls their relationship during World War II,~~ declares their sense of unity and determination to defend themselves against external armed attack "so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone," and contemplates further development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the West Pacific area.

Article I contains provisions similar to those in comparable articles of other security treaties. By its terms the parties reaffirm their solemn obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to settle by peaceful means any international disputes in which they may be involved, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article II incorporates in the treaty the principle of the Vandenberg resolution (S. Res. 239, 80th Cong.), which advises that regional and collective security arrangements joined in by the United States be based on continuous self-help and mutual aid. The parties pledge themselves by such means to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and Communist subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

Article III confirms the agreement of the two parties to strengthen the base of freedom and to cooperate in economic and social advances which are so closely connected both with a successful resistance to communism and also with the greater welfare of the people.

Consultation regarding implementation of the treaty, as the need arises, is provided for under article IV.

By article V, each party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific area directed against the territories of either party would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Here again the treaty makes it clear that there is to be no conflict with the United Nations, for measures taken to deal with an external armed attack are to be reported immediately to the Security Council of the United Nations and such measures as are taken will be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

The territories to which articles II and V apply are specified in article VI to be—

in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan, and the Pescadores; and in respect of the United States of America, the island territories in the West Pacific under its jurisdiction.

It is also provided that articles II and V will be applicable to such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement.

Article VII grants to the United States the right to dispose such land, air, and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as may be required for their defense, as determined by mutual agreement. It does not make such disposition automatic or mandatory.

Article VIII makes clear that the obligations of the parties under the treaty do not affect in any way their obligations under the United

4 MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Nations Charter. It recognizes the primary responsibility of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security.

Articles IX and X specify that the treaty is to come into force with the exchange of ratifications at Taipei and that the treaty has indefinite duration, with provision for termination on 1 year's notice.

There are also enclosed, with a view to their transmittal for the information of the Senate, the texts of notes exchanged between the Secretary of State and the Chinese Foreign Minister, dated December 10, 1954. These notes express the understanding of the signatories with respect to some phases of the implementation and operation of the treaty. They make clear the recognition by the parties of the inherent right of the Republic of China to the self-defense of all territory now or hereafter under its control. They confirm the understanding of the parties that the use of force from such territories will be a matter of joint agreement, subject to action of an emergency character in the exercise of the right of self-defense. They recognize the mutual interests of the parties by providing that military elements which are a product of joint effort and contribution will not be removed from the treaty area to such an extent as substantially to affect its defensibility without mutual agreement.

I believe that the treaty will serve as an important deterrent to possible Communist efforts to seize positions in the West Pacific area, which seizure, if attempted, would, in fact, provoke a reaction on the part of the United States. By making clear that we recognize that an armed attack on the treaty area would be regarded by us as dangerous to our own peace and safety and that we would act to meet the danger, we give the world notice which, we are entitled to hope, will prevent hostile miscalculations and thus contribute to the peace and security of the area. Therefore, I hope that this treaty will be given early and favorable consideration by the Senate.

Respectfully submitted.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES,  
*Secretary of State.*

(Enclosures: (1) Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China, (2) texts of notes exchanged on December 10, 1954.)

MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the West Pacific Area,

Recalling with mutual pride the relationship which brought their two peoples together in a common bond of sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side by side against imperialist aggression during the last war,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the West Pacific Area, and

Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the West Pacific Area,  
Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace, security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and communist subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

ARTICLE III

The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with each other in the development of economic progress and social well-being and to further their individual and collective efforts toward these ends.

ARTICLE IV

The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty.

ARTICLE V

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE VI

For the purposes of Articles II and V, the terms "territorial" and "territories" shall mean in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores; and in respect of the United States of America, the island territories in the West Pacific under its jurisdiction. The provisions of Articles II and V will be applicable to such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE VII

The Government of the Republic of China grants, and the Government of the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose such

6 MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

United States land, air and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as may be required for their defense, as determined by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE VIII

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE IX

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the Republic of China in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Taipei.

ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate, in the English and Chinese languages, at Washington on this second day of December of the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Fifty-four, corresponding to the second day of the twelfth month of the Forty-third year of the Republic of China.

For the United States of America:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

For the Republic of China:

GEORGE K. C. YEH

JOINT STATEMENT REGARDING THE CONCLUSION OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR MUTUAL SECURITY PACT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, at his news conference today, made the following announcement:

The United States of America and the Republic of China have concluded negotiations for a mutual security pact. The treaty will follow the general pattern of other security pacts which the United States of America has concluded in the Western Pacific.

The treaty will recognize the common interest of the parties in the security of Taiwan and the Pescadores and of the Western Pacific islands under the jurisdiction of the United States. It will provide for inclusion by agreement of other territories under the jurisdiction of the parties. It is directed against threats to the security of the treaty area from armed attack and provides for continuing consultation regarding any such threat or attack.

This treaty will forge another link in the system of collective security established by the various collective defense treaties already concluded between the United States and other countries in the Pacific area. Together, these arrangements provide the

Mie  
TTPI

essential framework for the defense by the free peoples of the Western Pacific against Communist aggression. Like the other treaties, this treaty between the United States and the Republic of China will be defensive in character. It will reaffirm the dedication of the parties to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The above joint United States-Chinese statement is being released simultaneously at Taipei.

DECEMBER 1, 1954.

STATEMENTS BY SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN FOSTER DULLES, AND FOREIGN MINISTER GEORGE K. C. YEH UPON THE OCCASION OF THE SIGNING OF THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AT WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 2, 1954

Secretary Dulles:

It is a great pleasure to welcome Foreign Minister Yeh, Ambassador Koo, and the members of his staff here this afternoon for the signing of this Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China. I wholly concur in what President Chiang Kai-shek said in his message to me yesterday, that "a necessary link in the chain of Far Eastern defense has now been forged." It is my hope that the signing of this Defense Treaty will put to rest once and for all rumors and reports that the United States will in any manner agree to the abandonment of Formosa and the Pescadores to Communist control. The signing of this treaty is not only an expression of the good will and friendship existing between the Governments of the United States and of Free China, but also of the abiding friendship of the people of the United States for the Chinese people.

Foreign Minister Yeh:

It has been my privilege and honor to be associated with Mr. Dulles in the making and signing of this Treaty of Mutual Defense between my country and the United States of America. I am happy to recall that throughout the negotiations for this treaty, conducted at Taipei and Washington, we have been guided by the principle of mutuality and the spirit of friendly cooperation.

It is the hope of my Government that this treaty will serve to promote the common cause of freedom, particularly at this juncture of the world situation.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
Washington, December 10, 1954.

His Excellency GEORGE K. C. YEH,  
*Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China.*

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to recent conversations between representatives of our two Governments and to confirm the understandings reached as a result of those conversations, as follows:



8 MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The Republic of China effectively controls both the territories described in Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Defense between the Republic of China and the United States of America signed on December 2, 1954, at Washington and other territory. It possesses with respect to all territory now and hereafter under its control the inherent right of self-defense. In view of the obligations of the two Parties under the said Treaty, and of the fact that the use of force from either of these areas by either of the Parties affects the other, it is agreed that such use of force will be a matter of joint agreement, subject to action of an emergency character which is clearly an exercise of the inherent right of self-defense. Military elements which are a product of joint effort and contribution by the two Parties will not be removed from the territories described in Article VI to a degree which would substantially diminish the defensibility of such territories without mutual agreement.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

/s/ JOHN FOSTER DULLES,  
*Secretary of State of the United States of America.*

DECEMBER 10, 1954.

His Excellency JOHN FOSTER DULLES,  
*Secretary of State of the United States of America.*

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's date, which reads as follows:

"I have the honor to refer to recent conversations between representatives of our two Governments and to confirm the understandings reached as a result of those conversations, as follows:

"The Republic of China effectively controls both the territory described in Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Defense between the Republic of China and the United States of America signed on December 2, 1954, at Washington and other territory. It possesses with respect to all territory now and hereafter under its control the inherent right of self-defense. In view of the obligations of the two Parties under the said Treaty and of the fact that the use of force from either of these areas by either of the Parties affects the other, it is agreed that such use of force will be a matter of joint agreement, subject to action of an emergency character which is clearly an exercise of the inherent right of self-defense. Military elements which are a product of joint effort and contribution by the two Parties will not be removed from the territories described in Article VI to a degree which would substantially diminish the defensibility of such territories without mutual agreement."

I have the honor to confirm, on behalf of my Government, the understanding set forth in Your Excellency's Note under reply.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

GEORGE K. C. YEH,  
*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China.*

Far Eastern/T. Lon. Carter/HGT

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
MEMORANDUM

*file  
FMC*

TO: ..... **Mr. J.W. Holmes** .....

Security ... **Confidential** .....

FROM: ..... **Far Eastern Division** .....

Date ... **2nd December, 1954** .....

REFERENCE: .....

File No.		
50056-A-90		
11		✓

SUBJECT: ..... **Security Treaty between the United States and Nationalist China.** .....

I attach for your signature, a memorandum to the Press Office expressing some views on the new United States-Nationalist China Security Treaty.

A. R. Menzies

Far Eastern Division

Far Eastern/T. Lam. Carter/HGT

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
MEMORANDUM

*file*

TO: **The Press Office**

Security .... **CONFIDENTIAL** ..

Date ... **2 December, 1954** ..

FROM: **J.W. Holmes**

File No.

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: **Security Treaty between the United States and Nationalist China**

If you are asked for the views of the Department on this treaty, which was announced in Washington yesterday, you might answer along the following lines:

2. As the Minister is not in Ottawa, the Department is unable to give any official views. However, unofficially, and not for attribution, you could point out that Mr. Dulles' announcement refers specifically to Formosa and the Pescadores islands as being the area to which the United States guarantee applies. The coastal islands, where the fighting is taking place, are therefore outside the scope of the treaty although Mr. Dulles did say that other areas might be included by agreement between the two parties. Nevertheless, the fact that Formosa and the Pescadores islands are specifically included and the coastal islands excluded is evidence of the defensive character of the treaty. Whereas the coastal islands are useful in the defence of Formosa, they are, of course, particularly useful for raids against the mainland.

*If you are asked whether we were consulted, you might say we were informed before the announcement was made.*  
J. W. HOLMES

C.C.: Pol. Coord.

J.W. Holmes

*file 71578-40* 0

INWARD TELEGRAM TO THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM OTTAWA  
FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS LONDON

SECRET

*File*

SENT: 5.15 p.m. 29th October, 1954

RECD: 1.25 p.m. 29th October, 1954

PRIORITY 6083-40  
5410-40  
CYPHER-SIMPLEX 11578-A-40  
Circular Y. 472 SECRET

50056-A 40  
111

Air mail Pretoria, Karachi, Colombo, repeated Delhi  
air mail.

Indian Prime Minister's Visit to China

Joint statement issued by Nehru and Ho Chi Minh after their meeting in Hanoi on 17th October said that both were interested in full implementation of Geneva agreements. Ho would give full cooperation to International Supervisory Commissions in Indo China. He wanted to solve all remaining problems peacefully so that countries of Indo China could live independently and prosper without external interference. Ho believed in "five principles" recently agreed between India and China, and wished to apply them between Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and other countries. Nehru agreed that would be advantageous, and shared the view that India's relations with Indo Chinese peoples should be strengthened.

2. At Peking, Nehru was received with highest honours, and had discussions with top Chinese leaders on political and general administrative matters. In speech at meeting convened by Mayor of Peking, his theme was necessity for prevention of war, and settlement of disputes by peaceful negotiations in atomic age.

3. Before Nehru left Peking, Sir Raghavan Pillai who had accompanied Nehru throughout his visit, told United Kingdom Charge d'Affaires in Peking that

(a) Nehru's political talks had been very promising. There had been no proposal from either side for a multilateral Asian non aggression pact. There was to be no joint declaration. Impression was that Chou En Lai was to some extent flexible, but that other Chinese leaders were far more rigid and doctrinaire, with little knowledge of non Communist world. Mao Tse-Tung delivered long theoretical lectures upon advantages of Communism over Western socialism.

(b) As ~~regards Formosa, Pillai~~ thought Chinese had worked out definite plan of action with Russians, but gave no inkling of the plan to Indians. Pillai thought Chinese might try to recover coastal islands by force, but that they would not risk provoking a conflict. Nehru continued to urge that peaceful settlement must be found and repeated this at press conference. Chinese seemed anxious to get early conference on Korea with participation of Indians, but Nehru urged them to be patient, and not to make premature move.

(c) Chinese insisted they did not want to interfere in internal affairs of any country, particularly mentioning Burma. They wanted normal diplomatic relations with Siam and Philippines, but had apparently had no response to feelers they had put out. Chinese had no intention of supporting either of the Burmese Communist parties.

(d) Chinese (as well as Ho Chi Minh) had insisted they would carry out implicitly terms of Geneva settlement.

(e) Chinese said that all that they had done for Dr. Singh, the Nepalese rebel, was to give him political asylum.

(f) Chou En Lai repeated outline of his new policy on overseas Chinese. He was anxious that his proposal to dispossess of Chinese nationality those taking nationality of their country of residence, should not be openly declared

before conclusion of negotiations with Indonesia, for fear of Formosan propaganda among overseas Chinese.

(g) on colonialism, Nehru's line was that it was "on its way out" anyway, and therefore need not be treated as a major problem.

(h) Chinese diplomatic relations with United Kingdom were not discussed.

(i) Pillai thought Chinese were still moderately friendly to United Kingdom, though slightly less so than before Manila Treaty and recent vote on Chinese representation in United Nations. Nehru had been at endless pains to support United Kingdom Government against Chinese criticisms.

(j) On America, Chinese line was that they would be glad to have friendly relations if only Americans would be friendly towards them.

(k) Indians were impressed by closeness of Sino Soviet connection

(l) Pillai was convinced present Chinese regime would stay, that they were going to concentrate on industrialisation, and would go ahead fast with massive Russian aid. He was much struck after his visit to Mukden, Anshan and Dairen by effect of Russian help.

4. United Kingdom Charge d'Affaires in Peking has commented that Nehru's visit may have been useful in showing Chinese leaders that Nehru has an essentially different outlook from theirs, and is much more responsive to world opinion, and that his counsels of patience should have some effect.

5. Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington, Pretoria. Please inform Commonwealth authorities. Four High Commissioners in London informed.

6. Karachi, Colombo.

Above is for your own information only.

JAM.29.10.54

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
FOR THE PRESS

OCTOBER 11, 1954

NO. 569

*files 57056-A-40*  
*Roberts (F.R.)*

Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs  
Walter S. Robertson left for ~~Taipei, Formosa~~ on the evening  
of October 9, where he will confer with Chinese Government  
officials on current and prospective United States aid  
programs.

Mr. Robertson was accompanied by Mr. Walter P.  
McConaughy, Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs,  
Department of State, and by Mr. Frank L. Turner, who is in  
charge of Chinese aid programs for the Foreign Operations  
Administration.

\* \* \*

State--FD, Wash., D.C.

C

P  
Y

52056-A/40  
111

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 685

October 1, 1954

Enclosures 6

AIR

OTTAWA FILE NO:  
99999-40

*file on 56056-A-40  
R.B. Edwards (F.F.)*

FROM: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA  
IN CEYLON, COLOMBO

SUBJECT: FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY VISITS  
CEYLON.

Mr. J.P.L. Thomas, First Lord of the Admiralty, arrived in Ceylon from Singapore on Tuesday, 28 September. His visit here "makes history", as it is the first time a holder of this position has done so, while in office. He will remain in Ceylon until Monday, 4 October, when he leaves "at the crack of dawn" for the United Kingdom.

2. The First Lord is an old friend of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, Sir Cecil Syers, both, having been Private Secretaries at the same time, and closely associated. Sir Cecil housed Mr. Thomas and two of his entourage in the persons of Sir John Lang, Permanent Secretary of the Admiralty, and Captain Luce, R.N., his naval secretary, in the new "WESTMINSTER HOUSE", the Residence.

3. On Wednesday, 29 September, Sir Cecil entertained for Mr. Thomas in a rather unique way for this area, by organizing a "Stag Dinner" for about sixteen. It was a most enjoyable affair from every angle, and gave each of us an opportunity for a brief chat with each of the three guests mentioned above. I sat next to the First Lord at dinner and enjoyed a rather longer conversation with him.

4. *Memory* I asked him no embarrassing questions, of course, but during our talk, Formosa and Quemoy, as well as Amoy, were mentioned, and he confesses himself as confused as to the meaning of the activities as I am and as worried about the possible result. He said he had "scotched" a report that elements of the Royal Navy were associated with the United States 7th Fleet. In other directions, the talks were general.

5. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, the Leader of the Opposition, was present and turned out to be an old Oxford acquaintance of Mr. Thomas. Reminiscences were exchanged, filtered through the comments of Sir Alan Rose, the Chief Justice, and an Oxford man, as is his host, Sir Cecil.

6. Mr. Thomas is large, well over six feet, forthright and frank, looks you in the eye and displays, in laughter, a mouth full of rather prominent teeth, his own I think I found him friendly and charming.

7. I enclose a few relevant press clippings.

Jas. J. Hurley  
High Commissioner.



File # 50056-A-40  
111 ✓  
CONFIDENTIAL

CHINESE POLICY - JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1954

General

The most disquieting development of the quarter has been a vigorous revival of propoganda for the capture of Formosa and the other Nationalist-held islands just off the Chinese coast which Chinese leaders have described as the major objective of Chinese policy; this has been followed by attacks on the island of Quemoy. It is unlikely that the Chinese intend to attack Formosa itself for the present, and the purpose of the attacks has probably been both to rouse patriotic feeling internally and externally to test United States reactions and to arouse apprehensions in the rest of the world about the consequences of United States policy.

2. While exploiting the Geneva settlement as evidence of their own peaceful intentions the Chinese have condemned the Manila Treaty as unnecessary and hostile. They have urged instead the merits of collective co-operation among the Asian countries based on the principles of non-aggression and co-existence.

3. There has been increasing bitterness towards the United States whose policy in support of Chiang Kai-shek and over the Manila Treaty has been interpreted as implacably hostile to China.

4. Every aspect of Chinese policy was endorsed by Krushchev in a speech made on his arrival in Peking with an imposing Soviet delegation to the October 1st celebrations.

5. The improvement in Anglo-Chinese relations resulting from the Geneva Conference was maintained though by signing the Manila Treaty and not voting for the Chinese People's Government's representation in the United Nations the United Kingdom is said to have placed obstacles in the way of Sino-British relations. The remaining British mercantile interests in China have derived no great benefit from the improvement. The visit of the Labour Party delegation was used by the Chinese to enhance their own prestige, and to contrast their own readiness for co-existence with the "warmongering" of the United States.

6. Within China the first National Peoples' Congress met in Peking. It adopted the new Constitution, elected the present leadership to the principal offices of State, and endorsed China's progress to socialism and industrialisation.

Formosa and the Coastal Islands

7. The propoganda campaign for the "liberation" of Formosa seems to have been touched off by the Nationalist seizure on June 23rd of the Soviet tanker TMAPSE, which much incensed the Soviet Government. It grew in violence after the reports of a proposed United States-Formosa Defence Pact, and was the most important theme of Chou En-lai's report on August 11th to the Government Council on his return from Geneva, when he declared emphatically that Formosa was China's internal affair and firmly resisted any idea of trusteeship. The Nationalists countered with leaflet raids over the mainland. But the Communists were the first to begin actual fighting, when on August 23rd they sent a small raiding force to the

Nationalists-held island of Quemoy (a few miles off Amoy harbour) and followed this on September 3rd with an artillery bombardment of the island. The Nationalists retaliated by bombing Amoy and other places and exchanges have continued intermittently.

8. The Chinese Communists' motives for this action probably include:-

- (a) determination to prevent the conclusion of a United States-Formosa Defence Pact or the inclusion of Formosa in any system of alliances;
- (b) the need to keep the spectre of American aggression alive to justify their internal policies;
- (c) a means of separating the United States from her allies;
- (d) serious inconvenience from Nationalist attacks on their shipping, and
- (e) desire to test reactions of the Americans, in particular, whether they would be prepared to extend their present guarantees, which cover only Formosa and the Pescadores, to the other islands.

An attempted landing on the Matsu group (off Foochow) was reported on September 28th, and on September 30th the newly-appointed Minister of Defence called on his forces to be prepared for an urgent combat mission. Meanwhile the Soviet Government, which has supported the Chinese in their demands, has raised the question of Nationalist interference with shipping in the General Assembly.

#### South-East Asia

9. The Geneva settlement has been insistently represented by the Chinese as a victory for the Communist policies of peace in the face of the aggressive plans of the Americans. Chou En-lai's visits to Mr. Nehru and U Nu were the first steps in a campaign to allay Asian fears. China's role in Indo-China, and the five principles of non-aggression and co-existence, enumerated in the joint statements after the visits, have been its main theme. The Chinese have contrasted their own allegedly scrupulous adherence to the Geneva settlement with the conduct of the parties to the Manila Treaty, which they have condemned as a breach of the settlement, an attempt to split Asia, and a pretext for United States intervention in Asian affairs. In his speech to the National Peoples' Congress on September 28th which displayed marked satisfaction at the success of these policies Chou En-lai proposed that "Asian countries should negotiate..... to promote collective co-operation and jointly strive to defend collective peace and security in Asia". They may therefore have in view some form of Asian non-aggression pact, based on the five principles.

#### Overseas Chinese

10. Both Mr. Nehru and U Nu emphasised to Chou En-lai the desirability of reassuring the Governments of South-East Asia about their large Chinese minorities. The new Constitution

states that the Chinese Government "protects the proper rights and interests of Chinese resident abroad" and a conference was held in Peking in July to elect thirty representatives of the overseas Chinese to the National People's Congress. On September 23rd Chou En-lai announced that the Chinese Government was willing to settle the question of the nationality of the overseas Chinese and to urge them to respect the laws of their host Governments. They would tackle the question first with the South-East Asian countries with whom they had relations; by this they presumably intend Burma and Indonesia, but probably not Malaya. The Chinese have thus shown that they see the need to appease anxiety. But nothing they have said so far limits their complete freedom of action.

#### Korea

11. The Chinese People's Government has claimed in official reports that seven Chinese divisions are being withdrawn from Korea. In his speech of September 23rd, Chou En-lai put forward a proposal for a new conference, including neutral Asian nations, to settle the Korean problem.

#### Japan

12. The Soviet Union and China have continued to make friendly gestures towards Japan. There have been gestures over Japanese war criminals; mention of trade prospects, invitations to delegations, and sympathetic references to the plight of the Japanese people under United States military occupation.

#### Nepal

13. The Chinese have publicly announced their readiness to establish normal relations with Nepal.

#### Anglo-Chinese Relations

14. Following on Mr. Eden's discussions with Chou En-lai at Geneva, the status of the United Kingdom Charge d'Affaires in Peking and his staff has been much improved although full diplomatic relations have not yet been established. He has been able to discuss outstanding problems with officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to an extent hitherto impossible. The newly-appointed Chinese Charge d'Affaires is expected in London shortly. In his speech of September 23rd however Chou En-lai described the United Kingdom's signature of the Manila Treaty and their attitude over Chinese representation in the United Nations as obstacles to the further improvement of relations.

15. Nevertheless the improvement of relations with the United Kingdom has remained ostensible Chinese policy. The press has refrained from attacks. When the ~~British passenger~~ aircraft was shot down by Chinese military aircraft off Hainan, the Chinese expressed their willingness to consider paying compensation; although they have not yet replied to our note of September 18th presenting a claim for ~~1367,000~~.

16. The visit of the British Labour Party delegation was exploited as a major event. They were told by Mao Tse-tung that Britain would have to choose between the friendship of China and that of the United States.

17. An official Chinese trade delegation visited the United Kingdom in July under the auspices of the F.B.I. and kindred organisations. It proved impossible to judge whether the Chinese were genuinely interested in trade in goods not covered by the embargo; but this may be clearer after the return visit of a party of British businessmen to Peking in November. In the meantime the British firms left in China continue to meet with difficulties in winding up their affairs.

#### Internal

18. The National People's Congress met for the first time in Peking from September 15th to September 28th. 1,226 delegates were elected during August, including 30 representatives from Overseas Chinese. The list of successful candidates showed no evidence of any widespread purge. Kao Kang, until recently chairman of the important North-East area was however notably absent. The majority of the "democratic" i.e., non-Communist leaders were duly elected to maintain their facade of the "united front". The Dalai and Panchin Lamas, whose arrivals in Peking have been attended with much pomp and publicity were also included.

19. The Congress approved the draft Constitution with only trifling amendments. Liu Shao-Ch'i the leading party theoretician, in a speech modelled on Stalin's similar report of 1936, characterised it as an important step in the transition from the current "new democratic" to a "socialist" society. The majority of the new laws dealt with the constitution, but the first Chinese legislation on corrective labour closely following the Soviet pattern was approved.

20. The existing leaders were elected to the principal offices of State: Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Republic (and commander-in-chief) with Chu Teh, the leading soldier of the regime, as Vice-Chairman; Lin Shao-ch'i became chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (S.C.N.P.C.), Chou En-lai Premier of the State Council, and P'eng Chen, the Mayor of Peking, Secretary-General of the S.C.N.P.C. The relationship between the State Council and the S.C.N.P.C. remains in doubt but both are firmly under Communist-control. P'eng Teh-luai, until recently Chinese commander in Korea, was appointed to the newly-created post of Minister of Defence. One of his first tasks will presumably be to deal with the curious decision to conscript 450,000 men between the ages of 18 and 22 who are being called up, according to official reports "gradually to extend conscription".

21. The Congress also received a series of economic reports from which it is clear that the regime intends to press vigorously ahead with the "socialist transformation" of all aspects of China's economy, with emphasis on heavy industry and the mustering of peasants into agricultural producer co-operatives. Rationing is to continue for a long time, and textiles and edible oils have been added to the growing list of controls.

22. It has been announced that more than a tenth of cultivated land has been affected by the floods of the Yangtze and other rivers and that it will now be impossible to reach this year's target for agricultural output. North-south communications appear also to have been seriously affected.

-----  
COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE

18th October 1954.

file 5056-A-40  
P. J. ... (K-E)

Policy Information Statement  
for USIA (FE-148) Sept. 9/54.

CONFIDENTIAL.

CHINESE COMMUNIST THREATS TO "LIBERATE" FORMOSA

On July 9 the Chinese Communist regime initiated a propaganda campaign reaffirming its ~~stated intention to~~ liberate Formosa. Since that time, the campaign has been intensified for both the domestic and the foreign audiences. Its intensity is approaching that of the "Resist America - Aid Korea" campaign and its scope surpasses that of the B-W campaign, which had more limited objectives.

This campaign needs to be carefully studied not because it portends an immediate Chinese Communist military invasion of Formosa (although this should not be ruled out as a long-term eventuality) but because it is obviously designed to remove by any or all means possible the principal deterrent to the regime's pretensions to legitimacy and world recognition--the Government of the Republic of China--and to negate the influence of the United States which has been responsible for impeding the consolidation of the power of the Peiping regime and the extension of its international influence in the cause of Communism.

The initial item which was used to tough off the campaign was the suggestion, attributed to General Van Fleet, of the possibility of the conclusion of a bilateral security defense pact between the U.S. and the Republic of China. Since then the propaganda content has become broader in scope, including denunciations of U.S. moves to develop a Southeast Asian pact, the suggestion of a possible Northeast Asian pact, proposed U.S. efforts to assist the Associated States, alleged U.S. unwillingness to forward an Indochina settlement at Geneva, the rescue operations of American air and naval units off the coast of Hainan in connection with the Communist shooting down of a British passenger airliner, the visit of Seventh Fleet units to the offshore island Tachen, and U.S. assistance and support of the Government of the Republic of China. All of these matters are treated as evidence of U.S. aggressiveness and of illegal or unwarranted hostile activities directed at the Chinese Communist regime. On August 11, Chou En-lai, in a report on foreign affairs at the 33rd session of the "Central People's Government Council", stated that "the liberation of Taiwan is a glorious, historic mission of the Chinese people", calling on the "Peoples' Liberation Army to redouble their efforts in every field ... for the glorious task of liberating Taiwan and defending world peace." On August 22, the Standing Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Consultative Conference, which is composed of representatives of all major political parties and groups, headed by the Chinese Communist Party, issued a "Declaration on Taiwan Liberation" which maintained that, on the basis of right and the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, "Taiwan is an inseparable part of Chinese territory." Hence, "to liberate Taiwan and to eliminate the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek group are an exercise of China's sovereignty and are China's own internal affairs, and we will brook no interference by any foreign countries." Clearly, Formosa with its rival Chinese Government has been singled out as the central issue on which the Peiping regime wishes to make its case against the United States and before the world.

There is no real evidence that the Peiping regime is building up an invasion force on the China coast preparatory to an attack on Formosa itself, as distinct from the current activities against Nationalist-held islands immediately off the Mainland coast. Thus it is probable that the primary purpose of the Peiping regime is by psychological measures to weaken the diplomatic, economic and military restrictions and barriers developed largely by the U.S. to impede the consolidation of Communist China's power and the extension of its international influence.

From a reading of the content of Chinese propaganda, this campaign appears to be a part of the broad efforts of the Peiping regime to defeat U.S. policies, such as opposition to recognition of the regime, opposition to the seating of Red China in the United Nations, maintenance of the U.N. embargo against the Chinese Communist Mainland, development of a Southeast Asian pact, and the conclusion of a bilateral security pact with the Republic of China. The Peiping regime appears to believe that this can be accomplished by isolating the U.S. from its friends and other non-Communist countries through diminishing fear of Red China's intentions on the one hand, and increasing fear of U.S. military and security policies, on the other. By making it appear that Formosa is the issue between the U.S. and itself, the Peiping regime may be counting on securing the support of those non-Communist countries and groups which have recognized or are prepared to accept its control on the China Mainland; which have little respect for the Kuomintang and the leaders of the Government of the Republic of China or are afraid of or opposed to their desires to recapture the China Mainland by precipitating a new conflict in Asia; which are desirous of peace and any accommodation with the Communist orbit necessary to avoid a conflict which might lead to atomic warfare; which for various reasons are opposed to the U.S. or inclined to suspect or dislike the U.S.; or which desire to promote certain economic or political interests which might be furthered by alterations in U.S. policies or to take advantage of benefits which they believe will follow promised changes in Communist policy.

The Communists portray the Government of the Republic of China as the instrument of American provocativeness and assert the legitimacy of Chinese sovereignty over Formosa but on the bland assumption that the Government of the Republic of China exercises no rights of sovereignty. In this way the Peiping regime and the Soviet bloc are undoubtedly hoping to undercut the position and influence of the U.S. in the UN particularly on the question of Chinese representation, an issue which is susceptible to confusion because many people are unclear as to the actual independence and power capabilities of the Republic of China and the legal status of the island of Formosa. The Peiping regime may not be altogether reluctant to provoke military or other retaliatory actions by the Republic of China or the U.S. in order to strengthen its charges of U.S. aggressiveness, to justify possible attacks on U.S. and Chinese Nationalist shipping or efforts to retake some of the off-shore islands. It is also possible that this propaganda offensive is induced in part by a desire to conceal anticipated or feared U.S. and Chinese Nationalist threats at a time when extensive floods have increased the vulnerabilities of the regime to external attacks, military, political and psychological.

Domestically, this propaganda campaign appears to be a continuation and a new phase of the persistent effort of the Peiping regime to dissipate traditional Chinese friendship toward the U.S. and to channel Chinese hostility towards the U.S. and away from more traditional objects or countries of popular Chinese distrust. By focusing attention on Formosa, which almost all Chinese regard as rightfully belonging to China, and by depicting the island as an effective controlling and ruling agent rather than the Government of the Republic of China, the Peiping regime is clearly trying to mobilize strong Chinese national sentiments as well as Asian nationalism to its support. As an attempt to mobilize further popular Chinese opinion behind the regime, the campaign also provides the regime with opportunities further to tighten its control over the people and internal security.

#### U.S. Position

The U.S. policy toward Communist China, as defined publicly on numerous occasions by the President and the Secretary and as set forth in Policy Information Statement PB-102 of April 6, 1954, has not been altered by this Chinese Communist propaganda campaign.